The Defeat of Black Power

Civil Rights and the National Black Political Convention of 1972

Leonard N. Moore

• Publisher: LSU Press
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9780807169056
• Topic: Sciences sociales
• Subtopic: Études afro-américaines

For three days in 1972 in Gary, Indiana, eight thousand American civil rights activists and Black Power leaders gathered at the National Black Political Convention, hoping to end a years-long feud that divided black America into two distinct camps: integrationists and separatists. While some form of this rift existed within black politics long before the 1968 assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., his death—and the power vacuum it created—heightened tensions between the two groups, and convention leaders sought to merge these competing ideologies into a national, unified call to action. What followed, however, effectively crippled the Black Power movement and fundamentally altered the political strategy of civil rights proponents. An intense and revealing history, Leonard N. Moore's The Defeat of Black Power provides the first in-depth evaluation of this critical moment in American history.During the brief but highly charged meeting in March 1972, attendees confronted central questions surrounding black people's involvement in the established political system: reject or accept integration and assimilation; determine the importance or futility of working within the broader white system; and assess the perceived benefits of running for public office. These issues illuminated key differences between integrationists and separatists, yet both sides understood the need to mobilize under a unified platform of black self-determination. At the end of the convention, determined to reach a consensus, officials produced "The National Black Political Agenda, " which addressed the black constituency's priorities. While attendees and delegates agreed with nearly every provision, integrationists maintained their rejection of certain planks, namely the call for a U.S. constitutional convention and separatists' demands for reparations. As a result, black activists and legislators withdrew their support less than ten weeks after the convention, dashing the promise of the 1972 assembly and undermining the prerogatives of black nationalists. In The Defeat of Black Power, Moore shows how the convention signaled a turning point for the Black Power movement, whose leaders did not hold elective office and were now effectively barred access to the levers of social and political power. Thereafter, their influence within black communities rapidly declined, leaving civil rights activists and elected officials holding the mantle of black political leadership in 1972 and beyond.

1

THE SOONER WE GET ORGANIZED FOR GROUP ACTION, THE MORE EFFECTIVE WE CAN BECOME

The Creation of the Congressional Black Caucus in Richard Nixon’s America

The Congressional Black Caucus was birthed in obscurity in 1969 during the heyday of the Black Power movement. Energized by the movement’s emphasis on race pride, cultural unity, and black institution–building, Congressman Charles Diggs capitalized on the increasing black presence in the United States Congress to form an organization. Initially called the Democratic Select Committee, the group changed its name officially to the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) in 1971. Born in 1922, Diggs grew up in a family that, by virtue of its lucrative funeral business, was part of black Detroit’s upper middle class. After short stints at the University of Michigan and Fisk University, Diggs returned home to get his bachelor’s degree from Wayne State University. He followed his father into politics by gaining election to the Michigan State Senate in 1951, and in 1954 he was elected to Congress as Michigan’s first African American congressperson. He was present at the Emmett Till trial, and in 1957 he becomes the first black congressperson to visit Africa when he was chosen to join the US delegation at Ghana’s independence celebration. His increased interest in African independence movements took him to the All-African Peoples’ Conference in 1958, and in 1959 he joined the House Foreign Affairs Committee, where he served as chair of the African Affairs subcommittee.¹

The structural catalyst for the creation of the Congressional Black Caucus lay in three separate yet overlapping developments: the implementation of the 1965 Voting Rights Act; white flight; and congressional redistricting. The Voting Rights Act brought thousands of previously disenfranchised black voters into the electoral process, who were committed to making the system work for them and their communities. Secondly, with rapid white flight to neighboring suburbs, large urban communities started to become predominantly African American. This demographic shift created majority-black congressional districts, which made it easier for black voters to elect their own to the US Congress. Further, many large urban communities underwent congressional redistricting during the late 1960s such that by 1969 there were nine black representatives in the US Congress: William Dawson (Chicago), Charles Diggs (Detroit), Robert Nix (Philadelphia), Adam Clayton Powell (Harlem), Augustus Hawkins (Los Angeles), John Conyers (Detroit), William Clay (St. Louis), Louis Stokes (Cleveland), and Shirley Chisholm (Brooklyn).²

