Japan, Italy and the Road to the Tripartite Alliance

Ken Ishida

• Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan
• Jahr: 2018
• ISBN:
  9783319962238
• Thema: Geschichte
• Thema: Japanische Geschichte

This book employs a comparative approach to explore the decision-making processes behind the Japanese and Italian foreign policies concerned with East Asia, Africa, Europe and the Mediterranean. It explores these policies in relation to the Axis powers and Britain in the 1930s. Both Japan and Italy shared significant similarities in their decision-making processes, which help to illustrate the workings of ultra-nationalist and fascist foreign policy. The work examines the mechanism of decision-making in the foreign ministries, rather than the personalities of leaders, in order to understand why and how both countries finally chose unexpected partners. The Tripartite Alliance has often been perceived through the diplomatic motives and arbitrary manners of dictatorial leadership in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and ultra-nationalist Japan individually. This book compares the foreign policies of Italy and Japan and looks outwards to their diplomatic relations with Britain, akey imperial factor in their expansions into East Asia and Africa, contrasting these Axis powers with Germany, usually thought to typify fascist diplomacy.

© The Author(s) 2018

Ken IshidaJapan, Italy and the Road to the Tripartite AllianceSecurity, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary Worldhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96223-8_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Ken Ishida¹

(1)

Faculty of Law, Politics and Economics, Chiba University, Chiba-shi, Japan

Ken Ishida

Email: [email protected]

End Abstract

World War II is often described as a war between the Allied Powers and the Axis nations. Nevertheless, there are not too many historians who have conducted research on the relationship between the countries that formed the latter alignment. Much of the existing historiography looks at the diplomatic motives and conduct of Nazi Germany, fascist Italy and ultra-nationalist Japan in the 1930s, individually.¹ As a result, many researchers tend to understand this tripartite alliance within the framework of the conventional wisdom that it was a “hollow alliance” in which the Axis powers somehow managed to form a coalition despite having very few commonalities.²

Within this framework of understanding, it is believed that the alliance was formed due to the opportunism of the Japanese and Italian decision makers. These leaders attempted to strike some kind of deal with other Western governments throughout the early 1930s yet failed to do so for various reasons. Only after that did they turn to Germany as a country that could save them from the diplomatic isolation that they themselves created by their aggression toward China and Ethiopia. However, even though there was little direct contact between the Axis powers, the European war provoked by Germany would not have become a world war without the actions of the Japanese and the Italians, who joined the war to support their common ally and broaden the theaters of war to Asia-Pacific and Africa. It must be said that World War II would not have broken out and developed as it did without the Tripartite Alliance . It is worth conducting a more thorough research of this important coalition and examining whether a global history of the Axis is possible.

This book will examine the foreign policies of ultra-nationalist Japan and fascist Italy in the 1930s, as such an attempt is essential to understanding the road to the Tripartite Alliance and the relationship between the countries in this alignment. It will look not only at the Italo–Japanese relationship but also analyze and compare the diplomatic policy-making processes of these two countries. Despite the fact that many political scientists have exemplified the effectiveness of a comparative approach to highlighting the characteristics of certain political institutions, not too many historians have adopted such approach. Especially after 2004, the publication of research that looks at the diplomacies of the Axis powers through a comparative approach has decreased.³

Some of the few works that make such an attempt are also inadequate in analyzing the foreign policies of these two countries.⁴ Richard J. Samuels offers an extensive comparison of Japan and Italy in terms of modernization and democracy from a broad theoretical perspective, but his work focuses on the central role of leaders rather than on decision-making structures in explaining why they came to different decisions despite their similar historical backgrounds.⁵ Therefore, his work has not sufficiently scrutinized how the decision makers were influenced by their environment or the structural settings of diplomatic policy-making institutions in which they existed. For the purpose of comparing the foreign policy decision-making structure of Japan and Italy, this study will focus on the foreign ministries of these two countries, and seek out the commonalities and differences between these institutions.⁶ As shown in Chapter 8, this book also deals with individuals, classifying them into categories. These leaders are only components of a structure, and their decision-making mechanisms reveal how they changed or maintained their positions.

The Tripartite Alliance is commonly understood as a product of the expansionist ideology espoused by the charismatic leaders Adolf Hitler , Benito Mussolini and Prince Fumimaro Konoe and promoted by their eccentric sub-leaders Joachim von Ribbentrop , Count Galeazzo Ciano and Yosuke Matsuoka , who were heretics in their foreign ministries. On the other hand, the traditional diplomats have been regarded as rational and moderate actors, whom fanatic decision makers deprived of their reasonable options to cooperate with the West.⁷ However, if one looks closely into the development of events from 1932 to 1936, it becomes apparent that such conventional wisdom is not always true and often misguided. Even the “realistic” diplomats in these countries acted under the name of anti-communism and regional hegemony, and often assumed that they were racially superior to the people of the countries in which they intervened.⁸ There was a decision-making mechanism that made it difficult for either of the foreign ministries to prevent the escalation of aggression by their governments. Historians must therefore place emphasis not only on the personalities of the important individuals in Italy and Japan but also on the structural aspect of the foreign-policy-making process.

