The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey

Military Coups, Socialist Revolution and Kemalism

Özgür Mutlu Ulus

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2010
• Print ISBN: 9781848854840
• eBook ISBN: 9780857738677
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

In 1960s Turkey, the armed forces and the radical leftist movement provided two very dynamic, but very different, political forces. However, somewhat surprisingly, the majority of radical leftists believed in the revolutionary potential of the armed forces in overthrowing the current regime and replacing it with a quasi-socialist one. This book considers the changing perspectives of the radical leftist movement towards the political role of the military in Turkey. Using a textual analysis of different leftist groups, including the Communist Party of Turkey, Ozgur Mutlu Ulus describes the development of the leftist movement in Turkey after the 1960 coup and explains why most leftists chose to encourage a military revolution, which they hoped would bring about the triumph of socialism in Turkey.

1

INTRODUCTION

1 Research goals and questions

To a child even the most ordinary, sterile life can seem like always being tuned in to the Discovery Channel. When I was seven I made one of my most unpleasant discoveries – when smoke comes from chimneys on a hot sunny day it is not good news at all. I woke up on a typical hot late summer’s day, 12 September 1980 to be precise, and saw smoke coming from many houses in my home town of Bursa. I looked out of the window in wonder at the busy town of Bursa and saw nothing but military trucks driving around the town amid fumes all day long. I learned to my amazement that books were being burned, which these were and why they were being burned. My parents, typical middle-class, left-inclined ‘intellectuals’, decided to gamble with their lives and not to burn their copies of these books. All the works of Marx and Lenin and some by Mao or Stalin just stood in the living room on top of the TV shelf for the next few months, hovering over the scenes of the military tanks and generals like a time bomb. We were lucky. They had looked for my mother, who was an administrator in the Association of Teachers Union of Turkey [Türkiye Öğretmenler Birliği Derneği: TÖB-DER], at her school, but she had already escaped.

Those who play cards professionally claim that luck is just an illusion – one really needs to know how to play. Politics, Thomas Hobbes once suggested, is like a game of cards: the players must agree which suit is to be trumps. In politics, he added, whenever no other suit is agreed upon, clubs are trumps.¹ The army’s role in the Middle East is sometimes explained by this fact, the atrophy of politics and the diffuseness of economic groups lead to violence as the prima ratio of politics.² Whether such was the case in Turkey in 1980, it was obvious from the start, at least from the announcement of the military takeover, what the clubs were set against. That was why everybody burned some books, but not others. That was why the extreme right with its combat squads (the Grey Wolves), who were also arrested, were quite in a state of shock. The Chief of Staff and the Commander of the coup d’état, General Kenan Evren, explained later that the takeover plans were drawn up to combat the working-class unions with their 15–20,000 militant members and the extreme leftist groups.

Only fifteen years earlier most socialists, however, had assumed that Turkey could never be like Greece – ruled by a fascist junta. The majority of the leftists in 1960–71, reminiscent of Hobbes rather than Marx, actually believed in the revolutionary potential of the armed forces for the transformation of the government into a quasi-socialist regime. The present work aims to provide answers to the causes and the consequences of adopting revolutionary lines built on, favouring or expecting revolutionary action from the Turkish army. Why did the leftists assume that the Turkish armed forces, as part of the NATO army, would overthrow the present regime in order to replace it with a socialist one? How did they formulate their views on the political role of the army and reconcile these with Marxism or leftism? Why was such a strategy so overwhelmingly advocated by most leftists including overtly revolutionary communist ones? As we know with hindsight that the socialist wave of the 1960s was terminated by a reactionary military intervention in 1971, something which the left did not expect, what does such an inaccurate assumption tell us about the nature of leftist movements?

The study examines the discourse and the perspective of the radical leftist movement on the political role of the military in 1960–71 through a descriptive historical analysis by proposing answers to such key questions as these. The discourse and perspective of each leftist group active in the 1960s has been examined by means of a textual analysis complemented by a study of simultaneous actual practice to see how political thought had an impact on organizational forms, sometimes to the extent of establishing juntas by military officers. The textual analysis will show us the mentality of the left, and how contemporary social and political realities were interpreted. This can help us understand not only how the ideology of the Turkish left was drawn in its age of ‘take-off’, but also its characteristics, especially in terms of international Marxist movements. The actual practice, on the other hand, will lead us to the consequences of the revolutionary lines constructed on the initiatives taken by the army. This will provide us with a clear idea of the trajectory of the leftist movement as the following decade, the 1970s, took up the legacy of the 1960s. As many leftist circles and their revolutionary ideas had their roots in this period, the impact of the 1960s was widespread in the following years.

