Democracy and Reform in the Middle East and Asia

Social Protest and Authoritarian Rule After the Arab Spring

Amin Saikal, Amitav Acharya, Amin Saikal, Amitav Acharya

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781780768069
• eBook ISBN: 9780857735188
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The protests that swept across the Middle East and North Africa in late 2010 and 2011 confounded long-time observers of the region, in both the media and academia. After addressing the conditions in the Middle East and North Africa that produced these attempts at revolution, Amin Saikal and Amitav Acharya explore the global impact of the protests, both in terms of their ideological influence on opposition groups and the prospects for democratic transition in a variety of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian governments. Democracy and Reform in the Middle East and Asia commences with a comprehensive attempt to understand the cultural, economic and political background out of which the uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya emerged. It then expands outwards investigating the impact of the Arab uprisings on a regional level in other Middle Eastern and north African states such as Iran, Morocco and Algeria, and on a more global level in the Asian states of China, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the former Soviet Muslim republics.
Saikal and Acharya bring a global perspective to the still-unfolding wave of calls for more meaningful political participation, which continues to make itself felt in the Middle East, to shed light upon the ideal role of both regional and international actors in promoting sustainable transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. This book not only offers explanations for why certain countries were more susceptible to the spread of the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, but also contrasts the organic and grassroots vehicles for democratization characteristic of the most recent Arab uprisings with the Western model of externally imposed regime change to illustrate the conditions necessary for a successful democratic transition. Touching on perennial issues in politics - for example, democracy, authoritarian rule and social protest - this book is vital for researchers of politics and international relations.

CHAPTER 1

Where Have All the Democratic Expectations Gone?

Tunisia and Egypt in Comparative Perspective

Mohammad Selim¹

Introduction

Tunisia and Egypt were the pioneers of the current wave of democratic change in the Arab world. The wave began in Tunisia on 17 December 2010, and as soon as it achieved its first goal of overthrowing Ben Ali on 14 January 2011, the Egyptians followed their Tunisian counterparts by instigating their own attempt to bring about democratic change. On 11 February 2011, the sweeping Egyptian protests forced Mubarak to resign. Although similar revolutions broke out in Yemen, Libya and Syria, the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions remained unique in the sense that they were the first to break down the barriers of fear that stood between the people and their rulers, and were mainly peaceful revolutions despite the violence with which they were met by the falling regimes. Other revolutions, however, were not as peaceful in terms of the violent crackdown by the authorities on large-scale mobilizations of protestors. Further still, the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions ousted their respective head of state, a major target of the protests, in less than a month. Elsewhere on the map of the Arab Spring, the revolutions dragged on for months, with no sign of the despotic rulers stepping down.

The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions have already brought about formidable political change to their countries. One of the main features of modern Arab politics has been, so to speak, the death of politics, which became the monopoly of a corrupt elite class. This elite class invariably argued that reform should be economic first, then political. In reality, however, neither type of reform was achieved, and economic reform became a cover for selling off national assets. The current wave of democratic change in the Arab world made ordinary people central actors on the political scene; younger generations are now well and truly engaged in politics. Even the Salafi fundamentalists and the Sufi spiritualists, traditionally distanced from politics, have now formed their own political parties and are well entrenched in the political process.

The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions were unique in yet another way. The revolutionaries who initiated the political change in both countries did not assume a leading role in the transitional period following the overthrow of the old regimes. Ironically, elements of the old regimes assumed these tasks. For the first time, we witnessed a period of democratic transition being designed and implemented by actors who were part and parcel of the old dictatorships. This has complicated the task of democratization in both countries, though to a lesser extent in Tunisia than in Egypt. Having said that, and compared to Egypt, the Tunisian road to democratization was shorter, and relatively more successful.²

Ever since the ousting of Ben Ali, comparisons between Tunisia and Egypt have not ceased. The first comparison took place between 14 and 25 January – that is, between the fall of Ben Ali and the outbreak of the Egyptian revolution. It revolved around the question of whether the events that occurred in Tunisia would also occur in Egypt. While Mubarak’s critics predicted that the impact of the Tunisian revolution would be felt in Egypt due to social and economic pressures,³ his loyalists, on the other hand, adamantly argued that ‘Egypt was different from Tunisia as each society had its own means of managing its crises’, and ‘that Egypt had more freedom of speech which can act as a safety valve against a possible replay of the Tunisian scenario’.⁴

