Inside South Africa's Foreign Policy

Diplomacy in Africa from Smuts to Mbeki

John Siko

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781780768311
• eBook ISBN: 9780857735799
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: African History
• Index: History

South Africa is still the major-player in African diplomacy, its military resources far outstripping those of other nations on the continent. It also has traditionally taken the lead role in Africa's united negotiations with other power blocs. Yet the recent consensus has been that South Africa's diplomacy over the last decades has been a disappointing failure - from appearing to back the controversial Mugabe regime to accusations that it is failing to utilize its position to encourage Chinese investment. John Siko has had insider access to the corridors of power in South Africa, and, with access to the major political players, charts the inability of South Africa to develop a coherent policy over the last four decades. In particular, he reveals the tight grip Mbeki has over foreign policy, to the detriment of SA's standing in the world, and argues South Africa's isolationist style of policy making has not changed enough after Mandela's election in 1994.

CHAPTER 1

UNDERSTANDING SOUTH
AFRICAN FOREIGN
POLICYMAKING

Every day, governments around the world make decisions, small and large, about their bilateral or multilateral external relations. Their sum results in what can be broadly termed as a country’s ‘foreign policy,’ best defined by American academic Marijke Breuning as ‘the totality of a country’s policies toward and interactions with the environment beyond its borders.’¹ Usually, these policies are relatively clear, characterized by such outcomes as trade and mutual defense pacts, foreign assistance packages, embargoes, or declarations of war.

While the ‘what’ of foreign policy is easily discerned, the question of ‘why’ can pose a more difficult question. Another definition of foreign policy comes from Nigerian scholar Adewale Banjo, who describes it as a ‘framework outlining how the country will interact, relate and do business with other countries and with non-state actors in mutually beneficial ways and within the context of a country’s national interest and economic prosperity.’² Implicit in this definition is the assumption that state priorities are unambiguous and that ‘national interest’ and ‘economic prosperity’ would be clear to a country’s policymakers and populace. Any citizen of a democratic society knows this is not the case; ask ten Germans about whether European Union membership is in their national interest or ten Americans about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and one is certain to receive an array of replies.

If one accepts that the foreign policy orientation of states (or non-state actors, players ignored by the definitions above) is open to interpretation, then the question turns from ‘why’ to ‘who matters’ in making policy. As Joseph Frankel noted in his seminal 1963 study on foreign policymaking, ‘“State decisions” are not made by states but on their behalf, by individuals and by groups of individuals.’³ From a legal and constitutional standpoint, responsibility for most of these decisions resides with the head of state or head of government, while ministries like foreign affairs, trade, defense, and others handle more mundane issues. In democratic societies, however, government entities are not necessarily the only actors that matter. Legislatures in many democracies have foreign policy competencies, such as the ratification of treaties. Business leaders seek policies that will improve their export possibilities and limit import competition. Academics, journalists, and civil society organizations will stake out positions on various external issues based on their beliefs and interests. At the base of the pyramid of actors is public opinion, which, while not always voluble on foreign policy, can assert itself at the ballot box if government actions stray too far from society’s norms and values.

Assuming that one accepts the hypothesis that actors beyond the executive branch matter in making foreign policy, one must turn to the final question of ‘how’ they engage in the foreign policymaking process. For example, let us assume a situation whereby a business association wants its government to pursue entry into a free trade area. What means would it use to build its case that such a policy was in the country’s national interest? How would the association seek to lobby the president and foreign minister? Would it use public pressure, private cajoling and financial contributions to the ruling political party, or a combination of tactics, to achieve its aims? Conversely, how would the government determine whether an association’s position deserves consideration or can be safely ignored? This is perhaps the most complex question of them all, given the multiplicity of factors that must be considered.

The goal of this book (adopted from a doctoral dissertation done with the University of South Africa) is to apply the questions raised above to South Africa—both pre- and post-1994—through the broad theoretical lens of foreign policy analysis to better understand how foreign policy really gets made, with an eye toward determining whether the country’s democratic transition has also made the foreign policymaking process more open and participatory. The African National Congress (ANC) government of post-transition South Africa made a distinct break with many policies of its apartheid-era National Party (NP) predecessor, but it is less clear—and little explored—whether the new government heeded calls before and during the transition to ‘democratize’ the country’s foreign policy apparatus, both by law and by custom, to give outside actors more influence in the process.

Framing the Question

To examine the degree to which the foreign policy debate was opened up after 1994, one must first ask what, exactly, constitutes ‘democratic’ foreign policymaking, a theoretical construct that has received so little attention to date in academic literature that it remains open to interpretation. Alexander Johnson in his chapter in the 2001 compilation South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a New Democracy enunciates three different models for conceptualizing democratic foreign policy:

– A liberal or ‘good citizen’ model that emphasizes states as bearers of individual rights and freedoms, focusing on the promotion of ‘democratic’ rights within nations.

– A model that views democratic foreign policy as seeking to transform the international collective mindset of democracy, seeking to make the global system more ‘democratic.’

– A third model that is more concerned with procedural democracy in the domestic political system and the priority of domestic obligations and duties of government over the discharge of international commitments.⁴

Much has been written about South Africa’s application of the first two models in its foreign policy, such as its promotion of ‘democratic values’ like respect for human rights and its efforts to reform global governance systems to give poor countries more influence.⁵ In this book, however, we will focus on the third model, which asks, basically, to what extent the broader electorate and other appropriate actors are able to weigh in on and influence a country’s foreign policy. This model is predicated on a conceptualization of ‘democracy’ broader than that proposed by Samuel Huntington, who argues that ‘the central procedure of democracy is the selection of leaders through competitive elections by the people they govern.’⁶ Rather, we will use the more inclusive definition proposed by Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Lipset:

– Meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organizational groups (especially political parties) for positions of government power through regular, free, and fair elections.

– A highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies such that no major (adult) social group is prevented from exercising the rights of citizenship.

– A level of civil and political liberties—freedom of thought and expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and demonstrations, freedom to form and join organizations—sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.⁷

Diamond, Linz, and Lipset emphasize the mechanics of feedback between election cycles, ensuring that through continual participation in governance and the personal freedom necessary for citizens to provide honest and regular feedback to their elected representatives, citizens (and groups) can influence policy debates, including those about foreign affairs. It is this framework that will help answer the key question of this book, which is how did South African leaders from the dawn of Union to the end of the Mbeki era take into account domestic inputs in South African foreign policy issues?

Obviously, the question of whether the process was made more democratic is highly subjective and rooted in perception; decisionmakers may claim (and truly believe) they considered outside inputs in the policy process, while those attempting to weigh in may feel their participation was ignored. Policy pronouncements seldom mention the means by which they were reached, how the metaphorical ‘sausage’ was made. Hence, the best the analyst can do—and the aim of this book—is to canvas a broad spectrum of opinions and insights by participants in the process, seek their impressions, compare their insights with those of others and existing literature, and draw conclusions.

Selecting the Actors for Examination

South Africa’s 1996 constitution—like that of many democracies—gives significant power to the head of state in the foreign policy sphere, although this does not mean he or she acts in a vacuum. A range of actors, inside and outside government, has throughout the country’s history attempted to influence South Africa’s external orientation. It is therefore necessary to examine a host of actors to see whether they have had an impact on making policy, or if they have been largely ignored. Chapters 3 through 10 will examine the influences of various actors on the policy process and their interactions with the executive. Each chapter will give a brief historical overview of each entity and the degree to which it has influenced past South African administrations before turning to their relative influences post-1994.

Public Opinion and Civil Society

Foreign policymaking in democracies tends to receive far less popular interest than that related to domestic issues, given that with the exception of military deployments, such issues have little day-to-day impact on voters and their families. Political scientist Ole Holsti’s model of foreign policy interest among populaces, for example, argues that citizens can be grouped into three categories—attentive and informed; moderately interested and with limited knowledge; and totally disinterested.⁸ Holsti puts the informed top layer at generally no more than 15 percent of the population, with the bottom, disinterested tier accounting for as much as 70 percent. Other models differ slightly from Holsti’s in terminology and percentage categorizations, but most have similar principles. While applying Holsti’s model to South Africa is difficult and inexact, this chapter will examine the available data and use interviews with policymakers to gauge public interest and better understand how (and whether) it was taken into account.

This chapter will also examine the role of civil society and pressure groups on the foreign policy debate, paying specific attention to the roles of organized labor and religious organizations. In the pre-1994 context, the role of the Broederbond will be examined in depth. After 1994, the ANC’s tripartite alliance partners, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), will be the chief focus. They are of particular interest since, despite their alliance with the ruling party, both groups have espoused distinct foreign policies from the ANC and butted heads with ANC leaders—and Mbeki in particular—on occasion, notably regarding Zimbabwe and Swaziland policies. In addition, the role of religious groups after 1994, given their lobbying efforts on such issues as Zimbabwe and the Middle East, merit attention.

The Press

In South Africa and around the world, the press—specifically the print press, the focus of this chapter—is the means by which citizens are kept informed of their government’s foreign interactions and policymaking. After examining the degree to which South Africans are engaged on foreign policy, it is worth exploring further to what degree the press is able (and willing) to drive the foreign policy debate in South Africa. Hence, a major focus of the chapter will be on the relationship between the reader and the media, with an eye toward better understanding how the demands of readership influenced foreign affairs coverage, and whether the press has ever been able to influence public opinion on external issues. In addition, the relationship between the press and government will be explored, particularly how it did or did not change after 1994.

