Poor Advice
“I'm afraid you've been poorly advised,” I told the new client as she sat in my office. That was certainly an understatement—in fact, she'd been ripped off by the advisor at the brokerage firm that invested her money.
We had just finished reviewing the investments in her portfolio, which she had brought to me out of dissatisfaction with her existing advisor. It was a familiar discussion for me. I have worked in finance my entire life, mostly in New York, but early in my career I was in London. Since 2009 I've run my own investment business helping clients from individuals to institutions invest their money. The 23 years I spent at JPMorgan and the banks that preceded its many mergers was great preparation. During that time, I managed derivatives trading through enormous growth and at times high volatility; oversaw traders handling risks across multiple products and currencies; and more recently, led a business that helped new hedge funds get off the ground. I had seen Wall Street and “The City” (London's financial district) from the inside. It had been a great career, but by 2009, I was ready for a new challenge. The daily commute was increasingly a mind-numbing grind, and big financial companies were likely to face ever-greater constraints on their activities. The politics of financial reform understandably reflected public abhorrence at the required level of support from the US government following the 2008 financial crisis.
I was and remain very proud of my career at JPMorgan. The company emerged from 2008 in better shape than any of its peers. While it's true that it has had to concede substantial settlements to regulators since then, it's impossible for any big company to be immune from poor decisions or bad behavior somewhere in its ranks. The culture and the people with whom I worked overwhelmingly reflected the best in terms of values and integrity.
So I'd left the huge company where I'd spent almost my entire adult life to run something far smaller but also completely devoid of bureaucracy. My firm would reflect the values of the best people I'd worked with over the years as it sought attractive long-term investments in a format that treated clients' money as if it was mine. Many firms, and many people, do the same thing. But as I've found out since 2009, they don't all do the right thing. There's plenty of room for improvement in the quality of financial advice that is given to investors.
We all have to trust professionals when we need help with something that is not what we do for a living, whether it's medical treatment, legal advice, or auto repair. We generally buy products and services with the knowledge of an amateur, and we are often vulnerable to an unscrupulous provider. We look for honesty; when we don't find it, sometimes we discover in time to protect ourselves and sometimes we don't.
The world of investment advice can be dauntingly confusing. Saving for retirement is increasingly the responsibility of the individual, as defined benefit pension plans are phased out in favor of defined contribution plans, 401(k)s, and IRAs. Unless you're a public-sector employee where pensions are still based on your salary just prior to retirement, the money you have when you stop working will largely be the result of decisions you made (or failed to make) during your decades in the work force.
My client, whom we'll call Penelope (not her real name), sat across from me waiting for an explanation as to precisely what poor advice she had received. She was here with her husband, and we had met through a mutual friend. Like many investors, Penelope and her husband are smart people who have enjoyed professional success without having to understand the intricacies of investment products. Penelope is in the pharmaceutical industry (not uncommon in New Jersey) and her husband works for an information technology company.
Penelope had bought into a very common investment called a Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT). REITs typically own income-generating commercial property, including office buildings, warehouses, shopping centers, rental apartments, and so on. They can be a great way for individuals to own real estate managed by a professional company. Many REITs are publicly traded, allowing investors to sell their holding at the market price, and there are mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs) that provide exposure to REITs. Used properly, they can be a legitimate component of an investor's portfolio providing income and some protection against inflation.
However, not all REITs are good, and a particular class of them called “non-traded REITs” is generally to be avoided. Penelope had unwittingly invested some of her savings in the wrong kind of REIT, one that provides substantial guaranteed fees to the broker selling it while often generating disappointing returns for the investor.
Public securities are registered with the SEC under the 1940 Investment Company Act. Registering a security requires the company to meet various tests for accounting standards, transparency, and so on. The advantage of registering is that the security can be sold to the general public. Unregistered securities have a far more restricted set of potential buyers. The investors have to be “sophisticated” (meaning wealthy, in this case), and the seller of such securities has to adopt a targeted marketing approach, going directly to people he thinks may be interested. You won't often see an unregistered security advertised, because the laws are designed to prevent that.
Hedge funds are another example of an unregistered security. Their sale is restricted to “sophisticated” investors deemed able to carry out their own research. It's a sensible way to divide up the world of available investments. Retail investors are offered securities that are registered and usually those securities are publicly traded, enabling the investor to sell if they wish. Sophisticated investors including high-net-worth individuals and institutions don't need the same type of investor protection, which allows them to consider unregistered investments that have higher return potential and also higher risk.
Non-traded (also known as unlisted) registered REITs fall in between these two classes of investment. By being registered, they are available to be sold to the general public. Having gone to the effort of registering, it's a reasonable question to ask why they don't also seek a public listing. It would clearly seem to be in the interests of the investors to have the liquidity of a public market listing so that they can choose to sell in the future. In fact, non-traded REITs have highly limited liquidity and often none at all. They can only be sold back to the issuing REIT itself, and the REIT is under no obligation to make any offer to repurchase its shares. They are a hybrid security—no public market liquidity and yet available to be sold to the public.
Generally, companies that need to raise capital, whether equity or debt, desire liquid markets in which to issue their securities. Liquid markets are widely believed to reduce a company's cost of finance. This is because investors require an illiquidity premium, or higher return, if they have limited opportunities to sell. Private equity investors expect to earn a higher return than if they had invested their capital in public equity markets. Small-cap stocks similarly need to generate higher returns than large-cap stocks to compensate for their more limited liquidity.
Although monthly income is the main selling point, the illiquidity can mean that your holding period exceeds the lease term on the properties. For example, if the non-traded REIT in which you're invested has five-year leases on its properties but you hold the investment for ten years, you have much more at risk than just your exposure to the monthly income.
