Culture, Curiosity and Communication in Scientific Discovery

The Eye in Ideas

Nigel Sanitt

• Verlag: Routledge
• Jahr: 2018
• ISBN:
  9780429861833
• Auflage: 1
• Thema: Social Sciences
• Thema: Sociology

Many aspects of research activity in science are opaque to outsiders and this opacity infects how connections are made between science and other disciplines. The aim of Culture, Curiosity and Communication in Scientific Discovery is to try to shine a light through the mist of scientific research by way of examples taken from the sciences, social sciences and the humanities.

The book maintains that the foundations of science are built on sand because theories come and go and the search for truth is elusive. Knowledge acquisition appears to be an end in itself, as though knowledge is some sort of commodity or object that can be traded. Nigel Sanitt explains that we have created a mythical objective world, where we pretend that opinions and values are generated by data alone and not by human beings.

Science is part of our culture and part of the understanding of science is bound up with recognizing the social, economic and political ramifications as they apply to science. Culture, Curiosity and Communication in Scientific Discovery is a radical interpretation of how science works and aims to change the way scientists and non-scientists think about science.

1

Introduction

1.1 The problem

We tend to take the progress of science for granted. Ask any man or woman in the street and they will use mobile phones as an example of scientific progress. Ask the same question a generation ago and you will probably be given computers as the prime example. Going back even further, there will be a list of technical advances such as: television, radio, aeroplanes and motor transport. The list can be extended back to include the steam engine, the printing press, the water pump and so on.

We clearly know more as time passes – or at least the people that manufacture the items on the above lists know more – so it seems churlish to question the progress of science.

What we are dealing with here are a number of different issues, though all are related to the concept of progress. The roots of progress are in knowledge, both theoretical and practical. We observe and interact with nature, we theorize and record, and as a result we claim knowledge. But progress, as exemplified in the lists above, has a practical and technological aspect. In fact, all the items listed above are examples of technological progress, albeit grounded in science. Science progresses in tandem with technology, but sometimes it can lead or even lag behind.

Whereas the mobile phone relies on prior technological advances, one can trace its roots back to electromagnetic theory and Maxwell’s equations. On the other hand, many discoveries and advances in knowledge in astrophysics would not have been possible without the prior technological advances in optical and radio astronomy.

Technological advance relies on other factors which are outside of science proper. Between patent and gadget there are an enormous number of steps involving economics and finance, design and marketing and even law and politics.

My point is that scientific progress cannot be measured simply by the number of gadgets we have. Neither can we measure progress by an increase in knowledge or understanding of nature. On their own, each of these factors contributes to progress, but it is their totality which defines progress.

The problem with this scenario is quantifiability. We may provide a narrative for what factors contribute to progress, but what exactly are we measuring?

However difficult this problem is at the practical level, at the theoretical level the idea of progress is problematic. We have to address fundamental issues of how scientists create and validate theories. In essence we come up against what comes under the term ‘the sceptical argument’.

Put briefly, the sceptical argument denies that scientific progress is possible, because no scientific theory can have the last word. Theories come and go, and it is the ultimate fate of all theories to be jettisoned, either by being falsified, replaced or abandoned. We may be left with more gadgets and claim technological progress, but true scientific progress is a dream, with understanding relegated to a future which never arrives.

The genesis of the sceptical argument can be traced back to ancient Greek roots of Western philosophy. There is a piece of naïve logic on the impossibility of knowledge:¹ “a man cannot try to discover either what he knows or what he does not know”. The idea being that if we know what we don’t know, then we already know it and if we don’t know it, how will we know if we find it. This reminds me of when I was at school and my friends and I used to annoy our English teacher. If we didn’t know how to spell a word the teacher would tell us to look it up in a dictionary. We would then claim that in order to find a word in a dictionary we would have to know how it was spelt, and since that was the object of our enquiry we could not proceed – this strategy did not work!

