Acting on Principles

A Thomistic Perspective in Making Moral Decisions

Zagar, Thompson

• Publisher: Wipf and Stock
• Year: 2010
• eBook ISBN: 9781630878351
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Religion

Acting on Principles, the product of over thirty years of teaching, gives a comprehensive overview of the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, placing it in dialogue with contemporary ethical theory and developments in Catholic theology since the Second Vatican Council. Suitable for students of ethics and moral theology, and general readers seeking Christian guidance in the formation of conscience and moral decision making, it presents the classical Catholic ethical tradition in a clear and lively style.

Part I

The Meaning of Human Life

1

Acting for a Purpose

In our study of moral principles, we have to use certain terms which will be fully explained as we proceed. One such term is “human act,” which is defined as an act done with knowledge and will, or a deliberate and responsible act. This does not say all about a human act, but it gives us a beginning. This beginning is rather important. Aquinas writes that “human acts and moral acts are the same.” This means that morality and human living are the same and that a study of morality must begin with ordinary human experience. Now the most fundamental and obvious experiential facts in human life are the facts of motivation or purpose, and the search for happiness. Victor E. Frankl, a survivor of the World War II concentration camps, writes in Man’s Search for Meaning: “There is nothing in the world, I venture to say, that would so effectively help one to survive even in the worst conditions, as the knowledge that there is a meaning in one’s life.”1 Frankl’s psychological tenet is that therapy comes from meaning, not meaning from therapy.

Reflecting on the same phenomenon, Erich Fromm says that unless a person belonged somewhere, “unless his life had some meaning and direction, he would feel like a particle of dust and be overcome by his individual insignificance. He would not be able to relate himself to any system which would give meaning and direction to his life. He would be filled with doubt, and this doubt eventually would paralyze his ability to act—that is to live.”2

Moral theology begins with and remains centered on the fact of motivation and the search for meaning and happiness. Both motivation and the search for happiness are not only a common psychological experience; they are also supported scripturally, especially by the eschatological character of the gospel. The law of nature accords with the law of revelation: “For this law that I enjoin on you today is not beyond your strength or beyond your reach. It is not in heaven, so that you need to wonder, ‘Who will go up to heaven for us and bring it down to us, so that we may hear it and keep it?’ No, the Word is very near to you, it is in your mouth and in your heart for your observance. See, today I set before you life and prosperity, death and disaster” (Deut. 31: 11–15).

Aquinas therefore begins his treatise on morality with what seems to be self-evident: the fact of motivation and the desire for happiness. Both are a common psychological experience. Explicitly or implicitly, they contain a series of morally significant propositions which may be useful to summarize at this point. They are:

1. All human (i.e., deliberate) activity is always for an end or purpose.

2. In all subordinated (related) human acts, there is always an ultimate end or purpose.

3. At least implicitly, there is an ultimate end of the entire human life in which formally, although not necessarily materially, all people agree. Happiness is considered to be such an ultimate end.

4. End or purpose is the cause of every human act, and as such it gives to the act its first moral specification.

5. Only a common ultimate end, not only formally but also materially common, can unite collective and individual human efforts into a social harmony and cooperation; only a supreme ultimate good which satisfies all human aspirations can qualify for such an ultimate end.

The first two theses, “acting for an end” and the existence of an “ultimate end in each subordinate series of actions,” are experiential facts. “Acting for an end” or having a motive pertains to the definition of human acts which are always done with knowledge and will or else they are not properly human. It seems obvious also that there must be an ultimate end or purpose in every series of related human activity, since it makes no sense to enroll in a college, to pay tuition, attend classes, etc., unless one hopes to learn something, to graduate and make use of it in life. And if someone enrolls just to have something to do, then that is his end.

It is less obvious that a person’s entire life (all actions combined) is ordained to a determined ultimate end; in other words, that every person has a constant and systematic vision of his or her life. John Dewey explicitly rejects the idea of “fixed ends” as contrary to change and progress. The fact is that the conceptions of happiness fluctuate and that an ultimate end can only be specified by demonstration or accepted on faith. It is even less obvious that there is a common ultimate end for all human persons and all generations, as the national and international differences and conflicts concerning a common goal of humanity sorrowfully prove. We must say, therefore, that the true concern of moral study is not so much the fact of motivation or of an ultimate purpose in related activity, but rather and primarily the existence and meaning of an ultimate goal of human life, the finis vitae humanae as Aquinas keeps repeating, and the way to achieve it.

