The Struggle for Modern Nigeria

The Biafran War 1967-1970

Michael Gould

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2011
• Print ISBN: 9781848858640
• eBook ISBN: 9780857730954
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: African History
• Index: History

International media coverage in the 1960s and early 1970s represented the Biafran War, in which the state of Biafra attempted to secede from the Nigerian Federation, as a grand humanitarian disaster, characterised by sustained conflict, starvation and genocide. Using interviews and newly-released archival material, Michael Gould questions this depiction, examining the role of foreign parties in the conflict and the impact of propaganda upon its international reception both during and after the war. Envisaged initially by both sides as a short conflict, the war confounded all expectations, stretching on for four years. It was a 'brother's war', one which divided families, and was characterised overwhelmingly by both sides' reluctance to enter into hostilities. This book seeks to answer some of the most fundamental questions surrounding the conflict, including how this avoidable conflict came about, why the war became so drawn-out and how the leadership of the opposing Generals Ojukwu, who led the Biafran revolt and Gowon, who was President of the Nigerian Federation, defined the conflict.
In the process, Gould offers a radical reappraisal of the many entrenched conceptions which currently surround the conflict. This book will be essential reading for all students of African history and politics, and post-colonial studies.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

To the North … dwell the Hausa and Fulani, devout Moslem people governed by feudal emirs. The Western Region is the home of the Yoruba, a tribe known for its profusion of gods and its joie de vivre. To the East, where they are now trapped, the ambitious and clever Ibo people thrived. Brought together forcibly under colonial rule, the three regions developed the hatreds and jealousies of totally different cultures.¹

At the time of independence in 1960 Nigeria was ruled by Britain and the North’s oligarchic elite, together with their coalition partners. After independence it was this same group of people who were left in charge. Admittedly there was a veneer of parliamentary democracy, but rigged and corrupt voting seriously compromised democratic elections. This meant that although there were sincere attempts by well-meaning nationalists to ensure that democracy was potentially possible, the reality was that the parliamentary system left by the British was hopelessly undemocratic and factionalised.

The social upheaval, which led to the civil war, occurred because the accepted system of corruption and preferment, well established during British control, and readily adopted by the new rulers, was simply unsustainable if it was to accommodate all those who felt that they should be part of the ruling elite. It was workable when the British were in control, because the authority and power base was theirs alone. However democratising the system simply undermined the new rulers’ power base and made oligarchic rule impossible. There was deep frustration for those trying to get into the centre of government. They could see the oligarchy enriching themselves and their extended families to the detriment and disadvantage of the majority of the community. The problem was that Britain, concerned for her huge vested interests in the country, had chosen the people whom it thought would protect and develop those interests. This is exactly what the ruling oligarchy did, but to the disadvantage of the majority of the population. The following quotation, originally referring to Kenya, could equally apply to Nigeria: ‘The shared interests of this alliance were deliberately engineered by the British Government in the dying days of empire, as the colonial government sought to transfer power to a reliable and sympathetic elite.’²

The tragedy of the first coup was that because it did not achieve its objective of ridding the country of the ruling elite and, to a lesser extent, of corrupt politicians, but allowed the army to take control, as the army was an extension of the ruling oligarchic elite, the coup leaders simply handed control of the country from one elite group to another. The counter coup was simply the North’s opportunity to reassert itself and ensure that its ruling elite was put in charge of the country again. But this time, they were not there by the ballot box, however corrupt that was, but by the power of the gun.

Under British rule the army had remained firmly out of politics. After independence it became increasingly politicised, not for want of becoming political, but because that was the only way it could exercise power in support of the status quo and the oligarchic rulers, centred in the north of the country.³ Lower down in the army hierarchy, well-educated junior officers became increasingly vociferous and increasingly disillusioned with their senior officers and governing politicians who were seen to be enriching themselves at the expense of the rest of the country. This led to the point where they felt that the only hope for Nigeria’s salvation was open revolt, for nationalistic and altruistic reasons, certainly not for their own self-aggrandisement or enrichment.⁴

Northerners had historically failed to embrace western ideologies, continuing to favour their Muslim and Middle Eastern heritage, as encouraged by the British. The North’s tragedy was because it failed to adapt to western ways, there was a vacuum in its economic, educational and administrative development. Because the South had readily absorbed western ideology, its people were only too willing to fill this vacuum. This meant that much of the economic and administrative life of the North was controlled by people from the South. This state of affairs created serious ethnic tensions, leading to a series of riots of killing and property destruction immediately after the second coup, which the military administration seemed unable or unwilling to control.

The fact was that the North, by persecuting Easterners, created the catalyst for the East to secede from the federation in order to create an independent state. The Aburi meeting was an attempt by the military leaders to reach a compromise to secure the life of the federation by allowing the four regions to step apart, but within the confines of a federal state. If this had been confirmed and carried out by all the parties it is likely that a civil war would not have occurred, but, because the newly appointed military ruler, following the second coup, was encouraged by his senior civil servants and Britain to renege on the Aburi Accord, a war became inevitable.

