A History of Czechoslovakia Between the Wars

From Versailles to Hitler's Invasion

Patrick Crowhurst

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781780763439
• eBook ISBN: 9780857729002
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 20th Century History
• Index: History

Here, Patrick Crowhurst identifies the crucial political problem that faced Czechoslovakia between 1918 and 1939 - the rift between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans that would open the way for the rise of Konrad Henlein's right-wing 'Sudeten Deutsch' party, and which was exploited ruthlessly by Hitler during Nazi Germany's 1938 annexation of Czechoslovakia. A History of Czechoslovakia Between the Wars deepens our understanding of a fragile Europe before World War II, and is essential for students and scholars of 20th century history.

CHAPTER 1

CZECHS VS GERMANS; ROLES REVERSED

Many Germans, especially if they were from the Sudetenland, would argue that the mistreatment of the Sudeten Germans after World War I was the major cause of World War II. They would point to the enmity between Czechs and Sudeten Germans and the Czech refusal to grant them equal status in the First Czechoslovak Republic. They would also argue that Sudeten German industry was not given equal status in the new state, though contributing to its economic success. This caused dangerous tension and was bound to lead to trouble. They might even argue that Hitler, far from fomenting trouble after 1935, was merely recognising the dangers of this enmity and seeking to resolve it. Any counter argument, that Germany had treated Russia worse in the Treaty of Brest Litovsk the previous year, could be dismissed as referring to a different set of conditions in another country. The German argument would of course be false, relying on prejudice, wrong information and looking back from 1939 rather than forward from 1918. But in so far that it represented the anger at the reversal of roles in the new state, it would be accurate. Sudeten Germans, who had previously dominated the Habsburg Empire, were now dominated by Czechs, whom they considered inferior. Sudeten German industry, which played an important part in creating an advanced, prosperous and industrially advanced state, was controlled by the Czech Government. This anger was very different to the situation described by Tomáš Masaryk, the Czechoslovak President. Masaryk had confidently predicted in 1918 that Czechoslovakia would become a second Switzerland, with different nationalities living harmoniously together.

In 1918, when the Allies began to prepare for peace, no one wanted another war. The loss of life on the Western Front had been greater than anyone could have imagined and elsewhere soldiers had died in large numbers in Russia, Central Europe, the Balkans and northern Italy. There had also been losses at sea. Civilians also suffered in Germany from the Allied blockade and in England to a lesser extent from zeppelin raids. The world had to be made safer by eliminating the causes of war. It was felt that World War I had been the result of extreme nationalism. A radical Serb, a member of an ultra nationalist Serbian society had, with the help of the Serbian Government, shot and killed the heir to the Austro–Hungarian Empire, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The result was an unstoppable timetable of events involving the major powers and previously secret treaties and plans for war.

From this point of view it was inevitable that nations, however small, that might cause trouble in the future, should be given their own states. Czechs, who had fostered nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century, should be among those rewarded in this way. They had been citizens of the Austrian part of the Austro–Hungarian Empire. So too should the Slovaks, who had been in the Hungarian part. These were to form the basis for the Czechoslovak state. Also included in the benefits of enlarged statehood were Romanians and Slavs in Hungary, Slavs in Italy and Poles in Russia and Germany. All non-Slav peoples had been removed from Hungary, reducing its population from 20,866,847 (the 1910 census) to 7,615,417 and its size from 325,411 sq. km to 92,963 sq. km.¹ The principle on which this was based was self-determination, which had been enshrined in Wilson's Fourteen Points. But self-determination was denied to the Germans, Austrians and Hungarians, who found themselves minorities in these new or enlarged states.

The legal basis for these frontier changes and the creation of these new states were the Treaties of Versailles, St Germain and Trianon. They were based on three fundamentally opposed ideas. The first was that nationalist demands for autonomy or independence in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans had, by 1918, become so important that they had to be satisfied. The second was that promises made to Romania and Italy during World War I to persuade them to enter the war on the Allies' side had to be kept. The third was that the defeated powers, Austria–Hungary and Germany, should not be allowed to exercise the rights of national self-determination given to others because this would make them stronger. This was a major blow to the Sudeten Germans, Austrians living in the western border areas of the new Czechoslovakia. At a stroke, they lost the dominant position and were subject to people they had formerly regarded as inferior and unworthy of having their own unique national destiny.² But the Allies believed that these steps were necessary if a second world war was to be avoided. There was also an element of revenge in the scale of the punitive reparations that were demanded from the defeated powers, especially Germany. Within a short time the economist John Maynard Keynes, one of the British delegates to the Versailles conference, had challenged the rationale for this.³ He encouraged many to question the long-term viability of the Versailles settlement, including the Treaties of St Germain and Trianon. Calls for their revision were being made as early as the 1920s.⁴