The impact of the 27 May intervention and the reinvention of Kemalism, the Ba’ath and Nasser regimes in the neighbouring Middle East countries and the liberation wars conducted by nationalist armies in African or Asian countries will be considered, as well as the tradition of the leftist movement in Turkey, and especially its relation to and understanding of Kemalism for a clarification of conjectural versus structural and/or historical factors in the affirmation of military interventions. After all, the ambivalent and even supportive attitude of the left to the 28 February 1997 intervention shows that such approaches could not be explained purely by conjectural developments (as has generally been argued by the participants of the movement in the 1960s) and the opportunity for a left-inclined intervention in the 1960s. I suggest that the intermingling of international developments, such as the Castro regime in Cuba, Nasser’s regime in Egypt and the Ba’ath regimes in Syria, with internal developments – the 27 May coup and the liberal constitution that followed – all contributed to the ideology of the leftists. However, internalization of the Kemalist ideology (as nation-state-building ideology), the Communist Party of Turkey [Türkiye Komünist Partisi: TKP] tradition, and the traditional lack of a class struggle paradigm in the leftist movement were the underlying and main determinants.

One of the significant problems in analysing the leftist movements in the 1960s is the sectarianism of the Turkish left. Why the left cannot maintain unity in Turkey has perhaps been one of the most widely posed questions. The analysis of the leftists’ perceptions on the role of the army will also shed light on fractionalization and its causes in the 1960s. One of my central arguments in this book is that the factions were mainly determined by different approaches to the political role of the army. This was also the case for the years towards the end of the decade, with divisions seen to be due to a different position on the issue or sectarianism being justified by assumedly different approaches. However, these were later understood as differences in strategies, first of all the parliamentary road versus the revolutionary road to socialism, and in later years the preference for a popular war versus urban and rural guerrillas. Even though the Turkish left is notorious for its ability to steadily continue a form of organization, the divisions in the 1960s and how they were acknowledged were extremely important because of their relevance for attitudes towards the army. An interesting feature of the leftist movements, which is also important for the following periods, was that the revolutionary circles had built their revolutionary theory and practice mainly on the support of intervention by left-wing military officers. Only the Workers’ Party of Turkey [Türkiye İşçi Partisi: TİP] had advocated a parliamentary road for transition into socialism and rejected transformation initiated through a coup. This was actually one of the grave paradoxes of the left: revolutionary currents had advocated carrying out a revolution, or more simply a change of order, through the initiative of the ‘forces of order’. The work will explain the basis of such a paradox and how it was overlooked as the role of the army was understood within a different conceptualization, especially under socio-political categories such as ‘military-civilian intelligentsia’, ‘national bourgeoisie’, ‘intermediary layers’, ‘vigorous forces’, ‘Jacobin petty bourgeoisie’ or ‘nationalist revolutionaries’.

2 Outline

The work covers the period between the two successful military interventions of 1960–71. The new constitution after the 1960 coup that expanded democratic rights and freedoms gave the ultra-left, which up to then had had to operate mostly underground, an opportunity to exist legally. Marxist or quasi-Marxist movements, which are generally referred to in Turkey as the ‘left’ or ‘extreme left’, expanded and diversified enormously during the 1960s. All movements that defined themselves as ‘radical leftist’, those with a socialist or revolutionary agenda and that have generally been regarded as such, have been included in the analysis. The left-of-centre party, the Republican People’s Party [Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi: CHP], which underwent an indeterminate and problematical twist after the mid-sixties mostly under the impact of the TİP, has not been included. These radical leftist movements generally define themselves as ‘socialist’ hence I have used the terms ‘left’ and ‘socialist’ inter-changeably throughout the work.

Even though the Communist Party of Turkey was one of the oldest political parties, remarkably, basic Marxist books could only be translated and published after 1960. Leftists could then formulate their opinions and debate in a relatively free environment, particularly in the new political journals or newspapers, which determined the course of action in the following periods. Apart from the TKP being tied to Moscow, all other groups were independent radical leftist or diverse socialist movements, and communism was still subject to penalty. However, apart from the TİP there was a lack of organization. Communists who were criminally convicted due to their political allegiance could not establish a political party nor become members of one, hence the opponents, or outside supporters of the TİP gathered around journals, societies, clubs and associations, and towards the end of the decade in party fronts which were referred to as the ‘guerrillas’.

