Children of War

Child Soldiers as Victims and Participants in the Sudan Civil War

Christine Ryan

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN: 9781780760179
• eBook ISBN: 9780857732255
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: African History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The use of child soldiers in the Sudan Civil War has shattered the accepted understanding of why children join armies. Thousands of children signed up to participate in Africa's longest running civil war, yet so far the international community and the academic world have viewed them as victims rather than participants. In this groundbreaking new study, Christine Emily Ryan challenges preconceptions which have held back aid work and reconstruction in the Sudan region. Using face-to-face testimonies of former child soldiers, she illuminates the multi-dimensional motivations which children have for joining the Sudan Liberation Army, and unravels the complexity of their political participation. At the same time, interviews with NGO personnel illustrate the gap that exists between the West and the reality of conflict in Africa. 'Children of War' provides a powerful critique of the position taken by the international community, NGOs and academia to the phenomenon of child soldiers, and calls for a new approach to conflict resolution in Africa.

CHAPTER ONE

SUDAN CONFLICT HISTORY

It is important to summarise the extensive conflict history of Southern Sudan from its independence in 1956 to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 in order to present a backdrop and context to the former child soldiers’ testimonies.

South Sudan refers to the area covered by the country’s three most southern regions: Bahr el-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile (see figure 0.1). While the boundaries of these territories have changed over the course of the last 50 years since independence, the area known as Southern Sudan has remained constant for hundreds of years.

As one travels south up the Nile River, it splits into two main sources: the White Nile and the Blue Nile. The Blue Nile heads east to Ethiopia, whilst the White Nile travels south to the Ugandan border. South of Malakal there is an area along the Blue Nile known as the Sudd,⁴² swamp-like conditions that were only penetrated by Western explorers in the 19^th century.⁴³ These conditions made for one of the most isolated regions in the world, even from other parts of Sudan.

The original formation of the Northern and Southern territories of Sudan can be viewed as a convergence of two regional areas: the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. This offers some insight into the ‘Arab vs. African’ dichotomy often cited today – indeed even in the meaning of the medieval Islamic name, Bilad al-Sudan, or ‘land of the blacks’.⁴⁴ Such divisions were further accentuated by dissimilarities in colonisation between North and South. While Britain maintained arbitrary control over the whole country, the management of the North fell under the control of the Egyptians. The South was treated as a separate region, detached from the rest of Sudan as a result of ‘closed door’ policies, which barred northern Sudanese from entering or working in the South. The British colonial administration discouraged the spread of Islam, the practice of Arab customs, and the wearing of Arab dress, while making efforts to revitalise African customs and tribal life that the slave trade had disrupted. As far as the British were concerned the region and its people were distinct from the North and the region was to be prepared for eventual integration with British East Africa.⁴⁵ This uneven pattern of colonisation, and the policies adopted by the colonisers, manifests today by divisions along lines of ‘colonial’ religions and languages.

Beyond demography, natural resources are also a key distinction between the two regions, and one that is becoming increasingly important. Much of the Northern Sudan Government’s revenue is derived from oil money; however, 85 percent of Sudan’s oil is taken from the South. While many commentators attempt to explain Sudan’s conflict on ethnic lines, the economic arguments cannot be overlooked.

The divisions used to define the Northern and Southern regions are manifold, based on religion, culture, history, lineage, geographical characteristics, and language. However, to construe the South as a homogeneous entity, would be incorrect. One quarter of Sudan’s population inhabit the Southern territories, and it contains over a hundred different ethnic groups and the majority of the 114 languages spoken in Sudan.⁴⁶ While the main religion is Christianity (in contrast to Islam in the North), there are also numerous indigenous religions.⁴⁷

According to authors such as Jok, the government of Sudan had an agenda of genocidal proportions in its conflict with the South.⁴⁸ Speculation as to the North’s desire to culturally eliminate or convert the South has been supported by the manifestation of their polices, such as the targeting of the family unit.

In moving towards independence many promises were made to the South in an effort to gain its support. In 1946, in a reversal of its previous policy, the British colonial authority decided to integrate North and South Sudan under one government with a common administrative authority situated in the North.

There followed the implementation of ‘Sudanisation’; however this was a Northern-driven process of homogenisation.⁴⁹ Its purpose was to create unity but this unity was soon argued to be one based on Islamisation and Arabisation.⁵⁰

Independence was declared on the 1 January 1956. At independence, the South faced not only losing the realisation of their own vision of political power within their territory, but also faced surrendering to the North’s vision of Arab and Islamic domination.⁵¹

For Southerners, Sudanese independence did not fulfil their expectations and instead only supported fears of Northern dominance.⁵² With widespread discontent in the Southern provinces, the First Civil War is believed to have begun in response to actions taken by the Northern government, namely their rejection of federalism for the South as well as their overall lack of political involvement.