This growth in the black congressional delegation was one of five major developments that led to the CBC’s founding. The second major development was the political trends that the new members participated in. Since most of them came from majority-black districts, they were free to be racially assertive with their political ideologies. Further, many of them were veterans of the civil rights movement who looked at their election as an extension of or the next step in the black freedom struggle. Third, the black delegation realized that Martin Luther King’s death left a significant leadership void in the black community. The movement had now splintered, and as Bayard Rustin wrote in 1965, it was now time to make the transition from protest to politics. Fourth, the African American contingent in Congress was deeply influenced by the Black Power era, a period when African Americans placed a tremendous emphasis on racial pride, group unity, and self-reliance. Indeed, many of them used the rhetoric of Black Power, and thus they owed their election to the energy of the Black Power movement, which inspired thousands of black grassroots activists to get involved in both local and national politics.³

Fifth, President Richard Nixon’s election in 1968 was arguably the most important development that led Diggs to establish what would become known as the Congressional Black Caucus. While black voters did not mistakenly assume that Nixon would be an ally, they were deeply shocked at some of his rhetoric during the campaign season. In an effort to undercut support for George Wallace, the infamous segregationist governor from Alabama who was running as a third-party candidate, Nixon made overt racial appeals to white voters. Code words such as “law and order,” “states’ rights,” “federal interference,” and “welfare cheats” signaled to white voters that a Nixon presidency would suppress black radicalism, forestall school integration, and potentially roll back some of the gains of the civil rights movement. By arousing racist white southerners and their northern counterparts, Nixon was able to ride this backlash into the White House. Once he was in office, his official approach to black concerns was “benign neglect,” a strategy proposed by Nixon staffer Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Moynihan suggested that the administration quietly ignore black issues: “The time may have come when the issue of race would benefit from a benign neglect. We may need a period in which Negro progress continues and racial rhetoric fades.” Once this memo became public it just confirmed what many black voters assumed privately about how Nixon would approach issues of civil rights. To be sure, Nixon owed absolutely nothing to the black community, since he only received approximately 10 percent of the African American vote. Consequently, Nixon was not obligated to address black concerns and black politicos did not expect him to.⁴

In an effort to quiet his black critics in the aftermath of the Moynihan memo, Nixon co-opted the rhetoric of the Black Power movement by promoting the idea of black capitalism, which was warmly received by many “bootstrap” black nationalists, those who believed that black folks needed to “do for themselves” instead of relying upon government handouts and welfare. Black capitalism from the Nixon perspective meant that the newly created Office of Minority Business Enterprise, in conjunction with the Small Business Administration, would launch initiatives to spur black entrepreneurship through generous tax breaks, guaranteed loans, contract set-asides, affirmative-action mandates, and racial quotas. This pro-business ideology was acceptable to CORE’s Floyd McKissick and Roy Innis as well as many Republican Party operatives. But the entire concept was loudly denounced by black radicals and mainstream black moderates. Author and activist Earl Ofari devoted an entire volume to why black capitalism was problematic. In his aptly titled book The Myth of Black Capitalism, he suggested that black capitalism “in theory and in hope” needed to be destroyed. “Black folks have been little attracted to trade, shopkeeping, buying and selling, or employing labor for the purpose of exploitation,” he wrote. Ofari was not alone in his criticism.⁵

With the opening of the 91st legislative session, black congressional representatives met often at the urging of Diggs and Clay under the banner of the Democratic Select Committee. But Diggs insisted that they institutionalize their efforts in a more formal way. “The sooner we get organized for group action the more effective we can become.” Clay echoed Diggs by suggesting that “without adequate programming and planning, we the DSC, a loose knit group might well degenerate into the Congressional Koffee Klatch Klub.”⁶