The seceded state of Biafra regarded the war as a war of survival in order to gain permanent sovereignty, whereas the rest of Nigeria was solely intent on getting the renegade state to return to the federation, and thinking that this would prove an easy matter had no long term plans for achieving its objective. Throughout the war both sides suffered from a chronic shortage of arms but for totally different reasons.

Although, initially, Nigeria regarded attempts to subdue the recalcitrant region as a police action, such was the unpreparedness of both sides for war that Biafra very nearly capitulated after the first few days of the conflict. However, it proved intuitive in reversing this situation, eventually, to become seemingly impervious to continual Nigerian onslaughts. Furthermore, Biafra’s position was inadvertently strengthened by the media’s ability to bring the ravages of the war to the attention of the international community. The media made great play on portraying dying, starving and disease ridden children in Biafra. This led to the international aid agencies providing increasingly supportive aid. Unfortunately, some aid agencies were not adverse to supplying arms as part of their aid programme to Biafra. This together with ‘Attack Markets’ and the East’s innate creativeness led to the war’s longevity.

It proved to be a strange war in some respects. There were no major set battles, as was the case in World War II. It was a war of minor skirmishes, short sharp confrontations and localised incursions with ever changing boundaries, both sides being in the ascendant and descendant in almost equal measure throughout the campaign. In spite of there being some 300,000 troops⁵ eventually involved in the war for both sides, total casualties could have been as few as 30,000.⁶ It was also a war which featured prolonged periods when little fighting actually took place. Of course there were significant incidents during the campaign which gave the Federal Government greater confidence that they would achieve their objective of retaining the unity of Nigeria. Defining moments such as the debacle at Ore, the capture of Enugu and the fall of Port Harcourt all gave the Federal Authorities belief in an eventual victory. However, equally salutary from the Federal Government’s point of view, and which in turn gave Biafra confidence that it could achieve sovereign status, were Mohammed’s shambolic attempts to cross the river Niger and take the important trading town of Onitsha, the Abagana incident, which Ojukwu insisted on leaving as a victorious feature for visiting journalists to witness, and the amazing rout of part of Adekunle’s division at Owerri.

It was also a war which featured virtually no heavy armaments. During the war’s closing stages the Federal Authorities had the benefit of some Russian-supplied heavy guns, but they played very little part in bringing the war to a conclusion. Although random aerial bombing of markets, hospitals and civilians by Federal airmen featured heavily in Ojukwu’s campaign to discredit the Federal Authorities on the international stage, the reality was that it had very little effect on the outcome of the war. What, however, was true was the dramatic effect the airlift had on Biafra’s ability to survive, especially during the later stages of the campaign. It is also true to say that Von Rosen’s Mincom aircraft proved effective in disrupting the supply of oil to Lagos, but their effectiveness was really too late to prevent an eventual Biafran capitulation.

The war also created celebrity generals, especially Adekunle and Achuzia, both of whom gained a reputation for aggressive behaviour towards their troops, but who both enjoyed success and adulation by the public. Such was their popularity that both were removed from their commands for the apparent fear that they might have become threats to the leadership of both sides. Eventually the war came to an end, to the great relief of most people on both sides, and reconciliation and reunion with colleagues and families who had fought on opposing sides became of paramount importance, to the point where on the surface at least the scars of this war quickly healed. As John de St Jorre pointed out, this indeed was a brothers’ war.⁷

Chapter content

Chapter 2 considers the background to the conflict and concludes that one of the main reasons for the war was because of the historical divisiveness between the Hausa, Fulani people from the North and the Igbo people from the East. Arguably this division had always been a cause of conflict, which is shown by the rise and fall of various empires from Nigeria’s earliest history. This division was confirmed by the British who because of parsimony, and because of their consul’s experience in India, determined on a policy of indirect rule. This policy, whilst acceptable, and welcomed by the North, found little favour in the South, especially the South East, where a system of democracy was the more accepted norm. The question of ethnicity went to the very heart of the origins of the conflict, which was highlighted by Britain’s attitude to class, race, religion and education at the end of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. One of the main reasons for the war was the ethnic mix of people, within Nigeria, who had little understanding of their individual diversity. It also considers the country’s political development from its earliest days up to and after independence and shows how divisive the parliamentary single vote system proved to be, and how political power gave financial power. The two coups which brought the military into the political arena are analysed and the book finds that the first coup was not ethnically inspired, but was a sincere attempt by the military to rid the country of its corrupt political structure, as Ben Gbulie confirmed when interviewed.⁸ Gbulie, also, argues in his book Nigeria and the Five Majors that:

The truth of the matter, of course, was that the January coup was a coup of the progressive elements of the Nigerian Armed Forces - an intervention clearly necessitated by the breakdown of law and order in the country. It was therefore neither an ‘Igbo affair’ nor, for that matter the affair of any other ethnic group connected with it.⁹

The book confirms that the second coup was simply the North reasserting its power over the country. The chapter also considers the increasing tension between two military leaders. Gowon, who emerged as an acceptable military leader for the country, after the second coup and Ojukwu, who had been appointed by the previous military regime to administer the Eastern region. Ojukwu was unwilling to accept that Gowon had de facto control of the country.

