Personality, it is said, is an individualâs unique way of perceiving his environment, including himself.
Gordon W. Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality (1961/1963, p. 274)
One of the most important lessons that one learns from the history of social psychology (which is covered in Social Psychology: The Basics; Frings, in preparation) is that interpersonal situations can exert considerable influence on individualsâ thoughts, feelings, and behaviour (e.g., G. W. Allport, 1968/1985). By the same token, the history of social psychology acknowledges that not all individuals necessarily think, feel, or behave the same way in a particular interpersonal situation, at a particular point in time (e.g., E. E. Jones, 1985/1998). Indeed, throughout the history of social psychology, individual differences in attitudes (i.e., individualsâ positive versus negative thoughts and feelings toward various persons, places, things, and other entities; Blair, Dasgupta, & Glaser, 2015) have been examined empirically as predictors of interpersonal behaviour (Ross, Lepper, & Ward, 2010).
Gordon W. Allport was a pioneer in the field of social psychology, especially regarding the conceptualisation and measurement of individualsâ stereotyped thoughts and prejudiced feelings as potential influences on individualsâ behaviour toward members of psychological outgroups (e.g., G. W. Allport, 1954/1979). In addition, G. W. Allport was a pioneer in the field of personality psychology (i.e., the study of the entire, functioning individual; McAdams, 1997), especially concerning the conceptualisation and measurement of traits (i.e., individualsâ descriptions of their own psychological characteristics; Paunonen & Hong, 2015) and values (i.e., individualsâ priorities in life as reflected in particular organised sets of beliefs; McAdams & Manczak, 2015) as predictors of individualsâ behaviour toward members of psychological ingroups and outgroups alike (e.g., G. W. Allport, 1937/1951, 1955, 1961/1963). Thus, whether viewed from the vantage point of interpersonal relations (e.g., Gaines, 2016/2018) or intergroup relations (e.g., Gaines, 2017), G. W. Allportâs psychology of the individual (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970) â including, but not limited to, G. W. Allportâs trait theory (Ewen, 1998) â offers a broad, expansive foundation for integrating various theories and results of empirical studies on individual differences in thoughts, feelings, and behaviour within particular social situations (see Funder & Fast, 2010).
In the present book, G. W. Allportâs (1937/1951, 1955, 1961/1963) psychology of the individual serves as the primary theoretical framework for our review of the literature in personality psychology. We are aware that, by emphasising G. W. Allportâs perspective on personality psychology, we run the risk of ignoring the conceptual road less travelled â most notably, Ross Stagnerâs Psychology of Personality, which presents a comparatively behaviouristic and experimental view of personality psychology across several editions (1937, 1948, 1961, 1974; see McAdams, 1997). However, G. W. Allportâs and Stagnerâs respective orientations share certain basic assumptions about the proper subject matter of personality psychology. For example, the opening quote from G. W. Allport (1961/1963, p. 274) concerning the definition of personality in terms of individual uniqueness â notwithstanding G. W. Allportâs pre-Womenâs Rights Era use of masculine pronouns to refer to all of humanity â directly cites Stagnerâs (1961) third edition of Psychology of Personality as a source of inspiration. In any event, with G. W. Allport as our conceptual guide, we shall strive to present a concise (yet comprehensive) review of personality psychology.
OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT BOOK
One of the most fascinating aspects of personality psychology is the co-existence of several well-defined schools of thought, each of which includes two or more wide-ranging theories that â according to their respective creators â go a long way toward explaining why individuals behave as they do (Ewen, 1998). Certain schools of thought (i.e., psychodynamic, behaviourist, and humanistic/existential) are regarded as âclassicâ (Wiggins & Pincus, 1992); whereas other schools of thought (i.e., trait, cognitive, and biological) are regarded as âcontemporaryâ or âemergingâ (see Digman, 1990). In Chapters 2 through to 7 of the present book, we will learn more about the major schools of thought within personality psychology.
Readers of the present book will notice that we have âstacked the deckâ in terms of the amount of space that we devote to psychodynamic theories that â following the lead of Sigmund Freudâs (e.g., S. Freud, 1908/1925, 1931/1950) psychoanalytic theory â assume that unconscious motives exert considerable influence on individualsâ behaviour (see Millon, 1996). Our expansive coverage of psychodynamic theories does not reflect a particular conceptual bias or predisposition toward those theories. Rather, our interest in psychodynamic theories can be understood in terms of the sheer impact that those theories have made within personality psychology (see also Ewen, 1998). Even Stagner â whose Psychology of Personality (e.g., Stagner, 1937), as we have already mentioned, serves as a behaviouristic alternative to G. W. Allportâs Pattern and Growth in Personality (1937/1951) â placed special emphasis upon the psychodynamic school (e.g., Stagner, 1961).