While they were still in the process of institutionalizing, the DSC requested a meeting with President Nixon in February of 1970. Nixon rebuffed the request via a rejection letter signed by a low-level White House staffer. Nixon’s chief of staff told Newsweek that they would not meet with the black group because “we try not to permit opportunities to use the President as a grandstand.” Throughout the remainder of the year the black delegation was unsuccessful at getting a meeting with him, but they did see their numbers increase with the 1970 elections of Harlem’s Charlie Rangel (Powell’s successor), Ron Dellums of Oakland, and Parren Mitchell of Maryland.⁷

In January 1971, the CBC boycotted Nixon’s State of the Union speech. The only black congressperson who attended was Republican senator Edward Brooke from Massachusetts, who represented a majority-white district. Although he was invited to join the CBC he repeatedly declined. The boycott was virtually ignored in the media, sending a message to the group that they still lacked national influence. Although the CBC was growing in membership it did not have the leverage or credibility to put pressure on Nixon. In the aftermath of the boycott the group decided to officially institutionalize their efforts, but first they needed a name. The “Congressional Committee on Minority Rights” and the “Congressional Committee” were among the names that were discussed. Congressman Charlie Rangel introduced the name “Congressional Black Caucus,” and it was unanimously agreed upon. The CBC was established on the principle of racial cohesion, race consciousness, and the idea that the delegation would look after black interests. Congressman John Conyers recalled that the Caucus was launched because of Nixon’s refusal to sit down with CBC members and address black concerns.⁸

The creation of the CBC is an important development in this story. For the first time in history, African Americans had visible representation in Congress, and by institutionalizing they had a bigger voice. All thirteen members of the CBC, unlike Congressman Adam Clayton Powell and Congressman William Dawson in the previous generation with their personality disputes and power struggles, were similar in outlook, orientation, and the belief that political power was the next step in the black freedom struggle. They were united, in sync, and excited about representing the people. Further, the CBC’s actions toward Nixon grew out of the criticism that many members of the CBC were feeling from their black nationalist critics. Nationalists felt that although the rhetoric and energy of the movement sent black people to Congress, they soon grew distant from the communities that they were elected to represent. Further, black nationalists were growing frustrated that the CBC appeared to be acting as spokespersons for the race. This criticism was in many ways the catalyst for the CBC’s demands to meet with the president.⁹

The Congressional Black Caucus and President Richard Nixon

In the aftermath of the State of the Union boycott, Senator Brooke arranged a meeting between the newly formed CBC and President Nixon in the Oval Office for March 25, 1971. In preparation for the meeting, the Caucus understood that they needed to talk policy with Nixon and not chitchat. In the days and weeks leading up to the meeting, the CBC put together a research team to draft a list of policy recommendations that they would present to Nixon. A team of nine people worked day and night at the headquarters of Delta Sigma Theta, an African American sorority, in Washington, DC, to assemble a document. A screening committee was established to look at approximately four hundred policy proposals and ideas that the CBC should consider, and they prioritized them. A team of academics, economists, and lawyers compiled the documents, with approval and consultation provided by civil rights leaders such as Whitney Young, Roy Wilkins, and Bayard Rustin, who all gave their blessing to the document. The fledgling organization made a brilliant move by consulting Young, Wilkins, and Rustin. CBC members knew that all three were not really relevant to the black masses anymore, but were astute enough to respect their historic contributions to the movement. Plus, by their bringing all three of them to the table, their white critics would not be able to use Young, Wilkins, and Rustin against them.¹⁰

