Part One
Salvation and Embodiment
1
The Problem with Conservative Christian Soteriology
Thank God for paradigms. They help organize our thoughts on a variety of topics, presuppose foundational concepts, and offer a frame of reference regarding basic beliefs and their associated practices. Paradigms provide a sense of intellectual grounding, behavioral consistency, and emotional security in a world of competing beliefs, practices, and values. But what happens when long-held paradigms are challenged? We experience the discomfort of cognitive dissonance. Because of this we sometimes ignore the conflict even while still depending on inconsistent presuppositions. I believe this is especially true within conservative Christian theology regarding the doctrine of salvation. In this chapter we encourage honest interrogation of our soteriological assumptions. Toward this end, I challenge core presuppositions about the nature of faith and its relationship to salvation across certain segments of conservative-traditional Christianity. The chapter concludes with our proposed solution of a renewal soteriology of embodiment.
Intellectualism in Conservative Christian Theology
As previously stated, an underlying claim throughout this book is that conservative traditional soteriology generally imbibes an epistemology that fosters an overly dominant emphasis on proper thinking and knowledge in salvation. Such stress on intellect promotes a dualist paradigm of cognition that divides the mind from emotions and behavior and generates static notions of a once-for-all salvation in terms of adherence to right teaching. This kind of soteriology does not take embodiment seriously because it focuses on intellect (orthodoxy) over practices (orthopraxy) and affections (orthopathy). This view of salvation theologically subordinates the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son, and relegates pneumatology to secondary status. Therefore a deliberate emphasis on the Holy Spirit will be vital to our proposal of a renewal soteriology of embodiment.
I advocate that one of the most problematic consequences of an intellectualist soteriology is a neglected pneumatology. We return more thoroughly to the negative consequences of a discounted pneumatology in chapters 5 and 6 through the work of various renewal theologians. Now we begin to clarify our claim of an intellectualist soteriology through detailing important terms and concepts. Then we examine three predominant intellectualist presuppositions in conservative-traditional theology. But why is this important and what are its ramifications? These questions will help us move forward in crafting our soteriological program.
Clarifying the Claim
As with any conversation, clear communication is necessary if accurate understanding is to be gained. Such is especially important in our case since the audience addressed is large and the implications are far reaching. So, let us clarify what is meant and what is not meant regarding our claim of an intellectualist soteriology. To accomplish this we must first explain important terms and concepts and, second, clarify that the soteriology concerned is just one—even if the primary—among a variety of other faith paradigms within conservative Christianity.
Key Terms and Concepts
This section explains key terms, cognitive models, and epistemological-theological paradigms central to our embodied paradigm of salvation. First, based on current research in the cognitive neurosciences, I support an integrated model of human cognition and reject a faculty psychology that compartmentalizes cognitive function. As we will later see, an integrated model of cognition is intrinsically embodied and, therefore, will be fundamental in our soteriological paradigm of faith. This is important because an embodied view of salvation both challenges and informs our preconceived ideas about the nature of faith, particularly how it is expressed and mediated. Notwithstanding all of this, even though I envisage salvation as a fully embodied process involving three interrelated dimensions—orthodoxy, orthopraxy, and orthopathy—various cognitive capacities will be treated individually to help us most clearly delineate intellect, behavior, and affections as integral to human cognition. Eventually, chapters 9 and 10 will re-integrate these domains toward a renewal soteriology of embodiment.
Second, I identify affections as the emotional-perceptual inclinations that predispose people to respond in particular ways. Because the affections are constituted only in part by emotions, the proposed soteriology is not an endorsement of emotionalism. Thus, orthopathy has to do with instilling enduring emotional and habitual affections properly reflecting a dynamic construal of Christian salvation.
Third, practices refer to the behavioral-confessional actions that are integral to cognition. While often conceived as resulting from rational choices, contemporary research in the cognitive sciences attests that practices do not merely derive from intellectual deliberation but actually shape and inform discursive reasoning. Orthopraxy then has to do with being attentive to behavioral actions and patterns (i.e., practices) which are part of a dynamic soteriology.
Varieties of Conservative Christian Faith Paradigms
Conservative-traditional soteriology (which includes segments of conservative Evangelicalism) embraces a variety of faith paradigms. The differences lie largely in their emphases on the objective and subjective elements of human cognition as appropriated in the corresponding models of faith. This study focuses on the intellectualist paradigm that underscores various propositions about Christ (which center on the rational nature of intellect) rather than those that also highlight trusting in the person of Christ (which additionally accounts for the subjective and affective nature of intellect). It is the former understanding with which this study is mostly concerned.
For instance, within the American Reformed tradition, the theme of union with Christ has a history of oscillating between emphasizing either the forensic or transformative dimensions of salvation, thus bifurcating the objective and subjective aspects of redemption. Some have sought to hold these two poles together in an integrated fashion such as Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758), whom I address in chapters 3 and 4, and the Mercersburg Theology of John Nevin (1803–1886). These theologians accounted for the affective nature of faith in addition to the intellectual task of comprehension. Among such theologians, terms like trust, persuasion, and conviction are vital for Christian salvation.
So, despite our focus on the prior paradigm, there are other sectors within conservative Protestantism that do not neatly fit within my general appraisal of its intellectualist view of faith. For sure, there are, and have been, evangelical and conservative streams that resist intellectualist assumptions of faith. My critique is not aimed at these groups. Their soteriological views are more dynamic than the otherwise intellectualist tendencies with which we are concerned. Nevertheless, while such exceptions (and others) exist, I still contend that this notion of an intellectualist vision of faith, for the most part, reflects “conservative-traditional-Christianity” (hereafter, conservative Christianity or conservative Protestantism). Hence, I have focused my research on this constituency of Christianity.
Next, we consider three dominant epistemological presuppositions about the doctrine of salvation. Taken altogether, these beliefs provide suffic...