Comparisons between Egypt and Tunisia continued after the fall of Mubarak on 11 February, with speculations on whether the perceived success of the Tunisian-style course to democracy would be echoed in Egypt. Some analysts argued that the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences were similar in many respects, and the relative success of the Tunisian revolution would affect the process in Egypt.⁵ Others, however, argued that Egypt was qualified to press ahead of Tunisia in terms of democratic transformation due to unique qualities that may be summarized in the following three points:

1. The margin of freedom in Egypt under Mubarak was wider than in Tunisia under Ben Ali, enabling Egyptian Islamist parties to enter into political coalitions with other political forces – facilitating post-revolution democratization.
2. Whereas Ben Ali fled Tunisia, the Egyptians arrested Mubarak and put him and his top aides on trial.
3. In Tunisia, it was the former speaker of the parliament who became the interim president during the transitional era, whereas in Egypt it was the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF) that assumed control of the country.⁶

These supposed qualities were controversial nonetheless. In fact, other analysts have considered these points to favour the Tunisian side over Egypt. For example, one analyst argued that Tunisia was blessed by Ben Ali’s departure, which left the latter’s close associates in a powerless state. In Egypt, however, Mubarak did not leave the country, thus providing his associates with some hope of a political comeback.⁷

A different theoretical approach by analysts was to focus on the similarities between Tunisia and Egypt. According to them, the principal elements shared by the two revolutionary experiences were: the dominance of the Islamist-secular polarization; the ban on Islamist groups during the reign of the old regimes which was turned into a major comeback after their fall; and the security vacuum following the revolution. There were, in tandem with these commonalities, some differences, the most important of them being the neutrality of the military in the post-revolutionary political process in Tunisia compared with Egypt. Also, in Tunisia, most of the politicians of the old regime were still active in post-revolutionary politics, compared with Egypt where they had almost vanished – at least at the official level.⁸

Another group of analysts contended that the road to democracy in Tunisia was more effective and less controversial than in Egypt.⁹ On 25 November 2011, Al-Jazeera satellite channel devoted its daily programme, Behind the News, to the topic of ‘Tunisia and Egypt: One revolution progresses and the other stumbles’.¹⁰ The main conclusion the panellists arrived at in the programme was that the Egyptian revolution was not progressing along the lines of the Tunisian revolution which preceded it. An Egyptian columnist also exhibited a similar sentiment arguing that ‘the Tunisian revolution was implementing many of its objectives, and its achievements were immediately seen. It was proceeding on the path of fulfilling its goals in a democratic and direct fashion. In Egypt, [however,] the revolution was still suffering from delays in achieving its objectives in a concrete way that would be felt by the average citizen in the street’.¹¹ Another Islamist columnist wrote an article entitled ‘The correct answer comes from Tunisia’, in which he argued that the Tunisians have presented a credible model which ought to be pursued by the Egyptians.¹²

The dominant perception among Egyptian analysts has been that Tunisia is progressing more quickly than Egypt on the path to democratization. This leads to the main inquiry in this chapter, which is: how do we account for the fact that the Egyptian path to democratization has been lagging behind its Tunisian counterpart, bearing in mind the fact that the Tunisian and Egyptian experiences were interrelated and occurred almost simultaneously? In the process of my inquiry I shall raise the following questions:

1. What were the main features of the Tunisian and Egyptian paths to democratization?
2. What were the main obstacles and mistakes that resulted in the relative delay in the democratic process in Egypt compared with Tunisia?
3. What are the main challenges which confront the processes of democratization in Tunisia and Egypt?
4. What are the main future trends in both countries with regard to the role of Islam and the military in the future political system?
5. What are the main features of the likely future models of development?

These questions do not intend to suggest that the Tunisian path went without problems or that it has reached the point of complete success. They only indicate that while both paths have encountered major hurdles, the Tunisian revolution has been more effective in dealing with them.

