India and Nuclear Asia

Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers

Yogesh Joshi, Frank O'Donnell

• Publisher: Georgetown University Press
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781626166172, 9781626166165
• eBook ISBN: 9781626166189
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

India's nuclear profile, doctrine, and practices have evolved rapidly since the country’s nuclear breakout in 1998. However, the outside world's understanding of India's doctrinal debates, forward-looking strategy, and technical developments are still two decades behind the present. India and Nuclear Asia will fill that gap in our knowledge by focusing on the post-1998 evolution of Indian nuclear thought, its arsenal, the triangular rivalry with Pakistan and China, and New Delhi's nonproliferation policy approaches. Yogesh Joshi and Frank O'Donnell show how India's nuclear trajectory has evolved in response to domestic, regional, and global drivers.

The authors argue that emerging trends in all three states are elevating risks of regional inadvertent and accidental escalation. These include the forthcoming launch of naval nuclear forces within an environment of contested maritime boundaries; the growing employment of dual-use delivery vehicles; and the emerging preferences of all three states to employ missiles early in a conflict. These dangers are amplified by the near-absence of substantive nuclear dialogue between these states, and the growing ambiguity of regional strategic intentions.  

Based on primary-source research and interviews, this book will be important reading for scholars and students of nuclear deterrence and India's international relations, as well as for military, defense contractor, and policy audiences both within and outside South Asia.

1

TWO DECADES OF INDIAN NUCLEAR FORCE DEVELOPMENT

The Emerging Posture and Looming Decision Points

After India conducted a series of nuclear weapon tests in 1998, many prognosticated a grim future for India’s nuclear forces and its status as a nuclear weapon state. India was called a “third-tier nuclear state” and “a low-level nuclear power.”¹ Some doubted India’s ability to expand its nuclear arsenal and its intention to be counted as a major nuclear power. In fact, India’s slow drive for weaponization was conflated with its limited capabilities. Given India’s nascent nuclear arsenal, compared to the technological sophistication and doctrinal clarity other nuclear powers had achieved, it was also suggested that India would not command the same respect that other major nuclear powers had. Some observers forecasted that Pakistan would remain the singular focus of India’s nuclear forces, and hence, India’s nuclear deterrent at best would be confined to South Asia.² The reasons for these assumptions were mainly material: shortage of fissile material, technological incapacity to produce reliable delivery systems, ineffective bureaucratic structures (especially in its scientific enclave), and rudimentary command and control systems. Progress on these components was assumed to be severely restricted by India’s dire economic health and the necessity to cater to more important demands of Indian democracy: the need for economic development and reduction of the chronic poverty that formed the dark underbelly of a nuclear India. Further, the hostile international reaction to India’s overt nuclearization threatened to restrict or even punish efforts to further develop Indian nuclear capabilities.

Moralistic considerations were also availed to argue that development of a robust deterrent would remain hesitatingly slow. While addressing an attentive audience at the India International Center just after the nuclear tests, India’s foremost strategic thinker—K. Subrahmanyam—claimed, “Nuclear weapons is not the issue. . . . It is a question of India’s dignity and sovereignty. India has the right to be equal with any other major power of the world because it represents one sixth of humanity and that is the issue, because a nuclear weapon is not a weapon of war.”³ Such ex post facto reasoning, especially coming from the center of realpolitik thinking in India, made India’s aspirations for nuclear status appear as mere symbolism—all rhetoric, no substance—further validating the assumptions that India had neither the intentions nor the will to expand its nuclear forces. Subrahmanyam also made a number of other claims: for projecting effective deterrence, only a few nuclear weapons would suffice; having managed to enter the “mainstream paradigm” of nuclear weapon states, India could now “change the paradigm itself” (read “pursue effective disarmament”); on the “basis of a perception of mutual deterrence,” India and Pakistan would now have peace; and India could now sign the CTBT and vouch for a nuclear weapon convention.⁴

Beyond these material and moralistic rationales for a rudimentary nuclear force, there was the notion that India was a different kind of nuclear power compared to the expansionist Cold Warriors and that India’s force development would be haltingly slow.⁵ India’s strategic restraint in past conflicts and its abhorrence of the use of nuclear weapons were often cited as proof that force development would not gain a lot of momentum. India’s limited use of force during the Kargil War gave further boost to the idea that even small nuclear forces could deter states from escalating the conflict, whether it was Pakistan or India that did the escalating. And therefore, India’s nuclear forces would not see a major accretion.

