Regional Integration – Europe and Asia Compared

Woosik Moon, Bernadette Andreosso-O'Callaghan, Bernadette Andreosso-O'Callaghan

• Verlag: Routledge
• Jahr: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351905503
• Auflage: 1
• Thema: Business
• Thema: Business General

The aim of this book is to examine and compare the integration process in both Europe and Asia, and to draw some possible lessons for East Asia from the European experience, which culminated with the establishment of the economic and monetary union. The book embraces the political dimension of integration (peace and security), economic, trade and monetary aspects, and cultural aspects. Written by well-known experts in the field of integration, this book represents one of the first attempts at comparing Europe and Asia in the process of integration, by incorporating the latest developments in the field. The main theme of the book - integration in Asia from a comparative perspective - has been relatively unexplored as most experts in the field of integration are also 'area experts' (i.e. European integration experts or Asian experts). The contributors to the book provide a distinctive perspective based upon their understanding of integration (political, economic, and socio-cultural) across various regions of the world.

Part I
Peace and Security – The Political Dimension of Integration

Chapter 1
The Experience of European Integration in an Historical Perspective

Frank Delmartino

Introduction

Nowadays the European Union presents itself on the world scene as a global player in the field of international trade and as an emergent actor in many other domains such as environment, development aid and even foreign and security policies. On the other hand, the Union is gaining constitutional status for its constituent treaties and has developed a whole range of transnational policies, culminating in a stable economic and monetary system.

Despite the many inconsistencies in the Union's overall profile, one cannot deny the achievements that have been performed during the second half of the twentieth century. From a brave but limited initiative in 1950, the European Community, later the European Union, has evolved into an encompassing organization, with almost continent-wide membership and some striking characteristics of a polity. Moreover, the integration process is not concluded yet. By qualifying the 'project' as an 'ever closer Union', its open end-character is highlighted. In other words, a historical overview of the first half a century of the EU should keep in mind that the culminating point in the integration process is by no means reached yet, neither in terms of institutional development nor in membership. However, the constitutionalization of the institutional framework in 2003-2004 can be seen as a suitable landmark for proposing a review of achievements and missed opportunities.

This chapter is not aiming at providing an exhaustive historical overview, there being a lot of literature available on this issue. We rather aim at highlighting a few junctures that have been decisive for the orientation of the integration process: which choices have been made (or imposed by the circumstances), which actors have contributed to promoting (or blocking) the project of a more united Europe? In short, this chapter does not bring an unbiased account on the long way to the present situation, but it tries to analyze and to explain the breakthrough of a European common enterprise, nowadays called 'Union'.

Therefore, quite some attention is devoted to the founding period in the wake of World War II and to the decisive move after the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. The present-day EU is not just a successful regional free trade area, irrespective of the contemporary political turmoil. It is very much an original project, strongly rooted in the specific recent history of the European continent. Accordingly, there can be no truly understanding of the EU without referring to the specificity of its context.

1. The Context

The general history of the European continent in the first half of the twentieth century is well known, worldwide, as it has indeed affected the entire world. The two European wars (1914-1918 and 1939-1945) gradually expanded into world wars. Their devastating effect was not only physical, material and economic, but moral as well. The expansionist policies of the major protagonists had had such disastrous effects that they were no longer regarded as legitimate. A new world order was ready for emerging from the debacle, stressing the rule of (international) law and the end of excessive state-centrism.

The framework for a worldwide new legal order was provided by the United Nations Charter (1945). However, on the European continent, with its outspoken antagonisms, a particular formula had to be found for guaranteeing peaceful relations and overall social and economic development. Europe's economy was in a very poor condition indeed, and the American Marshall plan was much welcomed as a decisive boost.¹ As a result of the looming Cold War, only the West-European countries were effectively benefiting from the transatlantic input. Nevertheless, the opportunity was not seized for setting up a systematic transnational cooperation.

Given the state-centrism of most governments, the so-called 'European Movement' was mainly rooted in civil society. Academics, trade-unionists, some politicians, in one word, activists of all kind, advocated a federal type institutional order for the old continent, envisaging a supra-national authority with effective powers for guaranteeing a peaceful and stable political and economic order.

