1
JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND MUSLIM FAMILY LAWS
New Ideas, New Prospects1
Ziba Mir-Hosseini
Contemporary notions of justice, informed by the ideals of human rights, equality and personal freedom, depart substantially from those that underpin rulings in classical fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and established understandings of the ShariÊża. This disjunction is a central problem that permeates debates and struggles for an egalitarian family law in Muslim contexts.
For instance, take the following two statements:
The fundamentals of the ShariÊża are rooted in wisdom and promotion of the welfare of human beings in this life and the Hereafter. ShariÊża embraces Justice, Kindness, the Common Good and Wisdom. Any rule that departs from justice to injustice, from kindness to harshness, from the common good to harm, or from rationality to absurdity cannot be part of ShariÊża.2
The wife is her husbandâs prisoner, a prisoner being akin to a slave. The Prophet directed men to support their wives by feeding them with their own food and clothing them with their own clothes; he said the same about maintaining a slave.3
Both statements are by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292â1350), a fourteenth-century jurist and one of the great reformers of his time.4 The first statement speaks to all contemporary Muslims, and both advocates of gender equality and their opponents often use it as an epigraph.5 But the second statement, which reflects classical fiqh conceptions of marriage, goes against the very grain of what many contemporary Muslims consider to be âJustice, Kindness, the Common Good and Wisdomâ. Consequently, Muslim legal tradition and its textual sources have come to appear hypocritical or, at best, contradictory. This presents those who struggle to reform Muslim family laws with a quandary and a host of questions: what is the notion of justice in Islamâs sacred texts? Does it include the notion of equality for women before the law? If so, how are we to understand those elements of the primary sources of the ShariÊża (QurÊŸan and hadith) that appear not to treat men and women as equals? Can gender equality and ShariÊża-based laws go together?
These questions are central to the ongoing struggle for an egalitarian construction of family laws in Muslim contexts and have been vigorously debated among Muslims since the late nineteenth century.6 Some consider religion to be inherently patriarchal and any engagement with it to be a futile and incorrect strategy;7 others argue that, given the linkage between the religious and political dimensions of identity in Muslim contexts, the path to legal equality for women in those contexts necessarily passes through religion.8 This chapter aims to explore these questions and address what often remains neglected in this debate: how Muslim womenâs struggle for equality is embedded in the intimate links between theology and politics. My central argument has two elements. First, the struggle is at once theological and political, and it is hard and sometimes futile to decide when theology ends and politics begin. Secondly, in the last two decades of the twentieth century a growing confrontation between political Islam and feminism has made the intimate links between theology, law and politics more transparent. New voices and forms of activism have emerged that no longer shy away from engagement with religion. A new discourse, which came to be known as âIslamic feminismâ, started to challenge the patriarchal interpretations of the ShariÊża from within.
After a brief examination of the notion of gender justice in classical fiqh texts, I sketch twentieth-century developments in the politics of religion, law and gender in Muslim contexts. This is followed by a discussion of two reform texts that negotiate and bridge the chasm â the dissonance â between contemporary notions of justice and gender rights and those informed by classical fiqh rulings, and that lay the groundwork for an egalitarian family law. These are the book Women in the ShariÊża and in Our Society (1930) by Tunisian religious reform thinker al-Tahir al-Haddad, and the article âThe status of women in Islam: a modernist interpretationâ (1982) by Pakistani reform thinker Fazlur Rahman. I have chosen to focus on these two texts because they belong to two key moments in the Muslim debate and struggle to define the scope of womenâs rights in the twentieth century. Al-Haddadâs book appeared in the context of early twentieth-century debates and the early phase of the codification of Muslim family law; Fazlur Rahmanâs article was published when political Islam was at its zenith and Islamists, trumpeting the slogan âreturn to ShariÊżaâ, were dismantling some earlier reforms. Both thinkers met with a great deal of opposition from the clerical establishments in their own countries at the time, but their ideas, which conservative clerics declared to be heretical, proved to be instrumental in shaping later discourses and developments. Al-Tahir al-Haddadâs ideas informed Tunisian family law, which was codified in 1956, and to this day remains the only Muslim code that bans polygamy. Fazlur Rahman developed a methodology and framework that, by the end of the century, facilitated the emergence of feminist scholarship in Islam. I conclude by considering the implication of this scholarship with regard to changing the terms of reference of the debates over Muslim family law reforms.
