Contact with Reality

Michael Polanyi's Realism and Why It Matters

Esther Lightcap Meek

• Publisher: Cascade Books
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781498239837
• eBook ISBN: 9781498239844
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophers

Is knowledge discovered, or just invented? Can we ever get outside ourselves to know how reality is in itself, independent of us? Philosophical realism raises the question whether in our knowing we connect with an independent reality--or only connect with our own mental constructs. Far from being a silly parlor game, the question impacts our lives concretely and deeply. Modern Western culture has been infected with antirealism and the doubt, skepticism, subjectivism, relativism, and atheism that attends it--not to mention distrust and arbitrary (mis)use of reality.Premier scientist-turned-philosopher Michael Polanyi stepped aside from research to offer an innovative account of knowing that takes its cue from how discovery actually happens. Polanyi defied the antirealism of the twentieth century, sounding a ringing note of hope in his repeated claim that in discovery, we know we have made contact with reality because "we have a sense of the possibility of indeterminate future manifestations." And that sense marks contact with reality, because it is the way reality is: abundant, generous, and fraught with as-yet-unnameable possibilities.This book examines that distinctive claim, contrasting it to the wider philosophical discussions regarding realism and antirealism in the recent decades. It shows why Polanyi's outlook is superior, and why that matters, not just to scientific discoverers, but to us all.

Part 1

Early Consideration of Contact with Reality

Preface to Part 19

The purpose of this inquiry is to examine and evaluate a little-known and probably not seriously enough considered aspect of Michael Polanyi’s thought: his realism. Polanyi is known best for his contribution to philosophy of science and epistemology, specifically, for his advocacy of the role of personal commitment and appraisal in knowledge, and his development of the subsidiary-focal structure of knowledge. Polanyi’s realism—that is, in part, his conviction that reality exists independently of any knowledge of it, and confidence that human knowers are generally successful in establishing contact with reality in their acts of learning and discovery—is less well known, even though it lies close to the heart of his theory of knowledge.

At least one legitimate reason for its comparative obscurity is the fact that Polanyi nowhere gives his realism systematic treatment. His realism is evident and often explicit throughout his works, but these passages are for the most part short, and the subject is often introduced and disposed of without the kind of logical development and the explanation of concepts that the reader would like. Polanyi’s realism is also obscured by the great popularity (or notoriety) of his fiduciary program, such that it is probably difficult to believe that a philosopher so concerned with presenting the ultimately fiduciary character of the foundation of knowledge could also be concerned about any sort of contact with extramental reality—let alone that if he had such a concern, his proposals could possibly be considered successful.

In this work, I propose to make the case for Polanyi being called a realist. I will offer a systematization of his idea of contact with reality and a demonstration of his realism. Then, I will endeavor to bring his ideas into the arena of contemporary discussion of the matter. It must then be determined whether Polanyi has in fact substantiated his claim: whether the knower does in fact lay hold of the real in his epistemic activity. These are the questions that I hope to address in the coming chapters. The very first chapters are for the most part introductory, offering a sketch of Polanyi’s fiduciary program and his structure of knowledge that will provide the important context for the realism discussion. Special attention will be given to Polanyi’s analysis of the process of discovery, for it is closely tied to his realism.

It shall be seen that reality for Polanyi is epistemically independent, and that even so, it is substantially accessible to the knower. We shall see that Polanyi defines reality as that which inexhaustively manifests itself. For him successful contact with reality is attested to by virtue of its accompanying intimations of an indeterminate range of future manifestations, as well as by virtue of the experience of a sudden and far-reaching integration. These theses not only reveal the character of Polanyi’s realism but also bear implications for questions of truth and correspondence.

In comparing Polanyi’s thought with that of other contemporary philosophers of science with respect to the issues of realism, we will gain a better sense of the nature of Polanyi’s realism as I piece together his position on such issues as progress and rationality in science, the nature of truth, and various current realist theses. It will be seen that, although Polanyi would espouse key doctrines of contemporary realism, the peculiar character of his realism is such that he would give a qualified and fresh interpretation to each.

The concluding chapter of this part explores the Polanyian notion of indwelling in its attempt to ground and justify as well as amplify Polanyi’s realism. This is done by way of a short excursus into the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenologically portrayed concepts of preobjective experience, and the lived body in particular, closely parallel Polanyi’s ideas. As a result, it is hoped that Merleau-Ponty’s fuller development of these notions will provide Polanyi’s realism with fuller justification. It becomes apparent that realism is a viable option by virtue of the fact that the knower, as a physical being, is already rooted in and part of the world prior to any distinction between subject and object. What is more, he constantly reaches beyond himself to something else—this by reason of his very nature.10 Human knowledge, then, is rooted in the tacit and hence rooted in the world, but is integrative in character and hence always reaches beyond the knower to incorporate the known.

The reader unfamiliar with Polanyi may find it helpful at this juncture to be given some sense of Polanyi’s relative position with respect to contemporary philosophy of science, even though a more expansive analysis appears in chapters 8–10. Harold I. Brown, in his 1977 Perception, Theory and Commitment: The New Philosophy of Science, considers Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge to be one of the founding works of a new approach to science: a movement that has been united in its attack upon the methods and conclusions of logical empiricism.11 Subsequent exponents of this new image of science, according to Brown, include Stephen Toulmin, Thomas S. Kuhn, and Paul Feyerabend. In the new approach, study of the history of science replaces formal logic as the primary tool for analysis of science. The concern is less with the logical structure of completed theories and more with the rational basis of scientific discovery and theory change. The central claim is that a presupposed theoretical framework is more fundamental to scientific knowledge than is a group of data (which can no longer be considered theory-independent). The framework itself guides the determination of the nature and significance of data as well as the choice and solution of problems. The framework is modified only from within, especially in the event of a major discovery. Brown deems Karl Popper a transitional, in fact, an equivocal, figure. On one interpretation Popper conforms to the principles of logical empiricism despite his proposing falsificationism, and on another interpretation (Imre Lakatos among others) he attempts to embrace some of the motivating concerns of the new movement.

Let us add to Brown’s assessment the following: Polanyi’s critique of empiricism compares favorably with that of Feyerabend’s, differing from it primarily because of Feyerabend’s disregard of any questions of rationality—something Polanyi fervently maintains in a revised form. In contrast to Kuhn, Polanyi does not concern himself with a structure of scientific revolutions or with a distinction between normal and abnormal science. The fact that Polanyi is concerned with the process of a scientific discovery allows Kuhn’s developments to be brought into line with his. Although Kuhn develops the Polanyian notion of the scientific community and acknowledges in particular the foundational role of tacit knowing, Kuhn’s proposals contain no epistemological structure like Polanyi’s. Finally, there are hints of what may turn out to be a fundamental difference of characterization of reality and truth—a topic to be discussed more fully in chapter 9. Some similarity exists between Popper and Polanyi, especially on the more recent interpretation of Popper. Lakatos, who is deeply critical of Polanyi’s proposals, has himself nevertheless emphasized the role of human judgment in intellectual performances, in his development of Popper’s position; nor does he consider his own position to be any the less rational for it.

In concluding this introduction, I make two disclaimers. First, Polanyi’s concern ...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Part 1: Early Consideration of Contact with Reality
• Part 2: Re-Calling Contact with Reality
• Bibliography