As early as 1946, Winston Churchill, then an opposition leader, launched the idea of a 'United States of Europe'.² However, those in power, were less enthusiastic about a fully fledged federation, based on the American model. Giving up national sovereignty – one should better formulate it as 'shared sovereignty' – was not part of the political discourse (yet).

Therefore, the outcome of the first assembly of the 'federalists' (1948), was not warm-heartedly endorsed by the governments.³ A Council of Europe was established in 1949, encompassing a Parliamentary Assembly and a Conference of Ministers (of Foreign Affairs), but the only major breakthrough was realized in the field of human rights. A Convention was agreed upon and formally enacted, stipulating the fundamental freedoms and the preconditions for the rule of law, as they are understood in the constitutional tradition of the Western liberal democracies.⁴ A court, based in Strasbourg, was established for supervising their correct application.

Undeniably, this agreement marks a new era in European intergovernmental cooperation. On the other hand, intergovernmentalism does not reach beyond the willingness and commitment of the least devoted partner. Unanimity among many states is hard to achieve, especially with regard to crucial political and economic issues. One could not indeed expect from the Council of Europe with its Assembly–based method of decision-making, to forge a fundamentally new type of transnational integration.

Such an initiative had to come from a key actor, having the legitimacy and the moral authority for setting a new standard. The proposal made at a press conference on 9 May 1950 by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman, was indeed breaking new ground.⁵ France proposed to share with Germany and with other interested countries, its sovereign regulating powers in the crucial strategic fields of coal and steel. In line with the wording in French language mise en commun (pooling), a Community was to be established, exercising supra-national competences, with a 'High Authority' as decisive actor.

Apart from the German Chancellor Adenauer, who agreed in advance, the French move was a surprise to all European governments. Only the US were informed beforehand, as they strongly supported closer cooperation between the European partners. The British, on the other hand, were not too enthusiastic. They did not welcome any threat to the sovereign decision-making power of the Parliament in Westminster. Moreover, their relation with Europe was ambiguous: surely, they were with Europe; but were they in Europe? Finally, the reaction of Britain and of the Scandinavians was negative, whereas Italy and the Benelux countries were prepared to start negotiations.

Historians have been puzzled by the motives that pushed Minister Schuman to his unexpected declaration. Certainly, a personal commitment towards a lasting peace between the main antagonists played a role. Schuman had experienced in his young years the paradoxes of division, being born and raised in German occupied Lorraine. This personal motivation did not prevent the French leadership of pursuing strategic goals as well. The German economy was recovering quickly – the so called 'Wirtschaftswunder' – and the heavy industrial sector, especially coal and steel, was on its way to retake its pre-war dominant position. Instead of combating it, as happened in the past, why not incorporate it in an overarching institutional setting?

This view was mainly put forward by Jean Monnet, the head of the French planning office, an experienced and inspiring technocrat who can be considered as the co-founder of the European Community. The Germans, as well as the other partners, were not blind to this strategic move, but they nevertheless joined the initiative, convinced as they were of the 'added value' of a strongly integrated approach.

In the light of history, the year 1950 had gathered all preconditions for a unique juncture, opening the path towards integration: the intelligence and courage of the leaders, the strong motivation of the European movement, the external threat of the Cold War and the support of the USA. The institutional formula, however, had still to be shaped in operational terms. And here Jean Monnet came to the fore as a skillful negotiator. The Treaty of Paris has given birth to the first truly supranational institution on the European continent.

2. The Foundations

Once the six founding countries had agreed on the principle of sharing their sovereign rights in the particular field of coal and steel, in other words the heavy industries of the early 1950s, their political assent had to be formulated in legally solid and consistent institutions and procedures. Schuman's initial plan was not concrete at all. 'The French have a plan to have a plan', was a cynical but not unfounded British remark at that time. In Monnet's eyes, the 'Haute Autorité' (High Authority) of technocrats should be given all responsibilities for regulating the sector in an authoritative way. These 'Eurocrats' should be nominated by the member states and approved by the Council of Ministers. However, once appointed, they would no longer accept any instruction from their governments and would only serve the European interest.