A serious point behind these quasi-logical meanderings is how we acquire knowledge. This was an issue in ancient times just as much as it is an issue today. The way a child learns to speak and gain understanding is still just as much a miracle as it has always been.

Plato tried to solve this problem with a neat trick. He claimed that knowledge was already there at birth and we spend our whole lives simply recollecting or remembering what we already know.

As far as scientific knowledge is concerned, this is allied with the methodology of science: How does nature plus human beings equal scientific knowledge?

1.2 Truth in science

There are many synonyms to describe truth in science: reliable, warranted, genuine and valid, to name a few. Sometimes these words are used as an alternative to truth when truth is what is meant. The legal profession brooks no compromise on this point where witnesses in court have to tell “the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth”. The trouble is that even the most honest witness may be mistaken.

In science most scientists do not worry about the truthfulness of their theories. They take a practical view that as long as a theory is useful, they are satisfied, and if a theory ceases to be useful, they will drop it. This is not fickleness on their part, they would claim, but simply the use of common sense. Make no mistake; common sense is a powerful argument. The problem is that it is not enough.

The concept of truth is problematic. When we say that something is true, what do we mean? We mean to say that such and such is the case. But saying that something is the case, what do we mean? We mean that it is true! In going around in circles, I am not just being perverse or argumentative: trying to define truth always ends up with circular arguments. The reason is that the concept of truth involves self-reference or infinite regression.

Peeling back the idea of truth, we need to first define the kind of entities that are capable of being true. I am referring here to propositional statements, i.e. declarative statements which are true or false. Other types of utterances such as questions, exclamations and imperative commands have to be added to non-verbal communication and memory to capture the complexity of how we acquire meaning.

There are basically four groups of theories of truth at the present time. All of these scenarios have their problems and it is easy to undercut definitive explanations by simply asking: how do we know that any of these theories of truth are true? Impishness aside, the theories attack the problem by addressing different notions associated with truth.

The correspondence theory of truth addresses the relationship between our ideas and the world. Truth refers to the correspondence between what is stated to be the case and what is the case. This is different from mathematical or logical truth, which has its roots in Aristotle’s logic. The inductive deductive distinction is crucial and identifies inductive truth as the oxymoron which it is.

Two attempts to go beyond the correspondence theory of truth are pragmatism and the coherence theory of truth. The latter looks not to an individual proposition, but rather to an assembly of propositions. Membership of this elite company renders a proposition true by virtue of justified belief in a coherent system. The question then is: is the whole system of propositions true? The coherence theory of truth does not save propositions from this question.

Pragmatic truth is much more prosaic: truth is seen as useful belief. If it works for the scientist then it counts as truth. The trouble is, if it ceases to be useful, then it is no longer true. But truth is not a characteristic that can be put on and taken off like a suit of clothes.

The fourth theory of truth and the most modern is the deflationary theory of truth. This take on the problem that approaches truth from a language perspective. Truth is established by virtue of the linguistic use of the term true.

1.3 Scepticism and practicality

The idea that we can never know anything about the world with absolute certainty goes back to ancient Greece. This sceptical view, however, flies in the face of the success of science. We know more about the world and scientific progress, whether theoretical or technological, is readily apparent around us. There may be no truth that can be defined about nature, but that does not seem to hold back the march of science. Science progresses, but in terms of networks of questions and answers created, not truths discovered.

In fact, most scientists are not bothered about notions of truth in science. They do their experiments, make their observations, and critically analyze their theories and results. As long as what emerges is ‘good science’, then success is guaranteed and technological advance follows. One may ask: if the system works, why try and fix it? Why bother with truth in science if it does not seem to make any difference? This practical standpoint may appear, in the short term, to be reasonable, but in the longer term, cracks appear.

First, on the theoretical side, it is an uncomfortable position to be in knowing that theories can have the rug pulled out from underneath them at any time. How do we view knowledge gained, if such knowledge may turn out to be false? And is such knowledge really knowledge at all?

