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John C. Ford
John Ford’s Sitz im Leben very much influenced his approach to moral theology. In the pre–Vatican II period of the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, moral theology was identified with the manuals of moral theology. The purpose of these manuals was to train future priests for their role in the confessional to know what acts were sinful and their degree of sinfulness—mortal or venial sins. The method was casuistic. Authoritative papal teaching had a primary role, and such a teaching provided guidance and answers to particular problems within these parameters. Ford was a leader in moral theology in this country and abroad. He strenuously defended the papal teaching condemning artificial contraception and in the 1960s also worked behind the scenes to maintain the condemnation.
John Cuthbert Ford, SJ (1902–89), was a Jesuit (Society of Jesus) priest recognized by many as the leading Catholic moral theologian of his generation. Despite some illness, he was ordained a priest in 1932 and shortly afterward was sent to obtain a doctorate in moral theology at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome run by the Jesuits. In 1937, he defended his dissertation on the validity of virginal marriage, which brought together canonical and sacramental aspects of theology as well as moral theology. He began teaching at the Jesuit theologate in Weston, Massachusetts, where he had been a student, and taught much of his academic life there, with a stint as professor of moral theology at the Catholic University of America from 1958 to 1966. He resigned from teaching at Weston in 1969 and died twenty years later.1
Ford never wrote a systematic moral theology textbook, but he began publishing the article “Notes on Moral Theology” in the new Jesuit publication Theological Studies, which since its beginning in 1940 has generally been acknowledged as the leading Catholic theological journal in the United States. To this day, Theological Studies still publishes “Notes on Moral Theology” every year. From 1941 to 1956, Ford and his friend Gerald Kelly, SJ, who taught at St. Mary’s, the Jesuit theologate in Kansas, were responsible for “Notes on Moral Theology.” Ford and Kelly then decided to reorganize, greatly expand, and develop the matters and issues treated in “Notes” as well as the issues that came afterward.2 They published in 1958 Contemporary Moral Theology, volume 1: Questions in Fundamental Moral Theology, and, in 1963, Contemporary Moral Theology, volume 2: Marriage Questions.3 Both volumes were very well received. The two authors worked very closely together in agreement, so what I will call Ford in this chapter is often Ford and Kelly. (Kelly’s major contribution was in the area of medical ethics, but he died before the discussions about Vatican II and Humanae vitae.) These volumes constitute Ford’s most academic contribution, but he also published many articles and small books on other topics, such as alcoholism and how religious superiors use psychiatry and psychological testing in relation to the rights of their subjects.4
John Ford as a Manualist
John Ford’s Jesuit vocation was to teach seminarians and priests how to administer the sacrament of penance, in those days commonly called confession. Confession played a very significant role in Catholic life in the pre–Vatican II times. In his teaching, Ford followed the manualistic approach of his Jesuit predecessors, and by his publications he played a leading role in moral theology in the United States and even outside the country. He was looked on as a significant reformer for his contributions to the discipline.5
Although Ford never wrote a textbook or manual of moral theology, he used a manualistic approach in his understanding of the discipline. This Jesuit professor strongly agreed with the focus of the manuals as preparing priests and future priests for hearing confessions. Contemporary Moral Theology speaks of the apostolate of the confessional and recognizes that the historical evolution of the science and the principal goal to which it is directed explained to some extent the necessary emphasis on mortal sin and its limits.6 Traditional Catholic moral theology recognizes mortal sin as a serious violation of the law of God, which separates the person from God’s love and is ultimately deserving of eternal damnation. The very nature of mortal sin underlies the importance of discussing what is mortal sin and what is not. Venial sin is a lesser sin that does not break the relationship with God and result in eternal damnation if not repented before death.
An Illustration of the Emphasis on Determining Sinfulness
An illustration from Contemporary Moral Theology shows Ford’s great concern of establishing what is mortal sin and distinguishing it from venial sin. The specific issue concerns determining the degree of sinfulness in the case of avoiding occasions of sin (1:147–57). An occasion of sin is an external circumstance involving an impulse or allurement to sin with a consequent likelihood or danger of sinning, which would not be present or would be greatly diminished if the external circumstance were avoided. The manuals distinguish between proximate and remote occasions. Another important distinction concerns necessary and voluntary occasions. Theologians agree that, given an occasion of serious sin, which is voluntary and truly proximate, there is a grave obligation to remove it or avoid it. Not to do so would itself be a mortal sin objectively. (The distinction between objective and subjective mortal sin will be discussed later.)
For a good number of moral theologians, an occasion is proximate when the danger of sinning is truly probable, even though it is equally probable that, in spite of the occasion, the sin will be avoided. Thus, mortal sin is objectively committed each time one exposes oneself to this probable danger without a proportionate cause. Putting oneself in such a danger would be a serious violation of the virtue of prudence.
Contemporary Moral Theology opposes this thesis that it is objectively a mortal sin to voluntarily expose oneself to the danger of probably committing an objective mortal sin. The authors do not maintain that no sin is involved but only that it is not necessarily gravely or mortally sinful. A number of reasons prove this point. First, a duty under pain of mortal sin must be proved, and the burden of the proof rests on those who assert the obligation. The degrees of the danger of sin are indefinitely numerous, extending from certain to mostly certain, to highly probable, more probable, equally probable, probable, less probable, hardly probable, to even degrees of possibility. There is a gradually diminishing malice as one goes down in this scale so that at some stage all would agree there is no grave malice involved. Here we are talking about a prudential judgment, and other theologians propose different degrees of probability. Arthur Vermeersch, SJ, Ford and Kelly’s professor in Rome, draws the line that the danger of sinning has to be more probable than not sinning, while others maintain that it must be highly probable or morally certain. Consequently a formula based on probable danger is too rigid.
