A History of the Royal Navy

The Seven Years War

Martin Robson

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781780765457
• eBook ISBN: 9780857728784
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Law
• Subtopic: Economic History
• Index: Law

The Seven Years War (1756-1763) was the first global conflict and became the key factor in creating the British Empire. This book looks at Britain's maritime strategic, operational and tactical success (and failures), through a wide-ranging history of the Royal Navy's role in the war. By the end of the war in 1763 Britain was by no means a hegemonic power, but it was the only state capable of sustained global power projection on a global scale. Key to Britain's success was political and strategic direction from London, through the war planning of Pitt the Elder and the successful implementation of his policies by a stellar cast of naval and military leaders at an operational and tactical level. Martin Robson highlights the work of some of the key protagonists in the Royal Navy, such as Admiral Hawke whose appreciation of the wider strategic context at Quiberon Bay in 1759 decided the fate of North America, but he also provides insights into the experience of life in the lower decks at this time. Robson ultimately shows that the creation, containment and expansion of the British Empire was made possible by the exercise of maritime power through the Royal Navy.

Chapter 1

‘Voilà, the war begun’

The Countdown to War,
1754–6

The year 1756 is a very ‘European’ date for the start of the Seven Years War, for it ignores an ongoing situation between France and Britain in North America where blood had already been spilt. The continued problems in North America between Britain and France had their roots in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle which had, supposedly, ended the War of the Austrian Succession in 1748. The treaty had settled nothing, and imperial competition and eventual conflict in North America was the result.

French possessions in North America were concentrated in the south around New Orleans, and the north-east around Montreal and Quebec. With British possessions along and inland from the Eastern Seaboard the potential for Anglo-French disputes to turn into conflict were therefore concentrated into three distinct areas around Nova Scotia, New York and the Ohio Valley, though it must be pointed out that the proximity of New Orleans to the British West Indies islands was also seen as a cause for concern.

With the Royal Navy’s presence at sea, the only way for France to link up her disparate possessions was via the Mississippi and Ohio rivers, then via Lakes Erie and Ontario. The journey between the Ohio and Lake Erie was overland and this area of territory, home to the Iroquois Confederation of Native Americans, was the direct cause of conflict erupting in North America between Britain and France. In Versailles, French intentions were not necessarily to block westward expansion of the British colonies, but that is what was happening on the ground. It was certainly perceived that way in London. Initial skirmishes between the French and British colonial forces had seen the British rebuffed, and in 1754 the French completed Fort Duquesne where the Ohio forks into the Allegheny and Monongahela rivers (the former heading north towards Lake Erie).

The events of 1754 show that conflict could be a reality outside of formal declared war between European states. Eighteenth-century statesmen recognised the concept of ‘reprisal’ in the colonial sphere, tit-for-tat small wars fought by colonial forces over disputed territory. It did not always involve a state of war between European powers. The problem would arise when formal regular troops, either from colonial possessions or sent from Europe, tipped the balance one way or the other, usually leading to the other side sending out regular reinforcements, thereby creating a cycle of escalation. The other manner in which escalation could occur would be if recognised territorial possessions were attacked.

It is, therefore, important to point out that France and Britain were both transatlantic powers (albeit of different scale and importance) with interests in North America and Europe (and beyond for that matter). Three Navigation Acts in the 1650s and 1660s created a transatlantic ‘maritime imperial system’ for Britain based upon trade and shipping, and this generated wealth that allowed for the more effective management of public finance than her continental neighbours. By 1755 nearly half of all shipping sailing from English ports was long-distance oceanic, and this provided a pool of skilled seamen to man merchantmen in time of peace and warships in time of conflict. While Britain did have interests in Europe, separated from Continental Europe by the Channel and the Royal Navy, the foundation of her power was a clear head start in the transatlantic economy. On the other hand, while possessing North American colonies and a growing merchant marine, in 1754 France most certainly was still more a Continental European power. For Britain, any power fighting France in Europe would also distract French resources away from a maritime colonial conflict. So while it might be a neat historical division to treat the war for empire and the power struggle in central Europe as separate entities, the reality was much more complex and challenging.¹

The British government was keen to respond to the setbacks of 1754, but without provoking escalation into a wider European war. The British domestic political scene was, however, entering a period of uncertainty which influenced policy and strategy. When Prime Minister Henry Pelham died on 6 March 1754 he was succeeded by his brother the Duke of Newcastle. The Newcastle administration would receive much criticism for its policies until replaced by the Pitt–Devonshire ministry on 16 November 1756. This arrangement lasted until May, when it in turn fell from office after the loss of Minorca and the execution of Admiral Byng. There followed a period where there was no effective government until the formation of the Pitt–Newcastle ministry of 25 June 1757. That lasted until the death of George II and the accession of his grandson, George III, which saw another change in the political make up with the rise of his favourite, the Earl of Bute.²

