Spies, Patriots, and Traitors

American Intelligence in the Revolutionary War

Kenneth A. Daigler

• Publisher: Georgetown University Press
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781626162587, 9781626160507
• eBook ISBN: 9781626160514
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Early American History
• Index: History

Students and enthusiasts of American history are familiar with the Revolutionary War spies Nathan Hale and Benedict Arnold, but few studies have closely examined the wider intelligence efforts that enabled the colonies to gain their independence. Spies, Patriots, and Traitors provides readers with a fascinating, well-documented, and highly readable account of American intelligence activities during the era of the Revolutionary War, from 1765 to 1783, while describing the intelligence sources and methods used and how our Founding Fathers learned and practiced their intelligence role.

The author, a retired CIA officer, provides insights into these events from an intelligence professional’s perspective, highlighting the tradecraft of intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and covert actions and relating how many of the principles of the era’s intelligence practice are still relevant today. Kenneth A. Daigler reveals the intelligence activities of famous personalities such as Samuel Adams, George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Nathan Hale, John Jay, and Benedict Arnold, as well as many less well-known figures. He examines the important role of intelligence in key theaters of military operations, such as Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and in General Nathanael Greene’s campaign in South Carolina; the role of African Americans in the era’s intelligence activities; undertakings of networks such as the Culper Ring; and intelligence efforts and paramilitary actions conducted abroad.

Spies, Patriots, and Traitors adds a new dimension to our understanding of the American Revolution. The book’s scrutiny of the tradecraft and management of Revolutionary War intelligence activities will be of interest to students, scholars, intelligence professionals, and anyone who wants to learn more about this fascinating era of American history.

CHAPTER 1

GEORGE WASHINGTON LEARNS THE INTELLIGENCE TRADE

To identify George Washington as the founding father of American intelligence collection was an easy task.¹ There can be no question that he functioned as the senior intelligence officer for the Continental Army, as well as being its prime intelligence consumer. With both these responsibilities, he was able to direct his collection efforts on what he wanted and needed to know, rather than what could readily be collected. This focus enabled him to direct the collection of strategic intelligence, while also receiving and using tactical intelligence obtained from his subordinate commanders. In addition, his personal management style fit well into these responsibilities. As one biographer described him, Washington “worked with almost superhuman stamina, organizational ability, and regard for detail. He was a micromanager in the best sense of the word.”² Equally important was that Washington had previous experience, both good and bad, in military intelligence collection and, as was his character, he had learned from his experiences.

Washington’s introduction to intelligence collection came from his experiences during the period of the French and Indian War. Many of these experiences provided valuable lessons based upon intelligence failures, while others demonstrated that Washington possessed a mind and nature oriented toward the intelligence discipline. By July 3, 1775, when he assumed command of the army surrounding Boston, Washington possessed at least a basic knowledge of how to integrate intelligence activities into military planning. However, his immediate priority was to create some structure and discipline among ragtag colonial militia units that composed the army of observation around Boston and to turn them into the Continental Army. His priority had to be in the areas of command-and-control, logistics, and tactical organization. That said, he did instigate some basic collection activities and moved to create communication channels for intelligence information collected by subordinate commanders to reach his headquarters. But a more focused and disciplined approach to his intelligence activities would have to wait until he got his army somewhat organized.

Washington’s first exposure to intelligence collection came in 1753 when the royal governor of Virginia, Robert Dinwiddie, dispatched him to the Ohio Territory to deliver a letter to the French commander there and return with a response. Washington was at this time a major in the Virginia militia. Dinwiddie, as well as the royal governors of Pennsylvania, New York, and South Carolina, was concerned, with good reason, that the French were encroaching on British territory. The Ohio Territory—generally the Ohio River Valley area and populated mostly by Indians—was seen by both the British and the French as the next area for economic exploitation within North America. Dinwiddie wanted to build a series of forts to protect this British frontier, but he was unable to obtain adequate funds from the colonial legislature, the House of Burgesses. Finally, he took his concerns directly to King George II, and the king supported his views. In addition to his official concerns regarding French expansion into what he considered English territory, Dinwiddie was also a stockholder in the Ohio Company of Virginia. The British government had granted this land company about 350,000 acres on the Ohio River for sale to new settlers.

To what degree his personal interests affected his aggressiveness in desiring to secure the territory remains speculative. In those days as today, the public and private interests of government officials seem to have a way of interrelating in a personally beneficial manner. However, in the greater geopolitical, worldwide rivalry between England and France, protecting English interests in the territory was a major concern for the British government.³

Dinwiddie was directed to obtain funding from the colonial legislature, purchase armaments, and build the forts. King George noted that as he had reports that “a number of Europeans not our subjects are appearing in a hostile manner in the area, you are instructed to inquire into the truth of the report. If you shall find that any number of persons shall presume to erect any fort or forts within the limits of our Province of Virginia, you are first to require of them peaceably to depart.”⁴ In reality, it is highly doubtful that the British government had any accurate concept of what portions of the Ohio Valley were within the domain of the colony of Virginia. However, Governor Dinwiddie’s views on the issue would become, de facto, the British position.⁵ With royal support Dinwiddie began publicizing the French threat in the Ohio Territory, and the House of Burgesses endorsed his concerns. Subsequently, the governor selected Washington to carry the formal letter of complaint to the French commander in the territory.

