Comparative Democratic Politics

A Guide to Contemporary Theory and Research

Hans Keman

• Verlag: SAGE Publications Ltd
• Jahr: 2002
• ISBN:
  9781446224847
• Auflage: 1
• Thema: Politics & International Relations
• Thema: Politics

Democracy is the most widely used way of organizing politics in the contemporary world. Comparative Democratic Politics brings together a team of renowned international scholars to provide a comprehensive review of theory and research in this essential area of comparative study.

A key aim to the book is to introduce and understand representative democracy as a political process and contemporary system of governance in need of constant attention and scrutiny.

Four important themes include:

· the contribution of comparative politics as a distinct field within political science to our understanding of democracy, democratic politics and democratic theory

· what we can learn from a comparative analysis of the role, functioning and behaviour of the principal actors (electorate, parties and institutions) across nations

· the relationship between politics and public policy formation and processes of democratic decision-making and corresponding policy-making capacity

· how we measure contemporary democracy or democratic performance in both a procedural and material sense.

Comparative Democratic Politics will afford new and important insights to the contemporary study of representative democracy. It will be essential reading for all students and academics of political science and public policy seeking a deeper understanding of both the world?s so called established and emerging democracies.

PART ONE

THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO DEMOCRACY

The three chapters in this first part of the book are meant as a general introduction for what follows later. The main goal is to introduce the reader to the comparative approach in political science. Such an introduction is necessary because to many it is not self-evident that the comparative approach is a distinctive field within political science (Keman, 1993a). Yet, ‘Comparative Politics’ is distinctive and, at the same time, part and parcel of the discipline. In this book we advance the point of view that theory formation on the level of political systems requires a rigorous and systematic empirical foundation. And precisely, democracy, the central object of study throughout this book, arguably must be studied and discussed by means of comparative analysis.

The first chapter introduces the reader to the relationship between field of inquiry, the theoretical domain to which this field belongs, and how it can be systematically researched by means of comparative analysis. In Chapter 2 the origins and development of ‘Comparative Politics’ is elaborated. Daalder shows that the comparative approach was not only developed as an analytical and methodological tool, but that it developed in response to the ‘ups and downs’ of democratic development during the ‘interbellum’. In addition this essay makes clear that there is considerable variation among ‘comparativists’ in doing research. Amongst other things, these differences within the field of comparative political science concern: ‘Few Cases and Many Variables versus Many Cases and Few Variables’ (see also: Landman, 2000). This difference in comparative approach is often also denoted as the difference between quantitative or variable-oriented research and the qualitative or case-oriented approach of comparative politics (Ragin, 1987; Przeworski, 1987).

This debate is the starting point for Chapter 3. Here Keman attempts to demonstrate how far a more quantitative approach can travel in discussing the central topic of this book: representative democracy. In fact, this chapter shows in what way and to what extent it is possible to investigate cross-nationally the concept of ‘Polyarchy’ (cf. Dahl, 1971) worldwide. It is an example of how to relate (existing) theory to fresh empirical evidence. This chapter is then also intended to make the reader familiar with the universe of discourse of this book: the contemporary world of representative democracy.

1	THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO DEMOCRACY
	Hans Keman

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This book aims at empirical and theoretical analyses with respect to the interactions between political and societal actors within the institutional arrangements that characterize representative democracy. In particular, we have set out to investigate the interactions of these actors in parliamentary and presidential democratic polities and their impact on public policy formation and related democratic performance. More specifically, this book aims to explain the format and consequences of democratic politics under socially diverse situations and varying economic circumstances. In fact, one may wonder how it has been possible to construct and consolidate democracy in such a fashion that most democratic countries appear to have developed into relatively stable and effective polities under political and economic circumstances where one would not always have expected it. In other words: how does one account for viable and enduring forms of ‘democraticness’ often in situations where the seeds of conflict are expected to prevail over consensus and may well have led to political dissatisfaction and threats to democracy?

