Part I
Ecology and Economy
Alienation of Nature as the Emergence of the Modern
After marrying Jenny von Westphalen and moving to Paris in the autumn of 1843, Marx started to intensively study political economy for the first time. During this research process, he made a series of notebooks that contain excerpts and notes, which today are usually referred to as the Paris Notebooks. Marx was at that time not able to read in English and had to use French translations of major works of political economy by Adam Smith and David Ricardo. He was aware that he still had much to study in the discipline of political economy, so he did not publish any part of these notebooks during his lifetime and kept them for personal reference.1 Famously, one part of these notebooks, written between May and August 1844, was published in the twentieth century as The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, a misnomer as they were not manuscripts. This text became controversial after some Marxists became enamored with it. These self-styled Marxist humanists found an entirely different philosophy in the young Marx than that found in his economic analysis in Capital and used it against the party dogma of Soviet dialectical materialism.2 Their attempt to rescue the young Marx from the terror of Stalinism was to some extent successful and humanism became a trend within Marxist discourse, but without doubt the humanist interpretation was closely tied to a particular historical-political situation, and it subordinated Marxâs intention to their own interests. Today after the collapse of âreally existing socialism,â it is necessary to analyze the Paris Notebooks from a more neutral perspective, with recent philological evidence, so that one can contextualize Marxâs notebooks in the development of his theory instead of imposing arbitrary political interests upon them.
Surely it would be futile and a contradiction of Marxâs intention if one were to try to discover a fully developed version of his ecology in his notebooks of 1844. However, these notebooks undeniably contain Marxâs early recognition of the strategic importance of reestablishing a conscious âunityâ between humans and nature as a central task of communist society. If Marx was later able to conceptualize environmental destruction as an immanent contradiction of capitalism, his ecological critique in Capital partially originates from his earlier insight into the modern disunion of the human-nature relationship. This is the case even if his later theorization required many years during which he went through an enormous amount of economic, historical, and natural science books and developed his own system of political economy, one much more sophisticated than that of 1844. The young Marx formulated the unity between humanity and nature in the future society as the idea of fully developed âhumanism = naturalism,â a conception that Marx retained even after various later modifications of his own theory.
Focusing upon the theme âhumanism = naturalismâ in this chapter, I will reconstruct the importance of the Paris Notebooks from the standpoint of Marxâs economic critique, in contrast to the earlier debates between âhumanistâ and âscientificâ Marxists about the philosophical concept of âalienation.â According to Marx, the fundamental cause of alienation under capitalist production lies in the specific modern relation of the producers to their objective conditions of production. After the historical dissolution of the original unity between humans and the earth, the producers can only relate to the conditions of production as an alien property. Marxâs claim that the dissolution of the original unity constitutes the paradigm of modern society marks a decisive difference from the standpoint of most economists, who take the existing social relation for granted, as a given.
However, Marx was then still very much influenced by Ludwig Feuerbachâs philosophy. As a result, he tended to connect his historical analysis with an abstract and ahistorical âhuman essence,â and further, his critical understanding of the capitalist mode of production was not very profound. Nevertheless, Marx soon came to notice the theoretical limitations of Feuerbachâs philosophy of essence and succeeded in fully rejecting its abstract critique of alienation in his Theses on Feuerbach and The German Ideology and thereby establishing in 1845 a theoretical basis for his later research in natural science.
âALIENATIONâ AS PHILOSOPHICAL CATEGORY?
The popular Marxist concept of âalienationâ and âestrangementâ found in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts certainly documents the young Marxâs brilliant insight into the negative characteristics of modern capitalist production. However, this concept was also an object of never-ending heated debates in the twentieth century. On the one hand, Marxist humanists argued that Marx always held on to the theory of alienated labor to criticize the central contradiction of capitalism and to envision human emancipation in post-capitalism.3 On the other hand, Louis Althusser famously pointed to a radical âepistemological breakâ in Marxâs theory, maintaining that Marx after The German Ideology completely abandoned his earlier anthropological and Hegelian scheme of 1844 and moved to a totally different âscientificâ problematic.4 Althusser notably criticized the delusions of humanists who fetishized The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and embraced Marxâs Young Hegelian conception of alienation as an adequate foundation for historical materialism. The âepistemological breakâ was observed in the fact that alienation no longer played any important theoretical role after 1845. The endless debates between two entirely different interpretations served to deepen various dimensions of the concept of alienation, but at the same time a certain theoretical one-sidedness existed due to the heavily philosophic discussions of Marxâs texts.5
A presupposition was taken for granted in this philosophic debate. Whether one advocated the continuity of or a break in Marxâs theory, both interpretations regarded the text as a completed âwork.â However, this position is no longer acceptable after JĂŒrgen Rojahnâs careful philological examination showed in a convincing manner that the bundle of texts called The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts do not constitute an independent work; that is, they are not a coherent and systematic treatise. Instead, they are a part of his study notes, similar to those in the Paris Notebooks. These texts were spontaneously written down as part of a process that included making excerpts (Exzerpte), without any intent of publishing them. As Rojahn argues:
To summarize: Marxâs Manuscripts of 1844 must not be seen as a distinct entity, isolated from his notebooks of that period. Their various parts do not form a properly thought out âwork,â based on preceding studies, but rather, reflect different stages of the development of his ideas, which proceeding at a rapid pace at that time, was fueled by continued reading. Marx made his exzerpte but at the same time, also wrote down his thoughts. He did that alternately in his notebooks and his manuscripts. Only the ensemble of these notes, seen as a sequence of exzerpte, comments, summaries, reflections, and further exzerpte, gives an adequate idea of how his views developed.6
