Panzer Rollen

The Logistics of a Panzer Division From Primary Sources

Bob Carruthers

• Verlag: Pen & Sword Military
• Jahr: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781473868823
• Thema: History
• Thema: Military & Maritime History

Panzer Rollen provides an insightful look in to the workings of the Military Intelligence Service that was so invaluable in shaping both the strategy and tactics of the Allied forces during the Second World War.

Part 1

The German Armoured Division

Military Intelligence Service, Information Bulletin No. 18, 15 June, 1942

The following text is taken from a Word War II U.S. War Department Information Bulletin. As with all wartime intelligence information, data may be incomplete or inaccurate.

Chapter 1

Characteristics and Organization

1. The armoured division is intended for strategic roles. It combines great fire power with high mobility, and its armour and speed restrict the effectiveness of enemy weapons.

2. Its strength lies in attack. It is especially suited for surprise appearances on the battlefield, rapid concentration of considerable fighting power, obtaining quick decisions by breakthroughs, deep penetrations on wide fronts, and the destruction of the enemy. The attack of the armoured division has a serious effect on the enemy’s morale.

3. The nature of the terrain is a decisive factor for successful employment of the armoured division. Full use of its speed can be ensured by choice of good roads with bridges of adequate capacity, and by their being kept clear of other troops. Speed across country depends upon weather, formation of the ground, nature of the soil, and density of vegetation. It is slower than on roads. The full striking power of the armoured division can best be developed in attack over rolling country with few features. Marshy, wooded, and rough country allows movement off the road only for short stretches, with reduced mobility. It may exclude the employment of tanks.

4. The components of an armoured division are so proportioned that the detachment of individual units, especially of tanks, or their attachment to other units, restricts the fitness of the division for employment in strategic roles.

5. The main striking force of the division lies in its tank brigade. Its offensive infantry element is the motorized infantry brigade. In addition the armoured division comprises motorized reconnaissance elements, motorized artillery, anti-tank units, armoured signal units, anti-aircraft machine-gun troops, and supply and maintenance services. In active campaigns an observation squadron (serves also for artillery observation) and a light anti-aircraft battalion are attached to the division.

Chapter 2

Role of the Armoured Division

6. The armoured division normally fights in the framework of the armoured corps, but is also suited to carry out independent operations, in which case reinforcement with motorized infantry and artillery is usually necessary.

7. Its supreme role is to obtain decision in battle. Within the framework of the armoured corps it can carry out the following tasks:

a)Break through an enemy protective screen to make early contact with the enemy’s main force;

b)Obtain early possession of topographical features and sectors of decisive importance for further fighting;

c)Gain surprise in an attack on the advancing enemy to frustrate his plans and take the initiative from him;

d)Attack an enemy incompletely prepared for defence;

e)Attack on a narrow front against a prepared enemy;

f)Restore momentum to an attack which has come to a standstill;

g)Break through on a wide front against a demoralized enemy;

h)Exploit success and complete the destruction of the enemy by deep penetration or flank attack;

i)Pursue a defeated enemy;

j)Carry out strategic envelopment;

k)Attack to destroy enemy tank units;

l)Cooperate with parachute and airborne troops.

8. The armoured division acting independently can carry out the following strategic tasks:

a)Reconnaissance in force in cooperation with strategic aerial reconnaissance;

b)Early occupation of sectors important for further operations, of politically and economically important localities, and of industrial installations;

c)Delaying the enemy advance, providing a protective screen, or acting as a flank guard to a larger unit.

9. The armoured division is equally suitable for breaking through a prepared position when the position is strengthened by isolated permanent fortifications. The cooperation of medium artillery and bombardment aviation then becomes necessary.

In an attack on a prepared position, the speed and mobility of an armoured division cannot be exploited. There is a danger that tanks may be exposed to such heavy casualties against a prepared defence that the further employment of the division becomes impossible.

Armoured divisions are therefore only to be used for breaking through a permanent front if infantry divisions are not available, if the delay in bringing them forward may result in losing an opportunity to exploit the success with armoured divisions well forward, or if the enemy is already demoralized. The armoured division must then be reinforced by motorized infantry, artillery, and motorized engineers, weapons capable of assaulting concrete works, and smoke troops. They must also be supported by bombardment aviation.

10. The armoured division can attack across a river. The necessary amount of reinforcement by other arms, especially engineers, depends on the strength of the enemy and his defence, and on the width of the river.

11. The role of the armoured division in a protective task is generally offensive. It carries out counterattacks to relieve parts of the front under heavy pressure, breaks up enemy tank attacks by surprise thrusts, is employed against the flanks of an enemy who has broken through, or attacks the enemy from the flanks or rear while he is held frontally.

