China on Strike

Narratives of Workers' Resistance

Zhongjin Li, Eli Friedman, Hao Ren, Zhongjin Li, Eli Friedman, Hao Ren

• Verlag: Haymarket Books
• Jahr: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781608465804
• Thema: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Thema: Lavoro e relazioni industriali

China has been the fastest growing major economy in the world for three decades. It is also home to some of the largest, most incendiary, and most underreported labor struggles of our time. China on Strike, the first English-language book of its kind, provides an intimate and revealing window into the lives of workers organizing in some of China's most profitable factories, which supply Apple, Nike, Hewlett Packard, and other multinational companies. Drawing on dozens of interviews with Chinese workers, this book documents the processes of migration, changing employment relations, worker culture, and other issues related to China's explosive growth.

Part I: Struggles against

Factory Closures

Under normal circumstances, workers are likely to suffer disproportionately during factory closures. They not only lose their jobs but also frequently are unable to claim back wages. These cases of strikes following closures show how workers resisted, how they got their wages back, and how a few even received additional compensation. Whether companies shut down because of bankruptcy, relocation, or bosses secretly running off, workers are frequently faced with wage arrears and deductions. In most cases, because the boss runs off, the factory is not operating, and workers cannot apply forms of struggle like slowdowns or strikes that they can when the factory is in operation. Therefore, the government becomes the target of their struggle. The authorities use all kinds of measures to pacify, deceive, or break the struggles of workers. Unless workers are prepared to give up their interests, they usually have to “step up” their actions: block roads, act collectively, and amplify their impact through media in order to push the government to act quickly. Even if that happens, usually workers get only as far as making the government pay the wages and wage arrears the boss embezzled before the factory closed. In many places, even that part of the wages is not paid in full.

For example, in the midst of the economic crisis in 2009, one Dongguan factory owner secretly ran off. The local government stepped in to compensate the workers, but they received only 60 percent of the two months’ wages they were owed. With wages so long in arrears, workers who had already left didn’t get a single cent. Whether workers forgo part of their wages and how much they get in compensation depends on the power and determination of their struggles. For instance, when a Hong Kong owner abandoned his factory in Shenzhen, he had failed to pay the wages of seven thousand workers. The government tried its utmost to stay out of the issue, while the workers complained repeatedly and never got a satisfactory answer. They later blocked a road and turned to the media. Only then did the government show up for negotiations and promise to settle the wage arrears, but workers still only received 30 percent of what they were owed. In April 2011, a factory in Huizhou went bankrupt, and all employees—including all levels of management—took part in a struggle demanding economic compensation. Referencing an earlier case in Shenzhen where employees had gotten double compensation, they exerted great pressure on the employer. As a result, they won one and a half times compensation (according to seniority, each employee received one and a half month’s wages for each full year of employment). It is rare for workers to be united in their fight and win compensation. By contrast, workers in small factories that were closed nearby did not get a single cent of compensation.

Compared to strikes during normal factory operation, the struggles of workers during factory closures have some special features. Both cases in part I of this book reflect these features:

1. The workers fight with their backs to the wall. Often they are very active, unified, and show more force than in other labor disputes. The aim of their struggle is clear—for increased wages and it involves a wide range of people—almost all the employees are affected, sometimes including higher management (who are typically more likely to compromise).

2. The factory owner has usually prepared well ahead of time, so workers have limited means to react—even stopping work does not harm the interests of the owner. One shoe factory owner who “did a runner”1 lied, claiming that he was too busy to take any more orders, and gave the workers a few days off to rest. When the workers came back from their break, the owner had disappeared. For wage arrears, the workers could only turn to the government.

3. In general, actions of workers in closed factories have little impact on the workers in nearby factories. This is in contrast to strikes for wage increases, which can provoke workers in factories around them to take action. When a factory closes down and the local government pays compensation rather than the enterprise, the struggle comes to an end. However, when there is a relatively high number of factory closures in times of economic crisis, that kind of strike can have an impact on workers who are in a similar situation, and workers can use each other’s experiences of struggle to gain more power and benefits.

4. Resistance against factory closure can only serve as damage control. Normally, it’s hard for workers to get economic compensation from the government. Even if they fight hard, they only win a small portion of what they are owed.

In sum, during this kind of strike workers are on the defensive. In the eyes of the local authorities, even if it is just a fight against a factory being closed, it could “impact social stability.” To minimize that impact, many local governments intervene to pacify the workers. As early as 1997, the city of Shenzhen introduced “regulations for protection against company wage arrears in the Special Economic Zone of Shenzhen,” which state that companies have to pay regularly into a wage-arrears fund. In case the company goes bankrupt, has to close down, or the owner runs off, the workers’ wages are paid out of the fund.

