Special Operations in Norway

SOE and Resistance in World War II

Ian Herrington

• Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9781350192645
• eBook ISBN: 9781786725646
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 20th Century History
• Index: History

Between 1940 and 1945, Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE) carried out sabotage and organised resistance across occupied Europe. Over 5 years, SOE sent over 500 agents into Norway to carry out a range of operations from sabotage and assassination to attempts to organise an underground guerrilla army. This book is the first multi-archival, international academic analysis of SOE's policy and operations in Norway and the influences that shaped them, challenging previous interpretations of the relationship between this organisation and both the Norwegian authorities and the Milorg resistance movement.

Chapter 1

The Formation of SOE and Its Scandinavian Section: A New Strategic Tool and a Nordic Opportunity

The formation and development of SOE, its Scandinavian section and the military units, such as the Shetlands Base, which were crucial to the implementation of its objectives in Norway, had a fundamental influence on the extent and nature of its operations. Importantly, however, they shared one common factor: all of them were ultimately a result of Britain’s military circumstances after the fall of France and the forward strategy that this situation gave rise to.

SOE was created for strategic and military purposes at a time when Britain was weak, isolated and therefore inferior in both position and resources. It was a small but significant element of a strategy that at the time was seen as providing a means by which the nation could move towards the achievement of the ultimate objective of the war, victory over Germany. The origins of SOE have been covered extensively in the literature¹ but importantly for Norway it was created within a climate and context that fostered both a strong belief in and a call for a coordinated use of clandestine and subversive operations.

Norway was also a country where Britain could quickly take the offensive and target Axis power and resources. Factors such as its accessibility across the North Sea, long coastline, peripheral position, the specialist war materials it exported to Germany and its occupation by substantial enemy forces made it militarily very attractive. Consequently, SOE quickly formed a Scandinavian section that included Norway, which from the summer of 1940 was responsible for the implementation of its plans and operations in this theatre; it was also staffed by personnel who had a background in and enthusiasm for the implementation of indirect methods, particularly the application of economic pressure and the use of clandestine operations against the enemy.

In order to take effective action in Norway, it was necessary to have suitable operatives and transportation. These were provided through the Norwegian Independent Company No I (henceforward NIC (I)), the unit of the Royal Norwegian Army formed to carry out special operations on behalf of SOE and the Norwegian authorities, the Shetlands Naval Base and the RAF ‘Special Duty’ Air Squadrons that dropped SOE agents and equipment into Norway. All of these military units were crucial to the implementation of clandestine operations and will appear regularly. Furthermore, they embody the key elements that shaped SOE plans for this theatre. First, the importance of the strategic background, which although it led to an urgent and coordinated effort to create these facilities, also meant that there was a shortage of key resources for operations in Norway, particularly aircraft. Second, an early and clear understanding within SOE that it would not be able to operate effectively in Norway without both Norwegian cooperation and support from the regular armed forces, and that therefore these relationships were crucial to its future effectiveness.

The origins of SOE: The birth of a new weapon

SOE began its short five and half year life on 22 July 1940 when its charter, drawn up by Neville Chamberlain and which set out its future role, was approved by the War Cabinet.² Two factors were central in the creation of this new organization that was instructed ‘to co-ordinate all action, by way of subversion and sabotage, against the enemy overseas’.³ The first was a small but growing belief within political circles and especially within sections of SIS and War Office of the military value of this type of activity. The second and more important was Britain’s military isolation and weakness after the fall of France, which led to the creation of a new forward strategy in the war against Germany.

By July 1940 a commitment to the potential of sabotage, subversion and guerrilla warfare had taken hold among many important political figures in Britain. The most significant of these was Winston Churchill, who when he became prime minister in May 1940, as a result of his previous experience as a soldier, journalist, amateur spy and politician, already had a strong faith in the potential of irregular and clandestine warfare. This meant that he placed his considerable weight behind the COS proposal of May 1940 for the creation of a new organization to coordinate sabotage and subversion in the occupied countries, and his support for SOE although not unquestioning was at times critical to its long-term survival.⁴

