Israel and the Cold War

Diplomacy, Strategy and the Policy of the Periphery at the United Nations

Howard A. Patten

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN:
  9781848858084
• Edition: 1
• eBook ISBN:
  9780857737366
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

In the wake of its creation in 1948, the state of Israel was confronted with the challenge of establishing foreign relations with key players in the region, in the face of opposition from most of the Arab states. Howard Patten explores the genesis and development of Israel's foreign relations with Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia, known as the 'Policy of the Periphery'. Highlighting the pragmatism and Realpolitik at the heart of this policy, Israel and the Cold War analyses the national interests and mutual concerns which shaped relations and strategy at the United Nations during the critical moments of the establishment of the State of Israel and the following forty years, before the ramifications of the Iranian Revolution became apparent. During this period, Israel made efforts to create pragmatic alliances behind closed doors at the UN, even as ambivalence and hostility reigned in the public sphere.
Patten thus examines the implications that the Cold War system of ideological combat had on these attempts to maintain implicit, yet cordial understandings, as world events - such as the Suez Crisis of 1956, successive crises over Cyprus and the Ethiopian and Iranian Revolutions - tested the 'Policy of the Periphery'. 'Israel and the Cold War' traces the development of Israel's relations with these three states, from their initial beginnings to consolidation, then rejection and subsequent efforts to realign. Patten highlights the extensive diplomatic and military reverberations that occurred throughout the region, and the way in which these were played out at the UN. Based primarily on UN documents, this book is a vital primary resource for those researching the period in question and the formulation of foreign policy in the Middle East.

CHAPTER 1

FROM THE MARGINS TO
THE CENTRE: ISRAEL’S
POLICY OF THE PERIPHERY
PRE-1955

Israel and Iran

Iran voted against the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) partition plan on 29 November 1947.¹ The vote came at the culmination of a frustrating time for the Iranian delegation at the United Nations (UN). Indeed, at the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, on 11 October 1947, Iranian Representative, Mostafa Adl said that, ‘in the absence of a reasonable and workable solution, and since other members of the Committee had not shared his views … had accepted as an intermediary solution the minority plan for the establishment of a federal state’, but it was imperative that the Assembly not support the ‘imposition on Palestine of a government which would satisfy neither party’.²

The conclusion of the Iranian delegation was that ‘the two States recommended in the majority plan would not be viable, but would become a liability of world concern’. Adl clarified, though, that the Iranian position was not ‘based on any lack of sympathy for the Jewish community or on a pro-Arab spirit, but only on the principles of the Charter’. The diplomat announced that Palestine should be left ‘to the Palestinians, irrespective of whether they were Moslems, Jews or Christians’ and the inhabitants of Palestine should ‘determine their own fate’. Adl also stated that the Iranian delegation would ‘support a solution for partition only if it were supported by the majority of the peoples of Palestine’.³ This statement revealed the Iranian concern for regional stability that would reappear at the UN frequently.

Three days before the vote on partition, Adl had claimed that, ‘to partition a country into two different States, an Arab State and a Jewish State … will not be viable’, and ‘will probably be still-born’. He continued, ‘The solution proposed to you has no foundation in law’ and he believed that partition ‘suggests the open violation of the principle enshrined in Article 1, Paragraph 2, of the Charter, which gives all Members the right to govern themselves freely, without any kind of foreign vote or pressure and the right to choose the form of government which best suits them’.⁴

So concerned was Adl over regional stability, that he stated partition would ‘result in exposing not only the Near and Middle East, but perhaps the whole world, to fire and slaughter.’ Iran, he added, would vote against partition ‘in loyalty to the principles of the Charter and conscious of the respect which is due to them’.⁵ At the vote on partition, Adl declared that the ‘Arab world wishes at all costs to avoid a conflict which might have regrettable consequences’ and that ‘it [the Arab world] is ready to abandon its position of intransigence and even make concessions.’⁶ Keen to delay the vote, preserve Iran’s ties with the Muslim world and to prevent the creation of a Jewish state, which could scupper Iran’s relations with the Arab world, he then requested an adjournment of ‘not more than a few weeks,’ in order to ‘prepare the plan for the future government of Palestine’ and stated that UNGA could be ‘convened in Special Session to decide on the question’.⁷

