eBook - ePub
Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Aristotle and the Metaphysics
Vasilis Politis
This is a test
Buch teilen
- 360 Seiten
- English
- ePUB (handyfreundlich)
- Ăber iOS und Android verfĂŒgbar
eBook - ePub
Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Aristotle and the Metaphysics
Vasilis Politis
Angaben zum Buch
Buchvorschau
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Quellenangaben
Ăber dieses Buch
Aristotles' 'Metaphysics' is one of the most important texts in Ancient Philosophy. This GuideBook looks at the Metaphysics thematically and takes the student through the main arguments found in the text. The book introduces and assesses Aristotle's life and the background to the Metaphysics, the ideas and text of the Metaphysics and Aristotle's philosophical legacy.
HĂ€ufig gestellte Fragen
Wie kann ich mein Abo kĂŒndigen?
Gehe einfach zum Kontobereich in den Einstellungen und klicke auf âAbo kĂŒndigenâ â ganz einfach. Nachdem du gekĂŒndigt hast, bleibt deine Mitgliedschaft fĂŒr den verbleibenden Abozeitraum, den du bereits bezahlt hast, aktiv. Mehr Informationen hier.
(Wie) Kann ich BĂŒcher herunterladen?
Derzeit stehen all unsere auf MobilgerĂ€te reagierenden ePub-BĂŒcher zum Download ĂŒber die App zur VerfĂŒgung. Die meisten unserer PDFs stehen ebenfalls zum Download bereit; wir arbeiten daran, auch die ĂŒbrigen PDFs zum Download anzubieten, bei denen dies aktuell noch nicht möglich ist. Weitere Informationen hier.
Welcher Unterschied besteht bei den Preisen zwischen den AboplÀnen?
Mit beiden AboplÀnen erhÀltst du vollen Zugang zur Bibliothek und allen Funktionen von Perlego. Die einzigen Unterschiede bestehen im Preis und dem Abozeitraum: Mit dem Jahresabo sparst du auf 12 Monate gerechnet im Vergleich zum Monatsabo rund 30 %.
Was ist Perlego?
Wir sind ein Online-Abodienst fĂŒr LehrbĂŒcher, bei dem du fĂŒr weniger als den Preis eines einzelnen Buches pro Monat Zugang zu einer ganzen Online-Bibliothek erhĂ€ltst. Mit ĂŒber 1 Million BĂŒchern zu ĂŒber 1.000 verschiedenen Themen haben wir bestimmt alles, was du brauchst! Weitere Informationen hier.
UnterstĂŒtzt Perlego Text-zu-Sprache?
Achte auf das Symbol zum Vorlesen in deinem nÀchsten Buch, um zu sehen, ob du es dir auch anhören kannst. Bei diesem Tool wird dir Text laut vorgelesen, wobei der Text beim Vorlesen auch grafisch hervorgehoben wird. Du kannst das Vorlesen jederzeit anhalten, beschleunigen und verlangsamen. Weitere Informationen hier.
Ist Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Aristotle and the Metaphysics als Online-PDF/ePub verfĂŒgbar?
Ja, du hast Zugang zu Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Aristotle and the Metaphysics von Vasilis Politis im PDF- und/oder ePub-Format sowie zu anderen beliebten BĂŒchern aus Philosophy & Philosophy History & Theory. Aus unserem Katalog stehen dir ĂŒber 1Â Million BĂŒcher zur VerfĂŒgung.
Information
1
ARISTOTLEâS METAPHYSICS
1
What is the Metaphysics about? The question, âWhat is being?â
The work that we have here under the title âthe Metaphysicsâ (ta meta ta phusika) is a series of fourteen books, all or most of which were written by Aristotle (384â322 BC). They belong to his latest period of work. Therefore the Metaphysics belongs to what Aristotle wrote after founding (in 335 BC) his own school of philosophy in Athens: the Lyceum or Peripatos. This means that, even if we take into account that the Metaphysics must have been written over an extended period of time, Aristotle must have produced the work some years after leaving the Academy, Platoâs school in Athens; for he became a pupil of Plato (427â 347 BC) at the age of seventeen, and he remained in Platoâs school, first as a pupil and later as a relatively independent researcher, for some twenty years. But he left the Academy after Plato died.