Answering this question is not only of interest to professional political scientists, but is also highly relevant for a wider audience interested in the relation between politics and society in contemporary democracies. Particularly today it appears that turbulence and turmoil characterizes the relation between politics and society in many countries. As a result, party systems and governments appear to be in a situation of flux, both in terms of their partisan composition and in terms of public governance. This, in turn, affects the degree of acquiescence of societal actors and the extent of coalescence among political actors. Many commentators on current political affairs see this situation as conducive to a decrease in co-operative behaviour, affecting in the process of forming governments, and in a reduction in policy concertation affecting eventually policy performances. At the end of the day these developments appear to impair the domestic policy-making capacity of representative democracies.

Yet, this situation is historically not unique. On the contrary, political stability appears rather to be the exception to the rule.¹ Characteristic of democratic politics across the world and in (the ‘new’) Europe has been the swing back and forth between change and continuity (Bingham Powell, 1982; Mair, 1997; Budge et al., 1997). For politics is essentially the manifestation of conflicts arising from social heterogeneity, which sooner or later reach the political arena in terms of salient issues that have to be decided upon (Putnam, 1993; Keman, 1997b). This book is about the study of these developments and, more precisely, the extent to which democratic political systems are indeed capable of coping with societal change in the contemporary world.

The focus of the separate contributions to this volume is on the institutionalization of societal conflict and the extent to which this generates viable consensus formation among political actors that makes the attainment of public welfare by means of public policy formation feasible within representative democracies. Hence, the approach adopted here to account for change and continuity departs from the point of view that political institutions basically frame the process of political decision-making in these societies as well as shape the room to manoeuvre for political and societal actors to influence and direct public policy formation. We focus therefore on the democratic state and its political performance in order to understand the problem-solving capacity in contemporary democracies (Lane and Ersson, 2000).

The point of departure of this book is that institutional arrangements of representative democracies are to be considered as conceptual variables that vary across the various polities as well as over time. In addition, we hold the view that these variations in institutional arrangements influence the behaviour of politically relevant actors – representing societal interests – and thus their room to manoeuvre in reaching viable and feasible modes of policy formation. Democracy, from this point of view, facilitates and constrains conflicting interests that are an inherent feature of political life. This approach to the democratic process as a means of channelling or structuring, not eradicating, conflict runs through this book, recognizing, in the words of Lipset (1959: 1), that ‘stable democracy requires the manifestation of conflict’. Yet, at the same time we think it equally crucial to study the extent to which these mechanisms of containing conflict and preserving the political order are a means of institutionalizing societal conflict and establishing a proper balance between conflict and consensus (Diamond and Marks, 1992: 12).

In the remainder of this introductory chapter the general framework of analysis, which structures the arguments of the separate chapters as well as their sequential logic, will be elaborated. First, in Section 1.2 a crucial dimension to study the relations between political action and related policy outcomes in representative democracies will be discussed, namely the paradox of ‘conflict and consensus’ (Keman, 1997a; Scharpf, 1998). It is argued that political actors can and must be conceived of as behaving rationally in order to understand the feasibility of a more or less stable political order. In Section 1.3 this perspective is elaborated by outlining the political context in which actors and institutions are relevant for the study of democratic politics. In Section 1.4, I shall move on to a short discussion of the ‘new institutionalism’ that will enable us to relate processes of collective decision-making to the process of public policy formation with respect to political performance within democracies (Guy Peters, 1996; Czada et al., 1998). The argument will be that institutions do not only offer crucial insights in these processes, but can also be meaningfully applied to explain the nexus between conflict and consensus in democratic politics. Finally, in Section 1.5 of this introduction, the framework of empirical analysis – the political chain of democratic command and control – which structures this book, will be presented.

1.2 THE PURSUIT OF POLITICAL ORDER: DEMOCRACY AND PERFORMANCE

In comparative politics many explanations have been offered, attempting to account for the paradoxical situation of simultaneous change and stability in representative democracies (see for an overview: Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Daalder and Mair, 1983; Lane and Ersson, 1994). Yet, most of these explanations are flawed by the fact that they neither systematically link institutions to actors, nor relate the type and occurrence of political action systematically to the patterned variation of institutions affecting decision-making and the related democratic performance (Keman, 1997c; Scharpf, 1998; Schmidt, 2000).

