Materialism

A Historical and Philosophical Inquiry

Robin Brown, James Ladyman

• Verlag: Routledge
• Jahr: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429535376
• Auflage: 1
• Thema: Filosofia
• Thema: Storia e teoria della filosofia

The doctrine of materialism is one of the most controversial in the history of ideas. For much of its history it has been aligned with toleration and enlightened thinking, but it has also aroused strong, often violent, passions amongst both its opponents and proponents. This book explores the development of materialism in an engaging and thought-provoking way and defends the form it takes in the twenty-first century.

Opening with an account of the ideas of some of the most important thinkers in the materialist tradition, including Epicurus, Lucretius, Hobbes, Hume, Darwin and Marx, the authors discuss materialism's origins, as an early form of naturalistic explanation and as an intellectual outlook about life and the world in general. They explain how materialism's beginnings as an imaginative vision of the true nature of things faced a major challenge from the physics it did so much to facilitate, which now portrays the microscopic world in a way incompatible with traditional materialism. Brown and Ladyman explain how out of this challenge materialism developed into the new doctrine of physicalism.

Drawing on a wide range of colourful examples, the authors argue that although materialism does not have all the answers, its humanism and commitment to naturalistic explanation and the scientific method is our best philosophical hope in the ideological maelstrom of the modern world.

An outline of the history of materialism

Part I

The heart of materialism

One

Introduction

Metaphysics is that branch of philosophy concerned with the most basic questions about reality. Ontology is that branch of metaphysics that is concerned with the question ‘what exists?’ Materialism is an ontological theory that presupposes an intuitive concept of space, and the primary claim of materialism is that the only things that exist are those that occupy space. In the Latin of medieval philosophy, these are res extensa, extended things. Clearly there is a negative implication of materialism. The existence of spirits, ghosts and, crucially, transcendent beings such as the god of the monotheistic religions is denied by materialism. The res cogitans of medieval philosophy, thinking substance, according to materialists does not exist.

The problem is that this kind of materialism seems to be false. Undoubtedly there are things that do not occupy space at all, but the existence of which we would not seriously question. Candidates for such things include thoughts, velocity and danger. Materialism should be revised to assert that what exists, in addition to res extensa, are things that depend for their existence on things that occupy space. In other words, without material things there would be no thought, velocity, danger or anything else. The positive content of materialism becomes a claim about some kind of dependence, and hence materialists need arguments to demonstrate that some given class of things depends wholly for their being on material things. It proves to be easier to demonstrate the dependency of some classes of things than others. For example, velocity is not a thing that occupies space, but it is relatively easy to show that things like velocity, while not in themselves occupying space, are dependent in the way required; without there being things that occupy space and that move, there would not be velocity.

Abstract entities, such as numbers, are more problematic. It is not feasible to think of the number two, for example, occupying space, even if any example of a sign for that number – for example, ‘2’ – does occupy space. Statements like ‘there are infinitely many prime numbers’, which is a truth of arithmetic, seem to be ontological assertions. While materialists struggle with this kind of challenge, it doesn’t seem to bother them unduly. There are various responses; many simply deny that the number two has any genuine existence at all, arguing that the whole edifice of arithmetic is an abstraction arising from the perception of collections of individuals that occupy space. Others argue that whatever kind of existence numbers have, it is irrelevant to the kind of ontological problems in which materialists are interested.

The most contentious subject matter for materialism is always psychological phenomena, in particular conscious phenomena, such as perceptions, feelings and thoughts, and, critically, free will and practical reason. It is at this point that the philosophical dispute between materialists and their critics turns from ontological to moral – and even political – concerns. For example, while anti-materialists sometimes argue that materialist philosophy promotes a cold disdain for ethical commitment, materialists argue that belief in life after death discourages people from demanding enough from the one life they surely have.

Metaphysical theories do not stand independent of epistemological theories. Epistemology is that branch of philosophy that concerns itself with knowledge and belief. Anyone asserting an ontological theory needs to have something to say about epistemology, if she is to be taken seriously, to answer the challenges – how do you know that what you say exists does, in fact, exist? Or, on what grounds do you believe that what you say exists, exists? Materialism is an ontological theory that is intimately connected to a particular epistemological perspective.

