A striking feature about emotions in correctional psychology is that they are primarily viewed as problems to be managed. Difficulties with emotional regulation have been identified as a dynamic risk factor in the sexual offending domain, and as a consequence of this are considered to be a critical treatment target (Hanson & Harris, 2000; Thornton, 2013). In the general offending area, impulsive behaviour leading to crime is frequently linked to emotional dyscontrol (Andrews & Bonta, 2010). Theories of sexual offending typically include aetiological pathways or causes that are characterized by emotional instability. For example, in Hall and Hirschmanâs (1992) Quadripartite Model of child molestation (see Bartels, Chapter 2 in this volume), one group of individuals is defined by their susceptibility to negative affective states and tendency to behave in an impulsive and unplanned manner. Treatment for this group centres on learning how to control and regulate negative emotions. Similarly, according to Ward and Hudsonâs (1998) selfâregulation model, negative emotional states such as anger or anxiety may function as disinhibitors and precipitate reoffending. Finally, a core component of Ross and Fabianoâs (1985) influential cognitive skills treatment programme is devoted to preventing emotional arousal from impairing functioning and leading to further offending. One of the core assumptions of cognitive skills programmes is that there are causal relationships between cognition, emotion and motivation. The picture of emotion emerging from these models and theories is a negative one: emotions overwhelm individuals and if unchecked result in antisocial and destructive behaviour. They are problematic, destructive and need to be controlled.
The conceptualization of emotions within correctional psychology as behavioural disrupters, contrasts starkly with the richer and more nuanced characterization evident in contemporary psychological and philosophical theorizing and research (Colombetti, 2009, 2014; Lewis, HavilandâJones & Barrett, 2008; Solomon, 2007). In this latter body of work, emotions are described as biologically adaptive, essential for sound decisionâmaking, critical elements of interpersonal relationships and conduits to a meaningful engagement with life (Christensen, 2012; Helm, 2002; Maiese, 2011; Sterelny, 2012; Thompson, 2007). Furthermore, a number of emotional phenomena have been identified; ranging from specific emotional states to more enduring moods or personalityâbased dispositions. Emotions can enhance personal functioning, may be positive or negatively valenced, motivate individuals to pursue goals and function as interpersonal and intrapersonal signals of progress to goal achievement. The distinction between emotion and cognition has been effectively collapsed, and they are no longer considered to be polar opposites (Colombetti, 2014; Pessoa, 2013). Therapy has reflected this renewed interest in emotions as facilitators of behavioural change and specific emotion focused interventions are now routinely part of the repertoire of contemporary clinical practitioners (Greenberg, 2002; Leahy, 2015). For example, learning to focus on the somatic aspects of emotion in order to activate its phenomenological and behavioural components (Greenberg, 2002).
This change in understanding of emotional phenomena and its subsequent enriched role in therapeutic practice has not occurred in correctional psychology. Rather, a more limited understanding of emotions, motivation and cognition and their function in the process of behavioural change is typically the case. Why is this so? I think there are three major reasons for this neglect of emotional theorizing and research by correctional practitioners. First, a preoccupation with risk prediction and management in forensic and correctional practice has resulted in a neglect of desistance processes and emphasis on agency. What I mean by this is that attention to individualsâ personal goals and aspirations for living fulfilling and better lives has not occurred (Ward & Maruna, 2007). The process of constructing intervention plans that reflect what is meaningful to individuals necessarily involves consideration of positively valenced emotions â and more generally â wellâbeing related concerns. Second, the fragmentation of treatment programmes into discrete modules, such as emotional regulation, interpersonal functioning, cognitive restructuring and so on, has meant that it is tempting to focus on problem areas rather than processes for facilitating meaningful change. Engaging individuals fully in treatment requires attention to broader values and goals, and a coherent, positive plan for living rather than a disconnected strategy of tackling specific risk factors, or problems. Third, because correctional practice has been driven by pragmatic concerns, there has been a focus only on treatment theories and techniques that have been tested in riskâneedâresponsivity type studies (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Marshall, Marshall, Serran & Fernandez, 2006). This is a severe limitation. The desire to effect change in certain problem areas has concentrated efforts on developing specific treatment approaches and, as a result, there has been a lack of awareness of current affective science and its implications for therapy.
In correctional psychology, an artificial distinction between emotion and cognition has been uncritically accepted, and cognition has been favoured as the primary causal process. As we will see later, this has been undermined by theory and research in affective science. In this chapter, I present a view of the interrelationship between cognition, emotion and motivation which challenges the current theoretical status quo in sexual offence treatment and has serious implications for how therapists view and treat the components of emotion, cognition, and motivation. First, I will consider definitional and conceptual issues that are currently under the spotlight of affective science. I will then spend the rest of the chapter detailing the enactive approach to human functioning in general, and emotions, in particular. The enactive view of the mind is that it emerges from the biological process of autopoiesis, or rather, the dynamic processes by which dynamic systems protect, repair and organize their components and actively control their relationship to the environment (Hutto & Myin, 2013; Stewart, Gapenne, & Di Paolo, 2010; Thompson, 2007). It is a relational, dynamic conceptualization of organisms in which affective structures and processes play a significant role in framing salient features of the environment that represent potential benefits or possible threats. In this theory, emotions are at the centre of adaptive functioning and actively support cognition and behaviour. Following a description of enactivisim and its general assumptions, I will discuss its implications for correctional practice. My review of these implications will be brief as my major aim is to present a way of thinking about emotional phenomena that is supported by current research and theory, and that is capable of guiding future practice.
The Concepts of Emotion, Cognition and Motivation
Emotions are complex phenomena involving multiple systems that are loosely associated (Mennin & Farach, 2007) and involve physiological responses (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure), behavioural responses (e.g., facial displays and motor actions such as avoidance or escape) and subjective responses (e.g., feelings, verbally mediated thought). They involve relatively automatic appraisals of internal and external stimuli such as thoughts, interpersonal rejection or physical threats, and ready the organism to respond appropriately. Emotions are organismâwide phenomena and are typically experienced as occurring without volition. There are a range of emotional phenomena that vary in terms of their discreteness, persistence and duration. Specific emotions such as anger, joy and fear emerge readily in response to internal or external cues and serve to alert organisms to sources of threat or wellâbeing. They usually last for a few minutes at most and are intentional in the sense they are directed to specific objects or cues. On the other hand, moods are longer lasting and may be present continually for several days, even weeks. Personality based dispositions are present more or less permanently and causally generate moods. Furthermore, emotions are motivating and direct the person to engage in goal directed actions of a particular kind. The type of goals and related actions reflect the theme or meaning of the affective state. In addition, the meaning of an emotional situation is partly a function of individualsâ beliefs and attitudes. For example, fear will generate escape or avoidance goals (based on a threat appraisal) while anger causes retaliatory of selfâprotective ones (based on a perception of imminent, unjustified harm). Thompson (2007) captures the multiâfaceted nature of emotion nicely in the following quote:
Thus, emotions are organismâwide responses, are initiated without intent, involve evaluations, are motivating (i.e., ready the organism for action), are generally adaptive and have meaning; they are in effect, âsenseâmakingâ (Maiese, 2011). While there is disagreement concerning a number of their features, such as the degree to which specific emotions are discrete, there is consensus on these features (Frijda, 2008).
