The Mongol Conquests

The Military Operations of Genghis Khan and Sübe'etei

Carl Fredrik Sverdrup

• Publisher: Helion & Company
• Year: 2022
• Print ISBN: 9781913336059
• eBook ISBN: 9781913118228
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Ancient History
• Index: History

"A scholarly, detailed history of how the Mongols created the greatest landlocked empire in history" ( Midwest Book Review).
The Mongols created the greatest landlocked empire known to history. It was an empire created and sustained by means of conquest. Initially an insignificant tribal leader, Genghis Khan gradually increased his power, overcoming one rival after another. After he had subjugated all tribes of Inner Asia, he struck southward into China and later attacked distant Khwarizm in the Near East. Sübe'etei continued to make significant conquests after Genghis Khan died, conquering central China and leading a large force into the heart of Europe. Between them, Genghis Khan and Sube'etei directed more than 40 campaigns, fought more than 60 battles, and conquered all lands from Korea in the east to Hungary and Poland in the west.
This book offers a detailed narrative of the military operations of these two leaders, based on early Mongolian, Chinese, Near Eastern, and European sources. Making full use of Chinese sourced not translated properly into any European language, the account offer details never before given in English works. Detailed maps showing the operations support the text. Many conventional wisdom views of the Mongols, such as their use of terror as a deliberate strategy, or their excellence at siege warfare, are shown to be incorrect. This is a major contribution to our knowledge of the Mongols and their way of warfare.
"History is littered with great leaders leading great armies and conquering large swathes of the world—Attila the Hun, Alexander the Great, the Roman Empire . . . but none perhaps as staggering as that of Genghis Khan. I have never heard of Sube'etei, I'm ashamed to say, until now, in this excellent book by Carl Fredrik Sverdrup. Asian history has never particularly appealed to me, but this is big history, and the author's style makes it compelling and readable." — Books Monthly
"This is a very valuable addition to the literature on the Mongol conquests, giving us a much clearer idea of the detailed course of their campaigns, the world in which they took place, and the methods used to win them." — History of War

Part I

Genghis Khan

1

Temüjin

Before I ascended the throne I was riding alone on one occasion. 6 men lay in ambush along the route, with evil intentions towards me. As I approached them I drew my sword and attacked. They, for their part, loosed arrows at me but these all flew past without one hitting me. I hacked the men down and rode on unscathed. On my return I passed close to their bodies. Their 6 geldings were roaming masterless in the area and could not be caught, but I drove them on before me.

– Rashid al-Din, 440

Temüjin (c.1162–1227), 1 the personal name of Genghis Khan, was at heart a simple nomad and his aim in life was simple. He told his men: ‘The greatest pleasure is to vanquish your enemies, to chase them before you, to rob them of their wealth, to see their near and dear bathed in tears, to ride their horses and sleep on the white bellies of their wives and daughters.’ He had no interest in the luxury that contact with the Chinese world brought him, preferring to continue the life of a simple nomad. He was an aristocrat who viewed the world much in the same way as Alexander the Great of Macedonia had done. With regard to Alexander, Fuller tells the story how ‘some of his friends who knew he was fleet of foot urged him to run a race in the Olympic Games, his answer was that he would only do so if he might have kings run with him.’2 Temüjin would probably have considered this to be a very proper response. For Alexander and Temüjin the World was divided into lords and followers, upstairs and downstairs.

Though born the son of a tribal leader, nothing was given to Temüjin for free. As a boy, after the early death of his father, he endured some desperate times and had to fight hard for everything he gained. The first rival, or perceived rival, he killed when aged about thirteen or fourteen, was his half-brother Bekter. Temüjin also spent time as a captive amongst the Tayici’uts. The loss of position, the hard daily life, and the time in captivity were humiliating to the young lord. Without this experience he might never had developed into to such a hard and focussed person. He was singleminded and stubborn. He told his sons: ‘The merit of an action lies in finishing it to the end.’ He was not content with victory. He wanted to destroy the enemy. This single-minded determination was not matched by any of his rivals in the contest for supremacy of the Inner Asian plains. Where rival lords were content with the added prestige a victory brought, Temüjin continued to press the attacks until the rival tribe was captured and their leaders killed.

Temüjin shared power with nobody, but generously rewarded those who served him well. He was charismatic and attracted able men into his service, and they prospered with him. Song visitor Zhao Hong said he ‘had the gift to win over people.’ One example is the Khitan Yelü Ahai. He met Temüjin as a Jin envoy. Impressed by him, Ahai defected and entered into his service. Temüjin actively sought out able men to join him. He told Taoist monk Yelü Chucai: ‘In 7 years I have accomplished the task of conquering … the world, and my supremacy is acknowledged. I have few talents therefore I am fond of intelligent men, treating them as my brothers.’ Still, he was careful to keep successful officers in place. In 1218 he told Jebe not to be too proud of himself after he had successfully overrun the West Liao state. Jebe tactfully offered Temüjin a present of many horses. Temüjin promoted people partly on merit and carefully assessed the capabilities of his men, deciding who was suitable for command and who was not. He said of one man:

There is no greater warrior than Yisubei and no man who possesses his ability! But because he does not suffer from the hardships of a campaign, shrugs off hunger and thirst, he assumes that all others, officers and soldiers alike, who accompany him, are equally able to bear those hardships, whereas they cannot. For this reason he is not suitable to command an army.