The postwar condition of Czechoslovakia stands at the centre of these issues. In November 1918 it was a completely new country and in this sense it was unique. Romania, Hungary, Austria and Poland had all existed before, though in different forms.⁵ The new state of Yugoslavia was a federal union of south Slav states who, like the Czechs and Slovaks, were united by strong cultural links. Czechoslovakia had to be created from the wreckage of the Austro–Hungarian Empire, but it is worth asking why the state was made. Not everyone agreed that it was necessary or even advisable. For example Arthur Balfour, a member of the British postwar Government, thought that it would have been better to preserve the Austro–Hungarian Empire as a counterbalance to Germany.⁶ One view was that it was ‘a child of propaganda which was given great impetus by two able exiles, Masaryk and Benes’.⁷ The British held a neutral view in the discussions at Versailles; the Foreign Office believed that Britain had no direct or indirect interest in the matter.⁸ Consequently the British adopted the role of mediator. However, they did hope that Czechoslovakia would form part of a buffer against Russia, by now under Bolshevik control. Britain also hoped that the Czechs would feel that the British Government had made an honest attempt to support the best policy for each nation. By contrast the French wanted to weaken Germany and Austria. They were also anxious to remove the important Škoda armament company from Austrian control.⁹

The key factor was Tomáš Masaryk and Edvard Beneš' success in arguing for the state to be created. In particular they exploited the wartime success of 1,200 Czech soldiers who had fought courageously as the Czech Legion in the French army.¹⁰ This had been a late feature of the war. The only Czechs to oppose the Austrians directly after the war began in 1914 were those living in Russia. They petitioned the Tsar for permission to form a unit in the Russian army. This was granted and the unit was known as the Družina, though it was only used for reconnaissance and propaganda, to undermine Habsburg morale. Czechs living in the Austro–Hungarian Empire were conscripted in the army, some willingly, others, like the Good Soldier Švejk in Jaroslav Hašek's famous novel, very unwillingly. When the Austrian forces were driven out of Serbia and Galicia in the second half of 1914, many Czechs thought that the Austro–Hungarian Empire might lose the war. To make good the early losses more conscripts, including Czechs, were recruited early in 1915 and persecution of the Czechs began. Czechs began to desert and, in one case, two regiments went over to the Russians with their officers. Once on the Russian side some wanted to join the Russian army, but the Russians were wary of using prisoners of war in fighting units. Czechs did not take an active part in the war in large numbers until much later. A total of 90,000 Czechs in Russia, including prisoners of war, were recruited into a Czech Legion after Masaryk's visit there in May 1917.¹¹ After the Russian Revolution, some Czechs fought in the Civil War, others fought their way east along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok. From there they sailed round the world and joined the Czechs already fighting as a Czech Legion in the French army, where they served with distinction. Their valour caught the imagination of Czechs and Slovaks both in the Habsburg Empire and America, where there were important Czech and Slovak communities.¹² Their importance for Czech history is recognised by the war memorials in towns and villages in the Czech Republic to those who died helping to create it. In the past these indicated clearly what they were fighting for, though more recently memorials commemorate all the dead, regardless of who they fought for. For example, in Příbor, south west of Ostrava, the memorial shows a soldier in French army uniform. In the village of Žd'ár near Trnov in north Bohemia, a French helmet forms part of the memorial. By contrast, memorials for men who died fighting for the Habsburgs are rare. In Český Tĕšín, formerly part of the staunchly Austrian town of Teschen, it is hidden in a small park.¹³ This emphasises the extent to which Czechs dominated the new state, especially in areas that were predominantly Czech. It also helped to create a sense of national identity.

This excellent Czech military reputation from World War I was used by Masaryk, a former philosophy professor and Czech representative in the Austrian Reichsrat (Parliament) to support his claims for a new Czech and Slovak state. Of mixed Czech and Slovak descent and from a peasant background, he was an ideal person to represent both races. He was also married to an American and spoke fluent English. He proved an able diplomat. Beneš, an efficient negotiator and administrator, was his invaluable deputy. Masaryk had been able to win the support of Americans of Czech and Slovak descent when he visited America. The Pittsburgh Convention and the Philadelphia Agreement of 1918, made by Americans of Slovak and Ruthene (Ukrainian) descent, is normally seen as cementing the union of Czechs and Slovaks.¹⁴ One historian has commented rather unfairly that only in America could support for Slovaks and Ruthenes (the people of Sub-Carpathian Russia) be found, and that it was by no means united.¹⁵ But this is not a view that is generally held.

These two factors, military success and American political backing, proved to be crucial. They enabled Masaryk to transform the Czech pre-war claim to autonomy within Austria–Hungary into a demand for complete independence. The claim was first made by a group of Czech exiles in Paris in 1915 and in 1916 it became Masaryk's official policy.¹⁶ By 1918 this group had become the Czechoslovak National Council. Masaryk was President and Prime Minister (and Minister of Finance), Štefánik the War Minister and Beneš the Foreign (and Interior) Minister. This was recognised by Britain as a de facto co-belligerent government in August 1918, by America in September and France in October.¹⁷ On 18 October Masaryk issued the Washington Manifesto stating that the future state would be a parliamentary democratic republic with a liberal constitution. This claim to create a national – or multi-national – state reflected part of President Wilson's Thirteen Points on which these demands could now be based. In America Wilson was due to run for re-election as president and was susceptible to political pressure of this kind from American Czechs and Slovaks.