A belief in the potential of subversive warfare not only resided with the prime minister but also more widely. A fear of fifth columnists that developed in the country around the time of the defeat of France in May/June 1940 helped to foster this,⁵ and it led to pressure for Britain to create its own fifth column. An early result of this was the establishment in the of summer 1940 of the so-called ‘Auxiliary Units’, perhaps better known as ‘stay behind units’, which would be used to operate behind enemy lines in the event of a German invasion.⁶ In June 1940 a ‘Guerrilla Committee’ under Commander Stephen King-Hall, MP, was also formed. In July, it forwarded a memo to Sir Maurice Hankey, chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, whom the prime minister had given the task of coordinating the reorganization of subversive warfare. The memo describes winning the war ‘by combining a disintegration of the Nazi regime from within and bombing and blockade from without’ and points to the use of ‘total guerrilla warfare’, including raids by military forces, subversive action and sabotage and propaganda. It was eventually sent to many of the figures who were involved in the discussions with Hankey that led to the formation of SOE and highlights the considerable momentum that existed within the British political and military establishment for the use of irregular and subversive measures in the war against Germany.

The memo was sent to Sir Maurice Hankey on 4 July 1940. On 9 July, Hankey advised Stephen King-Hall that he had sent the paper to the ‘leading hands in the organisation which is developing’, by which he meant SOE. The paper was sent to Sir Stewart Menzies, head of SIS; General Bourne, head of Combined Operations; discussed with Lawrence Grand, head of Section D; and a copy probably reached Hugh Dalton, who a week later was given responsibility for SOE.⁷ Furthermore, there was a belief, which had emerged before the outbreak of war, in Nazi economic and political vulnerability.⁸ These factors created the fertile conditions that led to the germination of SOE and ultimately the implementation of special operations in Norway.

Alongside this, two small departments had been actively investigating the potential of subversive and clandestine warfare: Military Intelligence (Research) (MI [R];), a small section within the War Office under Lieutenant Colonel J. F. C. Holland that analysed the use of special or irregular forces, and Section D, a new section established within SIS under Major Lawrence Grand to examine attacking the enemy by means other than operations by military forces.⁹ These developments were important for Norway and elsewhere as they indicate that even before the creation of SOE significant consideration had already been given within the military and intelligence establishment to both the potential of clandestine warfare and importantly the employment of fifth column or resistance groups within occupied Europe. Many of the personnel who were later employed by SOE’s `Scandinavian section came from within Section D and MI (R), and they provided not only the organizational but also more significantly the conceptual foundations upon which activities within this theatre were built. These departments were active before and after the outbreak of war in 1939 and were importantly ‘seen as playing a part’ within economic warfare.¹⁰ They also took an early interest in Norway. Section D was active in Norway from as early as the summer of 1938 when H. H. Hartley was commissioned by Section D to survey Narvik harbour. He carried out the task and apparently brought back a ‘full report’.¹¹

Although there was a developing interest in irregular and subversive activities and a few small operations were undertaken within occupied Europe prior to spring 1940, they were largely uncoordinated and sporadic. With the rapid collapse of France in May and June, however, the context changed. Prior to this British strategy envisaged a three-stage process: warding off an attempted German knockout blow, followed by consolidation and a building of resources while German strength was undermined by economic pressure and propaganda and a final general offensive. It was a strategy based on a belief that ‘the French army could hold out and the German economy was vulnerable’.¹² Rapid German success in France in May 1940, however, required the COS to reassess Britain’s position, and on 19 May 1940 they met to consider a paper entitled ‘British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality’, the certain eventuality being the new conditions resulting from the collapse of France and the loss of a substantial part of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and its equipment. This document both marked a shift in strategy and led directly to the formation of SOE. It reaffirmed the British emphasis on economic pressure and air attack but more importantly placed them at the fulcrum of future strategy. An additional strand was, however, also added to the strategic mix, ‘the stimulation of the seeds of revolt within the conquered territories’. The potential of widespread resistance to German occupation across Europe was seen as a valuable additional weapon, which could be used after conditions in these countries had begun to deteriorate due to economic pressure. As this activity was considered of the highest importance, it was decided that a ‘special organisation’ was required. On 27 May 1940, the War Cabinet accepted the recommendations of this paper and instigated the process that led to the War Cabinet’s approval of SOE’s charter on 22 July 1940.¹³