Upon coming to power in 1754 Newcastle’s main foreign policy focus was North America and how to prevent conflict spreading to Europe. The recent past showed how difficult that might be. The War of the Austrian Succession, begun as a colonial conflict between Britain and Spain in 1739, served as a recent example of the near impossibility of preventing colonial conflict spreading to Europe. Moreover, the situation in Europe in 1754 was distinctly unfavourable for British interests. Although the Bourbon family compact, which tied together France and Spain, was waning a little due to the precarious state of Spanish finances, British aggression might lead to the implementation of a Franco-Spanish alliance. This would add Spanish colonial resources and, importantly, Spanish warships to the forces that France could assemble to take the war to Britain. It was important, therefore, for Britain not to be seen as an aggressor.³

Another issue was the relationship between Prussia and France. This was based around a military agreement of 1741 whereby France paid for 20,000 German troops to be at the disposal of Frederick of Prussia. In 1754 London did not know what Prussian intentions were, while talk of Germany raised the question of King George II’s electorate of Hanover – a vexing security complication. Newcastle argued for the exertion of British influence through alliances to deter aggression and to preserve the peace; the main object of Newcastle’s ‘system’ was to prevent the invasion of Hanover, not by France but by the apparently aggressive and ambitious Frederick of Prussia. If Hanover fell into enemy hands, then its freedom would have to be secured by giving up colonial conquests or possessions, an option that might work with regards to France but not with Prussia. The danger posed by France or a French ally to Hanover was a contributory factor to the British wartime policy of seizing French overseas territory in case a territorial exchange was needed. So, as much as British politicians would like to limit war to North America in order to limit the threat to Hanover, if war with France did spread to Europe it would likely involve colonial and European operations.⁴

In that regard the prospects for keeping France occupied in Europe to give Britain a free hand overseas as exalted by Newcastle were not that good. Moreover, Hanover in the hands of the French had the potential to give the French navy access to the North Sea. This was important for the final area of concern to Newcastle: the Austrian-controlled Netherlands. The security of British colonies ‘depended on the integrity of the Mother Country’s naval position in the Narrow Seas’; French access to the North Sea, especially from both Antwerp and the Texel, would fundamentally undermine the cornerstone of British naval policy: stationing the Royal Navy’s Western Squadron in the western approaches to the English Channel. For Britain, any price was worth paying to prevent Continental Europe’s most powerful military power possessing deep water, accessible ports on the North Sea, as this threatened invasion. Preventing the French from obtaining access to the Low Countries, and the Scheldt estuary in particular, was the main British security concern in Europe. Versailles could assemble an army of over 300,000 men for military operations, way beyond the British ability to muster a mere 80,000 men. France also possessed the world’s second largest navy and a growing economy.⁵

Set against such an unfavourable European situation, British diplomacy initially seemed successful. Discussions with smaller German states led to the hiring of mercenaries to provide an army to defend Hanover. Talks with Russia, where the Tsaritsa displayed a pathological hatred of Frederick, were designed to deter Prussia from attacking Hanover by prompting a Russian army to invade Prussia from the east. With somewhat cordial relations between London and Madrid, Spain seemed determined on neutrality, which was good news for British ministers as Spanish belligerence would immediately alter the balance of naval forces. In June 1756 the French could muster 62 ships of the line and 38 frigates, compared to the Royal Navy’s 89 ships of the line. The Spanish navy possessed 39 ships of the line, which could tip the balance of naval power. War with Spain would raise issues of Mediterranean security, in particular the safety of Gibraltar, as well as the security of Portugal and its excellent harbour at Lisbon; it would also raise the spectre of a joint invasion attempt of the British Isles. Overseas, a Franco-Spanish alliance might see the Royal Navy unable to guarantee the protection of West Indian islands and trade.⁶

That left Austria, which might yet be persuaded to stay out of an Anglo-French conflict. But Vienna was still seething at Frederick’s seizure of Silesia in 1740, adding further potential for a European conflagration of exactly the type the Newcastle ministry desperately wished to avoid. Talks between London and Versailles to avoid conflict stalled; the latter wanted an armistice, the former a definite treaty on North American territory.

