Democracy and Youth in the Middle East

Islam, Tribalism and the Rentier State in Oman

Sulaiman Al-Farsi

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781780760902
• eBook ISBN: 9780857733702
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The leaders of the oil-rich rentier states of the Middle East, and in particular in the Gulf, have hitherto often predicated their legitimacy on a tacit social contract with their (much poorer) populations. This social contract consists of little or no direct taxation, with some sort of subsidised living. But the casualty of this tacit agreement is often political participation, an issue which has come to the forefront in the Middle East following the 'Arab Spring' of 2011. Here, Sulaiman Al-Farsi looks at the impact the rentier nature of the Gulf States has on political participation, focusing on the nexus between tribe, religion and a new generation of young, highly educated citizens that is present in Oman. Specifically exploring the concept of shura (consultation), and how nascent concepts of democracy in the practice of shura have impacted and shaped the process of democratisation, Al-Farsi's book is vital in the examination of the political discourse surrounding democratisation across one of the most strategically important, but little understood states in the Middle East.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

This book examines the growing influence of democratisation and concepts of democratic power on the rentier – mainly oil-producing – states in the Middle East in general and in Oman in particular. Over the past four decades, the legitimacy of rentier states has rested upon an implicit social contract (seen as part of an Islamic tradition called al-bay’a: the pledge of allegiance) between people and regimes. In this contract, the regimes provide the people with some subsidies and decent jobs in the public sector and do so with little or no direct taxation, although it is at the expense of democratic forms of political participation. This implicit social contract has resulted in significant constraints being placed upon the development of democratic institutions and indeed upon the development of civil society itself in most rentier states. At the very least it has aided its reduction to a very artificial form of parliamentary representation wherein such parliaments have only minimal authority. At the same time, it has allowed such states, particularly in the Gulf region, to establish and maintain the public infrastructure, to incorporate advanced technologies, to produce a larger educated class, to increase the quality of public health and, in turn, to contribute to a growing population in the region.

In some rentier states, such as in the Sultanate of Oman, oil production is now in decline due to the sharp reduction in realisable oil reserves; oil in Oman is expected to run out in a few decades.¹ Here, the argument is put forward that such states now face, to various degrees, an increasing pressure to meet hitherto expected living standards, and some of the rentier states are likely to struggle to meet these expectations. With the number of university graduates increasing and the ability of the public sector to absorb them becoming increasingly limited by the decrease in oil revenues, greater dependence on the private sector to provide such employment seems inevitable, particularly because, unlike the people in some other Gulf States, Omanis do not typically object to working in all job levels in the private sector. The consequential growth of associations, syndicates and unions, together with calls for political reforms, signal a great change in the existing social contract, and thus a significant challenge is currently posed to the legitimacy of some rentier states. Therefore, greater pressure for democratisation can be expected in some oil producing states, in line with the respective decline in levels of oil production, as popular demands for self-empowerment increase and governing elites seek new forms of political legitimacy.

Despite the deep-rooted history and conservatism of Oman, from the beginning of the twentieth century until Sultan Qaboos came to power in 1970, the country witnessed a period of weakness at political, economic and cultural levels. Subsequently, many Omanis have left the country in a search of better education and employment, and many of the values that used to exist in Oman have been damaged – not least the firm sense of Omani identity.²

In respect of the decline and crisis which had swept across the country at the time, the few years prior to Sultan Qaboos’s reign witnessed at least two important events: the conflict between the government of the Sultanate at that time and the followers of the Imamate on the Jebel Akhdar and the government’s conflict with Marxist rebels in the Dhofar governorate.³ The former Sultan Said bin Taymur had been able to unify the country for the first time in modern history by the end of the 1950s. (Since the signing of the Seeb Agreement in 1918, Oman had been divided between the Sultanate that rules the coastal areas and the Imamate that rules the interior.) However, the conflict in the Dhofar governorate persisted until the mid-1970s. The other pre-eminently important event in that period was the discovery of oil in Oman in vast commercially significant quantities.⁴

