Super Snipers

Robert K. Brown, Vann Spencer

• Publisher: Skyhorse
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781626360679
• eBook ISBN: 9781628735413
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

In Super Snipers, the editors of Soldier of Fortune show readersthe ways of the expert sniper in forty stories from those who have mastered the craft. Becoming an elite sniper involves more than learning how to shoot. Snipers need to know how to judge terrain, wind, and sometimes even the curve of the Earth. They train their eyes to spot enemy movement in the distance and to never hesitate. A sniper is more that a finger behind a trigger; he is a scout, a scientist, a strategist, and the support group for a platoon. Super Snipers brings you into the world of some of the most accomplished snipers. From Finland to Iraq, Korea to Somalia, Soldier of Fortune Magazine provides forty stories directlyfrom the eyes and minds of the snipers who made the kills. These trained marksmen describe their method of calculating, aiming, and taking the perfect shot, all the way down to the type of chewing tobacco they prefer.
Some of the super snipers in this collection include:

• Chris Kyle ( American Sniper )
• Major Charles Greene
• Sergeant Dan Mills
• Gunnery Sergeant Jack Coughlin
• Robert K. Brown
• And many more!

Every sniper—just like every situation that calls for a sniper—is unique, and Super Snipers will show you every step of the way, as you find the target, narrow the scope, and take the shot.

SECTION ONE:
YESTERDAY’S SNIPERS

1

Let Our Snipers Hunt: Denying the Emplacement of IEDs

By Brian K. Sain, American Snipers Association

“The true sniper is not actually, in one sense of the term, a real ‘soldier.’ His nature, job, and gifts are too individualistic.”

—Ion L. Idriess

These words were written nearly one hundred years ago and are still applicable today.

Unfortunately, individualism in and of itself flies in the face of contemporary military thinking; for numerous reasons, many commanding officers simply do not understand the huge force multiplier they have with their sniper teams.

U.S. Army Spc. Jason Peacock, a rifleman from Alpha Troop, 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, scans the rooftops from his overwatch position during a cordon and search mission in Baghdad, Iraq, 8 Feb. 2007. The A-1/14th CAV conducted cordon and search missions with 2nd Battalion, 1st Brigade, 6th Iraqi National Police, to maintain security and stability in Baghdad. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Sean A. Foley)

The worth of the sniper in warfare has been proven time and again, but these lessons have been largely forgotten after every conflict. That is, until the newest tyrant attempts to rule the world by force and well-trained and equipped snipers are urgently needed once again. This unfortunate cycle of being “caught with our pants down” results in stop-gap measures like the designated marksman program, issuing worn out M14 rifles for precision work, and pressuring sniper schools to push students through to get enough trained snipers in the field.

Many fully trained professional snipers currently in the fight feel that the designated marksman program, with its marginal training and inadequate equipment, is “watering down” the sniper program. They feel that every soldier/marine should be a well-trained marksman first and the snipers should be left to do what snipers know how to do best. They feel it is irresponsible and downright ludicrous to send young men half trained (at best) to do a sniper’s job.

The designated marksmen, however (who come from various skill levels and backgrounds), are set on a tread wheel. Commanders who do not understand sniper tactics often task the snipers. The commanders assign these men to overwatch missions, but do not properly equip them for it. The designated marksmen have no choice but to follow orders and do the very best with what they have, or with what they can scrounge, inside or outside of their chains of command. Some do a great job and eventually attend sniper school upon their return from theater.

Many snipers believe they would be better served if they had their own command and support elements rather than being treated simply as an afterthought attached to a headquarters company. But lamentations from snipers to higher echelons for better gear and operational autonomy often fall on the deaf ears of officers primarily schooled in commanding battalions of tanks, artillery, and mechanized infantry. One comment overheard from an officer defending his position was stated as “Snipers don’t win wars.”

That assessment may have been valid with the former “big army” threat of the Soviet Union, but may be somewhat arguable given the nature of current conflicts. Tanks and artillery are of limited use in the urban fighting of Iraq, where the number one killer of our military personnel is the improvised explosive device, better known as the IED.

IEDs are placed by human insurgents, and one of the best ways to combat them is with a corps of well-equipped and well-trained snipers. Fully supported by their command, with common sense rules of engagement, and operating upon actionable intelligence that they often develop themselves. Coalition Force snipers can methodically hunt these insurgents down and eliminate them (with no collateral damage to innocents whatsoever). The battles for Fallujah and Najaf are prime examples of virtual domination by U.S. sniper teams.

Snipers are by their very nature hunters; due to their intensive training, snipers know their own capabilities better than anyone else. The same, however, cannot often be said of their commanding officers. Many company and field-grade officers have not training in sniper employment, do not understand their snipers’ capabilities, and have no idea how to deploy their snipers in a doctrinally correct manner.

Therefore, the sniper is caught in the proverbial Catch-22. Snipers require trust and autonomy from higher up in order to operate successfully (sometimes independently) and “do what they were taught to do.” Unfortunately, most E5s are not able to tell a commissioned officer much about how snipers should be deployed or why the gear snipers need is different than the other troops’ gear. After all, how could any E5 who has merely attended sniper school possibly know more about sniper employment than a commissioned officer who has not?

With the advent of the IED and the suicide bomber, many units that previously did not have snipers are now finding the sniper’s intelligence-gathering and overwatch skills vital to mission success. Since a school-trained sniper usually carries an infantry MOS, these armor, artillery, and cavalry units are often deploying some form of designated marksman to counter current threats.