However, Aristotle did not write the Metaphysics as a single work, and even the individual books (or sets of books) in it may not be finished works. Only after his death, and probably between 200 and 100 BC, were these fourteen books arranged and published in the order in which we now have them. The title itself, âthe Metaphysicsâ, is not Aristotleâs, but was probably devised by Andronicus of Rhodes when he put together the edition of the collected works of Aristotle (first century BC). He probably devised this title (ta meta ta phusika, âthe [books] that come after the Physicsâ) to indicate that, in his view, the Metaphysics belongs naturally after another work by Aristotle, the Physics. We may suppose that Andronicus thought that this is the natural place of the Metaphysics, because he thought that the study of all things and of things simply in so far as they are beings, i.e. metaphysics as characterized by Aristotle, comes naturally after the study of changing and material things, the things with which we are directly familiar from sense perception and experience, i.e. physics as characterized by Aristotle. For we will see that if there is anything that the fourteen books have in common, and that justifies collecting them together as a single work, the Metaphysics, it is the centrality of a single overall investigation. This is the investigation into all things and into things simply in so far as they are beings: things that are. So the title, âthe Metaphysicsâ, may perhaps indicate what Aristotleâs Metaphysics is about, but it does so only in an indirect and not immediately perspicuous way. We have of course become accustomed to thinking that the Metaphysics is evidently about metaphysics, and there is nothing wrong with thinking this. But Aristotle does not himself use this term, âmetaphysicsâ, and when he wants to indicate what his present study is about, he uses terms such as âwisdomâ (sophia), âfirst philosophyâ (prĆtÄ philosophia), and âfirst scienceâ (prĆtÄ epistÄmÄ).
Still, the Metaphysics is about some one thing and there is a single theme. This is the question, âWhat is being?â (tĂ to on; to on means âbeingâ, âthat which isâ). The Metaphysics is about the question âWhat is being?â in two ways. On the one hand, Aristotle raises this question; he undertakes a long search for an answer to it; and eventually he offers an answer. On the other hand, he also reflects on the question itself, what it is to raise it and to search for an answer to it, and even whether it is possible to search for an answer at all. As we would say, he also considers how metaphysics is possible. So let us begin by concentrating on the central question in the Metaphysics, âWhat is being?â
First of all, the question âWhat is being?â is about being, not about the noun âbeingâ or the verb âto beâ. It is about what it is for something to be, not about what it is for us to think or say of something that it is. Of course, how we think and speak, when we think or say of something that it is, may in various ways be important when we ask the question âWhat is being?â and âWhat is it for something to be?â But still, this question is not about how we think and speak when we think or say of something that it is; it is about being and what it is for something to be.
So what is this question about? Of what are we asking, âWhat is being?â and âWhat is it for something to be?â Aristotle evidently thinks that we are asking this question of beings (onta), things that are; i.e. we are asking of a being, something that is, what it is for that thing to be. But he also supposes that we are already familiar with beings, prior to our raising this question; and it is of such familiar things that he thinks that we may want to ask this question. So he thinks that we are familiar, pre-philosophically and from our ordinary experience, with beings; for beings are directly apparent to us and present to us, they are all around us and make up the world which we inhabit. It is of such familiar things that he thinks that we may want to ask âWhat is it for something to be?â: humans, plants, animals, which we encounter around us; the sun, the moon and other planets, which we see in the sky and which are central to our conception of motion, time and space; even the whole universe which appears to us to be made up of all these things. Of course, once we ask âWhat is it for something to be?â of such familiar things, we may go on to ask this question also of things that are not directly apparent or present to us, but in whose existence we believe on other grounds. But this is a second step, and we must begin with the beings with which we are already familiar.
But it is important to recognize that when Aristotle asks, âWhat is being?â, he intends this question to be understood in a particular way. For, as he understands it, this is not primarily the question, âWhat is there?â; it is above all the question, âWhat is it for something to be?â The question âWhat is there?â asks for a complete general description of what there is; we may say that it asks for the extension of being. But the question, âWhat is it for something to be?â, asks of anything that is, what it is for that thing to be. It asks for an explanation of why something that is is, or in virtue of what something that is is. We may say that this question asks for the essence of being, and for an explanatory account of the essence of being. Aristotle says (e.g. at the opening of book IV) that he wants to investigate âbeing qua beingâ, by which he means that he wants to investigate beings, and to investigate them simply in so far as they are beings, things that are. But this is precisely to investigate what it is for something to beâthe essence of being. So metaphysics, as Aristotle understands it, is not so much the search for a complete and general description of what there is; it is above all the search for an explanation of why something that is is, or in virtue of what something that is is.
From the very beginning of the Metaphysics (in book I, chapter 2) Aristotle characterizes metaphysics, or what at this stage he calls âwisdomâ (sophia), as a search for explanations (aitiai, which can also be translated as âcausesâ) and explanatory knowledge (epistÄmÄ), i.e. knowledge why something is as it is. This kind of knowledge we may call âscientific knowledgeâ and âscienceâ; and Aristotle repeatedly speaks of metaphysics as a search for such knowledge (epistÄmÄ). In particular, he says that metaphysics is the most fundamental science (prĆtÄ epistÄmÄ, see VI. 1, 1026a29), for it is the search for the most fundamental explanations. These explanations he calls âfirst explanationsâ and âfirst principlesâ (prĆtai aitiai, prĆtai archai); and he says that they are explanations of all beings (panta) and of everything there is. But he thinks that such fundamental and universal explanations are, precisely, explanations of what it is for somethingâanythingâto be.