It is often said that the cultural diversity between the non-Western and Western nations is so great that Japanese and Italian foreign policies cannot be aligned. Yet Japan and Italy, which were contemplating forming an alliance in the 1930s, did share commonalities in their foreign policies despite the structural differences in their decision-making mechanisms. Some of the early Axis literature instead exaggerates the totalitarian features of Axis diplomacy.⁹ Attempting to take an analytical stance between cultural determinism and simple generalization is highly problematic. In addition, the cognitive gap between the various views of individual actors and systems of international relations should be bridged through our knowledge of foreign policy. A tentative solution is to use a comparative method standardized by classification of the actors (see Chapter 8) in the Axis countries and to identify the decision-making mechanism of each foreign ministry.

This study will bring the contrast between commonalities and differences among the Axis powers into relief. Indeed, Japan and Italy both initially tried to avoid total confrontation with Britain, since they were not economically as strong as Germany. Nevertheless, their aggressive foreign policies resulted in their gradually marginalizing themselves from the League of Nations and the Versailles-Washington system . An important turning point for the globalization of the Axis came in 1937, when uncompromising attitudes grew, and self-centered aggressive rhetoric multiplied. This becomes apparent only if their international relations are analyzed through a comparative approach. The following chapters will review the above-mentioned conventional understanding, whose shortcomings can be understood by paying attention to their multinational context.

Finally, this study seeks to contribute to the current historiography by exploring three specific elements: first, the similarity and dissimilarity of Japanese and Italian political structures based on foreign policy ideology; second, individuals’ attitudes toward the international agreements relating to the League of Nations and Versailles-Washington system as well as their quest for regional hegemony ; third, commonalities with Britain and Germany as well as neighboring countries in Asia, Europe and Africa. These elements will reveal that Japan and Italy shared analogous characteristics, namely imperialism , racism and anti-communism in the late period of international cooperation, which also helps to illustrate why and how they chose the road to the Tripartite Alliance .

1.1 The Foreign Policy Decision-Making Structures of Japan and Italy

For the purpose of describing the similarities and dissimilarities between Japan and Italy, it is necessary to offer a brief analysis of the foreign policy decision-making structures of these two countries through comparison of each other as well as with Britain and Germany during the 1930s. Contrasting Italian and Japanese diplomatic policy making with that of Britain can highlight the differences between the fascist system and the democratic one. However, although the British Foreign Office was considered to be one of the most influential ministries in framing foreign policies, its decision-making mechanism was more consociational than determined. Moreover, through a comparison with Germany’s foreign policies, the peculiarities of Japan’s and Italy’s will come into focus. Even though all three Axis powers were often regarded as totalitarian, the absoluteness of these three “dictatorships ” differed.¹⁰ The basic elements for comparative analysis are shown in the Fig. 1.1.

Fig. 1.1

Foreign policy decision-making structure

In the British foreign policy decision-making process, the cabinet, the Foreign Office, Parliament and public opinion all took part in a tug of war. Particularly in Britain, the Foreign Office played a more independent role in its diplomatic policy-making process and exerted very strong control over the basic direction of policy than in other democratic countries such as the United States and France. However, the individuals who had the ultimate authority to undertake governmental decision making were not the bureaucrats but the cabinet ministers. Every minister was important. Even Neville Chamberlain , who was eager to act on his own initiative, could not ignore political opinions raised by other ministers without risking a breakdown of his cabinet. And since these ministers were elected politicians, they could not remain indifferent to the arguments of the opposition and public opinion, which were expressed through Parliament and the press. Multiple individuals determined the democratic British foreign-policy-making process.

Nazi Führerprinzip (leader principle) drew a sharp contrast with the British policy-making process. The German political structure was more top-down, and Hitler’s influence was very dominant, especially after he ruthlessly purged party members in 1934. He exercised firm control over certain fields of foreign policy in which he was interested, such as the Anschluß (German annexation of Austria) and Drang nach Osten (push eastward). It is true that the Nazi ideology did not totally penetrate the foreign ministry and military, whose institutional positions were preserved, and the German bureaucratic structure was not completely destroyed by Nazi coercion. Several historians also argue against “program theory” from a pluralistic point of view.¹¹ Nevertheless, in comparison with Italy and Japan, there was a clear hierarchical decision-making structure, in which Hitler reigned at the top, and this structure was not shaken wholly until the fall of the regime.

As the National Fascist Party imposed dictatorship in Italy, it is tempting to assume that the Italian political structure under its rule was similar to that of Nazi Germany. Yet Mussolini did not cast an overwhelming influence as Hitler did. Nor could he subject the entire political structure to a reign of terror against his sub-leaders. He was like a coordinator among the military led by the king , the foreign ministry and the National Fascist Party. Fascists were more enthusiastic about presiding over ever...