Aristotle’s Metaphysics famously begins with the statement ‘All men by nature desire to know’. Metaphysical theories and epistemological theories go hand-in-hand in the human project of satisfying that desire to know, and to understand the world that human beings inhabit. But it is prudent to add to Aristotle’s statement that men by nature want to feel that they know. People, or at least those Aristotle is talking about, don’t like the feeling of not knowing; it makes them anxious and uneasy, and in the middle of a violent and as-yet-unexplained thunderstorm, frightened. Some theory about what is going on, and preferably a readily understood theory, eases some of the anxiety not-knowing brings. The issue of whether or not that theory is true, whether or not it is genuine knowledge, is not of primary importance in stilling disquiet in the mind.

No sooner have we begun our inquiry in ontology than we have been obliged to consider epistemology, and then straightaway we must consider psychology. Faced with the ‘desire to know’ – we could call Aristotle’s idea the epistemological urge – we face the question of what methods to employ to achieve knowledge, and – here’s the psychology – to satisfy us and make us believe we have found knowledge.

The people of many of the first human societies, though apparently not all, developed theories that provided an account of the origins and nature of the world and natural phenomena. Two features of these theories are important: first, that such theories have an important role in strengthening social cohesion – a society can feel more cohesive if its members share a common outlook. The second property is that these theories very often involve reference to gods and spirits in the accounts given of natural phenomena.

Together, a society’s ontological perspectives expressed in these theories can be understood as the society’s worldview. The epistemology at the origins of the worldview is often hidden. Consider a society in which someone thought up the idea that thunder was the expression of a powerful being’s anger. To the modern understanding this is a projection of human emotional experience onto the world; through the link of loud noise and violent effects, thunder becomes associated with anger. Once such a worldview becomes established, for subsequent generations the source of belief becomes an authority that provides a canonical interpretation of events in terms of the supernatural agent’s temperament. The authority can be people – the elders or the priests, for example – or it can be, additionally, in societies that developed written language, a text, sometimes a holy book.

From the earliest times, materialists and their critics have been in dispute in a way that can be understood as a dispute between alternative worldviews – that is, a dispute involving divergent ontological and epistemological claims. A dispute about such matters can generate a lot of heat, as we shall see. But there is a critical asymmetry between the materialists and their opponents. In virtually all instances before the twentieth century, whenever there was a more-or-less established worldview, materialism was in the opposition to it. There were periods in the ancient world when there was genuine freedom of thought, and materialism was free to argue its case with alternative ontological theories, but, for much of the time, proponents of materialism were considered to be a kind of dissident, or outsider, and as such were susceptible to, or threatened with, intolerance and persecution. Thinking the ‘wrong’ way about the nature of the universe could, and often did, prove to be dangerous.

Before describing the history of materialism, a little more needs to be said about the alternative perspectives that developed in epistemology. What might be the possible sources of knowledge? Traditionally, in philosophy, two contrasting answers to this question are empiricism and rationalism. At its crudest, empiricism finds the source of all knowledge in our perception of the world through our sense organs, while rationalism names the source of our knowledge as our reason. It is not only to someone unfamiliar with the philosophical tradition that this dichotomy may seem odd, if not downright absurd. Human beings cannot really be imagined without sense organs, and perceptions would seem to be necessary to provide at least some of what reason takes as subject matter. Equally, sensory perception without some application of reason is going to provide nothing at all beyond sense perceptions, which cannot be, in and of themselves, knowledge. Knowledge can only come from an interplay of reason and perception.

Other problems with empiricism concern the analysis of just what it is that can be taken to be the sensory input to our sense organs from the external world. A common-sense view would take it that we see and touch, for example, a table. But the more sceptical empiricist may insist that this is just a hypothetical construction from the raw data of shapes of colour and tone that the eyes perceive, and the ‘feel’ in our fingers.

The true nature of the contrast between empiricism and rationalism lies in the critique of our reasoning alongside the critique of the evidence gained from perception. Perhaps the most striking example of the dispute concerns Parmenides, the pre-Socratic Greek philosopher who argued that motion was impossible. It would seem evident that there is motion, from what we perceive of the world, but Parmenides believed he had sound arguments to prove that motion was impossible, and therefore the evidence of the senses was unreliable. Parmenides needed to perceive apparent motion before developing the argument for motion’s illusory ontological status. The empiricist cannot rely simply on that perceptual evidence; she has also to discredit the reasoning that led to Parmenides’ claim.