Chapter 3 considers the events after the second coup, when the new military ruler, Gowon, found that his position was tenuous and precarious. Firstly because of the East’s and its military governor’s concern that Gowon was unable to stop the killings of Igbo people by Northerners, but secondly and most importantly the West’s ambivalence to support the new regime. Initially the West led by Awolowo, the Yoruba’s political leader and Adebayo, the West’s newly appointed military ruler, sought compromise with the East. As Nolte explains in her book:

By supporting the Gowon administration against Biafra, Awolowo disregarded, for the first time in his political career, popular opinion in his area of origin, Remo. After the clashes of 1965 and 1966, many Remo citizens were sceptical about the central government and thought that Yorubaland should secede from the federation, just like Biafra … Throughout the Civil War, people in Remo housed and hid Igbo refugees who were in danger of being arrested for detention by central government.

She goes on to comment:

One of the most important reasons for Awolowo’s support of the military government was Gowon’s determination to break up Nigeria’s regions into twelve states, which closely reflected Awolowo’s own views on Nigeria’s political future.¹⁰

Ojukwu came to the Aburi meeting with an agenda confirming that the four regions within the federation should move apart and indeed that the federation should become more like a confederation. The other parties had no fixed agenda, treating the meeting more as a discussion to gain consensus on the way to keep Nigeria united. Ojukwu’s carefully prepared plans convinced the other regional military leaders, including Gowon, of the soundness of his proposals. Sadly, as the chapter explains, Gowon reneged on the agreement.

The creation of many more states within the federation had always received support from Awolowo, and indeed had been considered during early colonial rule. Its focus was highlighted by Isaac Boro’s ill-fated attempt to form an independent state in the Delta region. Although it had a very limited life, it did have the effect of determining the military regime to confirm the creation of more states.

The chapter looks at the state of readiness by both for war at the start of hostilities, the near defeat of Biafra at the start of the war and Biafra’s attempt to defeat the Federal Government’s forces by invading the West. It also discusses the lack of awareness of the conflict by the international community until newspapers and television were able to bring photographic evidence to the attention of their readers and viewers.

Chapter 4 discusses how Ojukwu made good use of pictorial press releases to convince the world of his cause. He was able to persuade most countries in the West that they should support Biafra, at least with humanitarian aid, if not recognition. He was also able to use, to good effect, his unrivalled intelligence network, some of whose Igbo members were prominent in Gowon’s headquarters in Lagos. However as discussed his command and control of the region was often suspect particularly with regard to Biafra’s army. There were many instances where he restricted the supply of arms and food to his troops, exposing them to unnecessary risk and hardship, and allowed his civil executive power and control over the army, both of which were detrimental to Biafra’s success. This was in sharp contrast to Gowon’s laissez-faire approach with his generals. He gave them so much independence that in some instances they were accused of running their own fiefdoms, having total responsibility for buying and supplying arms to their divisions.

This in turn often led to a detrimental effect on the federation army’s ability to achieve its objectives, leading to a number of serious reverses.

Chapter 5 covers the intriguing ability of Biafra to suffer many reverses and defeats, and yet always to find resources which ensured her survival, which helped create the war’s longevity. They ranged from attempts at settling the dispute through outside agencies, where Biafra would remain intransigent over its demands for sovereignty, to the use of propaganda through the excellent use of a foreign news agency, who became so authoritative in communicating its cause that even the British Cabinet would refer to it for confirmation of current events. It also considers the extensive use of Biafra’s natural resources as well as its support and use of highly skilled and resourceful scientists who were able to devise many intriguing ways of helping Biafra to survive.

Chapter 6 considers the different styles, leadership and background of Gowon and Ojukwu, making extensive use of personal interviews not only with the two leaders but also with many people who had day to day contact with them, from their earliest days to the time throughout the war. It is an intriguing fact that neither men sought their positions of power. Both were appointed because of circumstance, therefore arguably neither had dictatorship ambitions to remain in power indefinitely. Indeed they gave the impression when interviewed that they both had had a job to do, that they exercised this to the best of their ability, ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• About the Author
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Maps
• Foreword
• Preface
• Acknowledgment
• Chapter 1: Introduction
• Chapter 2: Historical Background
• Chapter 3: The Path to War and Its Beginning
• Chapter 4: The Second Part of the War: From Mid-1968 to January 1970
• Chapter 5: Biafra’s Longevity
• Chapter 6: Gowon and Ojukwu: An Appraisal of the Two Leaders 149
• Chapter 7: Conclusion
• Appendix 1: Documents showing Nigerian arms imports from Britain 1967–1969
• Appendix 2: Document confirming the potential doubling of Nigerian oil revenue by 1970
• Appendix 3: Documents confirming the proposed sale of Biafran natural resources to Rothschild Bank, Paris
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Plates