If the armoured division has to take part in a defensive operation, which will be exceptional, every effort must be made to relieve it as quickly as possible by infantry units.

12. The armoured division can also be used independently to screen the withdrawal of large units. This task is usually carried out offensively.

Chapter 3

Employment of the Armoured Division

13. The speed and mobility of the armoured division demand of all commanders boldness, powers of rapid decision, and ability to convert decisions into brief commands.

14. The strength of the armoured division lies in concentrating the force of the tank brigade. This is the normal practice. It is the task of the commander to see that all arms of the division are used to support the tank attack. Individual arms must be mutually supporting, and each must be prepared to exploit the success of the other.

15. Task forces can be formed temporarily for specific missions:

a)In the attack, when the division is advancing on a broad front over several roads against a weaker enemy, or in traversing wooded or mountainous country;

b)In a rapid pursuit when the division has to anticipate the enemy in occupying important points, road junctions, potential bottlenecks, etc.;

c)In a withdrawal, to cover disengagement from the enemy.

Task forces are employed in accordance with the same principles that apply to the armoured division as a whole. The division commander can influence the battle by employing reserves of all arms. Task forces, however, must be provided at the outset with all means necessary for the task allotted. The division commander must make every effort to reconcentrate all parts of the division under his direct command.

16. The object of the armoured division in battle is destruction of the enemy, either by breakthrough or envelopment. The mobility of the armoured division enables it to avoid a frontal engagement and to manoeuvre to the enemy’s rear.

Foresight in choice of the terrain over which an anticipated engagement is to take place is of great importance. This terrain should be thoroughly covered by air reconnaissance. The art of command lies in ability to choose the exact moment for deployment for battle so that the object may be achieved with maximum speed and minimum losses.

The armoured division must be deployed in depth. When deep penetration is made, long flanks are frequently exposed. Anxiety on this cause must not, however, be allowed to hamper bold action nor divert the division from the decisive direction. Advance measures must be taken to screen the flanks and defend against air attack.

17. In battle the full striking force of the division must be used unsparingly. The more decisive the role of the division in the operation, the more important this becomes. The greater the forces that can be concentrated at one point, the greater will be the success and the smaller the losses.

18. The tank’s ability to surprise by its speed and mobility must be fully exploited. Aids to this are the screening of movements, camouflage of bivouacs, and prevention of enemy air reconnaissance.

19. Accurate knowledge of the topography must be obtained by detailed study of maps and aerial photographs before orders are issued.

Subordinate commanders must be kept constantly informed of the current situation and the division commander’s ultimate intention, in order to be able to adjust themselves to rapid changes in the situation which are often encountered as a result of the speed of movement, and in order to act in accord with the commander’s general plan when unexpected difficulties and obstacles are encountered.

The cooperation of all parts of the division must be worked out in the greatest detail possible by the division commander. In order to avoid delays, frequent use will be made in the armoured division of short warning orders. A thrust line (see note) will be given to the division during the attack in order that fresh directions of attack and objectives may be radioed in the clear. Important information gained by reconnaissance can also be communicated quickly and safely by this means.

The situation and necessity for rapid action may compel the division commander to intervene temporarily in the command of lower units by setting new objectives for the tanks or the motorized infantry regiments.

Note. – The thrust line (Stosslinie) method is much used by the Germans for sending map references in the clear. It consists of a line drawn upon a map which theoretically may run in any direction but actually usually extends in the proposed direction of advance or down the axis of a reconnaissance unit.

The line, which begins at a fixed point and continues indefinitely in the required direction, is usually divided into centimetres for convenience. To give a map reference a perpendicular is dropped from the reference point to the thrust line. Measurements are then taken from the point of origin to the point where the perpendicular cuts the thrust line, then along the perpendicular to the reference point. Since the point may lie on either side of the thrust line, the second figure must be prefaced by either ‘right’ or ‘left’ or as one looks toward the enemy.

A typical reference would be ‘6 right 3’. The figures are always in centimetres; therefore the actual distance on the ground will vary with the scale of the map used. The scale may start with an arbitrary figure, have dummy figures interspersed, or start with the number of the thrust line when there are several in a given area. These devices make the code difficult to break rapidly.

Instruments have been found consisting of a transparent ruler graduated in millimetres, with a shorter ruler similarly graduated fixed to slide up and down at right angles to the long ruler. Operators with practice can give references very quickly.

20. Commanders of all units must establish themselves with an advance headquarters well forward, and must be in a position to survey the battlefield frequently in time to issue their orders early and note changes in the situation.1 This applies especially to the division commander.2 On the move he will usually have his headquarters with the commander of the advance guard....