China's Foreign Policies Today

Who is in Charge of What

Axel Berkofsky, Giulia Sciorati

• Verlag: Ledizioni
• Jahr: 2022
• ISBN:
  9788855267182
• Thema: Politique et relations internationales
• Thema: Géopolitique

Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, China's foreign policy has significantly shifted from a defensive to an assertive approach. For decades, Beijing worked to integrate into the liberal international order, presenting itself as a peacefully rising power. By contrast, however, under Xi's leadership, the country is attempting to create a global system that is more favourable to its own interests.The Report examines China's current foreign policy approach, and the drivers behind the country's shift away from tradition. What are the main features of China's foreign policy today? How are decisions being taken, and to what extent do interest groups continue to have a say in decision-making after the recent power centralisation?

1. The Party-State Dichotomy: Convergence and Divergence in China’s Foreign Policy

Niklas Swanström

Xi Jinping has consolidated much of the power in the Chinese system, and his foreign policy is no different from other areas. On the contrary, President Xi has been very involved in foreign policy issues, and he has made a personal commitment to this sphere. Since he took power in 2013, there have been reforms in most areas of the Chinese State, with the regions, armed forces, and State functions increasingly subordinated to the Party and Xi’s power. With China increasingly assertive, and even aggressive, towards foreign states and their sovereign decisions that China interprets as going against Chinese interests, China’s foreign policy has increased in importance. Foreign affairs have become a more crucial power base, not least since the establishment of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the economic and political gains that could be carved out for individual actors.

In a state such as China, where policy often operates out of a black box and is based on personal connections, it is relevant to understand how decisions are taken, who takes them, and how they are executed. It is essential to understand that organisations and individuals are always driven by their interests and profits, maybe even more so in a totalitarian state such as China. There are different perspectives on who runs the Chinese State and its foreign policy, but generally, it is always a simplified view, much out of the need to make it possible to analyse or single out the most important actors or key aspects. In an article in the Diplomat, Fiddler outlines that the three pillars of Chinese foreign policy are the State, the Party (also referred to as the Communist Party of China - CPC), and the people.1 Fiddler identifies the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Liaison Department, and the United Front Work Department (UFWD) as crucial in assisting the CPC in formulating and executing foreign policy. We also have Franz Schurmann, among many, that has outlined the Party, the State, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as the main structures behind ideology and organisation in China.2 Much has changed since Schurmann’s book came out in 1968. Still, the primary system remains, and he focuses on a critical actor: the People’s Liberation Army. The PLA has often been neglected in more modern texts. Still, with the strengthening of the armed forces, assertive Chinese behaviour in disputed areas such as the South China Sea, threats to Taiwan, construction of maritime bases in foreign states, and so on, the PLA and military security will undoubtedly become more important once again.

I would agree with the general outlines proposed above but would also add a variety of subgroups that all impact decisions in one way or the other. China is not, and has never been, a unitary actor, very much like any other state. Through the modernisation of Chinese society, “new” actors have emerged as significant sources of input in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. What comes to mind immediately are the private entrepreneurs and a population that has been – more than in the past – exposed to foreign countries and public opinion that is much more vocal and knowledgeable than before, but one should also think about expertise in and use of modern technology, such as cyber actors (both private and military), a research community that is at the international forefront, and so on. Each one of these groups is a potential advocate of China’s foreign policy but could also be a hinderance for the Party line if their interests were to be neglected.

I would also put President Xi as an independent force outside of the Party and the State, integrating all the different functions of the Chinese decision-making process and with the power to direct policy formulations in a specific direction. He is the last and most important pillar of foreign policy formulation and a bridge with other actors. The central and unifying controlling force exerted by President Xi has been extensive. Before Xi took power, the situation was more fragmented and arguably moving in a more democratic direction. Now, it has been centralised under a single leader to the extent that has not been seen since Mao. The formal structures have not changed markedly during Xi’s terms of power; much of the changes have been informal and geared towards centralisation. This is not to say that China’s foreign policy formulation is unitary below Xi. On the contrary, there is a myriad of actors that have an impact.3 Still, the consolidation of foreign policy under Xi has been evident, and the power of independent units has decreased significantly. A case in point is Yunnan, and many border provinces, which were allowed to, or at least could, operate more independently before Xi’s reforms. This was true in the grey economy and informal contacts over the border, such as illegal logging and mining in Myanmar. This has significantly changed during the last few years with more control, despite regional attempts to resist the directives from Beijing. Still, the mountains are no longer as high, and the emperor is closer to home under Xi. That is not to say that people follow major decisions blindly. In all states and organisations, organisations and people are motivated by personal greed, political positions, convictions, etc. What will be looked at here is limited to who takes the lead, formulates, and executes foreign policy outside these special interests. I will limit myself to the relationship between foreign policy and Party and government institutions; others have looked at alternative structures and organisations within China and their impact on foreign policy.

Decision-Making and Centralisation

This contribution will not be able to flesh out every organisation and informal connection tied to the Party and foreign policy. Still, a rudimentary outline will be given, covering the most critical aspects of Xi Jinping’s attempt to centralise foreign policy and control the agenda. With the increased internationalisation of China’s interest and interference in other states’ internal affairs, politically, economically, and militarily, other institutions have grown in importance significantly, especially in terms of implementation but also considering that the Party does not have the expertise that is needed to handle all aspects effectively. This is not least true considering the impact of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the National Security Commission (NSC), the Central Foreign Affairs Commission (CFAC), State-owned enterprises (SOE) and the People’s Bank of China (PBC), to mention a few. China does not distinguish between government resources, private companies, and Chinese citizens. They are all components that the State uses to its advantage, even if the aim might vary between different interest groups within the State.4 This is not least the case in the indoctrination and influence campaigns that China has been conducting internationally. The UFWD is a crucial component here, but other forms of intelligence work and Chinese companies and students play a critical role in the implementation and, to specific degree, the formulation of Chinese foreign policy.

It is essential to note that the Foreign Ministry is not, by far, the most crucial body for State lead Chinese foreign policy and Foreign Minister Wang Yi does not have the political prestige in the Chinese system, as we will see, that other leaders have. The CPC Central Committee (Central Committee) is the leading Party structure. Still, it is the CPC’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission (CFAC) under the leadership of Yang Jiechi that deals with oversight of foreign policy, along with the State Council, which the Central Committee has granted the power for the the day-to-day administration of the country, pulling a great deal of the foreign policy weight.

Another fundamental organisation is the National Security Commission (NSC), created in 2013. Due to the overlap between foreign policy and security in the Chinese system, this is one of the more influential organisations. It has been given a mandate to examine all foreign policy issues through a security lens. This enables it to exert influence on plenty of topics, such as the cases of the South China Sea, Ukraine, and North Korea, to mention three examples.5 It is not only the organisation’s mandate that makes it crucial for foreign policy decisions, but also the seniority of the participants. Xi Jinping heads it,...