The CBC presented their set of goals to President Nixon in a thirty-two-page booklet. In attendance were the full CBC delegation and many of Nixon’s cabinet members and undersecretaries. Diggs began the meeting by stating that the CBC sought the meeting with Nixon “out of a deep sense of conviction that large numbers of citizens are being subjected to intense hardship, are denied their basic rights, and are suffering irreparable harm as a result of current policies.” He went on to mention the obvious, that “most of the districts that we represent are predominantly Black,” but that their concerns “and obligations as Members of Congress do not stop at the boundaries of our districts.” Diggs wanted Nixon to understand that their concerns were national and international in scope. “We are petitioned daily by citizens living hundreds of miles from our districts who look on us as Congressman-at-large for Black people and poor people in the United States.” Reports from the Nixon meeting make it clear that the CBC was not hesitant to voice their concerns to the president. They were not scared, they did not cower, and they were aggressive in raising the issues that most affected the black community. They were functioning in their role as representatives, and Nixon was unsure how to respond.¹¹

Diggs and the Caucus were hopeful that the meeting with Nixon would not be a one-time event but rather the beginning of a regular conversation and dialogue with the president. Prior to laying out their concerns and issues to Nixon, Diggs talked about how the United States spent $2 billion a year on Vietnam, while since the president took office 2 million more people had become unemployed and the country’s welfare rolls had increased by 2.5 million. They then talked about the need for a redistribution of the wealth. “The racist policies of public and private U.S. institutions insure that Blacks and other oppressed peoples suffer much more than others, whether in good times or bad.” In the eyes of the Congressional Black Caucus what was needed was a radical redistribution of wealth and income.

Before laying out their specific demands to Nixon, the Caucus listed nine principal goals:

1. The eradication of racism within the United States and its dealings with other nations.

2. The earning of a decent and living wage, or the means to survive in dignity when work is not available.

3. Decent housing for our families and equal access to the total housing market.

4. Fair and impartial justice and adequate protection against drug abuse and crime.

5. The enforcement of civil rights and other constitutional guarantees through various affirmative actions by the government.

6. A fair share of public funds used to support business and community development and full participation in determining how tax dollars are spent in our communities.

7. The guarantee by the federal government of ample health care for all citizens.

8. The protection of federal standards and guarantees in programs financed by federal funds.

9. The full participation by the members of our communities in executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government at every level.¹²

In making their requests to the president, the CBC members were also making a stinging critique of American society.

The CBC’s Sixty Recommendations

The CBC presented Nixon with a document that listed sixty recommendations over four main subjects. The first area was Economic Security and Development. The twenty-four recommendations in this section were broken into the following:

1. Manpower and Employment Rights (7 recommendations)

2. Welfare Reform (3 recommendations)

3. Federal Assistance to the State/Local Governments (6 recommendations)

4. Minority Economic Development (6 recommendations)

5. Poverty Programming (2 recommendations)

This section of the document wanted a guaranteed adequate income system; incentives for a progressive income tax; and an independent agency, led by black folks, to assist minority businesses to the tune of $1 billion annually.¹³

The next section of the document was Community and Health Development. The twenty-one recommendations in this section were broken into the following:

1. Education (9 recommendations)

2. Housing and Urban Development (6 recommendations)

3. The Drug Crisis (6 recommendations)

This section called for increased funding for day care and pre-K programs; a universal literacy program; increased funding for inner-city schools; an increase in the Federal Pell Grant program; increased funding for Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs); more money for public housing; an end to illegal drugs coming into the United States; and federally funded rehabilitation centers for drug users.

The next section of the document was “Justice and Civil Rights.” Here, there were ten recommendations across the following areas:

1. Criminal Justice (3 recommendations)

2. Civil Rights (4 recommendations)

3. Veterans’ Affairs (2 recommendations)

4. The District of Columbia (1 recommendation)

Some of the specific demands were for help for inner-city communities to develop fair and effective criminal justice systems; the appointment of black federal judges, US attorneys, US marshals, and especially black judges in the South; the implementation of the 1970 Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; corrective action against efforts to disenfranchise black voters in the South; the creation of a division on civil rights; and congressional representation and increased funding for the District of Columbia.¹⁴

The last section of the document was “Foreign Policy,” where there were six major recommendations. The CBC wanted sanctions against South Africa and other colonial governments; a Marshall Pl...