Iran was becoming aware that its border with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) made it a front-line state in the developing Cold War. This heightened the Iranian fear of further Soviet penetration of the Middle East throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s⁸ and, as Israel abandoned its policy of non-alignment and moved towards the West, Iran became more interested in pursuing bilateral ties, seeking concomitantly to develop relations with the US. However, in Iran at the time, there were two major political forces opposed to relations with Israel: the pro-Soviet and anti-Zionist Tudeh Communist party, and the Shi’a fundamentalists.⁹ These two forces were able to take advantage of the fact that many Iranian centrist intellectuals and nationalists were concerned with the struggle against perceived British dominance over Iran, via the Anglo Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).¹⁰ Thus, R.K. Ramazani’s definition of Iran’s relationship with Israel between 1948–50 as ‘calculated ambivalence’¹¹ is appropriate, particularly as Iran, after having recognised Israel de jure, voted against its admission to the UN.¹²

The Israeli move away from non-alignment and the cultivation of relations with Tehran was championed by the Israeli Embassy in Washington as a means for Israel both to overcome its political isolation and to negate the perception that it was a foreign entity in the Middle East. Jerusalem tacitly adopted the precedent forged by the embassy and ties with Iran became a strategic goal for Israel from October 1949.¹³ In addition to the stratego-political aspect of these ties, for Israel there was the added catalyst of potential immigration. Iran’s Jews, however, had not been persecuted by the regime, even after the birth of Israel and the subsequent war, and within the Iranian Jewish community, there was little awareness of the need to immigrate to Israel.¹⁴ Indeed, the Shah claimed to encapsulate the Iranian position towards all its citizens, including Jews,

We have never believed in discrimination based on race, colour or creed, and have often provided a haven for oppressed peoples of backgrounds different from our own. For example, it was characteristic of Cyrus the Great that, when he conquered Babylon, he allowed the Jews, who had been exiled there by King Nebuchadnezzar after the conquest of Jerusalem in 597 B.C., to return to Palestine with their sacred vessels and rebuild their destroyed temples.¹⁵

In fact, it was concern over the fate of Iraqi Jews that helped to facilitate the expansion of ties between Israel and Iran.¹⁶ Aliyah Bet, the organisation for the clandestine immigration of Jews to Palestine between 1920 and 1948 and precursor to the Mossad, had established links with the Iranian government during the 1948 war, with the specific purpose of aiding in the evacuation of Jews from Iraq. Israel, with Iranian support, successfully established an infrastructure for this purpose.¹⁷ There were harsh restrictions on the lives of Iraqi Jewry; Zionism was declared a crime in 1948 and there was no form of legal emigration until 1950. To circumvent this obstacle, Israel turned to Iran, which became an alternative, albeit low-key, route for Jewish emigration.¹⁸ In response, Iraq pressured Iran to close its border in order to prevent the passage of Jews, and Iran initially acquiesced, though subsequently performed a volte-face in the face of Israeli pressure.¹⁹

Domestically, Iran was encountering complications, particularly in the spheres of agriculture and technological development, areas in which Israel had expertise and was willing to offer the services of its technicians and engineers.²⁰ These contacts led to a deepening of the relationship and, consequently, there followed additional co-operation in areas such as planning co-ordinated positions over political development.²¹ This, in turn, made military co-operation between the two countries increasingly likely. Indeed, Israel had initially attracted Iranian interest largely due to its high level of economic development,²² and it has been revealed that both Israel and the US worked together in order to develop the Iranian secret police, the SAVAK.²³

Co-operation between the senior political echelons of both countries was also notable. This was carried out with the minimum of exposure, with the Iranian diplomatic presence in Israel based in the Swiss Embassy and the Israeli presence in Tehran officially termed a trade mission.²⁴ In essence, the Iranian Representative arrived in Israel in 1949 without either consent from the Israeli foreign ministry, or a clear designation, but promptly began dealing with reparations for Iranian families who had been affected by the 1948 war.²⁵ After Iran’s de facto recognition of Israel in March 1950, the Shah allowed Jerusalem to maintain a low level presence in Tehran.²⁶

