Europe Under Napoleon

Michael Broers

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9780857735683
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: French History
• Index: History

Napoleon Bonaparte dominated the public life of Europe like no other individual before him. Not surprisingly, the story of the man himself has usually swamped he stories of his subjects. This book looks at the history of the Napoleonic Empire from an entirely new perspective – that of the ruled rather than the ruler. Michael Broers concentrates on the experience of the people of Europe – particularly the vast majority of Napoleon's subjects who were neither French nor willing participants in the great events of the period – during the dynamic but short-lived career of Napoleon, when half of the European content fell under his rule.

1
Conquest, 1799–1807

Europe in 1799

The statesmen of western Europe were not overly concerned with the palace coup that made Napoleon Bonaparte head of the French state in November 1799. Nor were they entirely wrong in this. Past experience had shown them the inherent fragility of the regimes thrown up by the Revolution in France since 1789. These governments were always at their most vulnerable in times of military adversity and in 1799 the French Republic had just suffered a series of crushing defeats at the hands of the armies of the Second Coalition, which had driven the French out of Italy and Germany in the spring of 1799 and now threatened to carry the war into France itself for the first time since 1793. In these circumstances, a ruthless political purge, followed by yet another government under yet another new constitution – the fourth in eight years – was only to be expected. So often condemned for their inability to understand the nature of the Revolution inside France, the chancellories of Europe should be forgiven for drawing on recent experience in 1799 and thinking they had seen it all before.

Map 1: Principal Napoleonic Battles, 1797–1815

A great deal has been made of the power and might of the state forged by the French revolutionaries, especially by posterity, yet in 1799, the truth is that most of this work was still to be done. The military fortunes of the French Republic were what most concerned the other powers of Europe and those fortunes had been decidedly mixed since hostilities had begun in 1792. Ultimately, every French advance had been repelled at some point or other and the reverses of 1798–99 were the most serious inflicted on France to date. The ruthless efforts of the Terror period, 1792–94, made France into a power to be feared and no state, large or small, was foolish enough to ignore the revival of French power and ambition. Nevertheless, the most important point about the nature of French power in 1799 was its limitations, not its extent. Throughout the 1790s France had emerged as a strong regional power in western Europe, but she was far from capable of dominating the whole continent or even of being a determining influence beyond the ring of weak states to her immediate east and south.

No one questioned the subversive nature of the ideology of the Revolution, nor did anyone wish to see France become the dominant force anywhere in Europe, regardless of who might rule her. However, the leaders of Europe were not agreed on what priority to accord the French threat, because it was more of a threat to some than to others. In this way French weakness, rather than French strength, was what really sapped the determination of the first two coalitions assembled against France in the 1790s. This was very clear from the behaviour of the major European states in 1799.

Britain was the only major power to see the threat of France as unquestionably her first priority and the only one to remain in the war continuously. This tenacity is explained in part by the proximity of the two states but even more by their long-standing colonial and maritime rivalries outside Europe, many of which dated back to the seventeenth century. It had little to do with the growing power of France in continental Europe. In direct contrast, Prussia decided simply to ‘write off’ her minor territorial losses to France in the Rhineland and withdraw into neutrality. In 1799 this was still a sensible course of action; it was a position she retained until 1806 and an important illustration of how limited the scope of the French threat actually was. The issue most important to the Hohenzollerns was the fate of Poland, which France could not influence. Until 1798 Russia took even less of a practical interest in what to her was a very localized conflict at the other end of Europe. Even in 1798–99 Paul I was drawn into the Second Coalition only because France had tried to extend her aggression into the Mediterranean, but it was soon apparent that the French had overreached themselves there. Paul’s withdrawal, early in 1800, was determined by the realization that the true interests of his country lay in defending the Baltic from British commercial domination, rather than in the fate of Germany and Italy.

The conduct of the Habsburg Monarchy is a clear example of the dilemma of how to deal with the resurgence of France, for there were deep divisions within the Court which sprang from two utterly opposed visions of where Habsburg interests lay. The more traditional view saw the Monarchy as a German power with vital interests to defend against French ambitions in the Empire. At the heart of this view was a deep attachment to the role of the Habsburg family as Holy Roman Emperors. This was the opinion that held sway at Court for most of the 1790s, when foreign affairs were directed by Count Thugut. Thus, the Monarchy remained a major force in the war against France. A different current of thought centred on the Emperor’s brother, Archduke Charles. Less bound by traditional ties and convinced that the defence of the small German states was a waste of resources, this faction saw the future of the Monarchy as a territorially compact power, based in central Europe and the Balkans. Therefore Russia was the real enemy for them, not France.

