CHAPTER III
THWARTED EXPECTATIONS
Two of the compelling reasons behind the Revolution were the opposition to the colonial system of taxation and distress not only over friar control over practically every facet of political life but also over vast tracts of rich arable lands in Luzon. It has in fact been asserted that the Tagalog provinces became the heartland of the Philippine Revolution primarily because of the high concentration of friar estates in that area. Opposition to these aspects of the anciĆ©n regime had time and again thrown the Filipinos into open rebellion against the ruling power. These uprisings, however, had been easily suppressed, owing to the lack of unity of the Filipinos and the superior arms of the Spaniards.1 Ilustrados in the 1880s and the 1890s through the Reform movement campaigned for the assimilation of the Philippines as a province of the Spanish empire. If the country ceased to be a colony, the Filipinos would be granted Spanish citizenship and with it exemptions from the unreasonable taxes imposed on them as vassals of Spain. Steps could also be taken to reduce the pervasiveness of friar control in Philippine society.2 Such changes, if granted, would benefit rich and poor alike but specifically rising Filipino merchants, cultivators and entrepreneurs who were coming into their own through economic opportunities of the late nineteenth century, that sector of the indigenous so ciety whence sprung the ilustrado reformists. The agitation for reforms, however, failed miserably due to the metropolitan countryās preoccupation with its own economic and political problems as well as the strong pressure exerted by friars both in the colony and in Spain against any meaningful change.
The failure of the reform movement convinced non-ilustrado Andres Bonifacio and his associates that revolution was the only course of action that could overthrow the Spaniards in the Philippines. Hence, they founded the Katipunan in 1892, a secret society which had for its goal the liberation of the colony from the tyranny of Spain. The separatist organization became very popular in Luzon by early 1896, its membership had increased to around 30,000. The Katipunan offered no economic vision of what the Filipinos might do when the colony won its independence, at least in a purely Western conceptual framework. What is singularly significant in its world view, as reflected in the works of Bonifacio and Emilio Jacinto, the thinkers and leaders of the Revolution, was the premise that with the expulsion of the Spaniards, prosperity, contentment and abundance, a state of life the Filipinos had known ābefore the coming of the Spaniardsā would once more be enjoyed by the people and that the acts and laws of the government would be directed for their good and welfare.3 We can only infer that with the expected establishment of a Filipino brotherhood (nationhood!) and the belief in the return of abundance and contentment, may have actually suggested the institution of broad and social economic changes whereby the onerous system of taxation, agrarian problems, etc. would be replaced by a more equitable social structure.
When Aguinaldo proclaimed the independence of the Philippines in June 1898, this world view no longer prevailed among the leadership of the Revolution. The main goal, particularly when the revolutionary leadership was enlarged by the addition of ilustrados and wealthy Filipinos, was the attainment of sovereignty and freedom in the strictest political sense. There is little in the speeches and correspondence of Aguinaldo and the deliberations of the Malolos Congress to suggest that an economic vision loomed large in their thoughts. Whether or not they contemplated that a new economic program would be shaped by the course of political reorganization throughout the Philippines is not clear. But in 1898, it was not only the problems of providing legitimacy to the declaration of independence or repulsing the threat of American imperialism that Aguinaldo had to reckon with. Economic problems, perhaps more important in so far as the people were concerned, were of equal moment and demanded almost at once the attention of the Aguinaldo government.
The economic conditions during 1898-1902, the attitudes of the Malolos leadership toward economic reform, the expectations and hopes of the Filipino masses for the economic amelioration and change that the Revolution might bring thus bear some investigation. Yet, until the Insurgent Records yields detailed economic or fiscal data to the persistent researcher, this will not be an easy task. There are, however, enough relevant materials on two economic aspects, that of taxation and the land question, available for us to make some legitimate assessments. In this regard, the following questions may be asked: What position did the Philippine Government take on the problem of taxation, a much hated aspect of the Spanish regime and yet the only possible source of funding for its endeavours? How did it deal with the problem of the disposition of friar lands, given the restlessness of the Filipinos on those estates? Which section of Philippine society stood to profit or lose from government policy on taxation and the land problem. Our discussion in Chapter II shows that the political victors of the Revolution during its second phase were the municipal elites who continued to assert the power and authority, which they had long exercised during the Spanish regime, under Aguinaldoās program of political reorganization as well. How did this affect government policy? It would he ingenuous not to pursue the answers to these questions for they will show how disparate groups viewed the rewards of the Revolution, of what their views of the Revolution were and were not. Shortly after the declaration of independence, Aguinaldo decreed (20 June 1898) that the government would continue to impose the taxes established and collected during the Spanish regime. The only taxes suspended were those on gambling and cockfighting which Aguinaldo prohibited because they only tended āto ruin the towns with very little advantage to the public treasury.ā4 For about six months after the passage of the decree, however, the government collected only the cedula, a personal tax of one peseta (or a fifth of a peso), per head which all able-bodied males above the age of 18 who did not serve in the insurgent militia or the municipal police had to pay every three months. Local presidents, cabezas de barangay, municipal councilors and their assistants as well as men over 60 years of age and all the physically incapacitated were also required to pay this tax until they were granted exemptions by another decree of Aguinaldo on November ll.5 A special tax on the āwell-to-do class,ā to be determined by the government in consultations with the provincial representatives to the Malolos Congress, was also approved by the government.
