1 A NEO-CONFUCIAN REFORMERâS 1702 PURGE
A painting from Illustrated Records of the Tâamna Inspections (Tâamna sullyĆkto) (fig. 1.1) depicts burning buildings with Mount Halla and small volcanic craters (orĆm) in the background. The term âshamanic shrineâ (sindang) is written under each flaming building (see enlarged image in top left of fig. 1.1), leaving no doubt what the scene depicts: the oft-cited torching of 129 island shrines in 1702, for which Governor Yi HyĆngsang (1653â1733) is infamous among the locals to this day.
While like-minded Confucian scholars complimented Yi for his deed,1 simbang themselves manifest quite a different take on his act when reciting Chejuâs history during the performance of large-scale rituals: âThis is an island where five hundred shrines were burned, and five hundred temples destroyed during the time of Governor Yi from YĆngchâĆn [in KyĆngsang Province]â (HyĆn Yongjun 1980a, 44). The exaggerated number of shrines and temples destroyed demonstrates how large the incident looms in the memories of the practitioners. Though it is difficult to know how the populace actually reacted to Yiâs measures at the time, his actions quite likely caused much resentment among them, as mirrored in oral narratives that recount how Yi returned to the mainland only to discover that his sons had died, victims of vengeance exacted by the local deities he had offended (HyĆn Yongjun and Kim YĆngdon 1983, 100â110, 734â42; Pâungsok muĆm 1994, 2:417â29).2
Based on this story and in light of Confucian principles, most studies have interpreted the purge as the manifestation of a confrontation between a centrally appointed magistrate (suryĆng) armed with Neo-Confucian ideology and the subaltern local people on the periphery who were dependent on the âunorthodoxâ beliefs.3 While the confrontational nature of the event is undeniable, such a dichotomous interpretation blinds us to Yiâs extremely pragmatic approach to the management of resources involved in the popular religion and to his critical stance on Confucian officialdomâs double standard toward the vernacular religious practiceâthey condemned shamanic rituals as illegal but benefited from the shamanic tax (muse) purportedly enacted to discourage them.
FIG.1.1. Burning shrines, detail from KĆnpâo paeĆn (Obeisance to the royal court), Illustrated Records of the Tâamna Inspections. Courtesy of the National Museum of Jeju
The dominant interpretations of the incident predicated on an ideological and geopolitical dichotomy are plausible. But Yiâs accounts of the purge demonstrate the way in which state policy on rituals led reformists faithful to Neo-Confucian principles, such as Governor Yi, to appraise ritual consumption. In his disapproving view of the popular religion, sacrificial objects dedicated to rituals were devoid of any symbolic meaning and the laity was being exploited by shamans. He could not conceive of the possibility that people would willingly give up goods in the hope of achieving desired outcomes and that shamans were providing the laity with something valuable in exchange for what they were given. However, unlike other governors appointed to Cheju, he attempted to liberate the laity from the âwasteâ of resources expended on âwrongfulâ practice and practitioners from their profession by abolishing shamanic taxes. Moreover, he criticized officialdom and the government for tacitly supporting the very practice they insisted should be abolished in order to reap the economic benefits it generated.
CHEJU, CHOSĆNâS PERIPHERY
In the minds of the metropolitan elites of the ChosĆn dynasty, Cheju was at both the geographical and the cultural periphery. An island âas small as a bullet,â it was âthe farthest place from the central governmentâ (ChĆngjo sillok, 17 June 1781). According to Confucian cultural discourse that was prevalent during the dynasty, âany land far from the center,â to say nothing of remote areas like the island, âwas deemed to be less civilized than the center itselfâ (Sun Joo Kim 2010, 10). However, the central elitesâ discriminatory view that outlying regions were âculturally defectiveâ (Sun Joo Kim 2008, 161) was particularly pronounced with regard to the island that had once been an independent kingdom. Cheju was at the same time strategically significant for national defense and a valuable source of tax revenue and local tribute (e.g., horses, tangerines, and sea products). The new dynasty made an effort to establish a strong governing presence in the countryside, which the previous KoryĆ dynasty had lacked (Duncan 2000; Pettid 2001, 174; Yi YĆnggwĆn 2005, 164). For administrative purposes, the central government assigned Cheju to ChĆlla Province, located in the southwestern part of the Korean peninsula, and divided it into three parts: one special county (mok) and two lesser counties (hyĆn). As shown in figure 1.2 (note the inverted compass directions), north of Mount Halla was designated Cheju Mok, the seat of the governor (moksa); the southwest sector was named TaejĆng HyĆn; and the southeast sector was ChĆngĆi HyĆn (see the enlarged images in fig. 1.2).
