Arming the Sultan

German Arms Trade and Personal Diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire Before World War I

Naci Yorulmaz

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN:
  9781780766331
• Edition: 1
• eBook ISBN:
  9780857736680
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

International Arms Trade has always been a powerful and multi-functional constituent of world politics and international diplomacy. Sending military advisors abroad and promoting arms sales, each legitimizing and supporting the other, became indispensable tools of alliance-making starting from the eve of the First World War until today. To the German Empire, as a relative latecomer to imperialistic rivalry in the struggle for colonies around the word in the late 19th century, arms exports performed a decisive service in stimulating and strengthening the German military-based expansionist economic foreign policy and provided effective tools to create new alliances around the globe. Therefore, from the outset, the German armament firms' marketing and sales operations to the global arms market but especially to the Ottoman Empire, under the rule of Sultan Abdülhamid II, were openly and strongly supported by Kaiser Wilhelm II, Bismarck and the other decision-makers in German Foreign Policy.
Based on extensive multinational archival research in Germany, Turkey, Britain and the United States, Arming the Sultan explores the decisive impact of arms exports on the formation and stimulation of Germany's expansionist foreign economic policy towards the Ottoman Empire. Making an important contribution to current scholarship on the political economy of the international arms trade, Yorulmaz's innovative book Arming the Sultan reveals that arms exports, specifically under the shadow of personal diplomacy, proved to be an indispensable and integral part of Germany's foreign economic policy during the period leading up to WW1.

CHAPTER 1

THE GERMAN EXPANSIONIST
WAVE AND THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF GERMAN STYLE
OF WAR BUSINESS IN THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1880–98)

‘… and Caesar crossed the Rubicon’

Bismarck and His Ottoman Policy: Towards the First Expansionist Wave

‘The new Alexander will have to come from Germany or at least be German-inspired.’

Paul Dehn¹

‘The war of the future will be the economic war, the struggle for existence on the largest scale.’

Otto von Bismarck²

Kaiser Wilhelm II’s accession to the throne, in 1888, was widely regarded as a turning point for German economic and political influence in the Ottoman Empire. It has been argued that, prior to his accession, the German ruling élites stood almost completely in accord with Bismarck’s vision for diplomacy, which might be described as a policy of non-involvement in Ottoman affairs. In the years following the unification of Germany, Bismarck’s authority in all points of domestic and foreign policy became so overwhelming that a great majority of the population viewed him as the real ruler of the newly founded German Empire. Just before the outbreak of the Russo–Turkish War (1877–8), Bismarck gave a famous speech concerning his Eastern policy to the German parliament on 5 December 1876. Bismarck indicated that the policy Germany pursued should be dictated solely by its own interest. The following well-known quotation from Bismarck’ speech shows how he phrased his opinion concerning the Eastern question: ‘We will not permit ourselves to be influenced by any proposal whatsoever to pursue any other policy. I do not therefore advise any active participation on the part of Germany, as I do not see for Germany any interest which would warrant our sacrificing – excuse the harshness of the expression – the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.’³

According to The New York Times’ comment, Bismarck’s dismissal of the Ottoman Empire might have stemmed from his realization that ‘Turkish intrigue was a dangerous business for European powers’.⁴ Kaiser Wilhelm II also mentioned Bismarck’s ‘unfavourable opinion’ of the Ottoman Empire and ‘the men in high position there [Abdülhamid II and his bureaucrats], and of conditions in that land’.⁵

While some historians accept Bismarck’s claim of disinterest in the Ottoman Empire ‘at face value’, Ismail Kemal Bey, the former Ottoman Governor-General of Tripoli and Beirut, argued that ‘to extend German influence in the East became an essential part of the Bismarckian policy’.⁶ Although his above cited speech has been widely presented as the framework of Bismarck’s Balkan policy, the Eastern Question was, according to Bismarck’s formulation, a ‘question of Turkey’.⁷ Furthermore Marschall also portrayed Bismarck’s speech as a situation-specific statement. In one of his correspondences with Prince Bülow, he wrote, ‘when he [Bismarck] addressed the speech, he diagnosed the real existing state and at the same time in the East he secured the role of the honest broker’.⁸ Regarding Bismarck’s well-known remarks and the interpretations thereof, Ismail Kemal Bey wrote: ‘No historical utterance has been more often quoted than the celebrated remark of Bismarck that the “Eastern Question was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier”. But, although so often quoted, no historical utterance has ever been the cause of so much ambiguous comment, or has been more constantly misunderstood and misinterpreted.’⁹ In his memoir, Ismail Kemal Bey made the following illuminating comment about Bismarck’s pretended disinterestedness in the Ottoman affairs:

Bismarck … continued to push his views concerning Turkey. In spite of his pretended disinterestedness, when it was decided to send German officers and officials to Turkey to help organise her army and the civil and financial administration, in answer to those who had doubts as to whether such arrangements might be agreeable to the other Powers, he replied that, when Prussia was on the best terms with Russia, the Turkish artillery was organised by Prussian officers. Insisting as he did upon keeping a hand on Turkey, and, above all, on Asia Minor, he considered that Germany would reap much advantage by sending her officers and functionaries to those countries.¹⁰

The first step taken by the Sultan was to invite civil and military advisers from Germany, on 14 May 1880. This invitation, which Yasamee calls ‘both original and in some ways surprising’,¹¹ opened the door to German political, economic, and military penetration of the Ottoman Empire. However, as Griffiths pointed out, because of British protests and some other diplomatic problems that had emerged subsequent to the chaos in the Balkans, Bismarck had to postpone the fulfilment of Abdülhamid’s initial request.¹² Although it was widely believed that Bismarck did not favour sending military advisers to the Ottoman Empire and postponed their dispatch as a result, he actually supported the assignment of German civil and military advisers to the Ottoman Empire.¹³ According to Reşid Bey’s report, Bismarck’s reservations were not about the sending of civil and military advisers but were about the Ottomans’ request to enter the Triple Alliance.¹⁴ As the Prince of Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst (hereafter Prince Hohenlohe) also stated, Bismarck wanted to send the mission to the Ottoman Empire, while the Crown Prince Frederick III (1831–88) was doubtful about doing so. Having said that, however, Bismarck thought that the Austrian approval was needed in order to agree to the Ottoman request to enter the Triple Alliance. According to Ismail Kemal Bey, Bismarck realized that through sending military advisers to the Ottoman Empire, Germany ‘would have at her command a number of officials who knew and had studied these regions, and these at some time or another might be able to render great service’.¹⁵

On 14 July 1880, following his initial request, Sultan Abdülhamid II sent the draft terms of appointment for the prospective German military and civil advisers who would enter in the Ottoman service.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the 12 articles of draft terms did not assuage Crown Prince Frederick’s doubts. As Prince Hohenlohe recorded, the Crown Prince asked whether the dispatch of military officers and civil instructors to the Ottoman Empire should be postponed, because Bismarck thought that the officers might be used to help the Porte resist other European powers.¹⁷ After mentioning his point of view, the Crown Prince had bidden Prince Hohenlohe to communicate his doubts to the Chancellor Bismarck. Prince Hohenlohe sent the following report to the Crown Prince on 16 July 1880 in which he wrote:

Your Imperial and Royal Highness was on my last visit to Potsdam graciously pleased to entrust to me communications to the Chancellor, which I hastened to convey, and concerning which I take the liberty of most humbly reporting. As to the doubts of your Imperial and Royal Highness in regard to the sending of officers and civil servants to Turkey, the Chancellor has come to the conclusion that he cannot share them. He considers the measure in various respects advantageous.¹⁸

In fact, Bismarck was not ambivalent about sending the civil and military advisers to the Ottoman Empire; on the contrary he was well aware of the potential for mutual benefits of the presence of the Germans in the Ottoman service. According to Prince Hohenlohe, Bismarck emphasized that ‘it might be useful to Germany to have the Turks as friends in as far as this might be to their [the Ottoman Empire] advantage’. During his conversation with Hohenlohe, Bismarck also pointed out clearly the importance of increasing the influence of Germany in Istanbul. In his report, Hohenlohe summarized Bismarck’s argument that sending civil and military advisers to the Ottoman Empire would be multiply advantageous. Bismarck was of the opinion that the duties to be discharged by the advisers would be very instructive and would give them opportunities to show the extent of their capacity. Additionally, the Germans employed in the Ottoman Empire had some undeclared and unrecorded duties. During his conversation with Prince Hohenlohe, Bismarck put emphasis on that possible advantage and said: ‘It will furnish us with a number of reliable informants whom we could obtain in no other way.’¹⁹

