Faith and Reason in Continental and Japanese Philosophy

Reading Tanabe Hajime and William Desmond

Takeshi Morisato

• Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9781350217942
• eBook ISBN: 9781350092532
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Eastern Philosophy

This book brings together the work of two significant figures in contemporary philosophy. By considering the work of Tanabe Hajime, the Japanese philosopher of the Kyoto School, and William Desmond, the contemporary Irish philosopher, Takeshi Morisato offers a clear presentation of contemporary comparative solutions to the problems of the philosophy of religion. Importantly, this is the first book-length English-language study of Tanabe Hajime's philosophy of religion that consults the original Japanese texts. Considering the examples of Christianity and Buddhism, Faith and Reason in Continental and Japanese Philosophy focuses on finding the solution to the problem of philosophy of religion through comparative examinations of Tanabe's metanoetics and Desmond's metaxology. It aims to conclude that these contemporary thinkers - while they draw their inspiration from the different religious traditions of Christianity and Mahayana Buddhism - successfully reconfigure the relation of faith and reason. Faith and Reason in Continental and Japanese Philosophy marks an important intervention into comparative philosophy by bringing into dialogue these thinkers, both major figures within their respective traditions yet rarely discussed in tandem.

Part One

Methodological Reflections on Comparative Philosophy: Through the Works of Desmond and Tanabe

1

The Metaxological Methodology of Comparative Philosophy

A preliminary reflection

The number of academic works published on the general methods of comparative philosophy is much fewer in comparison with those published in many other subfields of philosophy. The scarcity of scholarship alone calls for methodological reflections at the overture of any works on comparative philosophy today.¹ But what stimulates one to develop a method of philosophy also accounts for the motivations in which one’s inquiry is practiced, which is to say that the investigation into a method of thinking necessarily entails philosophical self-reflection. For this reason, the establishment of a philosophical method has never been a simple task in the history of philosophy. As Hegel famously observes in the preface to Phenomenology of Spirit, many thinkers have been tempted to lay out what he calls “a lifeless universal”²—viz., a descriptive statement of what a philosophical method will aim to achieve, while failing to abide by the dynamic processes in which the significance of the very method becomes manifest. This should remind us of the old adage “one cannot learn to swim unless one jumps into the water.” What is peculiar to reflections on ways of doing philosophy is that each of us must find ourselves always already immersed in the activity of thinking. If we give a comprehensive description of a method to which the process of our thinking ultimately belongs, then the ways in which we describe it should not be exempted from that very process. Rather, through our intense self-reflection, our viewpoint should account for the fact that the description of a philosophy presupposes the dynamic praxis of philosophizing.

A lack of insightful self-narrative in any methodological reflection leads to a failure to demonstrate the significance of the philosophical method. In the context of comparative philosophy, this failure to think internally about the possible ways of relating one way of thinking to another often runs a serious risk—i.e., the risk of conjecturing an abstract standpoint from which we can externally examine these thoughts and their relations to each other. Contrariwise, a comparative philosopher must always remain attentive to the reciprocal relationship between the method and its description. This means that she must internally navigate through two distinct paths of philosophical thinking and then examine if she can reach a comprehensive method that reflects what is at work in both of them. This is to conduct immanent critiques on the ways in which two thinkers conceive of the relationship between each of their philosophies and the other. Without doing this comparative examination, we will not be able to account for the proper relationship between them. Our discovery of the common ground in which two distinct paths of thinking can cross and crisscross each other will be the result of our self-reflections in and through their works. This chapter will follow through with this task of self-critique in its search for the standpoint from which we can compare Tanabe’s metanoesis and Desmond’s metaxology.

This search for the method of comparative philosophy will be conducted from two different angles. First, I will investigate the possibility of comparative philosophy through Desmond’s metaxological way of thinking. Desmond’s comprehensive (and flexible) framework of thinking, originating from his engagement with the entire history of Western philosophy, should serve as the suitable starting point and the appropriate preparation for our future explorations into the less familiar waters of non-Western thought. Second, I will examine how the absolute dialectic in Tanabe’s metanoesis can help us understand the relationship between one framework of thinking and another. Neither Desmond nor Tanabe explicitly talks about the method of comparative philosophy. However, the process of their philosophical thinking opens the door to investigating such comparative methods of philosophy. In this second approach, I will also point out en passant some of the notable consonance between Tanabe and Desmond. After explicating the possibility of comparative philosophy from these two perspectives, we will be able to discover the common ground in which we can approach their works and therein demonstrate the proper method of comparative philosophy in accord with what is at work in the works of these thinkers.