Think Tanks and Academia

Think tanks and universities generate some of the most sophisticated foreign policy thinking and analysis worldwide, and South Africa is no exception. Foreign policy academics have been present in South Africa since the 1960s, and since 1994 have proliferated, fueled by the end of South Africa’s isolation. Despite the fact that South African academia has for years produced high-quality analytic products, it is less clear the extent to which the South African Government—especially during Mbeki’s administration—considered their inputs in shaping foreign policy or simply seeking diverse opinions on external issues. Did South African leaders consult broadly or rather use a small crop of ‘trusted’ academics? Did they consider these inputs when making decisions or just pay them lip service? This chapter will seek to answer these questions, fleshing out whether academia has been an influential player.

Business

South Africa’s business community, from conglomerates like Anglo-American to small- and medium-sized enterprises, is a force that cannot be ignored in the South African political arena, particularly given its ability to use party funding to lobby for or against policies. Given the growing interest of South African firms on the rest of the continent and the way in which events like the crisis in Zimbabwe affect corporate bottom lines, one would imagine that companies and groupings like Business Leadership South Africa or Business Unity South Africa would actively seek to engage the government on foreign policy. This study will henceforth seek to better understand how much influence the business community—broadly and in individual parts—had on Mbeki and his predecessors in the external realm.

Parliament

Legislatures in most democratic countries are empowered to provide a necessary check on executive foreign policy decisionmaking, particularly in terms of controlling the purse strings for defense and foreign affairs departmental budgets. That said, legislators also generally do not prioritize foreign policy issues, since they rarely have a direct impact on voter behaviors and tend to generate little legislation. This chapter will examine the degree to which South Africa’s parliament, both pre- and post-1994, has had the ability and shown the willingness to stand up to the executive in regard to foreign policy. Of particular interest will be the differences between ruling and opposition party legislators in their manner of dealing with external affairs.

The Ruling Party

Evaluating the roles of ruling parties and governments in policy formulation, both domestic and foreign, is tricky given the difficulty drawing distinctions where one ends and the other begins, particularly given the NP’s post-1948 and ANC’s post-1994 dominances of the political sphere. Foreign policy is generally not viewed as a factor of great dispute within the ANC, but this study will explore the means by which Thabo Mbeki—the Party’s dominant foreign policy figure from 1994 to 2008—solicited and processed inputs from within the Party, most notably from the ANC’s Department of International Relations, the National Executive Committee (NEC) subcommittee on International Relations, and other NEC subcommittees that play a role in the foreign policy debate. The interactions of Mandela and Mbeki with the ANC on foreign affairs will be compared with that of pre-1994 leaders with the NP, determining whether NP structures played any significant role on that front. In addition, this chapter will examine the foreign policymaking of the exiled ANC, with an eye toward understanding how its foreign policy structures influenced those of the post-1994 government.

Government Departments

Although nearly every government department in South Africa has some sort of external affairs competency, four departments since 1994—Foreign Affairs (International Affairs and Cooperation since 2009), Trade and Industry, Defense, and Intelligence—have been the primary players. Chapter 9 will explore the interactions between departments; between these departments and the Presidency; and with external actors in the making of policy to determine what departments have played dominant roles in the foreign policymaking process and how such influences have ebbed and flowed. The role of the now-abolished Department of Information on foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s also will be examined. Chapter 9 will focus in particular on the role of department principals (ministers, directors-general, generals, ambassadors, and the like) in influencing policy.

The Prime Minister/President

The last actor to consider is the national leader (prime minister until 1984; president thereafter). While studies of the other actors will seek to determine to what extent they influenced the decisionmaker, it would be remiss to not examine the decisionmaking characteristics of the national leaders to better understand how they made decisions. Mbeki, for example, has been widely painted as a president whose intense interest in foreign policy issues, as well as his years as one of the ANC’s leading foreign policy mavens, led him to keep his own counsel to the point that he gave short shrift to what outsiders told him, particularly on issues where he had some experience.⁹ This chapter also will examine the decisionmak...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Detecation
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• List of Acronyms
• 1. Understanding South African Foreign Policymaking
• 2. A Brief History of South African Foreign Policy
• 3. Public Opinion and Pressure Groups
• 4. The Press
• 5. Academia
• 6. Business
• 7. Parliament
• 8. Ruling Parties
• 9. Government Departments
• 10. The Prime Minister and President
• 11. Conclusion—Room, But Not Willingness, for Engagement
• Appendix: List of Interviews
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Back Cover