The difficulty in analysing the approach to the political role of the army is related to the fact that, as could be expected, there was no thematic discussion of the question by the actors involved. Sometimes the political role of the army was tackled directly, but at other times it was only hinted at in speeches or written material. Moreover, a subject that seems very unlikely or unrelated, such as the discussion of the economic mode of production of the Ottoman empire, could have implications, or a concealed agenda, concerning the political role of the army. Yet the role of the army was the bottom line of almost all discussions, separations, and divergence, but this can only be reconstructed by following passing clues and hints spread throughout speeches, recorded conversations and articles, and by making an overall assessment of the development of each group. The role of the army was generally discussed under revolutionary strategy, as revolutionary actors or especially as the revolutionary vanguard. Moreover, it was discussed under the guise of various concepts, such as the role of the ‘military-civilian intelligentsia’, ‘national bourgeoisie’, ‘intermediary layers’, ‘vigorous forces’, ‘bureaucracy’, ‘Kemalists’, ‘petty bourgeoisie’, ‘Jacobin petty bourgeoisie’, ‘state servants’, ‘nationalist revolutionaries’, ‘Young Turks army’ and even ‘bourgeois bureaucracy’ in a political revolutionary movement. As a result of the quantity of such concepts and the inconsistency in their use, I have chosen to conduct a chronological analysis rather than a thematic one; this also helps the analysis of changes in mentality and corresponding variations in terminology.

Each chapter is devoted to one single movement among the radical left. As the Turkish left has a tendency to split infinitely, with group membership being rather fluid, the positions of the actors were determined according to the main ideological movements which were reflected by some sort of separate organization. As each chapter is devoted to a single movement, all the chapters will start by providing general information on the particular movement under discussion. Where necessary brief background information will be provided to place the position of the movement in the 1960s more effectively, as in the case of the TKP. The approach taken to important developments such as Colonel Talat Aydemir’s failed coup attempts, the Cyprus conflict, the 1965 general election and its results, the workers’ revolt of 15–16 June, and finally the 12 March intervention will be considered for each of the movements. A brief survey of the political role of the military in Turkey is provided before the chapters on socialist movements, especially for readers unfamiliar with the history of Turkey. This chapter is based entirely on secondary literature as it is intended only as a general introduction.

The first chapter about the particular movements is a survey and analysis of the Yön movement, generally regarded as a ‘left Kemalist’ movement. It was formed and developed around a political journal, Yön, which became increasingly popular and influential in the mid-1960s. It is followed by the Devrim movement, the offspring of Yön. Devrim was the journal of the 9 March junta, a conspiracy consisting of retired and active military officers and civil intellectuals, the main cadre of Yön–Devrim writers. Though these two movements are intertwined they are examined separately as there were elements within Yön opposed to Devrim’s strategy, and a larger group of actors were involved in Yön than with Devrim. Most importantly, the conflicts within Yön itself led to the adoption of the Devrim strategy, which needs further clarification.

Doğan Avcıoğlu, the main thinker within both Yön and Devrim, had influenced the younger revolutionaries perhaps more than the basic Marxist works. Even the classics of socialism and communism were only translated into Turkish in the mid-1960s and they were not widely circulated, unlike Avcıoğlu’s popular book, Türkiye’nin Düzeni [The Order of Turkey]. The book was very influential in shaping the view of the younger generations who lacked any ties to a socialist or communist tradition. Avcıoğlu did not consider himself to be a Marxist, and he is generally perceived as an elite Jacobin whose political mission ended with the 12 March intervention, which, however, undermined his influence in the socialist movement of the decade.

The next chapter is devoted to the most important socialist party in the history of Turkey – the TİP. The party is of essential importance as it was the first openly socialist party to gain seats in parliament, with only a few, but very intelligent and vocal members, such as Çetin Altan, Behice Boran and Mehmet Ali Aybar. The TİP significantly managed to establish a federation of revolutionary workers’ trade unions [Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu: DİSK] under the leadership of trade unionists in the party. The party pulled together diverse groups, trade unionists, socialist intellectuals, Kurdish socialist intellectuals and Alevites. However, it was dissolved, mainly because of the reaction of the leftist group that implicitly favoured the intervention of the army for a socialist conversion and the inability of the party to cope with these reactions. The TİP was actually an aberration in Turkish leftist history as it advocated socialist revolution as a contemporary revolutionary stage. The socialist revolution discourse, however, was mainly set against the leftists supporting the initiative of the army.

The chapter on the TİP is followed by a study of the National Democratic Revolutionaries [Milli Demokratik Devrimciler: NDR]. The NDR was born initially as an ideological rival of the TİP. Its first leader, Mihri Belli, was a TKP convict, who actually considered the small group led by him to be the ‘real TKP’.³ This group did not recognize the external bureau of the TKP, which was tied to Moscow, nor its appointed General Secretary, Zeki Baştımar. The problem was also due to a political disagreement and the resulting leadership struggle between Belli and Baştımar, which had led to a huge dispute and split in the TKP when it was on trial during 1951. The TKP was factionalized into camps supporting ‘Zekiciler’ and ‘Mihriciler’. Mihriciler in particular accused Baştımar of speaking to the police. Baştımar had preferred a political defence and therefore admitted that many of those on trial had TKP membership. However, he had not actually revealed the identity of very important members who were to be influential in the 1960s, particularly Behice Boran and Sadun Aren.⁴ Belli claims to this day that he had actually opposed the order of the ‘Soviet bureaucracy’ to establish TKP outside Turkey with Zeki Baştımar its General Secretary.⁵