It appears a necessary and a rewarding endeavour therefore to analyse these concepts more systematically, in terms of their conceptualization and from a cross-national perspective. In this way it will be possible to assess the strengths and weaknesses of institutional arrangements as theoretical concepts and as empirical concepts that can ‘travel’ cross-nationally without unduly ‘stretching’ them (Sartori, 1970; Collier and Mahon, 1993; Pennings et al., 1999; Landman, 2000). One of the aims is to discover the extent to which the institutional design – or arrangement – of contemporary democracy works under changing circumstances and differing conditions and is capable of furthering political consensus by means of public policy formation where deep-seated conflicts appear inevitable and destabilize society. In other words: to what extent is representative democracy capable of coping with change whilst maintaining an efficient and effective political order?

A crucial and central question in political science thus concerns the way societal conflicts can be handled in a genuinely problem-solving fashion. Conflicts appear to the participants more often than not as a zero-sum game. If and when societal conflicts are indeed ‘solved’ in a unilateral fashion (for instance by ignoring substantial minorities due to simple majority-voting), according to the logic of game theory, in the long run this will more often than not be conducive to a situation of sub-optimal outcomes for all participants, even for the winners (albeit, of course, in a different degree for winners and losers in a society). In formal political theory this situation has been described as a result of the (well-known) Prisoner’s Dilemma, on the one hand, and will often lead to ‘free ridership’ as a consequence of collective action, on the other hand (Olson, 1982; Mueller, 1989; Scharpf, 1998).

Both explanations point to the so-called ‘social choice’ paradox of politics and society: rational actors pursuing their interests by means of societal interaction whilst being dependent on others, must act strategically to achieve their individual utility. However, the eventual outcomes of this process tend to yield optimal results (instead of maximum pay-offs) for all actors involved (Scharpf, 1997: Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997). To some students of politics this paradox must (inevitably) lead to the creation of the state, which enforces solutions to (individual) actors within a society in order to enhance public welfare (which is then a macro-level solution to problems that may, at best, induce optimal results on the micro-level; e.g. Rawls, 1972; Nozick, 1974). To others political authority is not necessarily a consequence of social choice (e.g. Axelrod, 1984; Czada et al., 1998). In this alternative view, rationally behaving actors – in need of collective action to achieve optimal gains – can and will in due time co-operate voluntarily on the basis of ‘tit-for-tat’. Hence, solving the ‘social choice’ paradox is a matter of exchange, either mutually or taking it in turns. If true, there would be a need for a separate authority and hierarchy to solve societal conflict by means of political consensus in order to enhance public welfare (Scharpf, 1998; Keman, 1999). From this it can be argued that the political process, embedded in the state – regulating societal conflict – becomes a separate segment of any society with its own institutions: in our case, the democratic state. It is important to note therefore that in this view the relationship between politics and society emphasizes the role of institutions and the way they work in overcoming societal conflict by means of consensus formation. Democratic institutions, however, may be necessary but in reality may not always be sufficient to produce a political consensus as well as an adequate policy performance at all times and under varying (social and economic) conditions. Vital for understanding these processes is the analysis of the role and functioning of political actors – parties and governments. This role is examined in Part Two of this book.

A good example is the way in which the majority rule in parliament regarding decision-making can create both theoretical and empirical stalemates, i.e. ‘voting cycles’ in democracies (Mueller, 1989: 63–89). In practice, these situations have been avoided in two ways: one, by means of compromises among decision-making actors (hence, exchange in order to co-operate); two, by adapting the formal procedures, introducing additional rules concerning agenda-setting and the rank-ordering of issues to decide on (Shepsle, 1997). It is precisely these practices, which laid the foundation of Lijphart’s model of consensus democracy (as oppose...