Bond issuers care a great deal about the liquidity in the bonds they issue, and the selection of bond underwriter is based in part on the firm's commitment and ability to subsequently act as market maker after the bonds are issued. The ability to sell bonds at a later date induces buyers to accept a lower yield than they would otherwise, thereby reducing the bond issuer's interest cost.
To cite a third example, the justification for high-frequency traders (HFTs) with their lightning-fast algorithms in the equity markets is that their activities improve liquidity. Michael Lewis in Flash Boys provided a fascinating perspective on how HFT firms have been able to extract substantial profits from investors through using their speed to front run orders. I'm not going to examine HFT firms here, but suffice it to say that their existence reflects the overwhelming public interest in the most liquid capital markets possible.
Why Not Get a Listing?
So now we return to non-traded REITs, and consider why a company that is qualified to seek a public listing because its securities are registered nonetheless chooses not to. Generally, you want to raise money at the cheapest possible cost, so why do these companies deliberately operate in a way that raises their cost of financing?
I think the answer is, they don't wish to attract any Wall Street research. Brokerage firms routinely publish research on stocks and bonds, and they look to get paid for their research through commissions. Good research gets investors to act on it, and the commissions generated by this activity are what pay for the analysts. Companies want positive research because it will push up their stock price, making the owners richer as well as making it easier to raise more money later on.
But suppose you run a company that is designed primarily to enrich the sponsors at the expense of the buyers? What if you know that drawing the interest of research analysts is likely to result in reports that are critical of fees charged to investors and the conflicts of interest in your business model? Then you would conclude that the higher cost of financing caused by the absence of a public listing is a reasonable price to pay for the higher fees you can charge away from the glare of investment research. Because if there's no public listing, there are no commissions to be earned from trading in the stock, and no commissions means there is little incentive to produce research coverage.
It is into this regulatory gap that the sponsors and underwriters of non-traded REITs have built their business. Illiquid securities are normally only sold to sophisticated investors, but since the securities are registered they can be sold to anybody. This means millions of unsophisticated investors can be induced to make investments that they'd be better off avoiding.
Inland American Real Estate Trust, Inc. (IAR) was the non-traded REIT that drew my attention to this sector. Penelope held an investment in the REIT that had been recommended by her broker at Ameriprise. Disclosure is a great defense. It turns out you can do some pretty egregious things to your clients if you tell them you'll do so in a document. IAR's prospectus discloses many of the unattractive features that characterize how they run their business. Because they are registered, their registration and many other documents are publicly available. They don't necessarily represent either the worst or the best of the sector, but they are one of the biggest non-traded REITs, so it's useful to examine their public filings.
For example, underwriting fees on the issuance consisted of a 7.5% “Selling Commission,” a 2.5% “Marketing Commission” and a further 0.5% “Due Diligence Expense Allowance,” adding up to a fairly stiff 10.5% of proceeds. But it didn't stop there. In some cleverly crafted prose, the document goes on to explain that “…our Business Manager has agreed to pay…expenses that exceed 15% of the gross offering proceeds.” In other words, up to 15% of the investor's money could be taken in fees.
The registration statement is full of tricky English language such as this. The entire document is 132,192 words, approximately twice the length of this book. It's absurd to think that any investor who's not employed in the industry will read and digest such a thing. The 15% in fees were disclosed around 20% of the way through the document, so in a legal sense the client was informed, but not in a way that represents a partnership between the advisor and the individual.
There are other little gems, too. The company will invest in property that will then be managed by an affiliate. So in other words, the sponsors of IAR will make money from managing the assets owned by IAR as well as for running IAR itself. “Management Fee” occurs 45 times throughout the document, and includes fees on the gross income (i.e., rent). There's also a 1% management fee on the assets. The investors do have to receive a 5% return first, but that return is “non-cumulative, non-compounded,” which means that if they didn't earn the 5% return for investors in one year, they don't have to make it up the next year in order to earn their management fee. There are fees of 2.5% to the business manager if they buy a controlling interest in a real estate business. There's also a 15% incentive fee, basically a profit share, after investors have earned 10% (although it's not on the excess profit over 10%, but on the whole profit). The simple word fee occurs 528 times.
There are 40 matches for “conflict of interest,” including most basically that the buildings owned by IAR will be managed by an affiliate of the sponsor with whom they do not have an arm's-length agreement. Said plainly, don't expect that the management of properties is done at a fair price, but be warned that it may be unfairly high.
Now, to be fair, whenever companies issue securities to the public they hire lawyers to construct documents whose purpose is to protect the company from the slightest possibility of being sued after the fact. Glance through the annual report (known as a 10K) of almost any company and you'll find a whole list of “risk factors” telling you why you might lose money on your investment. Even Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway, as honest a company as you'll find, includes a list of risk factors in its 10K that seem fairly obvious, such as, “Deterioration of general economic conditions may significantly reduce our operating earnings and impair our ability to access capital markets at a reasonable cost.” You'd think any investor would be aware of this, but it's in there anyway just so they can say they warned you.
IAR mentions “risk factors” 44 times. It warns the investor that it is operating a “blind pool,” in that they don't yet know (at the time of the offering) what real estate assets they're going to buy. They go on to warn that there may be little or no liquidity for investors to sell (how true that turned out to be).
Another common problem with non-traded REITs is that the high dividends that attract investors may not be backed up by profits. Interest rates have been low now for years and are likely to remain historically low for a good while longer, as I wrote in my last book, Bonds Are Not Forever: The Crisis Facing Fixed Income Investors. Low rates benefit people and governments who have borrowed too much, w...