When some Tayici’ut visited his camp they found he ‘is a ruler who takes care of his subjects and knows how to command.’ He established detailed rules, which were clearly communicated and strictly enforced. A courier on the road had the right to seize a fresh horse from any man, even high-ranking military commanders; a soldier in Temüjin’s bodyguard had seniority over officers in other formations; and there were detailed regulations with regard to scouting, handling of plunder, etc. Temüjin always learned from mistakes and kept looking for better ways of doing things. He shared his lessons and ideas with others and made sure that they and the whole army learned from them also. In 1221 he returned to a battlefield where he carefully, though not politely, explained to the defeated officer the mistakes he had made. He wanted to make sure that he learned from the experience.

Temüjin demanded 100 percent loyalty, even from the men who served rival lords. He had nothing but contempt for those who defected, unless they did not first try to fight valiantly and fulfil their duties to their previous lord. He said: ‘A man who is once faithless can never be trusted.’ He was, however, happy to take into his service a brave enemy who had served his previous lord faithfully. He never had to deal with serious revolts by relatives or senior lords (though some defected early on). When he returned to Mongolia after a seven year campaign in the west there had been no unrest or any other problem at home. When Alexander returned to Babylon after a seven year campaign in the east (Sogdia and India), someone had run off with the treasury and started to hire mercenaries in Greece. After Temüjin died the succession measures he put in place worked smoothly. The comparison is often made to the Macedonian realm of Alexander, which fell apart after his death.

Temüjin was a skilled politician who was able to win over factions to his side. A trademark ploy was the use of misinformation and devious diplomacy to weaken the enemy’s resolve even before a military attack was made. He famously sent messages to enemy leaders in 1203 detailing their unjust conduct, and he attempted to divide the family of Muhammad II in 1220. Before he attacked Jin in 1211 he had won over the border tribes, had Jin defectors in his service, and probably had contact with Khitan leaders ready to rebel in Manchuria.

Many commentators and historians have misunderstood the military style of Temüjin. He is often presented as conquering through ‘pure’ strategy without having to fight battles. Thomas Barfield is one of few historians who know better. He commented:

In one important respect Chinggis Khan differed from all other nomadic leaders: he had a penchant for fighting decisive battles. The traditional nomadic approach, when confronted with a large well-organised force, was to withdraw and delay giving battle until the enemy was exhausted and had begun retreating. The campaigns of the Persians against the Scythians or Han Wu-ti against the Hsiung-nu demonstrated the effectiveness of this approach. Nomads traditionally advanced before weakness and retreated before strength. Chinggis Khan on the contrary, was willing to risk all on the effectiveness of his force and tactics in an open battle. Of course he was experienced at using the tactical retreat to lead an enemy into an ambush – the most common Mongol trap – but he never employed the strategic retreat of withdrawing long distances to avoid the enemy. Instead he sought the best tactical position and attacked.

The battle focus of Temüjin influenced his strategy. He was happy, like Hannibal before him, to let the enemy mass their forces so that they would be more likely to accept his challenge.

Very little is known about Temüjin’s specific battlefield tactics. He could use both penetration and outflanking tactics and had reserves ready to exploit advantage gained. He defeated the Naimans at the Naqu in 1204 by first inducing them to deploy in an extended formation and secondly making a strike with a compact body against their centre. On this occasion he faced a relatively strong foe. In 1221 he attacked the much weaker army of Jalal al-Din along the Sindhu (Indus). Jalal al-Din’s right rested on the river and his left on the mountains. Temüjin outflanked the enemy right, after it ventured forward, with his reserve and drove their whole army against the Sindhu. It was probably also an outflanking attack that helped secure victory against the Jin in 1213. The Mongols always held substantial forces in reserve. This is something all steppe people did.3

The one pre-battle strategy Temüjin used fairly often was to wrong-foot the enemy by means of a surprise march, either simply moving quickly or by moving along an unexpected path. He surprised his foes by a direct approach in 1206 and 1207. In 1208 and 1209 he attacked the same general areas, but then gained surprise by moving along a different path. He pursued defeated forces and especially the enemy leaders ruthlessly. He knew that a defeated leader could re-emerge as a threat if not eliminated. He explained in 1220, speaking about Muhammad II: ‘It is necessary to make an end of him … before men gather around him and nobles join him from every side.’ Temüjin resorted to strategic manoeuvre and trickery if he had been defeated or if he faced a very strong enemy army/position. After a defeat in 1203 he retreated to a distant place and regrouped, waiting for the enemy coalition force to disperse, supporting this process by actively sending messages to various enemy leaders. Once that happened he made a surprise attack on the main group and eliminated it. Unable to storm a strong position in 1209 he was again able to regroup. He was later able to tempt the enemy into the open by means of a feigned retreat, and then ambushed and routed them. In 1213 he outflanked and encircled a strong position he could not assault directly.