While covert relations between Iran and Israel were developing, at the UN, the Iranian stance was openly critical of Israeli policies. Indeed, speaking of the 1948 War of Independence, Iranian Representative Ghassemzadeh stated that ‘the desire of the Arabs to return to their homes was based on a natural, sacred and inalienable right, consecrated by the Charter, which all Member States of the United Nations had signed’ and that the ‘Government of Israel was, however, unwilling to fulfil the obligations imposed upon it by the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly’. He continued, that the ‘General Assembly should instruct the Government of Israel to comply with the provisions of United Nations resolutions by permitting Arab refugees to return to their homes and by compensating them for property losses.’²⁷

With this appeasement of the Arab bloc at the UN, Tehran, coinciding with its recognition of Israel, stated that it would be willing to accept an official Israeli diplomatic delegation on 16 March 1950, following the Shah’s return from a trip to Pakistan.²⁸ Israel believed that the reception of such an official diplomatic team would begin to institutionalise the relationship between the two countries, and render any sudden Iranian withdrawal of recognition impracticable.²⁹ As a result of the meeting, Iran’s official Representative in Jerusalem became its special envoy.³⁰ However, the formal exchange of missions was beset by difficulties, which largely stemmed from Iran’s inability to withstand both internal and external pressures over its relationship with Israel, and culminated in the closure of the Iranian Consulate-General in Jerusalem on 7 July 1951.³¹ The closure, damaging as it was for the Israelis, was explained by the Iranians as the result of a crisis between Britain and Iran over the future control of Iranian oil. In addition, Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadeq, heading a nationalist coalition formed around opposition to the AIOC, which was nationalised in 1951, was facing considerable internal opposition to Iran’s ties with Israel.³² This was an interesting event indeed as, now, the Iranian government was attempting to allay Israeli fears over the ostensible worsening of the relationship between the two countries and not solely attempting to placate the Arab bloc at the UN.

To counter some of this pressure, the Iranian delegation at the UN presented a mollifying stand on the Arab-Israeli dispute. Representative Dr Djalal Abdoh explained that ‘while Iran was bound to the Arab States by cultural and religious ties, it had no animosity towards Jews’. To emphasise this, he added ‘the best proof being that the Jews were represented by a Jew in the Iranian parliament’ and that ‘recently a group of Iranians imbued with Nazi ideology had been legally prosecuted’. Moreover, the diplomat believed that, since 1947, the dynamic between Israel and the Arabs had changed, as in 1947 ‘the Arab states had opposed the partition of Palestine and the internationalisation of Jerusalem; today, they were ready to negotiate with Israel …’ Finally, Abdoh noted that ‘a state could not live in peace and prosperity so long as its neighbours did not have friendly feelings towards it’ and that Israel should ‘take a realistic attitude and recognise that it was surrounded by Arab States which had made great concessions to it’.³³

From 1951, the US, under Truman, decided that Mossadeq was a threat to both Iran’s domestic interests and those of the US.³⁴ This was confirmed for Washington in 1953, when Mossadeq turned to the USSR for economic aid in order to counter the hardship faced by Iran after western oil companies placed an embargo on Iranian oil in response to the nationalisation of the AIOC. As a result, the US administration, through the CIA, facilitated a coup d’etat against Mossadeq, which returned power to the Shah and succeeded in reducing the political power of the Iranian elected assembly.³⁵

The reaction of the US to the r...

Table of contents

• Cover
• About the Author
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1. From the Margins to the Centre: Israel’s Policy of the Periphery, Pre-1955
• 2. Iran and Israel, 1956–72: Calculated Ambivalence?
• 3. Iran and Israel, 1973–82: From Consolidation to Revolution
• 4. Turkey and Israel, 1956–72: Alignment and Ambivalence
• 5. Turkey and Israel, 1973–82: Rejection and Realignment
• 6. Ethiopia and Israel, 1956–72: From Partner to Pariah
• 7. Ethiopia and Israel, 1973–82: Pressure and Resistance
• 8. The Policy of the Periphery
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography