1
Singapura
Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal?
Introduction
Singaporeâs ambivalent national and regional identity has been imaginatively depicted in Chua Mia Teeâs iconic painting National Language Class (see book cover). Chuaâs work has drawn considerable attention for its ability to capture on canvas the ideational and identity challenges confronting Singaporean society in the late 1950s. Partially adopting a âback to the futureâ approach, this study purports that many of the challenges confronting Singapore in the 1950s and 1960s remain relevant in the new millennium.
Chuaâs 1959 social realist painting is commonly interpreted as an assertion of an emerging nationalist identity, with Malay language as the social glue uniting the various ethnic communities. The painting depicts Singaporeans of different ethnicities attempting to free themselves from English, the language of their colonial masters, by learning Malay, the national language of Singapore, Malaya and the Malay World. As they sit around a round table, a symbol of equality, the Malay teacher asks his nine students two simple questions: Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal? (What is your name? Where do you live?). Pregnant with political symbolism, these ostensibly simple questions capture the political dynamics of the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the Malay language was a social bridge and major medium of communication for the masses.
Reflecting this nationalist zeal, many left-wing Chinese school students demanded that the study of Malay replace English in their Chinese medium schools. Nationalists such as Lim Chin Siong were in favour of recognising Malay as the national language (Rahim, 2008:97). In preparation for merger with Malaya, the PAP government made strenuous efforts to highlight Singaporeâs Malay identity. Yusof Ishak was installed as the islandâs Yang di-Pertuan Negara (Head of State), and a national anthem Majullah Singapura was composed by Jubir Said in the Malay language. The state flag included the Islamic insignia of the crescent and moon. All students were required to study Malay as a second language while teachers had to pass at least Standard 1 Malay before their confirmation as teachers (Rahim, 2008:102).
Ironically, in contemporary Singapore, the elementary questions Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal? and the words of the national anthem Majullah Singapura are not understood by most Singaporeans owing to their lack of familiarity with the national language. Indeed, many Singaporeans today are not even aware that Malay is the national language, believing that there are only four national languages.1 Lamenting the loss of Singaporeâs Malay heritage, poet and playwright Alfian Saat perceptively highlights the contemporary paradox in Chuaâs work by noting that the âpainting show[s] that we have come so far in our journey as a nation that we have forgotten where we come fromâ.2
In many respects, Singaporeâs Malay past has become almost invisible, swept aside in the official narrative of the âSingapore Storyâ which generally begins with the arrival of the imperialist Stamford Raffles in 1819. Singaporeâs pre-colonial Malay past has become relegated to the realm of myth, and is as remote to most Singaporeans as the pre-colonial history of neighbouring countries. This selective forgetting and remembering of the islandâs Malay heritage goes some way towards explaining its disconnect with the regional Malay World (Nusantara).3 This historical amnesia is in keeping with the PAP governmentâs construction of the larger âSingapore Storyâ which has swept aside many politically sensitive aspects of Singaporeâs history.
Singaporeâs regional disconnect and ambivalence have been reinforced by its economic achievements which sharply contrast with most countries in Southeast Asia. These achievements have encouraged Singaporeâs populace to cast their gaze away from the region and towards the more advanced industrialised economies (Thompson, 2006), with subtle encouragement from the PAP leadership. In differentiating Singapore from the region, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew has referred to the predominantly Chinese city-state as the âVenice in the Middle Agesâ, an âIsrael in a Malay-Muslim seaâ and an âoasis in a desertâ (Wilairat, 1975:45). In an October 2007 interview, Lee noted with some satisfaction that âWe are a standing indictment of all the things that they can be doing differently âŠâ and he reminded Singaporeans of the challenges associated with Singaporeâs geography: âWhere are we? Are we in the Caribbean? ⊠Are we like Hong Kong, next to China? ⊠We are in Southeast Asia, in the midst of a turbulent, volatile, unsettled region.â4 In his characteristic way, Lee periodically stresses the importance for the resource poor city-state of continuing to distinguish itself from its larger and resource rich but less affluent neighbours, indirectly enjoining Singaporeans to take considerable pride in Singaporeâs âregional otherâ status. This is manifested in the PAP governmentâs ongoing Sinification campaign while at the same time downplaying the countryâs Malay historical origins.