At the same time that these events were taking place in Paris, the Vienna parliament was being transformed. Many Austrians watched the growing Slav nationalism with undisguised horror.¹⁸ Recognising the force of Czech national feeling, leading Bohemian and Moravian politicians were invited to the Vienna parliament, where they formed an all-party union. Their plan was to change the monarchy into a federation of free and equal states, one of which would be composed of Czechs and Slovaks. However, on hearing news of the Allied recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council, the Czech delegates rejected the proposed federation and persuaded the imperial government to allow them to go to Geneva to negotiate with Beneš. While discussions were taking place there, a group of agrarians, right-wing social democrats, national socialists and others established Czech independence in Prague and formed a de facto government. They were joined by a Slovak, Dr Srobar, who also signed the declaration of independence. This was followed on 30 October by a declaration of Slovak independence from Hungary and a union of Czechs and Slovaks. The state was thus created by a self-appointed council and not by public referendum, as Masaryk's Washington declaration had promised. By November the separate councils had dissolved, leaving the new government in Prague under the leadership of Kramář. On 14 November the new National Assembly approved the declaration of independence. Masaryk was unanimously elected president, Beneš foreign minister and Štefánik war minister. Kramář returned to Prague from Geneva in November and Masaryk the following month. Elections were held in 1920, which confirmed Masaryk in power.

But it was one thing to agree the principle of creating a state. To agree what it should consist of was another matter. This is where Masaryk's own prestige played a major part in persuading the Allies. He argued that the important precedent for Czechs had been the Great Moravian Empire, created in the ninth century, whose fame had even been acknowledged by the Byzantine Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus.¹⁹ The memory of this empire gave the Czechs a sense of national prestige that no other small Slav state possessed. Although it is referred to as ‘the Great Moravian Empire’ in fact it had three separate forms. The first had been a larger version of the present Czech Republic.²⁰ In the thirteenth century, under the Přemyslid king Otakar II, the kingdom consisted of Bohemia and Moravia, plus land to the south extending almost to the Adriatic. Later, under the Luxemburg kings Vaclav II and III, the original southern part of the kingdom was replaced by a north–south band of territory to the east of Bohemia and Moravia. This new part of the kingdom extended from Gdansk on the Baltic southward to beyond Budapest. Although both these kingdoms subsequently lost their non-Czech territory, Czechs remembered their great European empire. Moreover, Czechs believed that their power and prestige within Europe had survived the decline of this empire. In their eyes it had only been destroyed at the Battle of the White Mountain (Czech Bilá hora) in 1620, at the beginning of the Thirty Years War.²¹ This defeat had led to the subsequent German domination of the Czech lands within the German Confederation.

This memory of a glorious past would not have been enough to justify the creation of a Czech and Slovak state in 1918. What made the case of the Czechs different was their economic success in the second half of the nineteenth century. This had given them the confidence to demand equal rights with Austrians. The creation of the important textile industry in Brno had been the first stage.²² This was followed by the discovery and exploitation of both lignite and bituminous coal in Bohemia and Moravia, which led to the creation of important industries. Coal mines and iron works in North Moravia and the chemical industry of North Bohemia were the most important. The new economic success of Czechs at the same time as that of the Austrians led to a revival of Czech nationalism. It also helped to create a sense of Czech cultural identity. This was reinforced by a wide range of economic, cultural and social organisations and societies and the construction of buildings such as the National Theatre. Czechs were aware that they formed a majority of the population of Bohemia but were denied civic rights. This led to the Czech–Austrian struggle in politics, economics and culture that form the background first to the demands for autonomy and later for complete independence. It was reflected on the Austrian side by cartoons showing Czechs as primitive migrants and street musicians. Czech cartoons portrayed Austrians as aggressive and domineering.²³ Cartoonists believed that no reconciliation would ever be possible between them. This was still the situation at the end of World War I.

Evidence of Czech economic success, reinforced by the military contribution to the Allies in World War I and American support, formed the political basis for the new state. It did however ignore the success that Sudeten German firms had enjoyed within the Austro–Hungarian Empire. But there was also the question of what Czechoslovakia should consist of geographically. Masaryk and Beneš argued that it should be based on the ‘Historic Provinces of the Bohemian Crown’, citing the example of the Great Moravian Empire.²⁴ The presence of large numbers of Austrians in the areas bordering the frontier did nothing to detract from this important historical principle in their eyes. However, Masaryk claimed later that he had been willing to ‘reconstitute the traditional frontiers of Bohemia so as to cede to Germany those areas of the Sudetenland who [sic] were predominantly Ge...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1. Czechs vs Germans; Roles Reversed
• 2. Diplomacy, Industrial Development and Growing Resentment
• 3. The Enemy Within; Sudeten German Nationalism and the Sudeten Nazi Party
• 4. Henlein, the SdP (Sudeten Deutsche Partei) and German Money
• 5. Hitler’s Manipulation of Sudeten German Grievances
• 6. Henlein’s Election Victory, Crisis, International Alarm and the Munich Conference
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Back cover