The political changes which resulted from Sultan Qaboos acceding to the throne and from the economic changes after the discovery of oil helped to repair the ravages of the decades which preceded 1970. Omani people restored their identity and culture through the deployment of formal education, which quickly established national curricula. The curricula reminded citizens of their history, values and traditions and assured them of the sovereignty of their country throughout history. Therefore, the development which took place and is still underway in Oman, this book contends, is not due solely to the discovery of oil reserves as some theorists of the rentier state model have argued. It is also a function of the reformulation of the nation’s history after a period of decline; the cultural and economic activities of Oman in terms of trade and industry were present throughout history and were not solely a product of the modern era.

The establishment of Oman as a modern state was embarked upon at all levels after 1970. It was therefore necessary to reformulate the political structure of Oman but in line with its current stage of development. Oman had been opened to the world at all levels; the slogan adopted by the country was ‘to start from where others have ended’, and this motto was applied to education, health and modern management systems and therefore had to be applied to the political system as well.⁵ The Sultanate realised that the era of authoritarian political systems was over and that an era of political pluralism based on democratic values had arrived. The government recognised two important facts: firstly, the Omanis who had left to study and work before 1970 had become aware of the importance of political reform; and secondly, Oman was suffering from having a distinctly weak civil society (as was the case in other Arab countries).

The opening up of the political horizon in a tribal society based mainly on tribal legitimacy, which fights any sort of centralisation of power even if it comes in a democratic form, may well serve to evoke negative reactions and results, not least with regard to the social and political system in the state. Therefore, the intended project of political democratisation was to be exercised through a gradual opening up of the political horizon alongside progress in the development of civil society, but crucially in keeping with tradition and other historic values of the country.⁶ As will be discussed in Chapter 2, it was necessary and obvious (at least to its architects) to choose the Islamic Shura as a model for policy making in the country, particularly since Oman is the only country which has maintained the Shura practice throughout its history; indeed, its demise could lead to much social upheaval in Oman as the legitimacy of any political system in the country is based on the extent to which it recognises the Shura.

From 1970 onwards Oman witnessed a new ‘top-down’ democratisation process which juxtaposed the traditional democratic practice of Shura, derived from Islam, with the concepts and institutional practices of modern Western democracy. Omanis were allowed to vote en masse, for the first time in the Sultanate’s history, in 1991. It is a new political phenomenon for the ordinary Omani people to directly practise Shura at the national level, and it is a process which has been introduced from the top down. In the traditional Islamic Shura, participation – at the national level – was restricted to elites and notables who claimed representative legitimacy on behalf of various tribal confederations. Ordinary people in the past were restricted to providing nominal mandates once the Shura had been formed and decisions had been taken. Nevertheless, all Muslim people can practise Shura at the hierarchically lower levels as it is regarded as a norm of living (to the extent that all have a right even to criticise the ruler if he is found wrong).

Since the 1990s, however, it would seem that a process of democratisation, which embraces all segments of Omani society, including the clergy, has come to be accepted by most sections of society. Significantly, though, this process is relatively new, and some, especially the educated younger generation, feel that current democratic reforms remain insufficient in terms of addressing the challenges which Oman faces in the twenty-first century. By employing the resources of websites, the media, and other open forums, this emerging educated and technocratic elite has begun to push the government towards making more substantive political reforms. This phenomenon represents a nucleus of ‘bottom-up’ democratisation approaches, reflected for example in the manner in which its agents are initiating contacts with regional and international human rights organisations.

This book therefore identifies three types of democratisation taking place in contemporary Oman: the traditional, led by the religious institutions; the top-down, led by the government; and a bottom-up process which is emerging slowly amongst the younger generation. Oman, it can be argued, is passing through a transitional period in which all three processes react against and struggle with each other in order to reach a certain compromise or settlement. The presence of this unique phenomenon offers a very interesting opportunity to examine these democratisation processes. The following paragraphs explain the contest oriented around the concept of the rentier state and the process of democratisation in Oman – involving the three different actors. This all takes place against the backdrop of Ibadism – a source of consistency in the Omani state and Omani society.