1. Menâs authority over women: qiwÄma as a legal postulate
At the heart of the unequal construction of gender rights in Muslim legal tradition lies the idea that men have guardianship or qiwÄma over women. Verse 4:34 (from which the idea is derived) is commonly understood as mandating menâs authority over women, and is frequently invoked as the main textual evidence in its support. This verse is often the only verse that ordinary Muslims know in relation to family law. It reads:
Men are qawwÄmĆ«n (protectors/maintainers) in relation to women, according to what God has favored some over others and according to what they spend from their wealth. Righteous women are qÄnitÄt (obedient) guarding the unseen according to what God has guarded. Those [women] whose nushĆ«z you fear, admonish them, and abandon them in bed, and aážribuhunna (strike them). If they obey you, do not pursue a strategy against them. Indeed, God is Exalted, Great.9
Since the early twentieth century, this verse has been the focus of intense contestation and debate among Muslims, centring on the four terms I have highlighted. There is now a substantial body of literature that attempts to contest and reconstruct the meanings and connotations of these terms as understood and turned into legal rulings by classical jurists.10 Recent contributions have been most concerned with the last part of the verse, and the issue of domestic violence.11 Neither this concern nor the contestation over the meanings of these terms is new; they occupied the minds of classical Muslim jurists when they inferred from the verse legal rulings regarding the rights and duties of spouses in marriage.12 But the nature and the tone of the debates are new. Juristic disagreements were not, as now, about the legitimacy or legality of a husbandâs right to beat his wife if she defies his authority; they were about the extent and harshness of the beating he should administer. In classical fiqh texts, the validity and inviolability of menâs superiority and authority over women was a given; the verse was understood in this light, and the four key terms were used to define relations between spouses in marriage, and notions of gender justice and equity. As we shall see, all revolved around the first part of the verse and the notion that men are womenâs qawwÄmĆ«n, protectors and providers.
Let us call this the qiwÄma postulate,13 which I shall argue is the lynchpin of the whole edifice of the patriarchal model of family in classical fiqh. We see the working of this postulate in all areas of Muslim law relating to gender rights, but its impact is most evident, as I have argued elsewhere, in the laws that classical jurists devised for the regulation of marriage.14 They defined marriage as a contract (nikÄáž„), and patterned it after the contract of sale (bayÊż). The contract renders sexual relations licit between a man and woman, and establishes a set of default rights and obligations for each party, some supported by legal force, others by moral sanction. Those with legal force revolve around the twin themes of sexual access and compensation, and are embodied in two central legal concepts: tamkÄ«n (submission) and nafaqa (maintenance).15 TamkÄ«n, obedience or submission, specifically with regard to sexual access, is the husbandâs right and thus the wifeâs duty; whereas nafaqa, maintenance, specifically shelter, food and clothing, is the wifeâs right and the husbandâs duty. The wife loses her claim to maintenance if she is in a state of nushĆ«z (disobedience). The husband has the unilateral and extra-judicial right to terminate the contract by áčalÄq or repudiation; a wife cannot terminate the contract without her husbandâs consent or the permission of the Islamic judge upon producing a valid reason. There are numerous moral injunctions that could have limited menâs power to terminate marriage; for instance, there are sayings from the Prophet to the effect that áčalÄq is among the most detested of permitted acts, and that when a man pronounces it, Godâs throne shakes. Yet classical fiqh made no attempt to restrict a manâs right to áčalÄq. He needs neither grounds nor the consent of his wife.