The war with France exposed the chief weaknesses of the Habsburg state, but in a very particular way: the division of the Monarchy into the Austrian and Hungarian crowns was a traditional source of military, financial and administrative complications. The wars of the 1790s revealed less the inability of the Monarchy to defend itself – in fact it proved a formidable force – than the diverging priorities of the two crowns. As long as France remained a regional power only, the Hungarian Diet in Tressburg (now Bratislava) saw little merit in whole-hearted support of the war effort. This was reflected in the limited troops and taxes it contributed in the 1790s. For the Magyar nobles, the most pressing problem was the anarchy and disorder across the border with the Ottoman Empire which was much closer to them than the Rhineland or northern Italy. The view was very different from Vienna, however. To Thugut and his circle, French aggression was an established fact that had to be confronted; to the Magyars it was a distant noise.

All this points to the relatively restricted influence France had in Europe by 1799. The Habsburgs had been able to hold the French advance in check almost single-handed until 1797 and had more than restored the military balance by 1799 with only minimal help from Russia and the Ottomans. Moreover, when it is remembered that this had been done without the full co-operation of almost half the Habsburg Empire the extent of French power assumes its true proportions. Nothing was decided in the west by 1799; the French Republic and the Habsburgs still contested for domination in the region and no one was more aware of this than the policy-makers of the Directory. That was why a faction among them panicked and turned to Napoleon. The Directory deserves great credit for its consolidation of French power but it had not proved itself capable of sustained, secure expansion. By 1799 its own weaknesses stood exposed. Perhaps the best tribute that can be paid to those at the centre of the regime was the realism that made them turn to reform led by a stronger executive under Napoleon. Ultimately this is what would separate France from her rivals: the ability to adapt in the face of relative failure.

The End of the Beginning, 1799–1801

The Military Position in 1799

The armies of the Second Coalition stood poised for victory in 1799 in all the major sectors of a front stretching from the Rhine, across the Alps, to the Mediterranean, the withdrawal of Russia from the war notwithstanding. However, France regrouped its forces in the winter of 1799–1800. At no other time during the wars of 1792–1814 were the advantages so clear of having a commander-in-chief as civilian head of state. Napoleon was able to co-ordinate his tactics, planning and resources very impressively and to a degree not possible under the Directory.

The inactivity and indecision of the Austrian leadership allowed the initiative to pass to the French in these months more than anything they could do to help themselves. The contrast between the approaches of the two states to the coming campaign marks the first of several major changes within France connected to the creation of the new regime. Whereas Napoleon could proceed with a coherent plan and subordinate political aims to military necessities, Habsburg policy was dictated by a mixture of both. Thugut, a diplomat, influenced purely military affairs to a degree already unthinkable for Talleyrand, his French counterpart, although such interference had not been unknown under the Directory. In a diplomatic effort to win over the south German states by making a show of protecting them, Thugut allowed the French to consolidate themselves in Switzerland where Kray now saw no possibility of an Austrian offensive. Even before the new campaign had started, the Austrians had been forced on the defensive and divided their forces in such a way as to lose their numerical advantage.

The greatest constraint on both sides, and not one often recognized as a levelling factor, was the cumulative exhaustion wrought by seven years of war, mainly with each other. Neither Napoleon nor Archduke Charles really wanted to fight in the spring of 1800. The French armies, often unpaid and underfed at the best of times in the 1790s, had suffered heavy desertions in the wake of the defeats of 1799, while the new more systematic conscription law introduced by the Directory in 1798 not only failed to replenish the depleted ranks of the armies, it also fostered serious disorder inside France, as well as in the Belgian departments. It is hardly surprising that Napoleon sought peace talks with Britain and the Habsburgs almost as soon as he took power. When his offers were rebuffed he was at least in a position to decide to fight on and, more importantly, on how to do so.

Archduke Charles had no such freedom; he was subject to the will of Francis II and had to compete with Thugut for influence at Court. He lost the argument in 1799–1800, and resigned. Charles saw that the army was as exhausted as Napoleon’s and wanted time to rebuild it. Reform was needed as well as repair, but he argued neither could be done without a period of peace. In the event, when Thugut – who was confident that war and army reform could take place simultaneously – overruled Charles, both armies were forced to fight against the better judgement of their commanders. Napoleon was able to plan for a quick victory, sure in his own mind that France could not sustain a prolonged war.

