Unelected Power

The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State

Paul Tucker

• Publisher: Princeton University Press
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9780691196305
• eBook ISBN:
  9780691196985
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Government & Business
• Index: Business

How central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracy

Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint.

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface to the Paperback
• Preface
• 1. Introduction: Power, Welfare, Incentives, Values
• Part I. Welfare: The Problem, and a Possible Solution
• Part II. Values: Democratic Legitimacy for Independent Agencies
• Part III. Incentives: The Administrative State in the Real World; Incentives and Values under Different Constitutional Structures
• Part IV. Power: Overmighty Citizens? The Political Economy of Central Banking; Power, Legitimacy, and Reconstruction
• Conclusion: Unelected Democrats: Citizens in Service, Not in Charge
• Appendix: The Principles for Delegation to Independent Agencies Insulated from Day-to-Day Politics
• Acknowledgments
• Bibliography
• Index