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A Concise Introduction to General and Trans-Classical Systems Theory
Alfred Locker (1922â2005)
(translated and completed by Markus Locker)
Abstract
This succinct presentation exposes the strengths and weaknesses of General Systems Theory (GST) in dealing with reality as a whole while remaining firmly rooted in mathematically based methods. More fully recognizing the existing correspondence between any system and the observing subject, it is argued that on account of a systemâs autology and allology in view of its observer, full access to any system is only granted through simultaneous observation, perception, and participation in the system of concern. Hereby emerging paradoxes require a non-classical treatment provided by the premises of Trans-Classical Systems Theory (TCST). TCST recognizes the inseparable unity of presuppositional (p) properties and objective (o) features of a system, assuming that the whole or gestalt of a system cannot be inferred by simply observing and measuring its functions, or their changes (evolution), but gradually reveals itself through the transformation a system and at the same time the human observer undergo in the process of observation. Systems Theory, as general approach to conceive of reality in a non-deterministic view, thus remains an ambivalent tool; on the one hand prone to restrain reality to arguably limited scientific modes of inquiry, while on the other hand truly able to become conscious of all of reality in its demonstrably systemic wholeness.
A Glimpse at the History of Systems Theory
By and large conventional scientific thinking retains the maxim that in order to gain true knowledge of material objects and phenomena, all things must first be dissevered and broken up into tractable elements. Subsequent to thorough examination and quantification, these elements can allegedly be re-united with the secondary aim of rendering the originally given subject matter wholly accessible. In general, however, it must be assumed that any method embodying this very scheme is fated to miss this target altogether since the attempt of reconstructing reality after its fragmentation without fail leaves behind an untraceable surplus or remainder. This knowledge existed already in antiquity, commonly known as the Aristotelian dictum that the whole is larger than the sum of its parts, but with the advent of modern science it has been progressively ignored. Science, increasingly enamored of its alleged achievements, never came to realize that its so-called breakthroughs were bought at the costly price of reductionism, i.e., subjugating subject matter (or even worse: subduing it) to states and conditions that allows it to fit the methods of quantitative assessment.
At the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century, leading figures in the sciences became increasingly discontented with the persistent fragmentation and deconstruction of reality. The fact that empirical methods captured the entirety of phenomena only to a very small degree, or failed to explain their totality altogether, could not be overlook any longer. Thus, a crisis arose which brought about a gradual shift from an analytical to a synthetic view of reality. The hereby ensuing quest to overcome empirical reductionism resulted in the development and formulation of meta-sciences, labeled as theories of ganzheit (wholeness), gestalt (form), and system respectively, that remain intimately connected with the names of their proponents, like for example, Othmar Spann (1878â1950), Christian von Ehrenfels (1859â1932) and Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901â1972), who were all natives of Austria. The most recent meta-science was fleshed out by Ludwig von Bertalanffy and became known as General Systems Theory (GST). Over time, each meta-science underwent developments of different form and pace, such that nowadays systems-theory, on account of its general usefulness, is by far the best known theory, taking center stage in the public consciousness. Throughout the past century, systems-theory and the simultaneously originating science of Cybernetics increasingly dealt with the age-old philosophical problem of subjectivity and the epistemic role of the observer of phenomena, while at the same time progressively addressing the issue of wholeness.
Yet in spite of their shared opposition to scientific reductionism, the methodologies of the two sister-sciences, GST and Cyberneticsâthough with notable exemptions, like for example Gotthard GĂźntherâcontinue to adhere to the classical principles of logic and rational consistency, foremost expressed in their avoidance (or deliberate elimination) of ambiguity and paradox. In that sense, GST and Cybernetics remain ostensibly artificial and restricted in handling reality in its assumed entirety. Realityâas perhaps distinguished from excerpts thereof readily accessible and measurable by individual scientific disciplinesâby no means is, and can be grasped, entirely free from contradictions and paradoxes. At the same time as a genuine meta-science must be capable of recognizing reality appropriately (i.e., in its entirety), and wield some correcting influences upon it in the event the system is subjected to disturbances, it likewise must be competent to deal with paradoxes innate to all reality. Along these lines, the turn of the twentieth to the present century may be characterized as the transition from a classical to a trans-classical view of reality. Trans-classical thinking, as proposed by this author, will fortify and enhance GST, not only by way of tolerating paradoxes, but by supplying the epistemic capacity to fruitfully employ paradoxes in accessing and comprehending reality. The newly emerging meta-science may thus sensibly be called Trans-Classical Systems Theory (TCST).
Towards a Definition of System and Systems Theory
Reality as System
Exceeding a purely formal definition of system akin to most mechanistic models, von Bertalanffy engendered the modern conception of system on the basis of biology. A system, according to von Bertalanffy, is a complex of entities relating mutually and self-referentially to one another and to the whole of the system, thus providing the latter with the faculty to sustain itself against any disturbing influences threatening the systemâs existence through stimuli originating from its environment (and/or by irritant processes originating from the system itself). This broad definition, perhaps more aptly considered a circumscription, is self-referential in that the definiens equals the definiendum. On account of the fact that the herein rendered notion of system is essentially artificial, i.e., conceived and formalized by a human person, it likewise contains and displays traits of its âinventor,â which in turn allows for a genuine insight into the systemâs organization, i.e., its essence or nature. Consequently it may be inferred that each system is a subject-analog (i.e., analogous to its observer or designer) and to a certain degree a substance-analog (i.e., sharing in the nature of its observer or designer). This fact accounts for the systemâs self-reference, i.e., the ability to refer to its elements and their relation with one another, and to communicate the difference between itself and its environment, including the observer. What follows is that a formalized system can indeed be viewed as a genuine segment of reality encompassing (or at any rate representing) the latter in a nutshell. Conversely reality itself appears only in the form of differentiation, and thus is to be considered a system. Assuming the veracity of the system-subject correspondence, one significant mode of access to reality is attained that has long been overlooked, viz. the mutual representation of phenomena where everything may be represented by everything else, even in the form of opposites or paradoxes. Systems, for that reason, cannot be understood as staticâtimeless momentary cross-sections of realityâbut must be seen as expressing the incessant dynamism of the whole. Trans-Classical Systems Theory is tantamount to a systems-analysis that acknowledges realityâs permanent change or transformation.
A Preliminary Systems View
Already an initial and static understanding of systems does reveal significant systems characteristics such as the concepts of self, subject, and substance, but also the notion of wholeness or gestalt that must be designated as presuppositional (p), i.e., existing alongside the systemâs objective (o) properties. Whereas the systems theoretician can encounter these presuppositional properties (that are qualitative and in principle inaccessible to quantification and measurement) through introspection or self-reflection (i.e., by means of obtaining a meta-systems view), only the objective properties of a system are empirically detectable and therefore identical with those usually described in the sciences. The specificity of a system is such that it may be considered on the one hand as the difference between these two kinds of features, and, on the other hand, as the unity of them. The acceptance of both aspectsâtogether with an additional yet fundamental third aspectâviz. that of the immediate, instantane...