Actually, Bismarck had made the same point in one of the official reports submitted by German ambassador on July 1880. At the end of the report, Bismarck had added that the Germans in the Ottoman service would provide the German government ‘with influence and informants’.²⁰ In fact, as future events proved, Bismarck’s assumption, which was based on well-calculated political observations, was correct. Bismarck’s vision of obtaining reliable information regarding the political, economic, and military state of the Ottoman Empire through the advisers was fulfilled indeed. The German civil and military missions, thanks to their intimate relation with Ottoman officials and officers, provided a large quantity of important information, especially concerning the military contracts arranged by some high-ranking Ottoman officers.²¹ Prince Hohenlohe gave the following details:

[Bismarck said that] … the consequences the arrangement may have for the Turks and its acceptability to the European Powers need not concern us. It is not our policy, [Bismarck] says, to further either Turkish or European interests. A European interest is, to his mind, a fiction useful to all who want to use others, and can find persons who believe in the phrase. It might be useful to us to have the Turks as friends in as far as this might be to our advantage. The Turkish artillery had been trained by Prussian officers at a time when we were living on terms of the utmost cordiality with Russia, and we had thus acquired influence and useful connections in Turkey. If Chauvinism, Panslavism, and the anti-German elements in Russia should attack us, the attitude and the military efficiency of Turkey would not be indifferent to us. She could never be dangerous to us, but under certain circumstances her enemies might be ours.²²

However, the German government did not take any immediate action, and thus appeared reluctant to approve the request.²³ In December 1881, more than one year, after Prince Hohenlohe conducted this interview with Bismarck, Abdülhamid II sent a special delegation to Berlin in order to accelerate the process and also to show his persistence.²⁴ The head of the delegation was a member of the Sultan’s military household, Ali Nizami Pasha, who was accompanied by Reşid Bey, Sultan Abdülhamid’s private secretary (Kâtib-i husûsî-i hazret-i şehriyârî).²⁵ One of Reşid Bey’s contemporaries, Ali Ekrem Bolayır, emphasized Reşid Bey’s important position in the palace, stating that he had a very bright influence on the sultan’s administrative affairs.²⁶ The main agenda of the mission was to negotiate a possible alliance with the German Empire and to request civil and military assistance.²⁷ On 10 December 1881, the mission started with the decoration of the Emperor Wilhelm I with the Nişan-ı imtiyaz (the high order of distinction), which had never before been conferred on a foreign sovereign.²⁸ Afterwards, Ali Nizami Pasha and Reşid Bey were hosted for dinner by the Kaiser and Chancellor Bismarck, followed by several meetings during which they negotiated to obtain a commitment for military and civil assistance from Germany.²⁹ Bismarck received Ali Nizami Pasha two times, on 15 and 17 December, and two days after Ali Nizami’s second audience, on 19 December, Bismarck received Reşid Bey.³⁰

As a matter of fact, the Ottoman delegation was going to Berlin to convince Bismarck and insist on him dispatching the advisers to Istanbul, but in actual fact, Bismarck did not need to be persuaded, since he was well aware of the future benefit of this ‘tool’ and had already decided to let them enter the Ottoman service.³¹ Yet, on the occasion of this visit, Bismarck had found the best opportunity to share his thoughts about the British, Russian, and French governments and their territorial and political interest in the Ottoman Empire. Through these personal meetings and conversations, in which personal diplomacy had been perfectly applied by the chancellor, he successfully confirmed his non-interventionist approach towards Ottoman internal affairs in a way that the Sultan would like. Meanwhile he also ventured to give some very sharp advice on one of the most critical and bitter issues of Sultan Abdülhamid’s reign: namely the prec...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• List of Maps and Images
• List of Abbreviations
• Notes on Usage
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1. The German Expansionist Wave and the Political Economy of German Style of War Business in the Ottoman Empire (1880–98)
• 2. German Military Advisers: Businessmen in Uniform
• 3. Arms Orders and Contracts: The First Fruits of Personal Diplomacy
• 4. Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Political Economy of Personal Diplomacy (1898–1914)
• 5. Sultan Abdülhamid II and his Bureaucrats (1876–1909)
• 6. The Power Shift and its Consequences (1908–14)
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Back cover