Crisis and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire

The Downfall of a Sultan in the Age of Revolution

Aysel Yildiz

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN:
  9781784535100
• Edition: 1
• eBook ISBN:
  9781786721471
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

In 1807 the reformist Sultan Selim III was overthrown in a palace coup enacted by the elite special forces of the day-the Janissaries. The Ottomans were bankrupt and had been forced to make peace with Napoleon after Austerlitz, but it was Selim III's efforts to reform an empire that had suffered successive military defeats, and to reform along the lines of modern principles-with an end to the privileged 'feudal' position of many in elite Ottoman civil-military society-which sealed his fate. This book seeks to situate Turkey's reactionary revolutions of 1807 into a wider European context, that of the French Revolution and the outbreaks of revolutionary activity in the German states, Britain and the US. The Ottoman Empire was an interconnected and crucial part of this early-modern world, and therefore, Aysel Yildiz argues, must be analyzed in relation to its European rivals. Focusing on the uprising, and the socio-economic and political conditions which caused it, this book re-orientates Ottoman history towards Western Europe, and re-situates the late-Ottoman Empire as a key battle-ground of political ideas in the modern era.

CHAPTER 1

REBELLIOUS ROUTINES

He hath flown off the roof and ended up in hell. That is far enough to fly for such a scoundrel.¹

Introduction

The turbulent years 1807 and 1808 witnessed an uprising (25–29 May 1807), a counter-revolution (28 July 1808), followed by the so-called Alemdar Incident (November 1808) and a short period of civil war (16–19 November 1808). The first of these incidents, known as the May uprising, ended with the dethronement of Selim III and the elimination of the Selimian ministers. The five days of the May uprising were a period of continuous negotiation between the centre and the rebels. By contrast, the subsequent incidents saw no such negotiations: the counter-revolution was a simple coup d'état led by Alemdar Mustafa Pasha (grand vizier from 28 July 1808 to 16 November 1808; d. 1808), aiming to reinstate Selim III and eliminate the cadres involved in the uprising. This precipitated a war between supporters of Alemdar and his opponents, which wrecked the city for several days.

The speed and impact of the May uprising can hardly be overestimated: what began with the murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi, the superintendant of the Bosporus forts on 25 May, ended, in a week, with a change in the throne. A close study of the course of events over those five days allows us to situate the uprising within the wider history of Ottoman rebellions. In particular, it reveals the essential role of dialogue between the Porte and the rebels: for, as we will see, there were several stages of negotiation and bargaining, and at each stage the dialogue could have turned out differently, leading to a different outcome. In the end, however, the dialogue was broken off with the decision by the rebels to dethrone Sultan Selim III. A new process of bargaining then unfolded with the new Sultan, Mustafa IV, who in the end issued an amnesty paper, the Hüccet-i Şeriyye, which exempted the rebels from punishment.

Patterns in the Flow of Events

Although the reasons for rebellion varied, the uprisings of the early seventeenth to early nineteenth century have a characteristic structure, which can be summarized as follows:

1. Petition phase: expression of discontent, usually via petitions.
2. Outburst phase: a triggering incident that precipitates the event.
3. Diffusion phase: increase in the number of participants with the invitation of urbanites and the military corps.
4. Bargaining phase: initial contact between the rebels and the centre.
5. Congregation in meeting places: Et Meydanı (“the Meat Square”),² the Hippodrome or in some cases in the vicinity of the palace.
6. Legitimation phase: the rebels invite the ulema to participate.
7. Negotiation phase: the rebels demand that the centre abolish a practice or punish culprits.
8. Revenge phase: the functionaries held responsible for the fault are murdered.
9. Deposition phase: [in some cases] the throne is claimed.
10. Settlement phase: issue of an amnesty for the rebels.

Ottoman uprisings traditionally follow this pattern, though the precise sequence and number of steps may change. The May uprising lacks the petition phase, unlike in 1632, 1651 and 1703, when the insurgents first presented petitions and requests to the centre. In 1632 and 1651, the guildsmen and the janissaries both had recourse to petitions, repeatedly presenting the grand vizier with their complaints. Having been unsuccessful, they turned to other authorities, such as the shaikh al-Islam, the nakib al-eşraf, the head of the descendants of the Prophet (sayyids), and finally to the sultan himself. Their frustrations with the petition process eventually led them to open revolt. In 1632, unable to make their voices heard, they began to revolt and in several instances forced Murad IV to hear their complaints.³ In his description of rebellious routines in the European context, Sidney Tarrow argues that the traditional European form of petition, valid since the seventeenth century, disappears from the routine during the course of the eighteenth century,⁴ and the Ottomans seem to be no exception. In the incidents after 1651, the dissidents take to the streets without first sending petitions to the relevant authorities.⁵

Ottoman rebellions usually started with a small group of insurgents (1651, 1703, 1730, 1807, 1808) initiating the upheaval in response to a triggering cause, then converging on the Meat Square within the janissary barracks in Aksaray. In the process, the rebels entered the bazaars, calling upon Muslims to join their cause and ordering non-Muslims to remain neutral but to close their shops. Before or after arrival at the square, they also invited other military corps to join them. In most cases, the Meat Square served as the central meeting place for the insurgents, although the true focal point was the court at the Topkapı Palace – the exception being the Edirne Incident of 1703, when Mustafa II was in residence at the Edirne court.