Washington received the governor’s letter on October 31, 1753. It was a polite and diplomatic note, stating that the Ohio Territory was well known to be the property of Great Britain and making a formal complaint regarding French efforts to build military fortifications there. He requested justifications for the French actions, if there were any, and under whose authority these actions had been taken. Dinwiddie concluded the letter by asking for a peaceful French departure from the area and that Major Washington be treated in a polite and candid manner.⁶ Washington was also tasked to observe and report on French military forces and facilities in the Ohio, as well as attempt to ascertain France’s plans and intentions there.⁷ It was a dangerous mission because the French had already taken British subjects as prisoners, and the local Indians represented an equally dangerous adversary in the territory, if not more so.

Washington was always disciplined about record keeping, and his journal of the mission was published in Williamsburg in 1754.⁸ He obtained his first intelligence on the French on November 25, 1753, by debriefing four French deserters who had traveled with about a hundred others from New Orleans to join with French forces from along Lake Erie. They said the French had constructed four small forts along the Mississippi River. He also learned from a local Indian chief that the French had a fort on Lake Erie and another on French Creek, connected by a road. He obtained drawings of both forts.⁹ Three days later, another chief told him the French were planning for war against England and intended to move more soldiers down the rivers into the Ohio Territory in the spring.¹⁰

On December 4, Washington reached an old Indian town called Venango, at the entrance of French Creek into the Allegheny River. There he saw a house with a French flag flying and met three French officers, one of whom, Captain Joncaire, claimed to be the French commander of the Ohio. However, Joncaire said that there was a French general officer nearby to whom Washington could present his letter. As was the custom among European military officers, Washington was invited to dine with the French officers. In his description of the meal, Washington makes it clear that the wine flowed freely and the French officers spoke openly about French intentions in the Ohio.¹¹ This is the first specific mention made by Washington of his elicitation skills and, perhaps more important, his personal discipline in the face of heavy drinking and an atmosphere of friendly conversation.

Elicitation is an important intelligence skill that is often aided by food and drink. It must also involve what appears to be a natural and mutual exchange of conversation. The challenge for the intelligence officer is to keep the conversation flowing without providing too much information, while using various techniques to steer it toward topics of collection interest. Being able to hold one’s alcohol in these situations is paramount, as the secret to a successful elicitation is to stimulate the conversation in the direction desired without actually saying all that much. More than a few intelligence officers have ended up giving their adversaries more information than they obtained because of a lack of personal and professional discipline. Practicing successful elicitation was a skill that Washington understood and used effectively.

The technique Washington exhibited in this elicitation was not based upon specific intelligence training. Rather, not unlike a great deal of what is called tradecraft, it was a disciplined and focused pattern of behavior based upon a set of rules. In Washington’s case his social education had established many of these rules early in his life. These rules came from a book titled Young Man’s Companion, which comprised 110 rules guiding an individual’s personal conduct. Several of the rules have direct application to elicitation:

Rule 6. Show respect while others are speaking by paying careful attention.

Rule 19. Have a pleasant manner.

Rule 33. Show proper respect to others.

Rule 41. Avoid being arrogant.

Rule 62. Keep the conversation on positive things and use wisdom in sharing your thoughts.

Rule 69. If others argue, try to make peace.

Rule 73. Be a thoughtful, clear and careful speaker.

Rule 86. In a dispute, don’t overwhelm your opponent so they cannot clearly state their position.

Rule 99. Don’t drink too slowly or too quickly.

Rule 105. Avoid showing anger.¹²

Following these rules allowed Washington to create a gentlemanly, and seemingly open, social environment that encouraged the French officers to state their opinions freely while he carefully weighted his responses to stimulate additional details and clarification of French plans.

As the dinner progressed, the French officers became quite open in discussing their intention to take control of the Ohio Territory. They claimed this right based upon the exploration of the area by René-Robert Cavelier, sieur de La Salle, a French explorer of the seventeenth century who explored the Great Lakes, the Mississippi River, and the Gulf of Mexico.¹³ He did most of his exploration in the Ohio Territory in the period 1672 to 1682. The validity of this claim, as indeed that of the English claim, was legally questionable because the Ohio Territory was a vast wilderness of no set boundaries beyond references to geographical features. However, Washington did not engage the officers in a debate over the issue. Rather, he allowed them to educate him on their position and, more important from an intelligence perspective, their plans and intentions.