Belli was close ideologically to the Yön circle in his perspective on the army, and also had a personal relationship with Doğan Avcıoğlu, especially up to the late 1960s. The NDR circle published political journals such as Türk Solu and Aydınlık and founded one of the most important leftist publishing houses of the time, the Sol Yayınları. NDR managed to attract university students through the ‘Idea Clubs’ founded initially by the TİP around the years 1968–9. This was actually the main success of the NDR. However, the movement immediately started to factionalize in early 1970. The sixth chapter will include all the splinter groups born out of the NDR strategy – sometimes in reaction to its Machiavellian expectations for the army to carry out the national democratic revolution ideology – namely the People’s Liberation Party-Front of Turkey [Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Parti-Cephesi: THKP-C], the People’s Liberation Army of Turkey [Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu: THKO] and the group initially defining itself as Proletarian Revolutionary Enlightenment [Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık: PDA].⁶ The chapter will question particularly whether there was a break or continuity in the splintering of the NDR movement with reference to the approach to the army.

This will be followed by a study of the line of the TKP, External Bureau. The TKP consisted of a small group acting abroad linked directly to Moscow. It naturally had very little impact, but it needs to be studied, however, as the TKP suddenly became one of the most important socialist/communist movements when it moved to Turkey in the 1970s. Furthermore, as communism was still subject to penalty in Turkey it can ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• About the Author
• LIBRARY OF MODERN MIDDLE EAST STUDIES
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• 1 INTRODUCTION
• 1 Research goals and questions
• 2 Outline
• 3 Sources and earlier literature
• 2 THE TURKISH MILITARY IN POLITICS: A SHORT SURVEY
• 1 The Turkish army and the founding of the republic
• 2 The 27 May intervention
• 3 12 March 1971: intervention through an ultimatum
• 3 BETWEEN KEMALISM AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENTALISM: DOĞAN AVCIOĞLU AND YÖN
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Politics after the 1960 intervention: vigorous forces as the revolutionary vanguard
• 3 Socialism as a development model
• 4 Yön pushing for reforms
• 5 Organizing opposition: the founding of the SKD
• 6 Organizing an anti-imperialist common front
• 7 Elections and disillusionment: direction of Yön settled
• 8 Co-operation with an ‘old-guard’ for NDR
• 4 REVOLUTION THROUGH THE NARROW DOOR
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The Order of Turkey: the manifesto of the ‘Nationalist Revolutionaries’
• 3 The media of the junta: Devrim
• 4 Between theory and practice: 9 March or 12 March?
• 5 THE WORKERS’ PARTY OF TURKEY: THE LONG ROAD TO SOCIALISM
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Socialist revolution discourse: TİP as the vanguard
• 3 TİP against ‘short-cuts’ to socialism
• 4 Rifts in the party: NDR or SR?
• 5 A feudal or an Asiatic state? New discussions on the role of the army
• 6 Disappointment in elections and disappearance of trust
• 7 Towards the 12 March military intervention and after
• 8 A brief conclusion
• 6 THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARIES AND THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ARMY
• 1 Introduction
• 2 No short-cut to socialism: socialism through NDR
• 3 NDR opposition in the TİP
• 4 The revolutionary vanguard problem: the role of the Kemalists, bureaucracy and the army in NDR
• 5 Establishing a national front
• 6 NDR and student militancy: the 1968 generation
• 7 NDR factions and their discourse on the army
• 7 THE VOICE OF THE TKP FROM ABROAD
• 1 Introduction
• 2 A concise review of the ideology of the TKP up to the 1960s
• 3 The TKP in the 1960s as an ‘external bureau’
• 4 The TKP in the mid-1960s: the revolutionary leadership problem
• 5 Workers’ revolt and the ambivalent position of the army
• 6 The military intervention and reaction of the TKP
• 7 Conclusion
• 8 THE KIVILCIMLI MOVEMENT IN SEARCH OF THE TURKISH PAST FOR A REVOLUTIONARY WARRIOR CULTURE
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The Kıvılcımlı movement in the 1960s
• 3 Kıvılcımlı’s political thinking about the army
• 4 Kıvılcımlı’s approach to the military interventions of 1960 and 1971
• 5 Conclusion
• 9 CONCLUSION
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The armed forces as the guardian of the republic
• 3 Revolution through a coup or by means of a united national front
• 4 The anti-imperialist alliance: a problematic relationship
• 5 The revised Soviet theory and its impact on the Turkish left
• 6 Divergence in the Turkish left: SR strategy and the revolutionary leadership problem
• 7 Final remarks: the army, the state and capitalist relations
• Notes
• Bibliography