After reaching the Meat Square, the insurgents would summon the high-ranking ulema, declare their grievances, and ask them to issue a fatwa sanctioning their demands – the execution of certain dignitaries or the deposition of the sultan. Once a rebellion was under way, state officials were no longer accepted as intermediaries, but became scapegoats and potential victims, and the bargaining then took place directly with the sultan. In 1703, a memorandum was prepared on the square, which demanded that Feyzullah Efendi, the shaikh al-Islam, be dismissed, and that the sultan return to the capital.⁶ Delegates were sent from Istanbul to the rebels and from the rebels to Edirne.⁷ In a similar manner, continuous negotiations took place between the ringleaders and the sultan during the course of the 1730 uprising.⁸ The rebels usually prepared a list naming certain people whom they wanted killed. This initiated a process of bargaining with the central authority, in which the centre either accepted the execution of the demands or refused to deliver them to the rebels; this was usually followed by some brutal and exemplary murders of the functionaries on the list. In some cases, the rule of the sultan came under direct challenge: the rebels insisted on obtaining a fatwa sanctioning his removal and the installation of a new ruler from the same dynasty, whereupon another bargaining process was instigated with the new sultan, the rebels demanding an amnesty – usually in writing – from the sultan, pledging not to punish them for their actions. In most cases, some time after the end of the crisis, the rebels would be rewarded with money or appointments. The second negotiation phase, this time with the new government, revolved around the efforts by the dissidents to minimize the negative consequences of their involvement.⁹ Frequent demands for “amnesty and safe conduct” suggest that cost benefit considerations were crucial in these conflicts.¹⁰ Moreover, each individual step within the overall development of the rebellion itself displayed distinct dynamics, in which the rebels frequently faced a dilemma that challenged them to reconsider their conditions and decisions.

Although the dethronement of the sultan or the elimination of the chosen ministers ended the dissent, disorder usually continued for some time afterwards, like the aftershocks of an earthquake. The duration and character of violence varied according to the power of the centre and the prestige of the rebels, as well as the persistence of the cause. Since dynastic authority was relatively weak at the time of the May 1807 uprising, the turmoil in this case persisted for more than a year (the reign of Mustafa IV), including the coup d'état by Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and the ensuing civil war. Viewed from this perspective, the uprisings of 1808 and even 1826 can indeed be seen as aftershocks of 1807, rooted in the challenge to the interests of the janissaries by the establishment of alternative armies by grand vizier Alemdar Mustafa Pasha (the Sekban-ı Cedid) and later by Mahmud II (r. 1808–39) (the Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye), and the concomitant challenges to the interests of rival groups.

The May 1807 Uprising as an Extended Form of Negotiation

Griesse remarks that revolts or uprisings can be seen as “moments of intensified propaganda and ‘dialogue’ between subjects and the authorities”;¹¹ as Eunjeong Yi notes, their violence notwithstanding, rebellions can be seen as “an extended form of negotiation”.¹² Rebellions or mutinies, unlike revolutions, are universally designed to force an authority to satisfy certain claims or eliminate certain sources of discontent. For instance, in the mutiny of the Spanish army of Flanders in the late sixteenth century, the mutineers entered into negotiations with the government following the establishment of a political organization among themselves.¹³ The May uprising was not an exception to this rule.

The negotiation process greatly determined the policies of the political establishment towards the rebels, as well as the responses of the rebellious crowd. While the revolutionary cadres or ringleaders were emerging, especially during the first few days after the initial outburst, the rebels would enter a process of negotiation either directly or via their representatives. Far from being detached or isolated from the Porte, they would be in constant communication with the authorities they were challenging. These early stages, therefore, never led to a denial of the power of the centre or an outright attack on the palace, although in some cases the palace did come under siege (as in the Alemdar Incident of November 1808) by the rebellious crowd. The connection with the palace was never interrupted by any of the officials (ulema, high-ranking military officers or other administrators) who were acting as intermediaries, and the scale of the violence usually depended on the reciprocal attitudes between the representatives of the centre and the ringleaders. In this respect, there is a similarity between the traditional uprisings and the acts of rebellious pashas, where the negotiation process was also crucial. On a more general level, this fits into the logic of the Ottoman Empire's “rule by negotiation”, as described by Karen Barkey in her influential An Empire of Difference.¹⁴

The May Uprising: Outburst Phase (Monday, 25 May 1807)