The Newcastle ministry, faced with the need to keep conflict in North America from spreading to Europe, were desperate to avoid the appearance of British aggression. But, while acting on the strategic defensive, in order to achieve the aim in North America some kind of operational and tactical offensive had to be implemented. In response to the setbacks in the Ohio Valley in September 1754, the Newcastle government decided to secretly reinforce North American garrisons. As Newcastle himself noted, if the French were not brought into line ‘All North America will be lost’. With this decision ‘1754 must be considered the year in which the global Seven Years War between Britain and France began’.⁷

The reinforcement would consist of two British regular infantry regiments, the 44th and 48th Foot, under Major General Edward Braddock; this would show Versailles how serious the British were taking the French incursion. If the French backed down, all well and good, if not then there was nothing left but to forcibly remove the French from Fort Duquesne. In that case, wrote Newcastle, ‘We then begin the war’. What was needed was a quick British victory to nip French ambitions in the bud and deter Versailles from further escalation.⁸

The initial object of the Braddock expedition was limited to the removal of the French from forts in the disputed Ohio territory. It was not an attack on recognised sovereign territory. But in a case of ‘mission creep’ it was expanded to include attacks on other French positions on Lake Ontario and in Nova Scotia. This was far too much for Braddock’s force, so he was vested with the command of all British regular forces in North America. Wider aims gave greater prospect for escalation; even worse, secrecy was lost. The French knew something was afoot and would surely respond, creating an escalatory cycle of the kind the Braddock expedition was meant to forestall. Sailing from Cork on 16 January, still in time of peace, Braddock’s force was escorted by the 50-gun ships Centurion, flying the flag of Commodore Augustus Keppel, and Norwich. Braddock arrived in Hampton Roads on 19 February 1755, with his troops following on 10 March.⁹

The problem with Newcastle’s strategy was that it ignored the very linchpin of any strategy to isolate North America, or anywhere else overseas: the Royal Navy’s Western Squadron. In time of peace, getting the Western Squadron to sea might deter Versailles. In war its task was not to blockade French ports in a strict sense, but rather to cruise off Ushant and keep a watch over the French Atlantic ports, in particular Brest. So placed, it would prevent any invasion attempt of the British Isles. It would also interdict French ships carrying reinforcements for North America, but that entailed intercepting them in European waters – precisely the kind of aggressive action that might add a European dimension to the conflict. The next-best option was to interdict French forces when they arrived in North American waters, as that would appear more akin to imperial defensive measures.

Fig. 1.1. Admiral Edward Boscawen

The need to do this became more acute when the French, fully aware of Braddock’s reinforcements, decided to up the game. By April 1755 they had collected 14 ships of the line containing around 3,000 troops at Brest. On 10 April 1755 the British Cabinet, prompted by the French stance in ongoing negotiations and the obvious naval preparations at Brest, rubber-stamped the decision to send a squadron of seven ships of the line to be stationed off Louisbourg. It was contrary to the principle of concentrating force in home waters to protect British interests overseas, but uppermost in the minds of British ministers was the desire to keep any conflict confined to North America. The Royal Navy officer tasked with the job was Admiral Edward Boscawen. His object was made patently clear:

If you fall in with any French ships of war or other vessels having on board troops or other warlike stores you will do your best to take possession of them. In case resistance should be made, you will employ the means at your disposal to capture and destroy them.

Following a further French claim to the entire extent of the disputed territory, the size of Boscawen’s squadron was increased to 11 ships of the line and he sailed on 27 April 1755. It had, however, proved difficult to procure seamen for the fleet and many of his ships were undermanned while many of those sailors he did have were already suffering from sickness.¹⁰

The French expedition, now numbering 19 ships of the line and six frigates, sailed on 3 May under Admiral Emmanuel-Auguste de la Motte. Although six of the French sail of the line were only to accompany...

Table of contents

• Biography
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• List of Illustrations
• Maps
• Colour Plates
• Series Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction ‘At 12 Mr Byng was shot’
• 1 ‘Voilà, the war begun’: The Countdown to War, 1754–6
• 2 ‘What a scandal to the Navy’: The Mediterranean, 1756–8
• 3 ‘To protect the trade and annoy the enemy’: Home Waters, 1756–8
• 4 ‘It would be a pity to disappoint them’: The West Indies, East Indies and Africa
• 5 ‘An entire good understanding between our Sea and Land Officers’: North America, 1756–8
• 6 ‘Our bells are worn threadbare with ringing for victories’: The Annus Mirabilis, Part 1: Lagos Bay and Quebec
• 7 ‘Heart of Oak’: The Annus Mirabilis, Part 2: Quiberon Bay
• 8 ‘Not the least fear of them being at sea filled me either with distraction or irresolution’: Home Waters, 1760–3
• 9 ‘An expedition of great consequence’: A Global War, 1760–3
• Epilogue ‘Victories which augment her honour and her riches’: Manila
• Conclusion ‘A vast Empire, on which the sun never sets’
• Notes
• Select Bibliography
• Plates