Based upon the dinner conversation, Washington subsequently gave Dinwiddie valuable military information. He reported that the outpost at Venango was to prevent English settlers from entering the area. He estimated the French had six hundred to seven hundred troops holding four forts. One was located by a small lake near French Creek, about sixty miles north-northwest of Venango. A second on Lake Erie was about fifteen miles from the first fort, a third was at the Lake Erie falls (Niagara Falls) and was used to store supplies sent from Montreal, and the fourth was on Lake Ontario, about twenty miles from the falls. He also learned that between Montreal and the third fort, three outposts were established to guard the supply route.¹⁴

About a week later, a French Army escort arrived to take Washington to Fort Le Boeuf, where he would present the royal governor’s letter to the fort’s commander. On December 12, Washington met Jacques Legardeur de Saint-Pierre and Captain Repentigny, another fort commander, and formally presented the letter. While the French met to discuss its contents, Washington took advantage of the time to scout Fort Le Boeuf and its armament. He noted it was almost fully surrounded by water, being at a fork of French Creek. He described the fort as having log walls, pointed at the top and about twelve feet high. The walls had portholes for cannon and others for small-arms use. There were eight 6-pound cannon—two on each side of the fort—and a 4-pound cannon at the gate. Platforms on the interior walls were used to mount the cannon and for soldiers to fire from. The fort consisted of a guardhouse, a chapel, a doctor’s office, and the commander’s private store. Outside the fort were barracks made of logs and other buildings, including ones for horses and blacksmiths. He estimated the fort was garrisoned by a hundred men plus officers. Using his companions to scout the number of canoes available to the garrison, Washington reported 50 made of birch, 170 of pine, and several more under construction.¹⁵

On December 15, Washington received the French reply. After a somewhat hazardous journey back to Williamsburg, he presented it to Governor Dinwiddie on January 16, 1754. The reply, typical of diplomatic correspondence to this day, was polite in rejecting any illegal or incorrect actions, while obfuscating any issue of blame or accountability.¹⁶ This set the scene for Washington’s first combat command. This experience would be painful but one from which he would learn valuable practical lessons. It would also provide the opportunity for more practice of his intelligence-collection skills.

Based upon the French reply, Dinwiddie issued a call for troops and promoted Washington to lieutenant colonel to command them. On April 2, 1754, he and about a 150 Virginia troops left Alexandria, Virginia, for the Ohio Territory. By late May, Washington had reached an area known as Great Meadows and began construction of a small defensive stockade he called Fort Necessity. Based upon a report from Indians he had sent to scout the French, on May 27 he led his troops from the fort on a night march to attack a small party of French soldiers some ten miles away. He was successful, killing a third of the French force including its commanding officer, Ensign Jumonville. His journal entry of that date notes that he was able to confirm from the prisoners that their mission was to make a reconnaissance of his position and the terrain surrounding it.¹⁷ While the French party had claimed to be on a diplomatic mission rather than a military one, its real purpose was collection of military intelligence. Washington also learned that the information regarding his location and strength had already been sent back by messenger to the French commander, with the understanding that he would act upon it. Based upon this knowledge, he then returned to the fort and prepared to defend it. In early June, Washington received some reinforcements. With these additional troops, he had about four hundred soldiers under his command.

During this period, Washington kept Indian scouts active screening his fort and searching for French scouting parties. On June 12, he sent a small force to collect nine French deserters previously identified by those scouts. In addition to debriefing the deserters, he decided to try to influence other French soldiers. He created a propaganda story in the form of a letter from them to their former fellow soldiers describing the benefits of deserting to the British side.¹⁸ The letter represents yet another indication of Washington’s recognition of the potential military benefits of a broad approach to military intelligence activities.

A second example comes from his late June meetings with representatives of the Indian tribes in the region. His primary objective for these meetings was to seek their loyalty and cooperation against the French, but he also used them to make statements directed at influencing French actions. Demonstrating what would professionally be called a counterintelligence situational awareness, Washington recognized that the French had sent some Indians to the meeting who were in their pay, to both identify his military resources and learn his plans and intentions. Recognizing this as an opportunity to spread some disinformation, he included in his speeches to the Indians information he wished the French to believe. His journal entry of June 21 states that at the conclusion of the council, the Indians “who had been sent by the French to act as spies, returned, though not without some stories prepared to amuse the French, wh...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Acknowledgments
• Preface
• Chapter 1: George Washington Learns the Intelligence Trade
• Chapter 2: The United Front Campaign That Led to the American Revolution
• Chapter 3: The Intelligence War Begins
• Chapter 4: Covert Action in Europe Leading to the French Alliance
• Chapter 5: Nathan Hale and the British Occupation of New York City
• Chapter 6: John Jay’s Efforts at Counterintelligence
• Chapter 7: Washington Establishes His Intelligence Capabilities
• Chapter 8: Benedict Arnold: Hero Turned Traitor
• Chapter 9: American Intelligence Activities Reach Maturity
• Chapter 10: Nathanael Greene and Intelligence in the Southern Campaign
• Chapter 11: Yorktown and the Endgame
• Chapter 12: The African American Role in American Intelligence Activities
• Chapter 13: Conclusion
• Appendix: Timeline of Revolution-Era Events
• Notes
• Glossary of Tradecraft Terms
• Bibliography
• Index