Oman, regardless of its limited oil reserves when compared with its neighbours, is regarded as being one of the rentier states of the Gulf region, but its declining oil reserves clearly threaten the ability of the Sultanate to continue to arrange political discourse and participation around a ‘rentier state model’. The country might fail to fulfil its duties in the implicit social contract, and the legitimacy of the government might well soon be affected. According to some reports, the decline in oil production rates will start within a decade.⁷ (Some Omani officials are still optimistic, hoping that new technology will allow for the extraction of the heavy oil reserves available in big, untapped reservoirs in the country.) But even if oil production rates remain at the same level or oil prices rise, some Gulf States in general and Oman in particular might not be able to continue with the rentier model as population growth outstrips oil income and the capacity of the public sector, which employs a vast proportion of the citizenry, is hindered.

As will be detailed in subsequent chapters, Oman has been ruled for over ten centuries by Ibadi Imams and has never been under the sovereignty of the great Sunni Islamic dynasties – except for the four decades that followed the end of the first Imamate state in the eighth century – beginning with the Umayyad Dynasty and ending with Ottomans.⁸ The majority of the population has in the past followed the Ibadi sect which serves to determine the religious and cultural borders in terms of state and society.⁹ Ibadi people suffered throughout history from continuous attacks from the different Islamic dynasties, especially from the Umayyads and the Abbasids. Attempts were made to destroy the Ibadi state, which was seen as a threat to the hereditary rule practised by the respective dynasties.

Ibadism’s understanding of Shura is different from that of other Sunni sects. The latter – except perhaps in the work of the Sudanese scholar Hassan al-Turabi and some of the renaissance era scholars in Egypt during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – see Shura as a process that never exceeds the offering of consultation by the ruler. Ibadis, by contrast, take Shura as a political agenda in which the ruler (Imam) is elected, thereby denying legitimacy to the idea of hereditary rule. Moreover, Ibadism genuinely practises the Islamic principles of Ijma‘ (consensus) and Ijtihad (diligence), a fact which has allowed them to adapt core Islamic values to suit a dramatically changing environment in the contemporary globalised era. This attribute of Ibadism exhibits its best qualities when it comes to Ibadi tolerance towards other religions and cultures.

Other attacks came in different forms such as in attempts to convert Ibadi people to the Sunni sect (attempts that still manifest themselves today in the proselytising of Saudi Wahabism). But such proselytising has met with limited success in the remote provinces of the Sultanate, where because of the particularly low levels of literacy, the people are deprived of a deep understanding of the differences between Ibadism and Sunnism and hence accept the proselytising calls. Ibadism represented to the followers of the Imamate a locus point of opposition to Western encroachment. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the reliance of the Sultanate on formal treaties with the British – who realised the strategic importance of Oman and of course the Trucial Coast and its significance in terms of protecting British interests in the Indian Ocean – provoked the anger of successive Imams, who challenged the legitimacy of the ruling order.¹⁰ According to the Ibadi notion the Imamate never dies but takes different forms which allow it to survive ‘implicitly’ or ‘explicitly’. An Ibadi Imamate can be absent (Imamah Ghaebah) when Ibadi people are in a status of weakness; hidden (Imamate Kitman) during times of threat or fear; explicit (Imamate Dhohor) during times of peace; or defensive (Imamate Difaá) during times of war or conquest. With this mindset, Ibadi people, represented mainly by the religious scholars, jealously guard the heritage that has served to shape Omani identity – religiously, politically and culturally – throughout Islamic history.¹¹