Due to the great distance and the difficulty associated with travel, an appointment to Cheju usually signified a demotion or sinecure for civil servants, regardless of the bureaucratic rank of the position. Reluctant to accept their appointments to Cheju, some officials declined their posts, and others left Cheju without permission before the end of their tenure (Yi YĆnggwĆn 2005, 160).4 In the eyes of metropolitan administrators, Cheju was a hinterland that lacked Confucian civilization and thus a place where the people and mores were âstill in chaosâ (158). On this unfamiliar ground, centrally appointed officials desperately needed help from local elites in order to govern a populace that was culturally quite different from that of the mainland, but they found it difficult to obtain such support especially during the early years of the dynasty.
The islandâs indigenous power holders (tâoho), mostly from the families of Ko, Yang, and Pu, construed magistrates as metropolitan intruders and initially resisted centralization. Well established in the region, few of these hereditary local strongmen with military, economic, and political power would have wanted to leave home and undertake the risk of traveling to Seoul in order to advance their social position with the central government (Cho and Pak 1998, 200). They maintained a symbiotic relationship with the central government after its subjugation to the KoryĆ in the twelfth centuryâthe latter depended on them in practical matters, such as defending the territories and levying taxes and tribute from the populace; in return, the dynasty granted the local leaders a certain amount of autonomy and protection. Despite the change from KoryĆ to ChosĆn, the native officials (tâogwan) still participated, in parallel with centrally appointed officials, in the local administration, each having his own official seal and military power (Sejong sillok, 10 June 1427). Moreover, qualified candidates for hyangni, the hereditary âclerks who ran day-to-day operations in the local administrative districtsâ and whose multifaceted role was indispensable to the ChosĆn governmentâs efforts at centralization (Kyung Moon Hwang, 2004, 2), were not readily available on Cheju due to the lack of formal education (Kim Dong Jeon 1991, 63â64; Tâaejo sillok, 27 March 1394).5
FIG.1.2. Detail from Halla changchâok (A panorama of Cheju Island), Illustrated Records of the Tâamna Inspections. Courtesy of the National Museum of Jeju. Arrows point to enlarged labels: (top left) ChĆngĆi, (top right) TaejĆng, (bottom) Cheju.
However, local authorities eventually had to cooperate with appointed officials in order to maintain and enhance their privileges in the face of the central governmentâs deepening control of the countryside, which systematized and intensified tax collection. For their part, thrown into a strange place,6 magistrates had to negotiate local allegiances for effective governance and for dealing with practical affairs (Palais [1975] 1991, 13), and they often turned a blind eye to corruption and the illegal activities of their local standing staff. The Confucian ideal of administering the state in a way that relieves the suffering of the people (kyĆngse chemin) was much compromised, and many governors were infamous for abusing their power and exploiting the local people.7 By making this practical compromise, the central government finally brought the power of the islandâs hereditary local leaders under control by the beginning of the seventeenth century.
Nevertheless, the mainland elitesâ condescending view of Cheju lasted throughout the dynasty. Augmented Survey of the Geography of Korea (SinjĆng Tongguk yĆji sĆngnam) (hereafter Geography of Korea) characterizes Cheju as a place where âcustoms are peculiar, the military is fierce, and the people are ignorant.â It cites an excerpt from a letter written by KwĆn KĆn (1352â1409), a major figure in Neo-Confucianism, to Yi WĆnhang, who had just been appointed governor of Cheju: âThe foolish islanders are human only when they are happy, but when angry they become beastsâ ([1530] 1969, 5:96â97).8 While exiled in Cheju, Kim ChĆng (1486â1521) observed, âOnly a few are literate,â âtheir minds are vulgar,â and âthey have no sense of honor or justiceâ (Cheju MunhwawĆn 2007, 17). Another exile, Kim ChĆnghĆi (1786â1856), a scholar renowned for his original style in calligraphic art, reveals one more humiliating perception of Cheju residents: âTheir obtuseness and ignorance are like those of the barbarians in Hokkaido of Japan.â9 In a fashion little different from what cultural historian Taylor E. Atkins refers to as âdyads for articulating differenceâ between colonizers and the colonized, such as âliterate/nonliterateâ and âcivilized/barbaric,â the elites depicted the islanders as âprimitives,â thereby asserting their own superiority (2010, 55).
The Dutchman Hendrick Hamel, a bookkeeper on the Sperwer (Sparrow Hawk), which was shipwrecked in 1653 on Cheju, known to him as Quelpaert, also observed the mainland intellectualsâ opinion of the islanders.10 After being held captive with his fellow shipmates for more than nine months before being transferred to the mainland, he wrote in his journal that the inhabitants were âheld in low esteem by people from the mainlandâ (2011, 12). Although he was perhaps unaware of it, the islandersâ devotion to shamanic practices on a greater scale than elsewhere in Korea added to the metropolitan elitesâ perception of Cheju as the least civilized part of ChosĆn Korea.
IMPROPER LOCAL CULT
The volume of the Geography of Korea that deals with Cheju mentions several distinctive local characteristics in the section on customs (pâungsok), among which an entry on shamanic rituals receives the most extended attention. This entry provides the most detailed information available at the time concerning popular beliefs and rituals: kinds of deities worshipped, seasonal communal rituals (dates and participants, as well as musical instruments used in ritual processions), representa...