On Monday, 25 May 1807, the authorities received alarming news from Hüseyin Agha, the dizdar (commander) of the Yuşa Tabya (or Macar Tabya) battalion of the Bosporus.¹⁵ According to his report, on Sunday night (24 May), the yamaks (auxiliaries) of the Irva (Revancık), Anadolu Feneri and Garipçe fortresses had visited their comrades in Anadolu Kavak and Yuşa Tabya. In their meetings, they had asked whether their comrades in the battalion had heard that new uniforms had been dispatched and were being stored at the residence of the commander (Kavak Agha). According to Hüseyin Agha, there was no consensus among the yamaks about how to respond to this, and they gave contradictory and equivocal answers. It seems that the intention of the yamaks who visited the other fortresses was to warn their comrades rather than simply to make inquiries, since if their comrades yielded, the report suggested, they themselves would also be forced to wear the new French-inspired uniforms. Indeed, according to the same document, that night ended with the yamaks deciding to meet at Hünkar İskelesi (in Beykoz, Istanbul) the next morning, in order to discuss the matter among themselves and to expel the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers present around the fortresses.

The next morning, the yamaks met at Umur Yeri by Hünkar İskelesi. After a while, Halil Agha, commander of Macar Tabya, and Hüseyin Agha, the author of the report, visited the meeting place. Upon their commanders questioning them about their intentions, the yamaks declared that they were not willing to wear the new uniforms. In reply, Halil Agha denied that the palace had any intention to force the yamaks into wearing them, but he was unable to convince them, and they replied that if the sultan indeed did not intend to impose new uniforms upon them, then the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers would not be stationed at the Bosporus forts. The yamaks also announced that they would meet again and would subsequently inform their commanders of their final decision on the issue. According to the same report, Halil Agha continued to try to persuade the yamaks, but was shot and killed. Hüseyin Agha was saved by the yamaks of his own battalion; escaping in a rowboat, he managed to send the above-mentioned report to the Porte.

In retrospect, the initial outbursts seem rather simple and naive. Indeed, it is hard to believe that rumours of an attempt by the sultan to impose new uniforms on the yamaks of the Bosporus could by themselves have caused a full-fledged uprising in the capital. Yet, these rumours do seem to have been potent causes of discontent. Indeed, on the margins of the same report, Selim III notes angrily, “Who fabricates such unthinkable hearsay? You must for certain ensure that such fabricators be uncovered and affairs be set in order.” In a previous note, some time before the uprising, the sultan had accused Russian spies of deceiving the soldiers and creating disorder among them, implying that he had no intention of imposing new uniforms.¹⁶ If there was no decision by the sultan, and there was no official edict, what was the real source of this alarming gossip? It seems likely that it was the initiative of a statesman, Elhac Mehmed Ragıb Pasha (d. 1828), who probably wanted to increase his favour in the eyes of Selim III.¹⁷ In an imperial edict written in the first days of the rebellion, the sultan rebukes Ragıb Pasha, accusing him of causing a “revolution” (ihtilal) in the forts of the Black Sea and holding him responsible for several unacceptable acts. The pasha had formed a small military unit under his command, but some of these new recruits were either janissaries or yamaks of the Black Sea fortresses, and had objected to his statement that “I will make you into common drilled soldiers [muallem asker] and give you Nizam-ı Cedid uniforms.” Consequently, the edict declares, more than twenty yamaks of this small unit had deserted and spread the word among the soldiers of the fortresses, resulting in the murder of Halil Haseki/Agha. Moreover, it continues, Mehmed Ragıb Pasha had announced the presence of Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers among the Ottoman volunteer commando (serdengeçti) recruits from Karaman for the Russo-Ottoman campaign, and had expressed his determination to distinguish them from the rest by imposing the new uniforms. After pointing out the danger in such acts, which could serve as a pretext for disorder and revolt, the sultan rebuked Mehmed Ragıb Pasha for his “seditious actions and statements”. It appears that Selim III was taking the utmost precautions to ensure that his functionaries avoided any actions that would create tension in his domain. While he states that measures were being taken to calm the rebellion around the fortresses, he orders Mehmed Ragıb to move immediately to Karaman.¹⁸ Thus, from the documentary evidence it does seem that there was no official attempt on the part of the sultan to force the yamaks of the Bosporus to wear the Nizam-ı Cedid uniforms; it is more likely that the rumours of such a government policy reached them through Mehmed Ragıb Pasha's attempt to impose new dress on his own soldiers.

The power of rumours should not be disregarded, especially in pre-modern societies wh...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Map and Tables
• List of Abbreviations
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction The Ottoman Empire in the Age of Revolutions
• 1. Rebellious Routines
• 2. The Breeding Ground
• 3. Does Modernization Breed Revolution?
• 4. Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire
• 5. Elite Rivalry
• 6. When the Feet Become the Head: The Limits of Obedience
• Conclusion
• Glossary
• Appendix
• Notes
• Select Bibliography