The current Al-Busaidi dynasty has been ruling Oman since 1744, when Imam Ahmed Bin Said, the founder of the Al-Busaidi Dynasty, was elected by Omani notables according to the Ibadi tradition. After his death in 1783, his son Said bin Ahmed ruled only for few years before his brother, Sultan bin Ahmed, deposed him and moved the capital from the Rustaq, in the interior to Muscat. Breaking with Ibadi traditions, Sultan bin Ahmed proclaimed himself Sayyid (lord). This incident marked the beginning of the period during which Oman had two ruling systems, originating from the same ruling family in Oman: Sayyids in Muscat and the other coastal area and Imams throughout the interior.¹² In 1806, Sayyid Said bin Sultan became the ruler and, breaking with tradition again, adopted the title Sultan instead of Imam, although he used both titles at different occasions. During his time, Oman reached its greatest position in terms of economic and political power, and the Omani Empire extended from parts of Pakistan and Iran to parts of East Africa.¹³ The Sultan managed to open the country to the outside world, and during his time, the British and French vied for influence throughout the region. The Omani Empire had two capitals at this time, Muscat and Zanzibar.

The Ibadi followers of the Imamate, however, feared the growing ties between the Sultan and the British in particular,¹⁴ and they despaired over the agreement signed later between London and Muscat which led to Zanzibar being lost to British control. They therefore initiated a revolution in 1868 known as the Revolution of Imam Azzan bin Qais, who came from the same Al-Busaidi ruling family. This incident renewed the struggle between the Sultans and the Imams. It is worth mentioning that the Sultans are also Ibadis and believe in the Ibadi principles and values, but they, in their quest to establish a modern state, established themselves as independent from the religious intellectuals’ control and concentrated on sea trade, especially before 1970.¹⁵ There have been periods in Omani modern history, however, when Sultans and Imams have cooperated with each other, particularly after signing the 1918’s Seeb Agreement.¹⁶

Most Gulf States have witnessed conflicts between those tribes who migrated to urban areas and thus tended to be better educated (hadar) and those living in deserts (bedu) and, again, between rulers and merchants.¹⁷ In the case of Kuwait, for example, the hadar tribes benefited more from the oil boom and controlled the oil revenues with the protection of Great Britain, which served the interests of the ruling families. The case of Oman, however, was slightly different, as the tension was not between hadar and bedu or rulers and merchants. It was instead a political conflict over the issue of legitimacy since the Imamate people of the interior were well educated by the traditional means and, indeed, have left behind a very rich tradition of scholarly work in theology, Arabic language literature and history which is still widely read throughout Oman. What differences did exist between the coastal Sultanate people and the interior Imamate can be attributed to two main factors: the respective sources of income of the two regions and their foreign policy strategies. The Sultanate, dominating as it did the coastal areas, was dependent on seafaring as the main source of income and proved flexible and indeed cunning in its dealings with foreign states, not least in signing treaties of cooperation and friendship with the British. Whilst this implied some compromise over full sovereignty, Oman retained a degree of political independence which marked it out from what became known as other Trucial States, where the role of Britain was far more transparent in ensuring the survival of a particular dynastic order.¹⁸ By contrast, the Imamate depended on an agrarian-based economy and eschewed overt reliance on outside powers which could potentially undermine the sanctity of the Ibadi order. Accordingly, the Imams were ill placed to benefit from the economic boom which resulted from the discovery and exportation of oil in commercial quantities from the mid-1960s onwards.¹⁹

In 1970 Sultan Qaboos came to power, three years after the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in Oman. He was born to an Ibadi father and a Sunni mother from the Dhofar governorate, which, from the late 1950s onwards, had been the scene of a growing insurgency, increasingly influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology and dedicated to the overthrow of the Sultanate. His Ibadi background undoubtedly helped in attracting legitimacy from powerful northern tribes. Equally, the fact that his mother was from Dhofar gave the Sultan an appeal among Dhofari tribes whose initial attraction to the insurgents was driven l...

Table of contents

• Cover
• About the Author
• Title page
• Copyright page
• Contents
• Figures
• Glossary
• Acknowledgements
• 1. Introduction
• 2. The Context of Democratisation in the Arab World
• 3. The Omani Context
• 4. The ‘Top-Down’ Model: Challenges to Its Success
• 5. The Traditional Model: Theology of Ibadism and Modernity
• 6. The ‘Bottom-Up’ Model: Ambitions and Challenges
• 7. Conclusion
• Notes
• Appendices
• Bibiliography