Terminology

Moral theology, like every other science, uses certain terminology which becomes its technical language. One such term or expression concerning the question of end is that “end specifies the act.” This means that the purpose for which an act is done determines the moral value of the act. Some acts seem to have a built-in finality, with which a personal purpose or motive may or may not agree. Thus, the end of stealing is stealing (taking what belongs to another against his will), although the thief may steal because of an emergency (stealing a boat to escape captivity in a war), or because he is a compulsive gambler and needs money. Such personal motivation makes a moral difference, but there is a considerable disagreement as to what extent, if at all, such motivation can change the built-in purpose of an act, particularly if the act is evil in itself. This is a central issue of morality to which we shall return in due course.

Another technical expression along the same line says that “the end is first in intention and last in execution” (primum in intentione et ultimum in executione). This means that the agent first perceives and intends his goal and then proceeds to achieve it. This also is morally significant, because it raises the question as to what extent a pure desire or intention of an end, without its materialization, affects the moral goodness or badness of a person.

Aquinas takes up this relationship between the end and the act to point out something that will remain fundamental to his own conception of morality and moral study, namely that it is the end which determines the goodness or badness of a human act: end as known and specified by the reason, or as perceived by the agent, and presented to the will for realization. Here is his statement:

An act done but once is not directed except to one immediate end, and from this it gets its specific character, but it can be meant for several further ends, of which one is designed for another. All the same it is possible for an act of one physical kind to be willed for diverse ends; for instance the taking of human life considered as a physical event is generically always the same, yet considered as a moral act it can be of specifically different kinds when the purpose is upholding justice or when satisfying anger: one is an act of virtue, the other an act of vice. Now an action receives its specific character from a term that is essential to it, not incidental. Moral purposes lie outside merely natural processes, and conversely the purpose there does not constitute moral situations. And so there is nothing to stop acts of the same physical category from belonging to diverse moral categories, and vice versa.3

The relationship between a built-in end or “the end of the act,” as we call it, and “the end of the agent,” or the subjective perception of a built-in end of an act will be the focus of our analysis of Aquinas’ understanding of objective morality. Such subjective perception of the end still differs from subjective motives of the agent, as an erroneous conscience differs from intentional choice of what one knows to be wrong.

Classification of Ends

It is obvious that in our daily life we have many and different ends, although in view of an ultimate goal which keeps us moving. Certain ends as certain things are desired for themselves, e.g., life and health; other things are desired for something else, e.g., medicine or diet for health. This introduces a useful distinction between the primary and secondary ends, with an ultimate end always in the background. The role of an ultimate end must itself be explained by another distinction between related and unrelated ends. This means that in the variety of purposes some are related (vertically), e.g., working, saving money, buying property, building a house, living in it; while other ends relate only horizontally, as we want money, then changing our mind we want land, or power, etc. It is only in the related ends (fines ordinati per se) that there must be an ultimate end; in other words, a series of causally related purposes cannot proceed indefinitely (non datur processus ad infinitum). The argument is reminiscent of the Prima Via, Aquinas’ argument from motion for the existence of God as the first mover. On the horizontal level or in unrelated ends, we can keep changing our preferences indefinitely. There is a moral significance in this classification of ends, too. Although the primary ends and especially an ultimate end are the most important, in practice we must not underestimate the role of the secondary ends: a good grade or a better-paying job are valid motivations.

Ultimate End

There are many questions which we can and will be asking about the meaning of an ultimate end, particularly the end or meaning of human life as a whole. Two such questions must be asked now. Assuming, as we do, that there is purpose in nature and in human activity, the first question Aquinas asked is “what it signifies” or how important is the conception itself of an ultimate goal in human life. The other question is “what it is when achieved,” or in what, specifically, does such an ultimate end consist: what is our true happiness? Let us elaborate a little further on these two questions.

End: What It Signifies

Some kind of an ultimate purpose or fulfillment within the limits of our own experience seems to be structured in nature itself. There is always a beginning and an end of life: birth and death as two mysterious principles governing our human existence. However, the meaning of the end in our present context is not the end in a physical sense, death, but finis as a fulfillment, an achievement; telos in Greek and hence the term “teleological ethics.” Vatican II’s Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions echoes this teleological basis of morality when it states: “Men look to the various religions for an...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Foreword
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• Part 1: The Meaning of Human Life
• Part 2: Conditions of Responsibility
• Part 3: Moral Good and Evil
• Part 4: Emotions
• Part 5: Moral Formation
• Bibliography