Reflective of this celebration of difference, many observers of Singapore politics have described the city-stateâs anomalous standing in the region by using terms such as âsuffers the regionâ, the regional âodd man inâ (Devan, 2007) and appears âlike a good house in a bad neighbourhoodâ (Low, 2001:434). Amidst the celebration of regional difference, perceptive observers have questioned whether this emphasis on Singaporeâs difference is in its long-term national interest. Eminent historian Wang Gungwu reminds us that
As with other politically sensitive issues, the issue of Singaporeâs anomalous regional identity has not been subjected to rigorous public debate and is generally overshadowed by its economic achievements. The city-stateâs rapid ascent from Third World to First World status has been widely applauded and held up as a model for emulation to regional and Third World economies. Enthusiasm for the Singapore model, particularly by authoritarian states such as China and Vietnam, has been sustained by its ongoing economic achievements. The city-state holds the eighth largest foreign exchange reserves and has the highest foreign reserves in per capita terms, manages the worldâs busiest port, is ranked as one of the freest and most globalised economies, and is repeatedly rated by Transparency Internationalâs index on corruption as the least corrupt country in Asia. Changi International Airport and Singapore Airlines have also been classed as amongst the best in the world. In 2007, the World Bank and its private sector arm, International Finance Cooperation, rated Singapore as the best place to do business. Riding on these achievements, the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and other government agencies have energetically promoted the Singapore model of development and governance.
Understanding SingaporeâMalaysia relations
There is only a relatively small body of work that has critically examined the ideological underpinnings of the city-stateâs foreign policy orientation (Singh, 1999; Leifer, 2000; Andrew Tan, 2004; Ganesan, 2005). This is mirrored by the lack of public debate on the foreign and security policies of the authoritarian state governed uninterruptedly by the Peopleâs Action Party (PAP) for 50 years.
There is also a notable dearth of academic publications on the mercurial nature of SingaporeâMalaysia relations from a historical, multi-disciplinary and regional perspective. Academic researchers, particularly from Singapore and Malaysia, tend to focus either on the economic, political or security aspects of bilateral relations without critically analysing these dimensions in an integrated fashion. Publications by Singaporean-based researchers have focused on unresolved bilateral issues related to the water agreements (Kwa, 2002), the tumultuous merger and separation years (Lau, 1998) and bilateral relations at the start of the Abdullah Badawi administration (Swee-Hock and Kesavapany, 2006a). Other than Lee Kuan Yewâs memoirs (1998; 2000), these Singaporean publications tend to gloss over many of the politically sensitive dimensions of bilateral relations. Moreover, they tendentiously adopt perspectives that are sympathetic towards the Singaporean government. Ongoing bilateral tensions have been simplistically attributed to Malaysian âenvyâ or to the idiosyncrasies of Mahathir Mohamad (refer to Swee-Hock and Kesavapany, 2006a), Malaysiaâs long-serving Prime Minister (1981â2003).
Such perspectives complement Leeâs belief that Malaysia has long been envious and somewhat irritated that despite Singaporeâs miniscule size and lack of natural resources it has remained Southeast Asiaâs most dynamic economy (Lee, 2000:269). Negative portrayals of Malaysia are routinely propagated by the government friendly Straits Times (Singapore) newspaper and television stations and other local media outlets. Similarly, the city-state has been commonly projected by Malaysian politicians as arrogant, opportunistic and insensitive to its Malay neighbours despite the reliance on them for labour, water, food and other basic necessities. In Singapore, Malaysiaâs ethnic-based affirmative action policies have been projected by the Singaporean leadership and the mainstream media as being without any merit. The general and specific shortcomings of Malaysiaâs nation-building and governance approaches are regularly highlighted. After years of this counter criticism and finger-pointing it is hardly surprising that there exists a growing social distance between the Singaporean and Malaysian public, with each viewing the other through the prism of state constructed discourses and stereotypes.
