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Semiotics and Biblical Interpretation
In order to understand the semiotic method used for this intertextual investigation, a comprehension of the landscape of both semiotics and biblical interpretation is necessary. The chapter begins with a brief historical survey of semiotics from the genesis of the term to its modern-day applications. The inclusion of this section is imperative since the method employed for this study is rooted in semiotic history, especially in the semiotic development of Charles Sanders Peirce (though Peirce is only introduced here since a fuller treatment of his work on semiotics is supplied in chapter 2). Moreover, secular intertextual theorists commonly speak of intertextuality using semiotic language. Next, the major research areas that are germane to this study are surveyed. The pertinent areas of research include intertextuality, biblical studies and semiotics, and 1 Peter and intertextuality. Each research area is treated in turn and focuses on seminal figures and foundational concepts. The aim of this chapter is to provide the theoretical framework for the presentation of the method in chapter 2.
A History of Semiotics
The term semiotics derives from the Greek semeion (ĻημεįæĪæĪ½) meaning āsignā and its cognate semeiotikos meaning āobservant of signs.ā Semiotics was coined by Hippocrates (ca. 460ā370 B.C.), the founder of Western medicine, as the study of the human bodyās warning signs, referred to today as symptoms. He believed the semeion was the physical form a symptom took and that it pointed to something invisible, such as a specific disease in the body. From this symptomatic identification it is argued that āHippocrates established medicine as a diagnostic āsemeioticā scienceāthat is, a science based on the detection and interpretation of bodily signs.ā For this period in time, the paradigm sign was the medical symptom.
The contribution of Plato (ca. 427ā347 B.C.) to semiotics is his distinction between natural (or physical) signs and conventional (or man-made) signs. Contrasted with natural signs such as smoke as a sign of fire, conventional signs were those man-made constructs such as words and symbols. For Plato, a significant point was that a word could signify not only an object, but numerous objects that resemble one another. For example, the word circle does not refer to merely a single object, but anything with the property of circularity. He suggested that the words humans use mirror the mental processes involved in encoding ideas with words. Platoās viewpoint often is referred to as the mentalist theory.
Aristotle (384ā322 B.C.), a pupil of Plato, differed from his teacher by claiming that words were not properties, but a means for naming objects. His definition of sign can be summarized as follows: ā(1) Written marks are symbols of spoken sounds. (2) Spoken sounds are (in the first place) signs and symbols of mental impressions. (3) Mental impressions are likenesses of actual things. (4) While mental events and things are the same for all mankind, speech is not.ā Contrasted with Platoās mentalist theory, Aristotleās is known as the empirical theory of signs.
One of the more important discussions on signs in the classical period was that between the Stoics and Epicureans (both ca. the early third century B.C.) on the status of the sign. The Stoics believed that natural and conventional signs were related in the sense that they both revealed something intrinsic. Also, the Stoics viewed signs as standing for a proposition or lekton (an āintelligibleā), which itself described an observable fact. According to this understanding, the lekton was part of an inference, the form of which was called modus ponens. Essentially, the Stoics understood signs as one premise of a logical syllogism. The Epicureans, on the other hand, discounted the inferential theory of the Stoics and held that a sign is not a proposition, but something that can be observed directly. Thus, āit is the observed smoke that is the sign of fire, not the proposition expressed by the sentence āThere is smoke over there.āā
From the viewpoints of these two philosophical groups, a fundamental question arose: Who can interpret a sign? Both Stoics and Epicureans would say that anyone can interpret a sign. However, the Stoics would add that only individuals schooled in formal logic could do so on the basis of inferential theory because their understanding of signs was limited to propositions. Since the Epicureans understood signs as the actual observed realityānot that of a stated or written propositionātheir view persisted as the framework for a general theory of signs, which was inclusive of language.
In none of the discussions on signs in the classical tradition did these philosophers and writers speak of words or sentences as linguistic signs (words, both spoken and written, were thought of as symbols). This important step in the history of semioticsāthe connection made between signs and wordsādid not occur until the work of Augustine (A.D. 354ā430). He saw a distinctive difference between natural signs (signa naturalia) and conventional signs (signa data). On this major point he differed from the views of the Stoics. For Augustine natural signs, as products of nature, lack intentionality, whereas conventional signs are a direct result of human intention. According to this view, signs such as medical symptoms are natural, and signs such as words and gestures are conventional. Intentionality refers to the production of the sign for purposes of communication. This basic conception of signs was so significant that it shifted the classical paradigm sign from the medical sign/symptom to the linguistic expression.
The influence Augustineās definition of a sign had upon the development of semiotics in the Western world was significant. His definition proved to be the foundation for most of the work on semiotics that would come in the following millennium. As Deely related, āAugustine defined a sign as āsomething that, besides the impressions it conveys to sense, makes something else come into cognition.ā Translating more freely, we can say that Augustine defines the sign as anything that, on being perceived brings something besides itself into awareness.ā Augustineās understanding of the sign is the fundamental understanding from which other theories and definitions derived. In viewing the sign as a sensed particular that points to something not sensed, Augustine is in agreement with the Epicureans. After the death of Augustine, interest in connecting sign production with human understanding waned; but it was revived in the eleventh century. A renewed interest in the classical writers led to the Scholastic movement. The Scholastics used Aristotleās empiricist approach and argued that conventional signs represented practical truths that were not constructed out of convenienceāalso referred to as the realist position. On the other hand, the nominalists claimed that since truth is subjective, signs represent variable human expressions of truth.
John Poinsot (1589ā1644) stands out as one of the most influential Renaissance figures in the history of semiotics. In his Treatise on Signs (1632), Poinsot systematically examined the issues of unity and scope with regard to the doctrine of signs. He defined the sign as an intermediary between things and thoughts that allows the mind to link these intermediary forms with realities in life. As a result, the realities can be observed and studied in the forms created to express or signify them. In the age of rationalism, John Locke (1632ā1704) is noted for coining the word semiotics to refer to a doctrine of signs. He viewed semiotics as an instrument philosophers could use, even going so far as to sug...