Second, what about the scientific method? Could the way we pursue science turn out to be wrong?

Third, just because we are able to make some predictions which turn out to be useful, does that mean that we are doing ‘good science’? And what exactly is the difference between good and bad science?

Fourth, on a more general point, can philosophical considerations inform future theories and scientific research? New ideas, new theories, new experiments all proceed apace. Those in the forefront have just not the time – nor inclination – to ‘ponder’ the greater questions. And who can blame them? After all most ideas end up invalidated so why waste time? And for those running just behind, it is hard enough to keep up with the latest fad, let alone think in detail about this week’s theory which will more than likely be next week’s dustbin contents. In short, the system favours exploration over contemplation. But is it quite that simple? In the end the quick fixes cease to be effective, the bandwagon comes to a halt and there seems to be no way out of the quagmire – this is the point when the real thinking begins.

I have to a certain extent highlighted the extremes in order to bring out certain points. In practice, what happens is a sort of interplay between different levels of a hierarchy of opinion. In science experimental data is being amassed all the time and its interpretation is part of the publication process. Debate and analysis continue, usually in tandem, and the interplay between theory and experiment defines the current status of a problem or problems. The analysis of the more philosophical aspects of sciences usually lags well behind, and the intensity of study is in proportion to the perceived difficulty in incorporating a theory within our world view.

My points are: why should the bulk of this process take place after the event, as it were? And how does one go about incorporating philosophical issues at an earlier stage within science? Both of these questions should be seen within an historical setting. Since the Second World War the technological aspects of science have become central and as a result the philosophical aspects have been relegated to the back seat. The pace and success of technological science has made such an outcome inevitable. However, there comes a turning point where in certain areas, particularly of basic or foundational science, serious problems emerge which inhibit progress, and which involve understanding and interpretation. I believe that we have reached this point in a number of areas in science, for example, in the problem of dark matter, which I discuss in Section 10.3, where philosophical issues have come to the forefront.

Sceptical arguments are paramount, but care must be taken not to ‘throw out the baby with the bathwater’. ‘No truth’ does not imply ‘no science’. One question is: can we salvage any truth in science? One aspect of truth which is directly applicable in scientific theorizing is that of mathematical or deductive truth.

In a valid scientific equation, the quantities defined on each side of the equals sign are amenable to mathematical analysis and the mathematical truth of the rules involved guarantees results. There are two observations about this.

First, results are only as good as the inputs. Assumptions about what physical quantities are represented in an equation are nothing to do with the formal mathematical form. The guarantee is purely mathematical and involves manipulation of algebraic entities.

Second, what counts as a valid equation depends not only on mathematical validity – no division by zero, but also on physical constraints – no negative mass or mismatch between dimensions of quantities: you cannot equate metres with seconds.

Given the above caveats, we can say that mathematical truth has a part to play in the representation of physical quantities, but this is an invisible characteristic in science, as it does not play a part in inductive arguments within theories.

Is inductive truth a contradiction in terms? And if so, do we have to deny progress in science?

1.4 Importance of science

That science is foundational is just taken as a truism, but it is worthwhile and sometimes necessary to spell out in detail how vital science is to society. As a means to acquire control, mastery, understanding and knowledge of the world it is without parallel. Energy, transport and communication are just three of the many areas which rely on scientific innovation and discovery.

There is a spillover into other areas and categories such as, culture, the military, religion and politics. Some of these interfaces engender friction, or even downright hostility, but they are an integral part of society.

Our knowledge of the Universe a fraction of a second after the Big Bang may not be the slightest use to us in our everyday life, but from a cultural point of view, our communal curiosity has turned research in this area into a decisive industry.

There have been those who have said that scientific research should be geared much closer to practical applications. The implication from this is that so-called fundamental research should be relegated to a minor league. Taking the football analogy further, this is similar to having a team consisting overwhelmingly of forwards – who are able to score goals...