Twenty years hence India’s trajectory as a nuclear weapon state is drastically different from the initial pictures painted by many in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests. Many initial assumptions have been undermined by growing instability in Indo-Pakistan relations, the shift in focus of India’s nuclear forces from Pakistan to China, and the shallow treatment disarmament receives in India’s current nuclear politics. What is glaringly conspicuous in India’s twenty years as a nuclear weapon state is progress in technical force development and expansion of the nuclear arsenal.

Today India boasts an expanding nuclear portfolio designed to extend beyond South Asia. Indeed, the ambitions of India’s nuclear weapon designers invite questions about whether political limits guide the program. The emerging nuclear force structure appears to be moving away from the stated postures of credible minimum deterrence and assured retaliation, that is, ensuring a minimum deterrent able to retaliate against nuclear first use by China or Pakistan. Instead, recent development projects—such as multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads, the 700-kilometer-range Shourya nuclear missile, and the potentially nuclear-capable short-range Prahaar, Brahmos, and Nirbhay missiles—indicate Indian interest in a war-fighting capacity. The government is facing growing pressure from within India to include war-fighting options in its nuclear approach, and a retired army officer and nuclear expert has argued that the Shourya and Prahaar “confer a war-fighting capability.”⁶ Even if these missiles are assigned solely conventional missions, they would still enable an enhanced Indian capability to launch conventional counterforce strikes. Shivshankar Menon, a former Indian national security advisor (NSA), published a memoir (discussed in detail later) outlining these emerging elements of Indian nuclear discourse and suggesting Indian interest in counterforce targeting, even including preemptive counterforce strikes.⁷

India is advancing all aspects of its technical nuclear capabilities. It is planning and unveiling ballistic missiles of ever-greater range, and its long-awaited nuclear-armed submarine fleet is finally taking operational form with the launch of INS Arihant. More subtle improvements are also being made in supporting infrastructure. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), responsible for missile development, is working on warhead miniaturization, which could lead to a tactical nuclear weapon capability. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) is upscaling its uranium enrichment capabilities, which could accelerate India’s fissile material production. A sense of momentous and fast-moving technical progress is in the air.

India’s land-based ballistic missile portfolio attracts most of the public limelight. In 1998 New Delhi hosted just three platforms—the Prithvi, Agni-I, and Agni-II—limited in range to targets in Pakistan. Today New Delhi is building the Agni-V, able to reach all targets in China, and working on the Agni-VI, intended to extend even farther. The missiles enjoy a certain patriotic symbolism, with each successive unveiling of a new platform attracting celebratory statements from the Prime Minister’s Office and favorable coverage in Indian media. However, there are questions concerning the governance of this missile program. India’s political masters appear not to have set an upper limit for the state’s missile aspirations. The operational credibility of these new missiles is doubtful given the limited DRDO testing program before entry into service. Despite the reported formation of several combined civil-military nuclear planning cells in the last decade,...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1. Two Decades of Indian Nuclear Force Development: The Emerging Posture and Looming Decision Points
• 2. Pakistan’s Nuclear Thought and Posture: Implications for India
• 3. China’s Nuclear Thought and Posture: Implications for India
• 4. The Doctrinal Background: Nuclear Deterrence in Indian Strategic Thought, 1964–2003
• 5. New Challenges for Indian Nuclear Doctrine: The Doctrinal Debate, 2003–Present
• 6. Indian Nonproliferation Policy: Approaches and Challenges in the Twenty-First Century
• Conclusion
• Selected Bibliography
• Index
• About the Authors