There was complex web of negotiations leading up to the formation of SOE in July 1940.¹⁴ But since June 1939, it had been recognized that there was a need to harmonize ‘paramilitary’ activities. It was, however, only after the collapse of France that sabotage and subversion were considered ‘of such importance’ that it was decided that they had to be unified ‘under one strong hand’. For example, in May 1940, the Inter-Services Project Board (ISPB) was set up to coordinate projects for attacking the enemy by sabotage or other irregular activities and met eight times during May 1940, but disappeared on the setting up of SOE in July 1940.¹⁵ Consequently, on 16 July 1940, Hugh Dalton, the Minister of Economic Warfare, was invited by the prime minister to take charge of SOE. The new organization therefore had its own minister, and subversive activities were removed from their previous Foreign and War Office control. SOE was also, rather appropriately, placed under the minister whose remit included economic warfare against the enemy. Dalton, as a Labour minister, was given control of SOE to maintain the political balance between the parties within the coalition government. It was also considered appropriate that a Labour minister should be in charge of a subversive organization. SOE had to continue to ‘consult’ with the Foreign Office and other departments, and its relationship with the Foreign Office was often problematic.¹⁶ Dalton’s grandiose view of what SOE could achieve, a Europe in a state of ‘permanent revolution’, and his call for subversion to be an independent service, a ‘Fourth Arm’, were, however, ultimately rejected.¹⁷ Therefore, although SOE represented a new element of Britain’s forward strategy, it was very much a junior player.

The creation of a charter was an attempt to define SOE’s function and its relationship with other organizations and government departments, such as SIS, MI5, the Foreign Office and the COS. And although the charter is vague in how these relationships would work, it does establish some important points of principle. Cooperation with the intelligence services and consultation with the Foreign Office are emphasized, as is the conviction ‘that the general plan for irregular warfare offensive operations should be in step with the general strategical conduct of the war’.¹⁸ Consequently, over the coming four years SOE was guided by a series of four separate directives that were approved by the COS. These set out in detail how subversive operations in the occupied countries of Europe including Norway would contribute to or support military operations. They also specified priorities and the role of SOE in the various theatres of war.¹⁹

In the autumn of 1943, by which time the planning and preparation of Operation Overlord, the invasion of north-west Europe, had become the Allies’ strategic priority in the west, responsibility for SOE in Norway was placed under the operational command of the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander Designate (COSSAC).²⁰ In line with this, SOE’s London office was merged with the offices of its American counterpart, the Special Operations (SO) branch of OSS to form SOE/SO HQ. In January 1944, command of Allied operations in north-west Europe and Scandinavia was placed under the control of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), and in May SOE/SO HQ was renamed Special Forces HQ (SFHQ).²¹ Therefore, from early 1944 through to the end of the war, it was directives issued by SHAEF that determined SOE activity in Norway.

The organizational realignment of special operations began during the summer and autumn of 1940 when Section D and MI (R) were merged into SOE. This new organization, which moved into its wartime residence in Baker Street in London...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Maps
• Introduction
• Chapter 1 The formation of SOE and its Scandinavian section: A new strategic tool and a Nordic opportunity
• Chapter 2 SOE policy in Norway, 1940–5: The combination of short- and long-term objectives
• Chapter 3 SOE and the Norwegian government and military authorities, 1940–5: Control through collaboration
• Chapter 4 SOE and the military resistance in Norway, 1940–5: Direction, separation and finally partnership
• Chapter 5 SOE and the other new organizations operating in Norway, 1940–5: A military alliance
• Chapter 6 SOE and the military and intelligence establishment operating in Norway, 1940–5: An unexpected partnership
• Chapter 7 SOE operations in Norway, 1940–4: The combination of sabotage and the organization of a clandestine army
• Chapter 8 SOE and the liberation of Norway, 1944–5: Operations in the shadow of overlord
• Conclusion
• Appendix A SOE coup de main operations in Norway, 1940–4
• Appendix B Sea-borne operations instigated by or involving SOE along the Norwegian seaboard, 1940–5997
• Appendix C SOE long-term and miscellaneous operations in Norway, 1940–5997
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index
• Copyright Page