The fortified cities of China and Persia presented a new challenge to Temüjin. He first encountered the problem in 1207 when he was at least 40 years old. He asked Ambughai some years later: ‘In attacking cities and seizing territory what goes first, troops or weapons of war?’ Ambughai replied: ‘In attacking cities first employ stone catapult shot because they are strong, heavy and have great range.’ Temüjin decided to form a corps of catapult operators. Temüjin himself never took much interest in siege operations, preferring to hand over the task to specialists.

Temüjin claimed to have overcome great odds in personal combat during his youth. He is likely to have overstated whatever might have been the original core, though he is unlikely to have been able to avoid getting into fighting in person. By the time it is possible to follow his campaigns, he no longer personally engaged in close combat. He was no ‘heroic’ leader like Alexander III, Xiang Yü, Heraclios, Gustav II Adolf, or Karl XII. Instead he directed operations from the rear, though he ventured forward enough to get wounded on occasion.

Temüjin assumed the title Genghis Khan in 1206.4 In this section he will be called Temüjin – covering his own campaigns – and Genghis Khan in the second, where the focus is Sübe’etei. In Chinese annals he is referred to as emperor or specifically the first ruler. They view him as the founder of the Yuan dynasty, though it was only his grandson Kublai who set up court in Beijing.

Sources: Zhao Hong, in P. Olbricht and E. Pinks, Meng-Ta Pei-Lu und Hei-ta Shih-Lüeh (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1980), p.12; Rashid al-Din, 437–440; Juvaini, p.143; George Dennis, Maurice’s Strategikon (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984) p.23; Harold Lamb, The Earth Shakers (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1949), p.67; Boyle, commentary on Juvaini, p.55; J. F. C. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press), p.58; James Chambers, The Devil’s Horsemen, The Mongol Invasion of Europe (London: Cassell, 1988), p.15; Barfield, p.160; Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp.17–19; Trevor Royle, A Dictionary of Military Quotations (London: Routledge, 1990), p.55.

1See Zhou Qingshu, ‘A critical examination of the year of birth of Chinggis Khan’, in Xin Luo, Chinese Scholars on Inner Asia (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University, 2012), pp.331–352.

2Fuller is retelling a Plutarch anecdote.

3See, for example, in the East Roman manual the Strategikon (written c.AD 620).

4This title is perhaps best rendered into English as Genghis Khan. Genghis Khan is used in this book as this form has become the most recognised.

2

The Officers

Further, Činggis Qa’an said to Qubilai, ‘For me you pressed down the necks of the mighty ones, the buttocks of the strong ones. You, Qubilai, Jelme, Jebe and Sübe’etei – these “four hounds” of mine – when I sent you off, directing you to the place I had in mind, when I said, “Reach there!”, you crushed the stones to be there; when I said, “Attack!”, you split up the rocks, you shattered the shining stones, you cleft the deep waters. When I sent you, Qubilai, Jelme, Jebe and Sübe’etei, my “four hounds”, to the place I had designated, if Bo’orču, Muqali, Boroqul and Čila’un Ba’atur – these “four steeds” of mine – were at my side, and when the day of battle came and I had Jürčedei and Quyildar standing before me with their Uru’ut and Mangqut troops, then my mind was completely at rest. Qubilai, will you not be in charge of all military affairs?’

– the Secret History, 209

Temüjin relied on relatives to command his armies. Family members, mainly uncles and cousins, commanded nine of 13 units in the Dalan Bajut battle in 1194. By 1201 his brothers had gained a more prominent position. In the final stages of his career, after 1211, his sons started to command armies. Thus, while family members were always important in the command structure, those Temüjin actually relied on changed over the course of his career.

During the Dalan Bajud battle, his mother Hö’elün commanded a unit, as did Temüjin himself. Bültecu, Saca, Taicu, Daritai Otcigin and Qucar, Joci, Altan, Mönggetü Qiyan, and Bültecu, uncles, cousins, or other relatives, commanded other units. Temüjin fell out with Saca and Taicu in 1196 and with Daritai Otcigin, Qucar, and Altan in 1202. All except Daritai Otcigin were later killed. Some of the family leaders viewed their association with Temüjin as an alliance rather than a clear subject/lord relationship, but this was not an attitude Temüjin was ready to accept.

Qasar, Otcigin, Belgutai, and Alcidai were the leading family commanders of the next generation. All except Alcidai were Temüjin’s full or hal...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Maps
• Preface
• Introduction
• A Note on Sources
• The Environment: Nomads and Sedentary States
• The Khitan War Machine
• Part I: Genghis Khan
• Part II: Sübe‘etei
• Appendices
• Bibliography