Signed in February 1972, the Addis Ababa Agreement allowed for the Southern region to commence self-government and ended 17 years of conflict. This period of peace could also be considered a time of suspended conflict, as most of the agreements reached were not upheld.⁵³

The South, as a united territory under the Addis Ababa Agreement, would be more capable of having a united political voice, posing a greater balance of power for the government in Khartoum. Such advantages for the South were seen in the North as threats to the status quo.⁵⁴

President Numeiry also faced internal pressure from those groups that supported the implementation of Shari’a law throughout the country.⁵⁵ Where the Addis Ababa Agreement assured the South religious freedom, this would be undermined if Shari’a were imposed.

Further tensions emerged with the discovery of oil in the Southern region in 1976, four years after the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed. The Southern government was not involved with the decisions concerning oil exploration and was left out of the negotiations with the international oil companies, Chevron and Total.⁵⁶ Numeiry’s power to control the economic benefits of the production of oil in the South, and therefore in Sudan, was greatly limited by the Agreement and he decided to override the provisions.⁵⁷ Accordingly, many commentators consider it was the discovery of oil that led to the dissolving of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983 and continued to be a motivation for violence thereafter.

Oil was not the only resource that became an issue in the 1970s. The scarcity of water was causing anxiety for both Sudan and Egypt after experiencing the lowest levels of water ever recorded in the Nile.⁵⁸ The Jonglei Canal was proposed in 1974 to the High Executive Council and was pitched as a necessary measure in order to meet agricultural needs in both Sudan and Egypt.⁵⁹ Construction on the project began in 1978 in the Southern area of Jonglei on the eastern side of the Sudd, the area of swampy conditions in the White Nile.⁶⁰ It was already apparent to the South before construction began that the Jonglei Canal would be a catalyst for imposing Northern domination.⁶¹ Contention built on a lack of Southern representation to the opposition of the canal project. The North’s full intentions with the Jonglei Canal were under suspicion, as well as why Southern officials approached the canal project with passive agreement.⁶²

The desire for control of the South’s natural resources, oil, and water, justified fears of Northern exploitation.⁶³ Aside from imposing Northern domination, the oil revenues have also allowed the government of Sudan to further finance the conflict with the South.⁶⁴

The 11 years of the Addis Ababa Agreement did not bring much needed development and reconstruction to the region.⁶⁵ It was to this economic underdevelopment that many parties were arguing for the disablement of the Addis Ababa Agreement. As Duffield notes, ‘it must also be realised that ending the war will do little to change the violent political economy that characterises Sudan and the subordinate and exploited position that Southerners occupy within it’.⁶⁶ While ending the war may have brought an end to immediate violence, it did little to address the root causes.

Second Civil War 1983–2005

In June 1983 Numeiry decided to dissolve the Addis Ababa Agreement, seen by many as the direct cause of renewed hostilities as the start of the Second Civil War.⁶⁷ In dissolving the Agreement, the Numeiry government was able to proceed with their ‘decentralisation’ plan for three regions of the South in June 1983.⁶⁸ Shortly after, in September, Numeiry cut short promises of religious freedom implementing Islamic law throughout the whole of the country.⁶⁹ Numeiry did this without the consent of the South and in doing so went against the Addis Ababa Agreement.⁷⁰

In an effort to strengthen the implementation of Shari’a, Numeiry put into action a state of emergency in April 1984, closing the University of Khartoum, jailing opposition leaders, and banning protests.⁷¹ The enforcement of Shari’a in the whole of Sudan brought to the forefront the issue of religious difference and further complicated the relations between the North and the South that many considered a political one.⁷² These political policies only added fuel to the fire for the war starting again in the south.⁷³

July 1983, shortly after the dissolution of the Addis Ababa Agreement, saw the start of the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) by Colonel John Garang.⁷⁴ He outlined the goals of the movement as focusing on the unity of Sudan and stressed that the movement was not a Southern movement towards independence.⁷⁵

In response to the government’s Jonglei Canal project as well as the exploration for oil in the Southern region, the SPLA specifically targeted both of these Northern initiatives. By 1984 both endeavours were brought to a halt as the SPLA launched their attacks.⁷⁶ Although the South was blessed with these natural resources that could possibly allow for further development, these resources instead complicated the South’s stride towards peace by attracting international interference.⁷⁷ As Egypt had invested heavily in the Jonglei Canal and Western governments were interested in Sudan’s oil reserves, the South had little control as these parties continued t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Figures
• Introduction
• Chapter One Sudan Conflict History
• Chapter Two NGOs Assisting Child Soldiers in Southern Sudan
• Chapter Three Child Soldiers of Southern Sudan
• Chapter Four Children’s Expression of Political Agency
• Conclusion and Looking Ahead
• Annex 1 Acronyms
• Annex 2 NGO Interviews
• Annex 3 Child Soldier Interviews
• Notes
• Bibliography