Notes
Introduction
1. Nettle, âIntroduction,â ixâxi.
2. For a critique of the subjective well-being view of happiness, see Nussbaum, âWho Is the Happy Warrior?â S86âS88.
3. Daniel Haybron in The Pursuit of Unhappiness distinguishes theories of happiness from theories of well-being. He identifies three approaches to happiness, as factual assessments of an individualâs state of mind, the psychological condition of âbeing happy.â One view is the hedonistic view, in which happiness is identified with pleasure. A second view is the life satisfaction view, in which happiness is being satisfied with oneâs life as a whole. A third view, which Haybron defends, is an emotional state view, in which happiness refers to a global emotional condition, including the propensity for certain emotions and moods. Thus, unlike the hedonistic view of happiness, which identifies happiness with a positive balance of pleasant experiential states, Haybronâs view sees happiness as more like the contrary of depression or anxiety. Therefore happiness is not simply a good mood, but a state of psychic affirmation and psychic flourishing. Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, 182.
Haybron wants to distinguish sharply between happiness as a psychological state and Aristotelian eudaimonia, well-being or flourishing. While he notes that the Stoics and Epicureans promote psychic states such as tranquility and joy, he denies that this is a central feature of Aristotleâs account. However, by defining happiness as psychic flourishing, Haybron himself implicitly acknowledges the intertwined nature of Aristotelian flourishing and the psychological experience of happiness. Haybron emphasizes that the goal of Aristotelian eudaimonia is to promote excellent activity rather than a state of âflow.â However, he also acknowledges that Aristotleâs account of pleasureâso closely tied to engaged activity, done with absorption and interestâclearly resonates with Csikszentmihalyiâs description of flow activities, which we will investigate in Chapters 4 and 11 (ibid., 115). Thus, even on Haybronâs account, Aristotelian eudaimonia would indeed seem to entail psychological dimensions of happiness.
4. For comparable approaches, see, e.g., Ziporyn, âTeaching Philosophy of Religions,â at forty-one minutes and following; Ivanhoe, âHappiness in Early Chinese Thought,â 263â64. Scholars have used the terms thick and thin description to note that although traditions may describe a concept such as âvirtue,â âtruth,â or âhappinessâ in different waysâas delineated in a rich, âthickâ descriptionâthey may nevertheless hold a broad conception that is comparable in a âthinâ description. For example, a thin description of the virtue of humility will give a general outline of the virtueâperhaps as having an appropriate attitude toward oneâs worth as a personâwhile a thick account will offer diverse descriptions of what it is to actually hold this attitude. See Van Norden, âVirtue Ethics and Confucianism,â 100; Virtue Ethics and Confucianism, 16â21. Van Norden also notes what he calls the lexical fallacy, the notion that a thinker cannot hold a concept for which there is no specific word in his or her vocabulary. Van Norden responds that we do not need a one-to-one correspondence of terms to assert that thinkers hold comparable conceptions. For example, he argues that the pre-Socratics clearly had some conception of philosophy even though they lived before the Greek term for philosophy was coined by the Pythagoreans; likewise, classical Chinese thinkers hold some notions of âtruthâ and ârights,â even if they lack specific words or thick descriptions for these concepts. Van Norden, âVirtue Ethics and Confucianism,â 101â2; Virtue Ethics and Confucianism, 21â23. On âthickâ and âthinâ descriptions, see also Nussbaum, âNon-Relative Virtuesâ; Ryle, âThinking and Reflecting,â 474â79; Geertz, âThick Descriptionâ; Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.
5. The aim of the new discipline of positive psychology is not simply to decrease suffering, but to enhance well-being, to realize human beingsâ capacity for creative, enjoyable lives. Martin Seligman, one of the founders of the discipline, has also recently added a third pathway to happiness, the life of achievement or accomplishment. Jayawickreme, Pawelski, and Seligman, âHappiness,â 4â10. Positive psychology acknowledges a debt to humanistic psychology; the two disciplines have also engaged in debates on questions such as whether one should emphasize subjective hedonic well-being or objective self-actualization; whether the therapist should take a value neutral stance or encourage ethical commitment to realization of virtues; and whether the discipline has sufficient empirical verification of claims to improve well-being. See Robbins, âWhat Is the Good Life?â
6. Milner, âAristotle vs. Aristippus.â Nevertheless, we will find that pleasure holds an important place in Aristotleâs conception of the good life. Pleasure is the appreciation of valuable activity; it reinforces or enhances our worthwhile engagement.
7. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.4 1095a 20. The term eudaimonia is comprised of the particles eu, âwell,â and daimon, âdivinityâ or âspirit.â Richard Kraut notes that âto be eudaimon is to therefore be living in a way that is well-favored by a god. But Aristotle never calls attention to this etymology in his ethical writings, and it seems to have little influence on his thinking. He regards eudaimon as a mere substitute for eu zĂȘn (âliving wellâ).â Kraut, âAristotleâs Ethics.â
8. Is human excellence thereby identical with happiness? The term eudaimonism is used to describe a view that links happiness with virtue; ancient ethical theories connected these two concepts in varying ways. Some thinkers argue that virtue and the exercise of vi...