The Soft Power of the Russian Language

Pluricentricity, Politics and Policies

Arto Mustajoki,Ekaterina Protassova,Maria Yelenevskaya

• Verlag: Routledge
• Jahr: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429590351
• Auflage: 1
• Thema: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Thema: Politik

Exploring Russian as a pluricentric language, this book provides a panoramic view of its use within and outside the nation and discusses the connections between language, politics, ideologies, and cultural contacts.

Russian is widely used across the former Soviet republics and in the diaspora, but speakers outside Russia deviate from the metropolis in their use of the language and their attitudes towards it. Using country case studies from across the former Soviet Union and beyond, the contributors analyze the unifying role of the Russian language for developing transnational connections and show its value in the knowledge economy. They demonstrate that centrifugal developments of Russian and its pluricentricity are grounded in the language and education policies of their host countries, as well as the goals and functions of cultural institutions, such as schools, media, travel agencies, and others created by émigrés for their co-ethnics. This book also reveals the tensions between Russia's attempts to homogenize the 'Russian world' and the divergence of regional versions of Russian reflecting cultural hybridity of the diaspora.

Interdisciplinary in its approach, this book will prove useful to researchers of Russian and post-Soviet politics, Russian studies, Russian language and culture, linguistics, and immigration studies. Those studying multilingualism and heritage language teaching may also find it interesting.

Part 1

Russian as a communicative tool

Lingua franca, intermediator or something else?

1 The Russian language away from the Metropolis

Challenges of pluricentric development

Arto Mustajoki, Ekaterina Protassova, and Maria Yelenevskaya

Globalization and wide-scale migrations contribute to an increase in language contacts. Many countries with sizeable minority groups have realized the value of competent bilinguals. Language policies are changing due to the needs of knowledge economy, which is to a large extent based on text and verbal communication. Another factor giving a boost to a wider acceptance of multilingualism is the pressure of interest groups and NGOs promoting linguistic rights and bilingual education (see Skutnabb-Kangas, Phillipson 2017). Despite pressure exerted on linguistic minorities to use majority languages, recently there has been a growing use of minority languages in the public sphere of many countries (Castiglione, Longman 2007; Cormack, Hourigan 2007; Gorter 2006). At the same time, diasporas are increasingly viewed by governments as a resource helping to advance their ‘mother’ nations’ political and economic interests (Fialkova, Yelenevskaya 2005; Safran 2007; Vertovec 2001). Contemporary Russia is a case in point, although in the Soviet period its attitudes to the diaspora were often hostile.

In 2017–2022, Russia is commemorating a centenary of the first, ‘White Wave’ of Russian emigration. Many countries witnessed how well-educated Russian aristocracy, intelligentsia, Cossacks, and people from other layers of Russian society, speakers of Russian and other languages of the tsarist empire, tried to find their way in a foreign environment. Some starved but fought against circumstances, building a new life; others failed to adjust and remained exiles until the end of their life. The White Wave left a significant impact in many countries and in many domains: its influence is palpable in the Hollywood acting system, in music and dance, in book art and architecture, in TV broadcasting and aeroplane-building, in American wineries and in the Finnish water cleaning systems. Scattered over different continents, white émigrés maintained ties with each other, although in the absence of advanced communications systems it was not easy. By contrast, ties with the mother nation were virtually non-existent. In Soviet times, a person with relatives or acquaintances abroad raised suspicions of the authorities and any communication with émigrés and their heirs preserving Russian as their home language was discouraged. Soviet citizens attempting to maintain such contacts faced punishment. Perestroika brought a change in attitudes, and in the late 1980s, the Soviet policy of distancing from the diaspora gave way to establishing and consolidating ties with diasporic communities. Numerous publications devoted to the White Wave have seen light since then, but its legacy has not been sufficiently studied from the linguistic perspective (works by Zemskaja, Glovinskaya, Granovskaya, Golubeva-Monatkina, Zelenin and some others are an exception).

Diasporic communities have grown exponentially since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In building new relations with them, there came a realization that Russia’s soft power to a large extent depends upon the use of the Russian language in the ‘Near and Far Abroad’ (see V. Putin’s speech addressed to diplomats in 2012 in which he appealed to use the Russian language more effectively in creating a positive image of Russia, kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15902). Russian-language maintenance by the émigrés is a desirable but not an indispensable condition for Russia to use her diaspora as an instrument of political influence. Yet, efforts to consolidate the diaspora seem to be more successful when the emphasis in the relations of the metropolis with the immigrant communities is on shared language and culture rather than on the ideology of loyalty and political support. An additional complication for achieving harmony is that Russia’s diaspora is far from being united, and relations between members of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ waves are at times friendly, at times tense and confrontational.

Russia’s strategies of engaging the diaspora in promoting her interests are sometimes found controversial both in the metropolis and outside the nation. Recently, there has been an intensive discussion about the ways the Federal Target Program ‘Russian language’, and activities of Rossotrudnichestvo, MAPRYAL and the ‘Russian World’ Foundation affect attitudes toward Russia through the intensification of ties with the Russian-speaking diaspora (Larina et al. 2017). The role of the Russian language is crucial for Russophones’ cultural and political affiliation with Russia; moreover, common language facilitates maintenance and further expansion of personal networks with co-ethnics, e.g., within transnational communities of businessmen, teachers, researchers, and artists. A case in point is the International Pedagogical Forum sponsored by the ‘Russian World’ Foundation. This annual conference brings together linguists, psychologists, publishers, university instructors and Russian language teachers to share know-how in teaching methodologies and educating bilinguals whose first or second language is Russian. In fact, this forum confirms that Russian language maintenance outside the nation’s borders is viewed by the current political elite as an important state project. ‘Well-being’ of the language is viewed not as a merely linguistic challenge, but as an essential aspect of the concept of Russianness in a quickly changing world. Moreover, it is viewed as a tool to bind diasporas to the Fatherland and exert power over dispersed Russian-speaking communities. Assemblies of the Russian World, of Russian compatriot organizations, Pedagogical Forums of the Russian World, and World congresses of the Russian press show that there is a pool of persons loyal to the policy of the Russian language propagation around the globe. For many language professionals and people involved in various service industries, continued maintenance of the Russian language in diasporic enclaves is an essential condition for earning a living.

Russian diaspora could never boast a unity of goals and attitudes to the country of origin. It is the language and the desire to maintain it that have always served as the diaspora’s primary unifying factor. At the same time, attitudes to the language and decisions about the necessity to preserve it are affected by the relations between Russia and host countries, and by political events, as has been shown by the Russian−Ukrainian conflict which resonated in the diaspora, causing ideological rifts and animosities (Fialkova, Yelenevskaya 2015; Rutten et al. 2013). Non-ideological support of the Russian language outside the nation is a sensitive issue that does not only require goodwill but calls for expert knowledge of local language, education policies and the economic situation that can either create incentives for Russian-language maintenance or make it irrelevant for diasporans’ socio-economic upward mobility (cf. Evgrafova 2013).

The number of emigrants from Russia has been growing since 2014, although official Russian statistics differ from the numbers reported by statistical bureaus of recipient countries. Today, Russia has become the third biggest donor of the labour force in the world, after India and Mexico. The most common demographic profile of Russian émigrés is a professional holding an academic degree, aged 25–34 and single. Their origin may be any region of Russia. Other recent trends are migration of very rich people and of those who find life in Russia problematic for political or sexual reasons. Many Russian speakers who received visas earlier and who emigrated from the countries other than Russia are not visible in statistics (proekt.media/research/statistika-emigration).

Some émigrés have made attempts to create ‘alternative Russia’ for Russian speakers outside the nation. The White Emigrants had numerous organizations dedicated to reconstruction of Russia in post-bol’shevik times, which they hoped would come soon. Their plans did not come to fruition as was vividly depicted by Vasilij Aksjonov in his novel ‘Ostrov Krym’. But their ideas have not been forgotten. In recent times, post-Soviet tycoons Boris Berezovskij in London, Mikhail Hodorkovskij in Berlin, and Marat Gel’man in Montenegro aimed to create societies of like-minded people able to work out how to develop alternative Russia (vesti.ru/videos/show/vid/770605/cid/1).

Today, social and political scientists investigating Russian-speaking communities emphasize the role played by various cultural institutions created by Russian speakers outside metropolis to build and invigorate communities. Indeed, Russian and bilingual kindergartens and schools, NGOs and ethno-cultural associations, amateur theatres and festivals contribute to the use of Russian in the public sphere. Researchers analyse the role of Russian-language conventional and electronic media which exist in more than 80 states and have changed the mediascape of countries with significant Russian-speaking populations. While conventional press is crumbling, Russian-language sites and portals frequented by diasporans thrive. Many electronic resources are interactive and facilitate transnational communication of Russophones residing in different corners of the world. The relevance of the media for the relations between the metropolis and diasporans is reflected in the activities of the World Association of the Russian Press. Founded in 1999, it declares as its primary goals creation of a united Russian ‘information space’¹ and securing ‘the right of the compatriots to information resources and communication in Russian’ (warp.pro/p1.html). A combination of state-sponsored and guided activities and support of grassroots initiatives is the hallmark of organizations working in accordance with the Federal Law on state policy toward compatriots. The attitude of the diasporans to this law, to the concept of ‘compatriots’, and to activities targeting them are not always benign, and the effect of this law on the relations between metropolis and diasporans has been discussed in several studies (see, e.g., Kozin 2015; Viimaranta et al. 2018). Currently, the concept of nashi ljudi ‘our people’ (all those who speak Russian and/or have a positive attitude towards Russia) is replacing the term sootechestvenniki ‘compatriots’ not only in the informal but also in the formal discourse. More scholarly work is needed to explore the effect of joint projects in various spheres of activities between residents of the metropolis and diaspora, as well as the impact of Russophones’ transnational organizations on the identity of diasporans. Russia’s efforts to promote the dominant version of the Russian language outside the nation and various manifestations of the diaspora’s resistance to this policy are also worthy of investigation.

Researchers studying Russian-speaking communities have begun to document linguistic data pointing to the processes of diversification of Russian as it develops away from the metropolis (Muth 2017; Rovinskaia 2013; Ryazanova-Clarke 2014; Yelenevskaya, Protassova 2015). At the same time, Russian continues to serve as a lingua franca in formal and informal communication in different regions (Mustajoki et al. 2010; Pavlenko 2006) and in virtual transnational communities.

The term ‘pluricentric languages’ was introduced by Kloss (1952). Large-scale use of a language in different communities, as a rule, leads to divergence of norm, as pointed out by Mufwene (2010). Studies of Russian as a pluricentric language are new and scarce, although its potential for pluricentricity was mentioned already by Clyne (1992). Indeed, the older Russian varieties may be found in both Americas and in the European countries that used to be the primary destinations of Russian-speaking émigrés, such as France, Finland, Germany, Italy, and others. These deep-rooted diasporas keep integrating newcomers, which contributes to further development of their communicative practices. An essential goal of research into Russian pluricentricity is to work out how to take into account the use of the language and the opinions about it collected from speakers in and outside the nation. Even if ‘the norms of the dominant nation are preferred’ (Muhr 2016: 17), the attitudes of people who become competent near-native speakers in multilingual societies should not be ignored. The goals of their efforts to master the Russian language and culture are two-fold. On the one hand, they want to be fluent and keep up with the language innovations; on the other hand, their way of life and their perception of themselves are distant from Russia. We are sure that changing functions of Russian abroad lead to the emergence of new norms outside Russia and that such norms are contributing to further modernization of Russian and its adaptation to each community in oral face-to-face and written communication, as well as in online social networking. This book aims to scrutinize diverse and sometimes disparate socio-linguistic situations of the Russian language in the Near and Far Abroad.

This volume also deals with specific features of the Russian language use and teaching in the Near and Far Abroad within the paradigm of pluricentricity developed by Michael Clyne (1992) and Rudolf Muhr (2012). Muhr (2015, 2016) has put forward a model of studying linguistic pluricentricity which involves political and economic power, language spread via electronic media and international language teaching organizations. This model takes into account transnationalism and attempts to centralize language development via international language organizations promoting the dominant norm, codifying institutions that ensure the control and centralization of norms and exonormative codification practices in Non-Dominant Varieties.

While the pluricentric trends in the development of such global languages as English, Spanish and French have been widely researched, the study of regional varieties of Russian triggered by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and mass migrations of Russian speakers is only in its infancy (Muhr 2016: 15). The time for such research is ripe, because more than a quarter of a century has passed since the Soviet Union ceased to exist, which intensified centrifugal tendencies in the development of Russian. On the one hand, it is a very short period for language evolution; on the other hand, drastic political, ideological and socio-economic changes on the territory of the former Soviet Union went hand in hand with quick changes in the Russian language and not only as it is spoken in the newly formed states but also in the metropolis (Gusejnov 2012; Karaulov 2004; Krysin 2004; Mechkovskaya 2005). So far, exp...