This chapter argues that the divergent outcomes of the Tunisian and Egyptian courses to democratic change were determined by certain leading factors, the most significant of them being: the specific historical legacies of Egypt and Tunisia; the type of leadership which assumed the transitional task of democratization in the two countries; elite fragmentation in Egypt compared with Tunisia; the nature of the public discourse of the Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt; and, finally, the electoral laws introduced in Egypt and Tunisia to pave the way for democratization. I will start by tracing the key junctures of the Tunisian and Egyptian pathways towards democratic transformation, beginning from the moment their respective regimes were overthrown. Then I will account for the divergent outcomes of the two countries in an attempt to answer the research questions mentioned above. The chapter will conclude with a delineation of the possible future trends on the road to democratic change in Tunisia and Egypt.

The Tunisian Path to Democratization

The Tunisian revolution achieved its first major goal when Ben Ali fled the country on 14 January 2011 due to a combination of pressure from the masses and the anti-government, pro-people stance of the military establishment. Following Ben Ali’s departure, a state of emergency was declared. Shortly after, the Constitutional Court announced Fouad Mebazaa as acting president under Article 57 of the Constitution. A caretaker coalition government was also created, which placed members of Ben Ali’s party and the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) in key ministerial positions. Other opposition affiliates were assigned to the minor ministries and elections were set to take place within 60 days.

However, the political climate entered a troubled phase when five newly appointed non-RCD ministers resigned almost immediately, and daily street protests continued unabated. This time, protestors demanded that the new government should keep out all members of the RCD and, even further, that the RCD itself be disbanded. On 27 January, Muhammad Ghannouchi, then acting prime minister, reshuffled the government and removed all former RCD members, with the exception of himself as an ex-RCD affiliate.

On 6 February, due to security concerns, the new Interior Minister suspended all party activities of the RCD. And, on 27 February, following further public protests, Ghannouchi resigned, and Beji Caid el Sebsi replaced him as acting prime minister. Finally, in March 2011, the RCD was dissolved.¹³

A High Commission for the Realization of Revolution Objectives, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition (referred to hereafter as the ‘High Commission’) was formed and tasked with amending the legal framework that ensures free, fair and pluralistic presidential elections. The commission was made up of 71 (increased later to 131) independent legal and political experts alongside judges and legal experts. It also consulted closely with political parties and civil society organizations.

The commission outlined several possible post-revolutionary courses of action: to hold presidential elections (whereby the president dissolves parliament and organizes legislative elections); to hold presidential and legislative elections simultaneously; or to form a committee to draft a new constitution, which would be put to a national referendum.

Acting President Mebazaa announced on 3 March that the latter course would be adopted, setting in motion a process that entailed holding elections to form a Constituent Assembly on 24 July, a date that was later postponed to 23 October. This Constituent Assembly would elect the interim president and prime minister until the constitution was written and approved. Following this, popular elections were set to take place in order to vote for a permanent president and legislative body.

The first meeting of the High Commission took place on 17 March, in which members discussed the draft laws for the election of the Constituent Assembly. The commission played a central role in drafting these laws and on 18 April created the Independent Higher Electoral Commission, to supervise the elections in October. In this regard, Tunisia was different from Egypt, where the military controlled and directed the process of drafting electoral laws, a process which was met with a strong public outcry and seen as a step towards the reinstatement to power of the old political factions.

Under the auspices of the High Commission, 11 political parties signed on 16 September ‘The Declaration on the Transitional Path’. The Declaration was a set of principles which proclaimed that elections for a national Constituent Assembly would be held on 23 October, and that the assembly would be responsible for writing the new constitution. The aim of the new constitution was to establish a balance between the three components of government.¹⁴

The voting system for the Constituent Assembly allocated seats through the adoption of proportional representation (PR) within various multi-member districts on closed party lists. New rules mandated that all party lists were required to alternate between male and female candidates. Almost 11,000 candidates (in a nation of almost 10 million people), spread among 1,500 party lists, ran in these elections – competing to win 217 seats in the assembly.