Metaxology in the context of comparative philosophy

Desmond’s original contributions to the areas of metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy of religion originate from his extensive reflections on fundamental philosophical problems rooted in the history of Western philosophy. Most of his works, however, do not make any substantive claim regarding the nature of comparative philosophy, nor do they explicitly incorporate the works of non-Western thinkers into the development of his own conceptual framework. In contrast, a more obvious place to look for comparative methodologies would be the Anglo-American pragmatist and process tradition. Robert W. Smid, for instance, cites William Earnest Hockings, Filmer S.C. Northrop, David Hall, Roger Ames, and Robert C. Neville as the leading philosophers who have made notable contributions to the development of comparative philosophy in recent years.³ The extent of their contributions is noticeably different from one thinker to the other. But Smid indicates that they are bound by a common thread: they explicitly discuss the importance of incorporating non-Western thought to develop a genuine world philosophy and/or that they actually engaged in the projects that attempt to realize this incorporation. However fruitful the outcome of these efforts has been, that domain of philosophy is not a suitable environment that would allow us to engage the works of Desmond as a basis for thinking comparatively. It is very likely that Desmond’s philosophy could be considered too “Eurocentric” from that perspective.⁴

Nevertheless, the fact that a thinker has worked extensively on the philosophical leitmotifs developed in the Western intellectual tradition is not a sufficient reason to disqualify his works as possible contributions to discussions concerning the methods of comparative philosophy.⁵ For sure, we can characterize Desmond’s thought as originating in the history of Western thought, and one may even argue that his philosophy owes much to a specific culture of Ireland.⁶ This judgment not only neglects the fact that comparative philosophy requires a constructive dialogue between multiple distinct intellectual frameworks, but also follows the problematic logic by which non-Western thought have been marginalized from the main discourses of philosophy in Western academia for ages. As much as we ought to be open to the possibility of finding a source of inspiration, and insight into the works of non-Western thinkers, we should never forget the possibility of finding another source of great insight right under our noses in the works of Western thinkers. Without maintaining this double openness to two distinct intellectual traditions, we will fail to practice comparative philosophy in the genuine sense of the word, let alone to generate an effective method for it.

Note also that the practice of philosophy ultimately requires an answer to a raised question. What is important is not only to chase the letters of a great thinker but also to think about the question that these letters are addressing.⁷ Since the systematic viewpoints that the letters signify are not exhaustible by the letters, every reader of a philosophic work can think with the philosopher, see through the viewpoints that these letters signify, and even when we cannot find any explicit treatment of a specific question that we would like to answer on the surface of these works, we can still strive to find out if there is any way to answer the question through the proposed viewpoints. This stance of “thinking with,” or what I would like to call “intellectual companionship,” will be taken in relation to the texts of Desmond, and it will enable us to describe how he would answer the question concerning the method of comparative philosophy.

Metaxology for the context of comparative philosophy

The framework of metaxological thinking, despite its lack of explicit reference to non-Western philosophy, is comprehensive in that it offers insight into the ways of practicing comparative philosophy. One of its characteristics is an effort to make sense of the intermediations between identity and difference, unity and multiplicity, self and other, etc. Its dynamic process of accounting for their interrelations is highly relevant for our understanding of the proper relationship between multiple frameworks of thinking in comparative philosophy. Put differently, metaxological metaphysics tries to make sense of the different ways of being in its communicative relation to the different ways of thinking about being and vice versa; hence, the relation between two ways of philosophical thinking apropos of given reality naturally falls within the scope of its analysis.⁸ To prove this point, I will roughly take the following three steps: (1) I will introduce the “fourfold sense of being,” (2) demonstrate its metaxological grounding, and (3) expose its implications to the current methodological discussions on the critical comparison between two distinct intellectual traditions.

The first step: A summary of the metaxological fourfold

The “fourfold way” of understanding being, according to Desmond, is practiced in the univocal, the equivocal, the dialectical, and the metaxological sense.⁹ These quadruple layers of metaphysical thinking represent major trends in the Western history of philosophy. The univocal sense emphasizes the unity of mind and being. It strives to demonstrate the intelligibility of reality through the recognition of an immediate togetherness between the structure of consciousness and that of being. The best example of univocal thinking can be found in our mathematical reasoning, where the rigid self-identity of a natural number is firmly defined as that which equals nothing but itself.¹⁰ The application of this univocal thinking to our understanding of reality can be traced back to its first appearance in the fragments of Parmenides. Yet the most prominent manifestation of it occurs in the notion of mathesis unviersalis, envisioned by modern philosophers like Descartes and Leibniz.¹¹ The second, equivocal sense calls for our attunement to the “unmediated difference between mind and being.”¹² It constantly urges us to re-evaluate our confidence in their immediate sameness and to question seriously the intrinsic value of their togetherness. Heraclitus’ infinite flux and Nietzsche’s transvaluation of all values are the prime examples of the call. We are called to attune ourselves to that which is other to the self-identity of univocal thinking.