A Council of Ministers was foreseen, not for supervising the High Authority, but for dealing with the implications of the coal and steel policies on overall economic development. The Treaty of Paris was far going indeed in transferring regulatory powers to the supra-national High Authority. A few years later, in the more encompassing Treaty of Rome (1957), a division of tasks was to be introduced between the functions of policy initiation and implementation on the one hand, given to the European Commission, as successors of the High Authority, and of proper decision-making assigned to the Council of Ministers, on the other. The Coal and Steel Community was thus bestowed with the most elaborate form of technocratic power.

Remarkably enough, this transfer of authority was widely accepted throughout society at that time, as it was seen as a way of bypassing the disastrous state policies of the past, when the energy and steel industries had been determining factors in preparing and conducting the wars. Although the High Authority, led by Jean Monnet, was highly competent, the full transfer of state powers to an appointed transnational body was never repeated. In its first years of existence, the supra-national character of the European integration process was reaching its highest peak. In Rome (1957), and more decisively since Maastricht (1992), the treaty making powers, in fact the governments of the member states, have restored the balance between supra-nationalism and intergovernmentalism. The golden years of the Monnet-method have been short.

Having highlighted the unique position of the High Authority, combining legislative with executive powers, albeit it in a 'technical' policy field, one should not forget about a third and a fourth actor. Right from the beginning, a Parliamentary Assembly was foreseen as an important consultative body. These delegates of the national parliaments of the six member states were asked for advice on all legislative proposals. European initiatives should indeed be consistent with national policies, and vice-versa. Next to the Council of Ministers, the members of Parliament were seen as part of a network of mutual information, consultation and (limited) involvement in the decision-making process. This significant, though not decisive role in the early years of the European Community, has marked the perception of the European Parliament (EP) by the general public. The direct elections of the members of the EP since 1979 and the increased powers of the EP conferred by the various treaty revisions since 1986, did not automatically guarantee the EP's central position in the European policy and decision making process, a situation contrasting with that of most national parliaments within their respective national political systems. On the other hand, the Court of Justice has been a crucial actor right from the beginning of the integration process. Its authority in solving legal disputes, quite often involving member states, has never been questioned. Moreover, by interpreting the treaties in a consistent pro integrationist way, it has contributed to the creation of a solid body of European law. One should not underestimate the stabilizing effect of legal standards and procedures – the so called acquis communautaire – on a Community/Union frequently shaken by political turmoil.

Despite the major changes these four actors went through in the last fifty years, they still form the institutional backbone of the Union. There is a striking continuity in this respect, although membership has increased dramatically and the competences are covering nowadays nearly the full spectrum of public policy. So, if there is no doubt about the success of the formula, the Monnet method should nevertheless be applied with caution. Jean Monnet himself recommended a gradual integration of specific economic sectors, culminating in the long term in an encompassing arrangement. Traditional federalists have blamed him for a lack of vision, as he advocated a step-by-step approach instead of a constitutional charter as a starting point.

A painful illustration of the limits of European integration was given by the aborted treaty on a European Defense Community. In the 'europhoric' early 1950s, the French Prime Minister René Pléven wanted to establish a genuinely European defense capacity based on systematic cooperation in the field of foreign policy. Given the external threat of the East-West confrontation, an agreement among the 'Six' was reached, applying in essence the Monnet-formula to the domain of 'high polities'. However, the Treaty on a European Defense Community (1952) was never ratified. Shifting away from its government's view, the French Parliament rejected the project (1954).

The failure of setting up a common foreign and defense policy was very deeply resented. A tremendous opportunity was lost for complementing the technocratic Coal and Steel Community with a political superstructure. The disappointment was so general that many doubted about the future of the integration project, especially since Gaullists and Communists apparently had taken the lead in French politics. The era of French leadership was over for some time.

In these moments of crisis, the Benelux countries took over the initiative. Meeting in Messin...