Paradigms of authoritarian nation-building
Many publications on SingaporeâMalaysia relations assume that the nation-building paradigms of these states are diametrical opposites â Singaporeâs purportedly based on meritocracy and multiracialism whilst Malaysiaâs is underpinned by bumiputera (indigenous) rights and communal politics. Whilst acknowledging the dissimilarities, this study highlights important similarities in the nation-building approaches of these neighbouring authoritarian states. Instructively, in the 1980s and 1990s, both states were energetic champions of the now discredited Asian Values discourse which strongly critiqued liberal democracy as being culturally unsuitable for Asian societies who supposedly accord priority to economic development above political liberalisation (Rahim, 1998). The authoritarian PAP and BN (Barisan Nasional or National Front) governments have also been relatively effective in disciplining, regulating and coopting dissent. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 examine the contradictions between the PAP governmentâs rhetoric of meritocracy and multiracialism and the reality of ethnic-based social and security policies. This contradiction is arguably driven by the socio-political dynamics of Singaporeâs authoritarian state, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yewâs strongly ethnocentric worldview and the stateâs subtle promotion of the PAP government as the guardian of Chinese interests in Singapore and the region.
In Southeast Asia, Singapore and Malaysia most closely resemble the Northeast Asian developmental states of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Like their Northeast Asian counterparts, Southeast Asiaâs hybrid developmental states possess many characteristics of state-led capitalism. This includes state agencies targeting and facilitating the rise of strategic sectors deemed necessary for industrial and technological mobility. However, unlike the political trajectory of the Northeast Asian developmental states, the Malaysian and Singaporean hybrid developmental states have each retained their authoritarian political structures and continue to be governed by the same political party since independence. This anomaly can be partly explained by the communal political orientation of the authoritarian PAP and BN governments who have preserved the classic âdivide and ruleâ ethnic policies of British colonialism, thereby perpetuating the politics of fear and insecurity.
The PAP governmentâs communal orientation and deep-seated insecurity stems from the bitter merger (1963â1965) experience which culminated in Singaporeâs âexpulsionâ from Malaysia. Leifer (2000:4) attributes the PAP leadershipâs culture of siege to the âtraumatic experience of an unanticipated separation from Malaysia in August 1965 ⊠represented consistently by the ruling PAP as an eviction ⊠an interpretation that has become part of national folkloreâ. The narrative of Singaporeâs unjust expulsion from Malaysia for supposedly championing a non-communal Malaysian Malaysia and its subsequent struggle for survival has lent legitimacy to the PAP as the guardians of Singaporeâs sovereignty. As a politically defining moment, the merger years continue to shape the political outlook of the PAP and, to a lesser extent, the UMNO (United Malay National Organisation) leadership. Integral to the narrative of crisis and vulnerability is the belief that the small and resource poor city-state can ill afford the luxuries associated with political pluralism, thereby justifying the persistence of authoritarian state structures. Alternatives to the PAPâs worldview and authoritarian nation-building paradigm have been projected as enhancing the risk of failure, chaos and anarchy (Barr and Trocki, 2008:7).
Economic competition and complementarity
Notwithstanding the strong economic rivalry between Singapore and Malaysia, their economies remain strongly integrated. Indeed, by the early 1990s, they had become each otherâs largest export market. The significant levels of bilateral trade can be strongly attributed to the high levels of intra-industry and intrafirm trade in industries such as electronics. Malaysia remains Singaporeâs major investment destination with more than 1,000 Singaporean companies located there,5 and the bulk of manufacturing investments based just across the causeway in Johor. Singapore is among the top sources of foreign portfolio investors in Malaysia.
Geographic proximity and the strong Singapore dollar have also encouraged Singaporeans to travel to Johor, as entertainment and other services available there are often over 50 per cent more expensive in the city-state.6 In 2002, Singaporean tourists contributed about 50 per cent of Malaysiaâs total tourism revenue,7 while Malaysians were the fourth biggest group of visitors to Singapore after Indonesia, Japan and China.8 Up t...