The dialectical sense configures the “mediated conjunction of mind and being.”¹³ It intermediates the formal unity of the univocal with the concrete multiplicity of the equivocal. Desmond argues that “at least in modern philosophy, [this mediation] is primarily self-mediation, [and] hence the side of the same tends to be privileged in this conjunction.”¹⁴ The dialectical sense thus recognizes the interplay of univocity and equivocity, specifically in terms of unity’s self-determination. This means that unity takes multiplicity as an indispensable moment for its development into the concrete unity of multiplicity. This is neither a simple affirmation of unity in the univocal sense nor an obstinate rejection of it in the equivocal sense, but a complex reconfiguration of their porous relativity that comprises the concrete totality of multiplicities. What is distinct in this dialectical way of thinking about being is that the sameness is ultimately crowned as that which blooms into the totality of difference, whereby the latter is never given for itself, but always for the former to mediate with itself. The concrete unity of multiplicity constitutes the immanent whole in this manner of metaphysical thinking.

Similar to the dialectical sense, the metaxological shows its faithfulness to the “mediated community of mind and being.”¹⁵ It recognizes the interplay between unity and multiplicity and tries to make sense of this interrelation. In contrast with dialectical thinking, however,

[the metaxological sense] calls attention to a pluralized mediation, beyond closed self—mediation from the side of the same, and hospitable to the mediation of the other, or transcendent, out of its own otherness. It puts the emphasis on an intermediation, not a self-mediation, however dialectically qualified. … [T]he inter is shaped plurally by different mediations of mind and being, same and other, mediations not subsumable into one total self-mediation.¹⁶

From the viewpoint of metaxology, the dialectical mediation is seen to be ultimately one-sided, for it undermines the status of otherness to the secondary position in relation to the totalizing unity of sameness. Contrariwise, the metaxological awareness remains attentive to the plurality of mediations in the self, the other, and their communicative relation to each other. It is mindful of the fact that the self can fully mediate with itself in its porous relativity to the other, while this intermediation does not deprive the other of its original status of being—that it is given to be for itself. Metaxology, in this sense, refrains from seizing otherness for the determination of the self as it is seen in dialectical thinking. But it proposes to give the space in which the self can let the other be for the other, and thereby each of them can enter into its open communication with the other.

This “giving of the space” does not mean that the self produces the space in which its intermediation with the other takes place within the more comprehensive framework of its self-determining process.¹⁷ (This is precisely what the dialectical understanding of being tries to demonstrate.) Rather, it indicates the openness of the self to the very space as that which is prior to and foundational for its self-mediations. This primal space is not reducible to the immanent totality of self-determining unity but allows the plurality of self- and intermediations both for the self and the other.¹⁸ Desmond calls this hyperbolic space, which is both transcendent to and immanent in the plurality of mediations, the “between” (metaxu). In making sense of this space or the between, being is always seen as an unmerited gift for all that is—if it is anything at all—to be. It is given both to the self and the other. It is given to each of them to be for itself, and given to both of them to be for each other. Hence, the proper relation between self and other, sameness and difference, or unity and multiplicity must reflect their intermediations that account both for their irreducible difference from and indispensable relativity with each other. This irresistible intimation and liberating distancing demonstrate the metaxological mindfulness that shows its fidelity to the “intimate strangeness” of being.

The second step: The metaxological grounding of the fourfold

The awareness of this “intimate strangeness” saves us from the temptation to master the middle space (i.e., the between) of mind and being through ourselves alone. It enables us to break away from their one-way communication in the dialectical sense and further releases us into their open community. It constitutes a kind of community, where mind and being are in an intimate rapport with each other. This community is open because mind knows that the plurivocal (inter-)mediation of being is not dictated entirely by the self-mediation of mind. The metaxological sense of being, in other words, always pays attention to the doubleness of the mediations between self and other: the self is mediating itself through its intermediation with the other, as the other is mediating itself through its intermediation with the self. The mediations are neither subsumable to nor identical with the other. Nor are they together subsumable into one more inclusive dialectic/speculative self-mediation of the Hegelian type. The metaxological mind lets being be, lets being fully realize itself in its relativity to mind, and through this compassionate mindfulness toward being, comes to understand the full significance both of itself and of what is other to itself. The metaxological mind that remains aware that being is neither reducible nor entirely subsumable to its own self-mediation appropriately articulates the self- and intermediations of mind and being as the plurivocal community enabled in, and manifested through, the hyperbolic space of the between.

The metaxologic...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle Page
• Title Page
• Dedication Page
• Contents 
• Foreword
• Acknowledgments
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part 1 Methodological Reflections on Comparative Philosophy: Through the Works of Desmond and Tanabe
• Part 2 The Fundamental Problems of the Philosophy of Religion: Thinking through Rational Universalism
• Part 3 Metaxology and the Problems of the Philosophy of Religion
• Part 4 Metanoetics and the Problems of the Philosophy of Religion
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index
• Imprint