Almost 90 per cent of eligible voters – an overwhelming percentage – voted in the October election. The election resulted in the Al-Nahda Islamist party winning 89 seats with 39 per cent of the vote, the Congress for the Republic (CPR) winning 29 seats with 8.4 per cent, Al-Aridha winning 26 seats with 6.3 per cent, and Al-Takattol winning 20 seats with 6.3 per cent.

A total of 18 of the 217 Constituent Assembly members represented Tunisians residing abroad. An estimated 1 million Tunisians reside overseas, with over 500,000 of them living in France. Polling took place in 80 countries around the world, and Tunisian expatriates elected ten representatives from France alone; three for Italy; one for Germany; two for North America and the rest of Europe; and two for the other Arab states.

Before the convening of the first session of the Constituent Assembly on 22 November, Al-Nahda, the CPR and Al-Takattol reached an unofficial agreement according to which Moncef Marzouki, the leader of CPR, would become the interim president of Tunisia; Mustafa bin Jafar, the leader of Al-Takattol, the interim speaker of the assembly; and Hamadi Al-Jebali, secretary-general of Al-Nahda, the interim prime minister.¹⁵ On 10 December, the Constituent Assembly adopted the Law on the Interim Organization of Public Powers which served as an interim constitution, and which was to stay in force until the adoption of a permanent constitution. This document set out the procedures and regulations of the exercise of executive, legislative and judicial powers during the interim period. Political power was to be concentrated in the office of the interim prime minister, which clearly raised Al-Jebali’s interest in the post. On 12 December, the Constituent Assembly elected Marzouki as president of the Republic and, on 14 December, Marzouki, as per the unofficial agreement, appointed Al-Jebali as prime minister. These appointments then triggered the process of drafting the new constitution.

The Egyptian Path to Democratization

Compared with Tunisia, the Egyptian path to democratization was slower and marked with an air of tension and violence. On 11 February 2011, Mubarak stepped down under mass public and international pressure, entrusting the country’s leadership to SCAF. Headed by Field Marshal Al-Tantawi, formerly minister of defence under Mubarak, SCAF was a body consisting of 20 senior and high-ranking officers in the Egyptian military. It also included the service heads and other senior commanders of the Egyptian armed forces.

According to the 1971 Egyptian constitution, Mubarak’s yielding of power to SCAF was illegal. The constitution stipulated that in the event where the president is not able to perform his or her duties, the Speaker of the House of Parliament would take over, and if the latter is unable to do so, the chairman of the Constitutional Court would assume the position of president until a new one is elected. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that SCAF had allowed Mubarak’s loyalists to attack protesters in Tahrir Square on 2 February in what would later be known as the ‘Battle of the Camel’, revolutionaries accepted SCAF’s rule.

According to the transitional arrangement, SCAF was to perform two functions. First was the traditional function of drafting and implementing strategies to maintain Egypt’s military security and, secondly, maintaining the political administration of the country. This was the first time since Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 1952 coup that army generals played a direct role in the political system.

On 12 February, SCAF issued a statement announcing its intention to suspend emergency law which had been in place for three decades. It also proposed a move ...

Table of contents

• Author Bibliography
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• Preface
• Introduction: Democratizing the Neighbourhood – The Implications of the Arab Spring for the Middle East and Asia
• 1 Where Have All the Democratic Expectations Gone? Tunisia and Egypt in Comparative Perspective
• 2 Managed Reforms and Deferred Democratic Rule in Morocco and Algeria
• 3 Humanitarianism, Democracy and Intervention: Libya and the Responsibility to Protect
• 4 Afghanistan and Iraq Between Democracy and Radical Islam
• 5 The Arab Revolution Is Bad News for Iran
• 6 Central Asia and the Arab Spring: Discourses of Relevance and Threat in the Region
• 7 Pakistan and the Arab Uprisings
• 8 China’s Responses to the Arab Uprisings
• 9 Democratization in Myanmar and the Arab Uprisings
• 10 Arab Uprisings’ Contagion: Electronic Vicariousness and Democratic Empathy in Malaysia and Singapore
• 11 ‘Look Over Here!’: Indonesian Responses to the Arab Spring
• Notes