We will gradually become more familiar with the basic question of metaphysics, âWhat is it for something, anything, to be?â But it is worth emphasizing that Aristotle from the outset associates the search for an answer to this question with a search for explanatory knowledge (epistÄmÄ), i.e. knowledge why things are as they are. So the basic question of metaphysics can also be formulated as, âWhy are the beings (ta onta) beings, things that are?â This must not, of course, be confused with the question, âWhy are there beings, things that are?â In general, we must not confuse questions of the type, (1) âWhy are there things that are F?â, with questions of the type, (2) âWhy are the things that are F F?â The basic question in the Metaphysics, âWhat is it for something, anything, to be?â, is associated with questions of type 2, not type 1.
Finally, it is worth noting that Aristotle does not think that this basic question of metaphysics, âWhat is being?â, is his own invention. On the contrary, in a memorable passage at the centre of the Metaphysics, he emphasizes that this question is as old as the trees, never ceasing to be âthat which is sought afterâ (to zÄtoumenon) and âa source of puzzlementâ (to aporoumenon):
Indeed, that which is always, both now and long ago, sought after and which is always a source of puzzlement, i.e. the question, What is being?,âŠ
(VII. 1, 1028b2â4)
From the beginning of the Metaphysics (I. 3â10) it is clear that he thinks that earlier thinkers have just as much been engaged in the investigation of being in general and as a whole (see, e.g. I. 3, 983b1â3). Here (in I. 3â10) he enlists a wide variety of earlier thinkers in this shared search: Thales, Anaximenes, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Pythagoreans and, above all, Plato, who is only recently dead.
2
Sources of the question, âWhat is being?â
But why does Aristotle think that we may want to ask this question, âWhat is being?â? At the opening of the Metaphysics (I. 1), he argues that it is because we are human that we want to ask this question. He argues that all animals desire some kind of knowledge (to eidenai), and in particular sense perception (aisthÄsis). But one thing that distinguishes us humans from other animals is that we desire not only any kind of knowledge of which we are capable, including knowledge that other animals desire, but also explanatory or scientific knowledge (epistÄmÄ), which is knowledge of explanations (aitiai). But further, he argues that explanatory knowledge requires knowledge of what things are, their essence; for it is by knowing what a thing really is, its essence, that we can explain why the thing is as it is. For example (this is based on Aristotleâs example in I. 1), it is by trying to know what a certain illness really is, its essence, that a scientifically minded physician may try to explain why this illness is as it is and behaves as it does: why it has the symptoms, causes, and consequences it has; why it responds to one treatment but not another, etc.
So, in general, Aristotle argues that it is simply because we are human that we search for science and explanatory knowledge (epistÄmÄ); and explanatory knowledge requires knowing the essence of things. But he also argues (in Metaphysics I. 2) that metaphysics is the most fundamental kind of explanatory knowledge; it is the knowledge of the most fundamental explanations and the explanations of all things. But this, precisely, is the knowledge of what it is for something to be, i.e. it is the knowledge of the essence of being and the answer to the question âWhat is being?â So he argues that it is because we are human that we want to ask the question, âWhat is being?â and âWhat is it for something to be?â, and that we want to search for an answer to this question.
However, in the course of books I and III of the Metaphysics there emerges what appears to be a different account of why we may want to ask this question, âWhat is being?â For Aristotle argues (in III. 1) that what in general motivates us to ask questions about being, and to search for answers, are particular aporiai that present themselves to us about beingâ aporiai in the sense of particular problems and puzzles that we are puzzled about. He goes on (in III. 2â6) to set out some fifteen aporiai about being. But before doing so, he argues (in III. 1) that it is precisely such aporiai about being that motivate us to search for what being is, and that if we are not puzzled about such problems and puzzles, then we cannot even begin to search for what being is. This suggests that Aristotle thinks that the question, âWhat is being?â, is not some arbitrary question that we may or may not want to raise; it is rather a question that presents itself to us as a problem and puzzle (aporia), or as an immediate consequence of similar problems and puzzles which present themselves to us. In general, it will emerge that aporiai about being are absolutely central in the Metaphysics and indeed to the whole project of the Metaphysics, the project of searching for what it is for something, anything, to be. Aristotleâs method in the Metaphysics is fundamentally based in aporiai (see Chapter 3).
So Aristotle thinks that the question, âWhat is being?â, is not just any kind of question, but an aporia; i.e. a problem and puzzle that presents itself to us and makes us puzzled about it. This fascinating view arguably goes back to Plato, especially in the dialogue Sophist (242bff.), where Plato argues that we are thoroughly perplexed and p...