Thus, since the text today known as The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts was written spontaneously in the very process of copying down excerpts from his readings, it does not include any final formulation of Marxâs thought, and Marx would never have imagined that his notes would cause such heated debates after his death because he wrote his notebooks only for private use. In this sense, humanists exaggerate the theoretical significance of these âstudy notes.â Humanists are not able to admit this philological fact, clinging to the idea that these notes are âmanuscriptsâ for an independent work. The priority they give to The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts tends to neglect Marxâs later economic texts, in which the theory of alienation loses its central role. And even if they refer to them, they often do so in a superficial manner, merely looking at terms such as âalienâ and âalienationâ as claims for the continuity of Marxâs thought.7 If the concept of âalienated laborâ is overestimated as a normative theory, such an approach contradicts Marxâs non-philosophic position after The German Ideology, which rejects any opposition of a philosophic idea against the alienated reality.8
In contrast, the âscientificâ interpretation represented by Althusser also neglects the unique critical aspect of Marxâs theory in the notebooks of 1844 by overemphasizing the break without recognizing any value in them. It is true that Marxâs Young Hegelian approach is problematic, and he later abandoned it. Still, it does not automatically follow that there is no continuity at all in Marxâs theory before and after 1845 and that one can simply ignore the Paris Notebooks. Such an interpretation too hastily reduces the richness of Marxâs critique to the Young Hegelian philosophy and cannot trace the formation of Marxâs thought because it misses the true beginning point of his critique of political economy. In his analysis of alienation of 1844, there already exists a central theme of his critique of capitalism, that is, the separation and unity between humanity and nature. This is why, in contrast to the earlier philosophic discussions, it is necessary to conduct a systematic examination of the development of Marxâs concept of nature in relation to his political economy. Instead of treating only The Economic Philosophic Manuscripts, we need to take the Paris Notebooks as a whole into account in order to know what kind of theory emerged in 1844.
First of all, it is helpful to have a general understanding of Marxâs theory of alienation or estrangement in his Paris Notebooks. According to the standard interpretation, there are four types of alienation, starting with Marx pointing out the reality under the system of private property, where âlaborâs realizationâ appears as a âloss of realizationâ and the âobjectificationâ of labor appears as âloss of the object.â9 The product of labor, in which workers objectify their own activity, appears not as their own product. It neither satisfies their needs nor confirms their creative abilities. On the contrary, it appears as an alien object to workers, as a power independent of the producers: âThe more the worker spends himself, the more powerful the alien world of objects which he creates over and against himself, the poorer he himselfâhis inner worldâbecomes, the less belongs to him as his own. It is the same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself. The worker puts his life into the object; but now his life no longer belongs to him but to the object. Hence, the greater this activity, the more the worker lacks objects.â10 Apparently, Marx applies Feuerbachâs critique of alienation in religion to the sphere of political economy to problematize the paradoxical situation in capitalism that an act of appropriation appears as a loss of the object. One cannot appropriate the sensuous world through a teleological act of laboring, but rather the external world of things dominates and impoverishes producers. It gets lost precisely through the act of production.
From this first type of estrangement of the sensuous external world, Marx deduces the second alienation of labor. If the product of laborers appears as alienated, it is, says Marx, because the activities of producers do not belong to themselves, but to someone else, resulting in the loss of self. In other words, the act of production is not a voluntary activity of objectification of oneâs own free subjectivity, but âforced laborâ:
In his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind.⊠His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it.11
As a result of reducing labor to a mere âmeansâ of their own subsistence, there is no room for producers to realize their own free self-affirmation through labor. The content of free human activity is now limited to animal functions such as eating, drinking, and procreating, and therefore the main objective of workers becomes the maintenance of physical subsistence. Yet even the realization of this hope is not guaranteed for them under alienated labor, when they are constantly exposed to poverty and sickness. Marx problematizes the modern inversion of the free and conscious human activity of labor into the act of dehumanization.
From these first two types of alienation Marx then infers the third form of alienation: âIn estranging from man (1) nature, and (2) himself, his own active functions, his life activity, estranged labor estranges the species from man.â12 Here Marx takes Feuerbachâs concept and argues that even if individuals are finite beings, humanity as such is universal and infinite as a âspecies-being.â13 Marx sees the essential manifestation of the universality of human species-being in its unique free and conscious act of production. In laboring, the producers can reflect upon a given situation and actively realize their own subjective ideas in the objective world by freely modifying the latter. In this sense, humans are a âuniversalâ being and differentiate themselves from other animals. According to Marx, while animals remain trapped in a given particular situation and can only work and consume in a certain mannerâthough we know now that this is not quite trueâhumans can teleologically relate to nature as their âinorganicâ body and modify its current forms in accordance with their own needs, inventing new technologies and creating a wholly new environment.14 Furthermore, Marx argues that human labor is also a âfreeâ activity because it is not always directed to the satisfaction of immediate physical needs for the sake of a bare subsistence. Humans can also produce something fully independent from their physical needs. For example, one can produce an artistic object âin accordance with the laws of beautyâ and attain self-confirmation and pleasure in this act.15 Marx bemoans the fact that alienation negates this creative activity, which is nothing but a manifestation of human species-being, since labor is now subordinated to mere individual purposes as a means to sustaining oneâs existence: âEstranged labor reverses this relationship, so that it is just because man is a conscious being that he makes his life activity, his essential being, a mere means to his existence.â16 The universal dimension of human labor gets lost as its functions are instrumentalized to increase the wealth of others.
Finally, Marx adds the fourth form of alienation: âAn immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labor, from his life activity, from his species-being is the estrangement of man from man.â17 If individuals have to strive desperately for their physical existence, their intersubjective social cooperation and communication becomes extremely prob...