Unfortunately, the gear and weaponry required for these men may not fall within the equipment guidelines of the type of unit deploying them. For example, an armor unit may have plenty of budgetary resources for their vehicles or computer monitors for their CP, but may not have money for the optics, weaponry, and specialized equipment the designated marksmen desperately need to protect the unit from IEDs and suicide bombers. This is because their modified table of equipment may not denote that the unit even has designated marksmen!

A commonly heard reply to a sniper’s request for gear and operational autonomy usually goes something like, “You guys are nothing special and no different than the rest of the troops, so quit whining.”

If this is so, then why are snipers handpicked, sent to one of the most rigorous and demanding forms of training the U.S. military has to offer, and taught things other airmen, marines, sailors, and soldiers are not? Why is a designated marksman chosen for his position over someone else if everyone is equally trained and no one is special? Anyone familiar with the sniper program knows that graduates from sniper school are rarely personnel you would consider “whiners.” On the contrary, snipers typically are consummate professionals and perfectionists. That is their nature and one of the primary reasons they are chosen for the job in the first place.

2

WORLD WAR II

Finnish Snipers in the Winter War

By John Plaster

Finland’s—and probably the world’s— greatest sniper of all time, Simo Hayha (left).

The One Hundred–Day War: One Shot-One Kill

During the winter of 1939–40, for some one hundred days, all alone, tiny Finland fought an immense Soviet invasion force. Outnumbered 4 to 1, the 130,000-man Finnish army and Civil Guard took on 26 Soviet divisions, tapping into their superior shooting and winter warfare skills to fight the Red Army to a standstill. Answering the challenge, laaki ja vainaa (one shot—one kill), Finnish snipers assisted this David-versus-Goliath fight and, in fact, one Finn scored what’s regarded as the greatest number of sniper kills ever recorded.

Corporal Simo Hayha, a thirty-five-year-old Civil Guardsman from the heavily forested lake country northeast of Helsinki, shot 542 Soviet soldiers, according to several sources. A prewar competitive shooter and moose hunter who’d roamed Finland’s woods and swamps, Hayha stood only five feet, three inches tall, but his fieldcraft, marksmanship, and courage more than compensated for his size.

The White Death—A Hunter’s Ghost

Hayha and his comrades of the 34th Infantry Regiment performed miracles on the Kollaa Front, where Soviet soldiers trudging the deep snow often found themselves shot by “cuckoos”—snipers in trees—who deployed in fours for deadly intersecting fire and then skied away. Often operating alone, Hayha drifted like the wind, a ghost that might appear anywhere, his shapeless shadow shooting first from one flank, then skiing to fire from another direction, and then lying low to ambush the Soviets after they’d passed his hiding place. Since he was famed for his white smock sewn from bedsheets, the Soviets nicknamed him Belaya Smert (the “White Death”). Hayha averaged an astonishing five kills per day for the entire three-month war, with his highest daily score reaching twenty-five. He found no shortage of targets, especially during the Battle of Killer Hill, where thirty-two Finnish ski soldiers fought off four thousand Soviet soldiers trying to assault them in deep snow.

Hayha preferred the M28/30 bolt-action rifle, a Finnish-made, higher-quality version of the Soviet 91/30, 7.62 x 54mm MosinNagant. Unlike many snipers, Hayha used iron sights, because that was how he was accustomed to shooting and because his engagement distances seldom exceeded 200 meters. Further, he believed that a scope would have raised his profile, making him more susceptible to being detected. By contrast, many other Finnish snipers had Soviet-made PE or PEM 4x rifle scopes, either purchased prewar or taken off captured Soviet weapons. Unlike the British, U.S., German, and Soviet armies, the Finns developed a special curved stripper clip that allowed these rifles to be quickly reloaded despite the scope.

Just as Dead

Some purists have questioned Hayha’s score due to his choice of weapons. About half his kills were at relatively close distances, less than 100 meters, which dictated using his 9mm Finnish Soumi submachine gun rather than a bolt-action rifle. Hayha saw no such distinction, considering an invading Soviet soldier just as dead whether he shot him from ambush at 50 meters or 500 meters.

Badly wounded by a Soviet sniper on March 6, 1940, Hayha regained consciousness a week later to find a ceasefire—Stalin’s bloody gambit to seize Finland had been deflected, the cost simply too great for the Red Army. In one hundred days of fighting, the Finns had lost twenty-five thousand men, but more than eight times their number—in excess of two hundred thousand Soviet Army soldiers—had paid with their lives for underestimating that tiny Scandinavian land.

The Famous Audie Murphy, Countersniper

By John Plaster

David Faces German Goliaths

Audie Murphy, America’s most highly decorated serviceman in World War II, fought German snipers several times, including a personal, one-on-one fight to the death. Though only twenty years old and slightly built, the young Texan possessed a heroic spirit, backed by impressive shooting skills and an almost intuitive grasp of tactics and terrain. On October 2, 1944, shortly after Murphy had received a direct commission to lieutenant, a German sniper shot the soldier beside Murphy. The wounded man’s agonizing scream attracted enemy machine gunfire, which hit a half dozen of Murphy’s comrades. The very next day, another sniper fired two well-aimed shots that instantly killed two more men and halted the young Texan’s unit. Murphy boldly volunteered to go after the sniper, but his company commander required him to bring along three infantrymen.

The Lone Sniper

Advancing toward the flank of the sniper’s likely position, Murphy halted and ordered the three soldiers to stay there. “It was simply safer that way,” he later explained. “With four men thrashing through the underbrush, the sniper would have been sure to spot one of us and perhaps kill us all.” Studying where...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Introduction
• Section One Yesterday’s Snipers
• Section Three Snipers on Today’s Battlefields
• Section Four General Sniping