EXAMPLES OF CORE CONSTRUCTS IN PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY
In order to understand core constructs in personality psychology from the standpoint of G. W. Allportâs (1937/1951, 1955, 1961/1963) psychology of the individual, one must begin by examining William Jamesâs (1890/2010) seminal version of self-theory (see C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970). According to James, the self is an individualsâ ongoing awareness that they are distinct from â yet interconnected with â various aspects of the physical and social worlds that they inhabit (see Swann & Bosson, 2010). Having been influenced by Charles Darwinâs (1859) theory of natural selection, James (1890/2010) emphasised the biological origins of the self (e.g., the self is a product of the mind â which, in turn, is a product of the brain). However, James (1902) subsequently encouraged readers to decide for themselves whether they believe that the self ultimately is a product of biology or a product of divinity. (Within philosophy and theology, the older term of soul historically was used to describe the self as a divinely ordained entity; see Calkins, 1917, for a critique of the pre-psychology literature on the soul.)
In turn, according to James (1890/2010), two major components of the self can be identified â namely, (1) the pure Ego, or self-as-knower; and (2) the empirical Me, or self-as-known (G. W. Allport, 1955). G. W. Allport contended that the empirical Me â which G. W. Allport preferred to label as the proprium â is the aspect of the self that is directly accessible to individualsâ consciousness. Having sidestepped the problems that plague Jamesâs conceptualisation of the pure Ego (e.g., if the pure Ego reflects upon the self, then what is the entity that presumably reflects upon the pure Ego, and so on; C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970), in Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (1937/1951), G. W. Allport promoted the empirical Me or proprium in Pattern and Grown in Personality (1961/1963) as the component of the self that encompasses and gives order to the wide array of traits, values, and other constructs that are part and parcel of individualsâ personalities (Ewen, 1998).
Within the empirical Me or proprium, G. W. Allport (1955) accepted Jamesâs (1890/2010) further division into the material self (i.e., individualsâ physical possessions, including their own bodies), social self (i.e., the roles and relationships within which individuals are embedded), and spiritual self (i.e., individualsâ intelligence and personality characteristics). (The term âspiritual selfâ, which James chose over potentially less soul-evoking terms such as âpsychic selfâ, does not appear to have been problematic for G. W. Allport, who shared Jamesâs (1902) interest in religion and spirituality; e.g., G. W. Allport, 1950.) G. W. Allport believed that, in everyday life, individuals do not experience components of the proprium as distinct from each other (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970). Nevertheless, G. W. Allportâs own programme of research â which included the development of surveys to measure traits (e.g., G. W. Allport, 1928) and values (G. W. Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960; see also Vernon & G. W. Allport, 1931) â tended to prioritise aspects of the spiritual self (see Ewen, 1998).
With regard to Jamesâs (1890/2010) spiritual self, G. W. Allport (1937/1951, 1955, 1961/1963) drew a distinction between individual differences in intelligence (i.e., presumed cognitive ability) and individual differences in personality (i.e., a variety of psychological attributes that lie outside the domain of presumed cognitive ability; see C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970). As it turns out, G. W. Allportâs psychology of the individual largely predates the emergence of cognitive psychology, which currently addresses theories and research on intelligence (see Gobet, in preparation). In any event, G. W. Allport viewed intelligence as a construct that should be considered separate from the subject matter of personality psychology (a view that is shared by many, but not all, of G. W. Allportâs followers; see Ewen, 1998).
Unlike James (1890/2010), G. W. Allport (1937/1951, 1955, 1961/1963) wrote systematically about the relevance of several modern-day personality constructs to the spiritual self (see C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970). For example, G. W. Allportâs psychology of the individual includes traits, values, attitudes, and motives (the latter of which can be defined as internal forces that direct individualsâ behaviour; Sheldon & Schuler, 2015). In principle, one could add affect (i.e., individual differences in feelings at a particular point in time; Augustine & Larsen, 2015) â including emotions (i.e., feelings that tend to be directed toward particular entities) and moods (i.e., feelings that are not necessarily directed toward any particular entity; R. Brown, 1965) â to the list of major personality constructs. Nevertheless, G. W. Allport devoted the bulk of his scholarly efforts toward understanding traits in all of their complexity (Ewen, 1998).
Regarding traits, G. W. Allport (1937/1951, 1955, 1961/1963) made a distinction between common traits (which can be found in varying degrees among large numbers of individuals and are especially amenable to quantitative research methods) and personal traits (which, in principle, might be found only among one individual and are especially amenable to qualitative research methods; C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970). G. W. Allport acknowledged that the field of personality psychology in general might gravitate toward studies of common traits (as ultimately proved to be the case during the second half of the twentieth century; McAdams, 1997). However, G. W. Allportâs psychology of the individual emphasised personal traits, as the psychological equivalent of fingerprints (i.e., no two individuals possess exactly the same combination of personal traits; Ewen, 1998).