The Campaigns of 1800–1801

Napoleon entrusted Switzerland, the main sector, to his closest rival, Moreau, while he led the smaller Reserve Army over the Alps and attacked an Austrian army under Melas in southern Piedmont. The early stages of the fighting revealed the fragility of the French armies as well as the strategic brilliance of Napoleon and Moreau. Suddenly Thugut’s elaborate, ambitious plans for a two-pronged Austrian offensive into France – across the Rhine into Lorraine and from northern Italy into Provence – evaporated. Kray withdrew to stronger positions on the Danube. It was a wise decision, if hardly what Thugut wanted. The quality of Kray’s army had declined sharply since the winter; desertion was rife, the supply system had broken down and disputes broke out between Kray and his staff. In these circumstances it is not surprising that Moreau was able to advance as far as the Danube but he could not bring even this battered army to a decisive battle.

In Italy, Melas confronted Napoleon at Marengo, in southern Piedmont, on 14 June. At this stage, the most striking feature of Napoleon’s campaign was a mixture of good leadership and stretched resources. The Austrians proved a match for Napoleon in the field. Marengo has been seen as the most fortuitous of Napoleon’s victories,¹ and it need not have been decisive. It turned into a quick French victory because Melas, shaken by the fighting, asked for an armistice even though he could have withdrawn his troops to the Austrian fortresses in central Italy, the Quadrilateral, where there were another 80,000 fresh troops. As it was, the armistice ended the war in Italy. This was what Napoleon knew he needed most because even this short campaign had stretched his army; it had to rest and regroup.

By the terms of the armistice the Austrians left the French in virtual control of all Italy outside the Veneto. For the Habsburgs, this meant the loss of all the territory they had reconquered in 1799. Kray then concluded an armistice with Moreau and surrendered most of Bavaria to the French, and peace talks began at Luneville, in eastern France. When the Austrians insisted that they would not make peace without Britain, Napoleon renewed hostilities in November 1800. This time the French could concentrate on the one remaining front, the Danube, and Moreau won a major battle at Hohenlinden on 2 December 1800. It was the decisive blow that Napoleon had staked the campaign and his own survival on and Moreau gave it to him. Napoleon’s masterplan had succeeded because in Moreau and his troops a new, more disciplined army had emerged. This was the first clear sign that the awesome power many contemporaries had detected in the revolutionary armies since 1792 was now almost a reality.

Habsburg resistance all but collapsed. Thugut resigned and the alliance with Britain was repudiated. On 9 February 1801 France and the Habsburgs concluded the Peace of Luneville. The war of the Second Coalition was now over in continental Europe. Only Britain remained at war with France and her isolation was further increased by the successful diplomacy of Tsar Paul in the Baltic, where his League of Armed Neutrality closed northern Europe to British trade. The Danes and Prussians, with Russian backing, sealed the Baltic and the North Sea coast of Germany. Simultaneously, but independently, Napoleon initiated a joint Franco-Spanish invasion of Portugal, also aimed at stifling British commerce. By June 1801 the continent was sealed more effectively to the British than at any other point in the Napoleonic wars. The combined efforts of the Franco-Spanish alliance and the League of Armed Neutrality came much closer to defeating Britain than the Continental System which evolved from 1806 onwards. Whereas the later system was built on coercion and centred solely on France, the pincer movement of 1800–01 stemmed from a spontaneous identity of interest between France and Russia. It was potentially devastating but, as events turned out, unrepeatable. In part, this was because in 1801 British commerce still centred on European markets but by 1807 Britain was drawing most of her essential raw materials from the New World. The assassination of Tsar Paul in March 1801 did not immediately shatter the effectiveness of the League; in the first four months of 1801 not one British ship passed the Danish straits. The blockade – and the League – were broken by a ruthless naval action off Copenhagen on 2 April 1801 led by Nelson, which destroyed the Danish fleet. In the wake of this the new Tsar, Alexander I, moved to restore good relations with Britain.

Copenhagen was the British equivalent of Marengo and Hohenlinden but Britain, like France and the Habsburgs, had been driven to breaking-point by the latest round of fighting. She now needed to reorganize not only her armed forces but her commercial networks. This was the context in which the British finally made peace with the French Republic at Amiens in March 1802. The only period of complete peace in the whole period 1792–1814 now began. It resulted from the mutual exhaustion of the three major protagonists, Britain, France and the Habsburgs, and the net result was to give Napoleon a free hand in continental western Europe. This was the price the partners of the Second Coalition saw they had to pay to consolidate their own positions. Napoleon, however, had no illusions about French limitations. The future of Europe for the next decade would now turn on how each of the great powers used the time they had just bought themselves.