Some years ago, the Dongguan municipal government crafted a wage-arrears protection law, but because of “bad timing” the law was shelved. To this day, no such law has been implemented. In some areas an unwritten rule exists: after a factory closure, the neighborhood committee or the landlord pays the workers 50 to 60 percent of their back wages, but no economic compensation is paid. For instance, when the owner of a leather factory in Dongguan-Dalang ran off and left about a hundred workers with wage arrears of three to four months, the responsible government department offered to compensate them for 30 percent of the wages. The workers were not satisfied and complained to the (higher-up) town administration. In the end, the government ordered the neighborhood committee to pay the workers 50 percent of their wages.

Guangdong Province also developed wage-arrears protection regulations. However, years after their formulation it is still a “difficult birth.”2 Ultimately, we cannot count on rulers to act benevolently and uphold justice. The best method is to act immediately, at the first signs of factory closure. According to my own limited experience and the conclusions of many colleagues, the following events can be forewarnings of an imminent factory closure:

1. Decreasing number of orders, or outsourcing. Workers won’t have overtime hours; many are dismissed or resign. When the factory is closed down, the owner can save a lot of money in wages and compensation.

2. Lengthy wage arrears. In general, companies hold back around one month’s wage. If they are continuing to hold back wages, then it is likely that the company has financial problems. In 2009, an electronics company went bankrupt and did not pay the wages of workers or upper-level managers for seven or eight months. The managers failed to anticipate the company closure and did everything to help the owner “get through the difficult times.” Eventually, they ended up with their own difficulties.

3. Fixed assets and raw materials are moved out. In 2011, the owner of a model kit factory ran off, while the workers were still turning up for shifts as usual. The owner used trucks to take out the molding equipment and raw materials. When the workers found out that something was wrong, they blocked the gate and took turns guarding it in order to stop the boss from further removing machinery and materials and to prevent even bigger losses.

4. Suppliers turning up frequently to demand payment, or even court officials arriving to confiscate equipment and machinery. Suppliers demand that customers pay within a certain period. If this payment deadline is not met, they might come to the factory or cut off the supply of goods. If the owner declares bankruptcy, the court can confiscate equipment and machinery. In that case, workers have to be alert and get together to fight for their wages and compensation.

5. Sudden declaration of holidays. When, in 2011, workers at a furniture factory turned up for work, they were suddenly asked to take their wages and go on a one-month holiday. In addition, all employees were asked to move out of the dormitories because they were allegedly going to be renovated. Only later did they find out that the owner was preparing to run off.

6. Frequent dismissals of groups of workers. Factory owners often use a decline in orders or the off-season as an excuse to fire groups of workers. That way it is not only difficult for the workers to sense anything abnormal, it also undermines workers’ solidarity and their ability to protect their interests collectively.

In many cases, workers sense early on that the owner wants to run and will then adopt measures like striking, blocking the gates, or complaining at the related government office. If they can put sufficient pressure on the boss, the workers may be able to protect some of their interests. However, there are sly factory owners who leave no traces when preparing for factory closure or who make feints to deceive the workers. In one case, the Taiwanese owners of a shoe factory in Foshan “moved in several tens of thousands of yuan worth of goods before leaving the factory, so nobody could anticipate that they would run off to Taiwan.” In that moment, the workers could only insist that the government “does not shirk its responsibility” and urged the related government departments to compensate the workers for their losses.

Under capitalism, many companies, especially small and medium-
sized ones, can suddenly go bankrupt due to competitive pressure. Many factory owners choose to abandon ship. During an economic crisis or in a recession this happens even more frequently. Workers should be mentally prepared, closely watch business operations, and pay attention to any signs that could indicate their factory’s closure. In reality, most often, workers have been far too weak to prevent the losses brought about by factory closures, yet it is urgent that we gather the related experiences of workers’ struggles and spread them to the best of our ability.

“Closed factory”

---

1. Translator’s note: zou lao, 走佬, originally a Cantonese term for bosses who escape their responsibilities and run away. See: http://baike.baidu.com/view/6137922.htm.

2. “Dispute after the Dongguan Government Offered Payments for the Wage-Arrears of a Toy Factory,” Nanfang Ribao, October 21, 2008, http://city.finance.sina.com.cn/city/2008-10-21/105808.html.

Chapter One

Visit to a Bankrupt Factory

Interview conducted June 27, 2010

Factory Background

M Technologies Limited in Shenzhen was founded in 2005. It is a 100 percent foreign-owned company engaged in the development of modern high-tech goods, including research, production, and sales. The main products are headsets for mobile phones, headphones for MP3 and MP4 players, all kinds of earplugs for headphones, multimedia headsets, harness-style headsets, computer headsets, and many plastic components. This information on the company was available on the Internet. The reality is much more complex.

In order to increase profits, capitalists form various kinds of alliances. As Ah Dong, a worker in this company, explained, there are four brothers from Chaozhou who all opened factories in Shenzhen. They use the same company name: M Metal Company. That is the name of the company the second brother’s brother-in-law registered in Hainan. It reportedly has a thousand employees there. All four brothers started to run factories as part of M Metal Company. They all order goods under this name, and the products they make are more or less the same.

The factory where Ah Dong works now has another alias: F Factory. As it is still not formally registered, it uses M Factory’s name for its production and busine...