Biomedical technologies have histories that inevitably come into being with an idea often stimulated by a random or unexpected observation that then initiates a series of experimental procedures. Many technologies never progress beyond this initial phase, but others are put into production and eventually applied in medical care. However, the application of a biomedical technology does not simply depend on its medical use alone, but is deeply influenced by prevailing medical and political interests and cultural norms, as well as by overarching ideas about the most promising directions for progress and mastery of the condition of the human body. Biomedical technologies are not merely devices or machines, such as blood tests and neuroimaging scanners that permit the routinized application of scientific knowledge; neither are they ethically and morally neutral.
At the experimental stage, biomedical technologies enable manipulations that intervene in animal and human bodies revealing previously unknown or inaccessible âobjectsâ, thus making them factually ârealâ. At times chance intervenes in the creation of these material entities or âtechnophenomenaâ. The improbable chain of events in 1928 that led the Scottish researcher Alexander Fleming to observe the antibiotic properties of the rare mould, Penicillium notatum, is a wellâknown example of the humble origins common to many biomedical technologies. Fleming rather carelessly left an open Petri dish smeared with Staphylococcus bacteria on his laboratory bench by an open window while he went away on a twoâweek holiday. When he returned, the yellowâgreen growth of the bacteria was surrounded by a clear halo produced by a mould that had accidentally drifted down from a mycology unit above into Flemingâs London lab one floor below. Various unconfirmed reports about the effectiveness of the mould had already been reported prior to Flemingâs âdiscoveryâ, but he was the first to grow a pure culture of Penicillium resulting in a new technophenomenon that he named âpenicillinâ. However, it was not until 1942 that sufficient observations and experiments had been carried out and adequate quantities of penicillin produced for it to be put formally into production in the United States, and then initially only on a small scale. It took even longer for ordinary doctors to appreciate its value and learn that the drug should be administered intravenously to be effective.
Ludwig Fleck argued in the first half of the twentieth century that phenomena that scientists work with are the products of technologies, practices and preconditioned ways of seeing and understanding. Fleckâs argument is that every scientific phenomenon exists only as a result of a technical intervention on the part of scientists,1 and that creating a firm separation between the worlds of research and of application (such as is commonly done between the laboratory and the clinic) is entirely inappropriate. In other words, biomedical technologies are anchored as part of one or more âsociotechnical systemsâ that straddle institutions including hospitals, laboratories, biotech companies and the state.2 The phenomena that result from their application coalesce as the accepted biological, clinical and epidemiological facts of biomedical practice. Such routinized practices are transportable across vast distances and are capable of marshalling yet more phenomena as a result of systematic interventions into patient bodies or human populations, thus producing yet more facts. In other words, biomedical technologies bring about transformations, resulting in newly discovered knowledge about the material world that, in turn, influences subsequent interventions. This insight informs our position that the science of biomedicine is actively constructed by technology â biomedical technology. By extension this means that healthârelated matters are routinely âobjectifiedâ as technical problems, to be solved through the application of technology and the conduct of science, and are, by definition, therefore, decontextualized in practice. Objectification tends to make opaque moral assumptions embedded in the actual application of any given technology as the following chapters will show.
This approach builds on and extends the work in the 1960s and 1970s of the French philosopher Michel Foucault. He argued that, commencing in the seventeenth century, management by the state began to be accomplished through the expansion of practices of regulation, discipline and surveillance directed at individuals. At the same time, government of âpopulationsâ â of what Foucault termed le vivant (âthe livingâ) â was brought about through the use of technologies such as the census. Foucault coined the term âbiopowerâ3 to describe the means by which government is exercised in the form of technologies that, although not machines, are nonetheless machineâlike in their systematic and codified generation of objects for management as well as new knowledge. Foucaultâs formulation encourages an examination of a broad range of practices as biomedical technologies. Shortly before his death Foucault introduced a distinction between, on the one hand, technologies of bodily governance that he termed âobjectifying practicesâ and, on the other hand, technologies of the self used to transform oneâs own body and mind through, for instance, spiritual exercises, public acts of contrition and confession.4 Together, these technologies have resulted in forms of embodiment, experiences and behaviours that many people assume are ânaturalâ, resulting in the âmaking upâ of kinds of people that did not previously exist.5
We argue that two significant developments since Foucaultâs time make straightforward application of his categories to contemporary biomedical technologies problematic. The first is the advent of what we call âtechno/biologicalsâ, technologies that are in part constituted from human biological material, thus troubling ânaturalâ categories about self and other and producing new forms of life. The second is the increasing deployment of biomedical technologies outside the parameters of the state, whether in the developing world or in industrialized economies, by nonâgovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private actors who seek to achieve specific health goals independently of a systematic governmentâmonitored approach to public health. In light of these developments, understanding emerging forms of biopower requires careful scrutiny of biomedical technologies in practice.
Technological Mastery of the Natural world and Human Development
A belief that mastery of the natural world could be achieved through scientific investigation and the application of âmachine powerâ was central to Enlightenment thinking.6 By the nineteenth century, writers as different as Herbert Spencer and Auguste Comte explicitly associated developments in science and technology with progress and the advancement of human kind. Spencer argued that the degree to which people are able to control the natural world is an indication of the degree of their civilized status,7 and the anthropologist Edward Tylor, in his book Primitive Culture, sought to rank cultures according to their ability in âadapting nature to manâs endsâ, with savages at the lowest end of the spectrum and educated peoples of Western Europe at the highest end.8 Of course there were a good number of wellâknown dissenters to a position that celebrated the progress brought about by science and technology, but these people were in the minority.9
Signs of this âhonourableâ and âaudaciousâ struggle against âbrute matterâ10 were evident in Europe from the fifteenth century on; the work of Leonardo da Vinci, Nicolaus Copernicus, Andreas Vesalius, followed later by Francis Bacon, Galileo Galilei, Isaac Newton and many others, provides evidence of an epistemological upheaval characterized today as the âscientific revolutionâ, one in which the world is made known through systematic investigation and transformed to what is assumed to be the better by means of the application of technologies. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries this approach was indispensable to the industrial revolution in northern Europe, one of the principal intentions of which was to improve the wellâbeing of the masses, if only so that they might be better able to endure excessively hard work.11 It also brought about worldwide exploration and colonization, including the systematic extraction of wealth in the form of natural materials of all kinds, both for building and engineering feats and for scientific investigation in laboratories and medical schools.12
One strand of early scientific thought that became extremely influential in both British and Continental thinking of the eighteenth century, and is particularly relevant for the argument that we make in this book, culminated in Isaac Newtonâs experiments on optics, mathematics and me...