The Watershed: The Great Powers at Rest, 1801–05

The collapse of the Second Coalition wrought many vital changes at the heart of the major states of Europe. In the course of 1801 Tsar Paul was assassinated and replaced by his son Alexander I. The government of the Habsburg Monarchy also saw sweeping changes, as Archduke Charles returned to the military high command with the brief to reform the army, while the conduct of foreign affairs passed to Cobenzl, an experienced diplomat, and to Colloredo, the Emperor’s former tutor. In Britain, the long period of political stability under the ministry of William Pitt the Younger was shattered when he resigned in March 1801. This had been provoked by his confrontation with George III over the issue of Catholic Emancipation, itself a by-product of the hastily enacted abolition of the Irish parliament and its amalgamation with the British one as a panic response to a serious, French-backed rebellion in Ireland in 1798. It would be several years before a ministry of comparable authority emerged to lead the country. Pitt was replaced by Addington, a less decisive leader, if a better financier and administrator than Pitt. Pitt proved ruthless in opposition; together with his former rivals Fox, Grenville and the Whigs, he made the life of Addington’s government untenable and forced him to resign by 1804.

With the other powers thus absorbed in their own affairs, Napoleon set about exploiting the terms of Luneville to the full. France was now confirmed in the possession of Belgium, Luxembourg and the west bank of the Rhine, areas she had seized early in the revolutionary wars. Napoleon was also tacitly allowed to annex most of Piedmont directly to France, the first step beyond the ‘natural frontiers’ proclaimed in 1792. The French advance was further confirmed by the recognition by Britain and the Habsburgs of several ‘sister republics’ created by the French in the course of the 1790s. Napoleon became their official guarantor.

Luneville reclaimed for France much of what had been won under the Directory, but not all of it, due to the cautious approach adopted by Napoleon at this early stage in his rule. The old idea of a western Europe composed of small, weak buffer states, so central to the concept of balance in eighteenth-century diplomacy, had not yet been abandoned. Set beside the resurrection of those sister republics closest to the borders of France, was the sacrifice of the further-flung ones in central and southern Italy, where the Pope and the various branches of the Bourbons were restored. Nebulous plans for a sister republic on the eastern bank of the Rhine were definitively abandoned. Instead, from 1801 until 1805, the French preferred to exercise an indirect influence on the rivalries of the German princes. This was a consolidation for France, but not an advance. In Switzerland, in 1803, Napoleon actually dissolved the centralized ‘sister’ Helvetic Republic he inherited from the Directory, replacing it with a cantonal federation over which his control as ‘Mediator’ was indirect, if decisive. A firm commitment of 16,000 Swiss troops per annum was preferable to direct political control.

Indirect control or, more correctly, determining influence was all Napoleon actually sought beyond France itself and the sister republics. He did not want to over-extend his territories because he saw very clearly that internal reform and consolidation had to be his first priority. He fought the 1800–01 campaign with the military and administrative machinery he inherited from the Directory and had seen how overstretched they were becoming. In seeking peace to reorder his state, Napoleon was conforming to the general pattern in these years. But France alone among the great powers in 1801 was able to enter into this process without major changes in its leadership; these had taken place already. Whereas for the other major states of Europe confused politics had to go with the process of reform, in France reform was part of a process of political consolidation. Ironically, France now had one of the most stable governments among the great powers, in stark contrast to her position at the start of the war of the Second Coalition in 1798. This difference was to prove crucial for the future. Just how much is revealed by an examination of the policies of the other great powers between 1801 and 1805.

In the immediate military and diplomatic context of 1801–05, the crucial point is that no other major state was able to reform itself to the degree achieved by Napoleon in France and its sister republics. Only the middle-sized German states matched the French bloc in the effectiveness of their internal reforms and they remained too small to influence the balance of power directly. Above all, no other state was able to revitalize its army to the extent Napoleon had by 1805. Those aspects of reform where Napoleon proved most successful were in local government and the army. They were not only those most essential for political survival in the early nineteenth century but exactly those areas where the other great powers enjoyed the least success.

Russia, Britain and the Habsburg Monarchy all suffered severe traumas in 1801. The strains of war had everywhere revived older fears and intensified many domestic difficulties for the governments of the three major memb...