There were, of course, differences between and within the classical schools over what constituted and what defined the three interrelated concepts â nafaqa, tamkÄ«n and nushĆ«z â but they all shared the same conception of marriage, and the large majority linked a womanâs right to maintenance to her obedience to her husband. The reason for their disagreement, Ibn Rushd tells us, was âwhether maintenance is a counter-value for (sexual) utilization, or compensation for the fact that she is confined because of her husband, as the case of one absent or sickâ.16 And it was within the parameters of this logic â men provide and women obey â that notions of gender rights and justice acquired their meanings. Cognizant of the inherent tension in such a construction of marriage, and seeking to contain the potential abuse of a husbandâs authority, classical jurists narrowed the scope of this authority to the unhampered right to sexual relations with the wife, which in turn limited the scope of her duty to obey to being sexually available, and even here only when it did not interfere with her religious duties (for example, when fasting during Ramadan, or when bleeding during menses or after childbirth). Legally speaking, if we take the fiqh texts at face value, according to some a wife had no obligation to do housework or to care for the children, even to suckle her babies; for these, she was entitled to wages. Likewise, a manâs right to discipline a wife who was in the state of nushĆ«z was severely restricted; he could discipline her, but not inflict harm. For this reason, some jurists recommended that he should âbeatâ his wife only with a handkerchief or a miswÄk, a twig used for cleaning teeth.17
Whether these rulings corresponded to actual practices of marriage and gender relations is another area of inquiry, one that recent scholarship in Islam has only just started to uncover.18 What is important to note here is that the qiwÄma postulate served as a rationale for other legal disparities â such as menâs rights to polygamy and unilateral repudiation, womenâs lesser share in inheritance, or the ban on women being judges or political leaders. That is to say, women cannot occupy positions that entail the exercise of authority in society because they are under their husbandâs authority â and are thus not free agents and not able to deliver impartial justice. Similarly, since men provide for their wives, justice requires that they be entitled to a greater share in inheritance. These inequalities in rights were also rationalised and justified by other arguments, based on assumptions about innate, natural differences between the sexes: women are by nature weaker and more emotional, qualities inappropriate in a leader; they are created for childbearing, a function that confines them to the home, which means that men must protect and provide for them.19
2. The reform and codification of classical fiqh provisions of family law20
In the course of the twentieth century, as nation-states emerged among Muslim populations, classical fiqh conceptions of marriage and family were partially reformed, codified and grafted onto modern legal systems in many Muslim-majority countries.21 The best-known exceptions were Turkey and Muslim populations that came under communist rule, which abandoned fiqh in all areas of law, and Saudi Arabia, which preserved classical fiqh as fundamental law and attempted to apply it in all spheres of law. In countries where classical fiqh remained the main source of family law, the impetus and extent of family law reform varied, but, with the exception of Tunisia, which banned polygamy, on the whole the classical fiqh construction of the marital relationship was retained more or less intact. Reforms were introduced from within the framework of Muslim legal tradition, by mixing principles and rulings from different fiqh schools and by procedural devices, without directly challenging the patriarchal construction of marriage in fiqh.22 They centred on increasing the age of marriage, expanding womenâs access to judicial divorce and restricting menâs right to polygamy. This involved requiring the state registration of marriage and divorce, or the creation of new courts to deal with marital disputes. The state now had the power to deny legal support to those marriages that were not in compliance with official state-sanctioned procedures.
All these changes transformed relations between Muslim legal tradition, state and social practice. Codes and statute books took the place of fiqh manuals; family law was no longer solely a matter for private scholars â the fuqahÄÊŸ â operating within a particular fiqh school, rather it became the concern of the legislative assembly of a particular nation-state. Confined to the ivory tower of the seminaries, the practitioners of fiqh became increasingly scholastic, defensive and detached from realities on the ground. Patriarchal interpretations of the ShariÊża acquired a different force; they could now be imposed through the machinery of the modern nation-state, which had neither the religious legitimacy nor the inclination to challenge them.
With the rise of Islam as both a spiritual and a political force in the latter part of the twentieth century, Islamist political movements became closely identified with patriarchal notions of gender drawn from classical fiqh. Political Islam had its biggest triumph in 1979, in the popular revolution that brought clerics into power in Iran. This year also saw the dismantling of some of the reforms introduced earlier in the century by the modernist governments â for instance, in Iran and Egypt â and the introduction of the Hudood Ordinances in Pakistan, which extended the ambit of fiqh to certain aspects of criminal law. Yet this was the year when the UN General Assembly adopted CEDAW, which gave gender equality a clear international legal mandate.
The decades that followed saw the concomitant expansion, globally and locally, of two powerful but seemin...