Materialist epistemology has evolved to coincide with what can be identified as the epistemology of modern science. With this perspective, empirical evidence is a necessary but not sufficient element for knowledge. Any assertion about the nature of reality may start from reasoned speculation, but must be subjected to test and critique, and, therefore, faces potential rejection. Theories that cannot be tested rule themselves out from scientific credibility. Finally, the scientific stance never relinquishes some element of provisionality, of tentativeness, in the details of theories that are espoused.

The Heart of Materialism

The heart of materialism is the withholding of belief in the existence of certain kinds of entity and certain kinds of phenomena. There are, it claims, no gods and devils, no ghosts, no spirits. There is, also, no such thing as Providence, or Luck or Fate. Reality consists of material things and things that are wholly dependent for their existence on material things. Their existence is controlled by laws of nature that are independent of Will. The development of the world is not directed by any pre-established plan. There is no predetermined End, good or bad, to which change is directed.

Materialism believes the vital psychological phenomena of our human and animal existence are wholly dependent on the material nature of our bodies. Though it remains obscure to human understanding, they emerge, in some way or other, from our material being. There is no soul independent of our bodies, let alone one that could survive the destruction of our bodies. There is no afterlife. A human life is a temporary phenomenon, normally encompassing a timespan of less than 100 years.

Materialism has humility in its heart, though it is admittedly sometimes hidden. It claims no path to knowledge other than through scientific endeavour. It holds no conviction that human beings can reach a true Theory of Everything, but it equally presupposes no set limits on human knowledge. It knows there are vast areas of reality about whose workings we know little or nothing, but eschews the adoption of scientifically inadequate theories to satisfy our quest for epistemological peace of mind. For sensible materialists, psychology in general, and consciousness in particular, remain a mystery. The optimists believe the mystery will be resolved; the pessimists are not so sure.

Materialists deny any objective grounding for morality and the notions of Good. Typically, morality is viewed by materialists as the codified rules that facilitate social stability. Such a code may be subject to criticism of various kinds. It may be accused of hypocrisy, if its proponents claim it serves the entire society while its critics see its purpose as maintaining the power of social elites. Alternatively, it may be shown to contradict principles, such as fairness, that the society endorses. But materialism as such can only offer a critique to the suggestion that the code is grounded in an objective legitimacy, the source of which is often identified as a supernatural figure or an authoritative sacred text.

That said, it can be argued that, paradoxically, there is an ethical perspective, if not actually at the heart of materialism, then at its side as a close companion throughout its history, until the twentieth century. Evidently, this perspective does not derive from the core philosophy of materialism but rather from the social experience of its proponents. As mentioned above, until the twentieth century materialists were commonly outcasts in society. In some periods, materialism found itself in a free-thinking milieu where it could flourish alongside rival ontological and epistemological perspectives, but for the greater part materialism has been on the margins of society, disapproved of, barely tolerated. Its adherents were seen as outsiders, opponents of established norms. They were not ‘right-thinking’, and, in consequence, they were commonly mocked, derided, vilified – and persecuted. It is suggested in Chapter 4 that the apogee of materialism is in the eighteenth century, and here we see it clearly adopting an ethical stance of freedom of thought. So it can be said that materialism’s ethical companion is toleration. Until the twentieth century, materialists were typically advocates of the right to divergent opinion, and of opposition to the imposition, by authorities, of beliefs and ways of thinking.

Accordingly, materialist epistemology requires that the outline of the heart of materialism is not read as a statement of dogma. The materialist asks for evidence for any statement about the nature of the world, but it should not, in the true scientific spirit, claim certainty about anything. All scientific theories are held with a degree of caution, and insofar as the belief that there is no god is a theory about the nature of the world, the materialist acknowledges the possibility that his or her belief is false. Materialists believe that there is neither credible evidence nor powerful argument for the existence of god, so that there is a negligible probability of theism being a true theory.

As stated above there is no necessary link between freedom of thought and materialist ontology and epistemology, and by the time materialists gained state power in some countries in the twentieth century the link with such ethics had been shattered. This was to devastating effect – not only for the victims of persecution at the hands of states governed by materialists, but also because it changed the standing of materialism in the intellectual realm. Although always disapproved of by the religious, materialism had previousl...