By the end of 1898, however, the government was convinced that the revenue from the cedula--on the basis of collection estimates for 1899--was not enough to support the cost of the Revolution. The income from taxation and other sources from June to December amounted to no more than P826,900 while the estimated receipts for the year 1899 amounted to only P6,343,407, less than fifty percent of the revenue collected by the Spanish government during the year 1896-1897.6 Very much in need of money, the Malolos Congress decided that other old taxes, despite their unpopularity and oppressiveness, should be retained by the government. In the final draft of the Philippine Constitution, the Malolos Congress included a provision that the laws in force in the Philippines ābefore the emancipationā would be enforced as the laws of the Republic.7 Aside from the cedula, the government was thus sanctioned to collect the following taxes: the industrial tax, the tariff on the professions, the urbana tax and the unpopular municipal arbitrios and impuestos (direct taxes on the slaughter and sale of meat, the use of market houses, carriages and work animal, etc.).8 Gambling and cockfighting, āa danger to the youth, a cause for alarm to families and a threat to the public order,ā were illegal, leading to much loss of revenue for the government because Aguinaldoās repeated interdicts on these vices, which used to be heavily taxed, were usually disregarded by the Filipinos.9
On February 19, 1899, Aguinaldo abolished the cedula and approved in its place the imposition of a special war tax called the ācertificate of citizenshipā (certifico de ciudadanĆa), a graduated poll tax very similar to the cedula it superseded (See Table 1).
TABLE I
CLASSES OF CERTIFICATES OF CITIZENSHIP
| Class | | Category of Taxpayer | | Amount of Tax Paid Annually |
| First | | Those who own or manage property worth more than P25,000 | | P100.00 |
| Second property | | Those who own or manage valued from P15,000 to P25,000 | | P50.00 |
| Third | | Those who own or manage property valued from P10,000 to P15,000 | | P25.00 |
| Fourth | | Those who own or manage property valued P5,001 to P10,000 | | P10.00 |
| Fifth | | Those who own or manage property valued P1,001 to P5,000 | | P5.00 |
| Sixth | | Those with property worth less than P1000 | | P2.00 |
| Seventh | | All men over 18 years of age | | P1.00 |
| Eight | | Soldiers and military employees in active service; those over 60 years of age; the physically and mentally handicapped | | Free |
Source: Budget Law of 19 February 1899, orig. Sp., PIR, SD 931.1, R. 54.
Since the well-to-do constituted a very small minority of the population, the non-propertied peasant class carried the main burden of taxation. Certain that the imposition of the certificate would cause resentment among rich and poor alike, Aguinaldo hastened to reassure the citizenry that the tax would be collected only āwhile the war last[ed]ā and that reforms in the system of taxation would be introduced as soon as the problem of American intervention was resolved.10
Under the Republic, the certificate of citizenship was the most important tax for the average Filipino for it was an identity card and a passport the lack of which prevented access to an official position or any kind of employment and collection of remittances, salaries and pensions. While Aguinaldo had abolished forced labor (prestación personal), those who failed to show evidence of payment of the certificate were likely to be employed at forced labor in civil or military public works. As a passport, lack of it restricted oneās movement to and from republican controlled towns as well as American occupied areas. Filipinos who had abandoned their towns in fear of being caught in the crossfire between the Americans and the Filipino forces in Manila and its environs during the early months of 1899 were prohibited from returning to their home unless they purchased the certificate.11
The restoration of the Spanish taxes clearly alienated many Filipinos from the republican leadership. In the face of the growing economic cri sis, however, these odious impositions were not the only cause of resentment and confusion. On 18 October 1898, Aguinaldo approved another act of the Malolos Congress intended to provide āspontaneous and voluntary contributionsā to the government from the propertied peopl (clase acomodada) of every town. Congress passed on that day a l...