Finally, with respect to personal traits, G. W. Allport (1937/1951, 1955, 1961/1963) distinguished among cardinal traits (i.e., single traits that essentially define the entire personalities of some individuals); central traits (i.e., five to ten traits that go a long way toward defining the personalities of most individuals); and secondary traits (i.e., an unspecified number of traits whose expression in the behaviour of some, if not most, individuals is heavily dependent upon the presence versus absence of situational influences; Ewen, 1998). G. W. Allportâs best-known empirical work on traits (i.e., G. W. Allport, 1965) focused on several central traits (e.g., aggressive, autonomous, sentimental, self-centred) â or, alternatively, one cardinal trait (i.e., neurotic) â of an older woman (âJennyâ) with whom a primary correspondent (âGlennâ) was acquainted for more than twenty years, via more than 300 letters that the older woman had sent to the correspondent and his wife (âIsabelâ), during an interval that spanned more than a decade after the correspondentâs stint as a university roommate of the womanâs son (âRossâ; see Hall & Lindzey, 1970; for further details on Letters from Jenny, see Box 1.1). Compared to cardinal traits and central traits, G. W. Allport de-emphasised secondary traits in practice (Zuroff, 1986).
BOX 1.1 INSIGHT INTO ONE WOMANâS PERSONALITY: GORDON ALLPORTâS LETTERS FROM JENNY (1965)
One of the most exhaustive, empirically orientated studies of a particular individualâs personality was Gordon Allportâs Letters from Jenny (1965; for a review, see Wrightsman, 1981). Although authoritative reviews of Letters from Jenny (e.g., Ewen, 1998; C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970) have tended to follow G. W. Allportâs practice of referring to âJennyâsâ main letter-writing correspondent as âGlennâ (and referring to the correspondentâs wife as âIsabelâ), Winter (1997) revealed that the name âGlennâ was a pseudonym for Gordon Allport himself; and the name âIsabelâ was a pseudonym for Gordon Allportâs wife, Ada(!). In any event, the letters in question served collectively as a treasure trove of insight into âJennyâsâ personality â not just for Gordon Allport, but also for successive generations of personality researchers (OâDell, 1978).
In the hands of a less-capable researcher, Letters from Jenny (G. W. Allport, 1965) might have functioned as a mundane, unenlightening account of the final twelve years of âJennyâsâ life, from middle to elderly adulthood. However, G. W. Allportâs mastery of entire schools of thought within personality psychology is evident in the ease with which G. W. Allport shifts from an existential perspective to a psychodynamic and, subsequently, trait perspective in fleshing out the unique combination of psychological attributes that comprise âJennyâsâ personality (see R. Brown, 1965, for a discussion of laypersonsâ and scientistsâ progression from describing individualsâ behaviour to drawing conclusions with regard to individualsâ personalities). Moreover, despite the increasingly paranoid content of âJennyâsâ letters over time (especially in the years following the death of her son, âRossâ), G. W. Allport stopped short of labelling âJennyâ as psychotic. Instead, G. W. Allport opted to emphasise âJennyâsâ basic dignity. Although we will not usually refer to G. W. Allport as a humanist (at least in terms of allegiance to a given school of thought), G. W. Allportâs overarching optimism concerning human nature is obvious in the ultimately sympathetic portrait of âJennyâ that one finds in G. W. Allportâs book (see also J. F. Brennan, 2003, for a description of G. W. Allport as a humanistic psychologist).
We hasten to add that G. W. Allport (1937/1951, 1955, 1961/1963) did not portray traits as the only constructs that were worth studying within personality psychology (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970). Nonetheless, G. W. Allportâs psychology of the individual does promote traits as the most relevant constructs for the development of personality psychology as a distinct branch of psychology (Ewen, 1998). By the latter half of the twentieth century, an overwhelming consensus among personality psychologists indicated that traits had emerged as the core constructs within their field (A. R. Buss, 1989).
EXAMPLES OF IMPORTANT (BUT NOT-YET-CORE) CONSTRUCTS IN PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY
So far, we have identified various core constructs within personality psychology, from the perspective of G. W. Allportâs (1937/1951, 1955, 1961/1963) psychology of the individual. However, we have not said much about important, but not-yet-core, constructs in personality psychology (notwithstanding their core status in developmental psychology; e.g., C. R. Cooper & Denner, 1998). As a theoretical point of departure, we turn to Erik Eriksonâs (1959/1980, 1963/1995, 1968/1994) ego psychology, which serves as a conceptual bridge between Jamesâs (1890/2010) self-theory and G. W. Allportâs psychology of the individual (see C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970). Erikson is best-known for his writings on identity, which Baumeister (1997) â drawing upon Erikson (e.g., Erikson, 1968/1994) â defined as âthe [combination or aggregate of] definitions that are created for and superimposed on the selfâ (p. 682). Identity may be distinguished from the self-concept (i.e., individualsâ conscious reflection upon themselves; Baumeister, 1998), in that identity is jointly constructed by self and society; whereas the self-concept ultimately is constructed by oneâs self (Bau...