In addition, just as there are degrees of certitude and probability, there are also degrees of the seriousness of mortal sins, admitting of degrees of gravity from an internal thought, a solitary external act, a sin that offends one or a few others, sins that damage the bodies or souls of others, to sins that damage the public good of the community or of the Church. Since prudence is the ultimate criterion, it is very difficult to propose a universal criterion when the danger of sinning becomes grave in the light of all these indefinite considerations.
Another argument against the universality of the stricter view is that the person who enters an occasion of sin where the danger of sinning is probable might have some reason for so entering the occasion of sin even if it is not proportionate to the danger. The distinction between free and necessary occasion is theoretically clear but very murky in practice. Necessity, like probability, admits of an infinite number of degrees.
It is fascinating that Ford himself does not propose any universal formula (e.g., equiprobable, more probable). Without his explicitly saying so, his reason apparently is that the very complexity involved makes it difficult to come up with a rigid universal norm. In his words, the judgment to decide when the penitent has a grave obligation not to expose oneself to the danger of sinning has to take into account the degrees of the probability of sin, the degrees of the gravity of the sin in question, and the degrees of necessity that may exist for entering occasions of sin. In light of all these factors, he does not propose his own universal norm but simply disagrees with the proposed norm that grave guilt is universally present whenever the probable danger of sinning is entered.
In addition, this illustration also shows Ford’s significant use of the method of casuistry, which was the method frequently employed by the manuals of moral theology. Critics of the manuals of moral theology show a pronounced dislike for casuistry, but Ford insists there is no really practical moral theology without good casuistry (1:141–42). This example also shows that Ford is a good casuist. A good casuist uses careful analysis to determine what are the most important considerations involved and does not get bogged down in what is peripheral. Good casuistry requires a broad knowledge of moral theology, which the casuist thus brings to bear in analyzing the particular issue or case. This example also shows why Ford at the time was considered to be a liberal Catholic theologian, arguing against the opinions of others that he judged to be too rigorous.7
Three other aspects of Ford’s writings also show that he was in the manualist tradition of moral theology. First, manualists followed a deontological or law model of ethics. Law was the objective norm of moral theology. Ford, like the manualists, insists on the primacy of law, duty, and obligation as the primary aspects of moral life. The first chapter in Contemporary Moral Theology, volume 1, is titled “The Church and the Moral Law” (1:3–18). He defines sin as the violation of a law that obliges in conscience (1:254). Opponents of a manualist approach decry the centrality of law, but Ford maintains it is dangerous “to decry a morality of duty, of law, and of obligation, because in the last analysis there is no other” (1:92). If all people would only obey the commandments of God, the combined interior beauty of those souls would be indescribable and the world itself would be a paradise (1:96).
Second, Ford sees a close relationship between moral theology and canon law. The manuals emphasize the connection between the two disciplines. The treatise on the sacraments in moral theology is almost totally canonical.8 His doctoral dissertation on virginal marriage included many canonical considerations.9 Ford’s first article in Theological Studies in 1941 was titled “Current Moral Theology and Canon Law” and was the precursor of “Notes on Moral Theology.” In this overview, Ford devotes twenty-six pages to canon law, covering the specific topics of canon law and civil law, law for religious, and matrimonial law.10 Under the heading of moral theology, he treats from a broader perspective “the Sacraments, Holy Eucharist, Penance” for five pages.11 In 1953, he wrote a brief book on the norms for fasting before receiving communion.12 The chapter in Contemporary Moral Theology, volume 1, “Juridical Aspects of Subjective Imputability,” includes a consideration of canonical norms of criminal imputability (1:253–59).
Part 1 of Contemporary Moral Theology, volume 2, deals with the ends of marriage and frequently refers to canonical considerations. Ford insists that “a divorce between canonical and theological principles would be intolerable, especially in the case of marriage, which is a society, and therefore essentially an entity of the juridical order” (2:56).
Third, and also in accord with the legal model, is the use of probabilism, which has already been mentioned somewhat in the discussion of occasions of sin. What happens when one is doubtful whether there is a law or obligation in a particular case? Among Jesuit theologians and many others, the theory of probabilism provided the answer. In case of a doubtful law or obligation one can follow, except in a certain few cases, an opinion proposing freedom from the law, provided it is truly probable even if the opinion in support of the law or obligation is more probable. The word “probable” is a translation of the Latin probabilis and means provable rather than probable. There are two kinds of probabilism. Intrinsic probabilism is based on the strength of the reasons given for the position. Extrinsic probabilism is based on the authority of the authors who hold such a position. It was generally accepted that six reputable authors would constitute a probable opinion but that one author of outstanding excellence, such as Thomas Aquinas or Alphonsus Liguori, could make an opinion probable.13
Ford appeals to probabilism when there is a doubtful obligation. Like other manualists, he also consults other authors to see if there are sufficient authors to make an opinion extrinsically probabl...