15
Definite Atonement and the Divine Decree
Donald Macleod
The focus of this chapter is the link between the divine intention of the atonement and its extent. Was it the eternal design of God that the cross should redeem every human being? Or was it his design to redeem the elect, a multitude so vast that no one can count them (Rev. 7:9), but still only a portion of the human race?
Wayne Grudem has expressed some unease over this approach, suggesting that it is a mistake to state the question in a way that focuses on the purpose of the Father and the Son rather than on what actually happened in the atonement: âIf we confine the discussion to the purpose of the atonement, then this is just another form of the larger dispute between Calvinists and Arminians.â He proposes, instead, that we should focus on the atonement itself: âDid Christ pay for the sins of all unbelievers who will be eternally condemned, and did he pay for their sins fully and completely on the cross? It seems that we have to answer no to that question.â
It is difficult to see how âwhat actually happened in the atonementâ can of itself, and irrespective of the divine intention, offer any answer to the question whether it was for the ultimate benefit of all or for the benefit of only some. The crucifixion narrative as such provides no answer, nor does the essential nature of Christâs death as a sacrifice. Was the sacrifice for all or for some? Nor can we find an answer in the effects of Christâs sacrifice. It expiated sin, but for whom? It propitiated God, but for whom? It made peace with God, but for whom?
As a matter of historical theology the question of the extent of the atonement has always been formulated in terms of the divine decree. Grudem himself quotes Berkhof to this effect:
The question does relate to the design of the atonement. Did the Father in sending Christ, and did Christ in coming into the world to make atonement for sin, do this with the design or for the purpose of saving only the elect or all men? That is the question, and that only is the question.
In stating the question in these terms, Berkhof was merely following precedent. Nor was this way of stating the question confined to those advocating definite atonement. The Five Articles of the Remonstrants (1610) similarly anchored the discussion in an âeternal unchangeable purposeâ (Article I), agreeably to which, âJesus Christ, the Saviour of the world, died for all men and for every manâ (Article II). The response of the Synod of Dort was likewise formulated in terms of âthe sovereign counsel and most gracious will and intention of God the Fatherâ (Article II.8).
As understood in Reformed orthodoxy, the divine decree is all-encompassing: God has freely and unchangeably ordained âwhatsoever comes to passâ (WCF, 3.1). This includes the eternal destiny of human beings. Some are predestined to everlasting life and others foreordained to everlasting death (WCF, 3.3). The core idea here is discrimination, a fact accepted in one form or another by all Christian traditions except the Universalist. There are âsomeâ and there are âothers.â The question is, At what point is this discrimination established?
Arminianism
According to Arminianism as represented by the Remonstrant Articles, the eternal counsel of God made no distinction between man and man. The discrimination takes place in time, when some human beings choose to accept the gospel and others choose to reject it. God elects the former and rejects the latter. There is no discrimination between some predestined to faith and others foreordained to be left in unbelief. Nor is there any decreed discrimination with regard to the outcome of the atonement. According to Godâs âeternal, unchangeable purpose,â Christ âdied for all men and for every man, so that he has obtained for them all, by his death on the cross, redemption and the forgiveness of sins.â John Wesley endorsed this position boldly, declaring that âChrist died, not only for those who are saved, but for those who perish.â More recently, Donald Bloesch has reiterated Wesleyâs contention that every human being is âa blood-bought soul.â
But how can blood-bought souls perish? Because, according to the nineteenth-century Scottish Arminian James Morison, while all objective legal obstacles to their salvation have been removed, other internal obstacles remain. These obstacles may be summed up in one word: unbelief, âwhich is now, therefore, the only barrier between human sinners and the enjoyment of pardon, justification, redemption, and reconciliation.â Morison seems to regard these remaining internal obstacles lightly. In reality they are formidable in the extreme, and, according to Arminianism, God has made no commitment to removing them. This goes back to the Remonstrantsâ doctrine of the divine decree: God has determined, by an eternal and unchangeable decree, to save out of the fallen human race those who, by the grace of the Holy Spirit, will believe in Christ. This sets forth clearly a doctrine of conditional election: an election of those who will come to faith, not an election to faith. Morison states it unambiguously: âSinners are elected by God just on the same principle that they are justified by him. Tis as believers that they are justified; and tis as believers that they are elected, and I no more scruple to rejoice in conditional election than I scruple to glory in conditional justification.â
On this construction there is no commitment on Godâs part to overcome human unbelief. The Remonstrants do, indeed, speak of the grace of the Holy Spirit (gratia praeveniens), but this grace is not linked to any determination to renew the individual will; nor is it, as in Augustinianism, invincible. On the contrary (Article IV of the Remonstrant Articles), many have resisted and overcome this grace, which amounts to no more than what the Reformed call âcommonâ or âgeneral grace.â Morison denies that there is âover and above the universal influence, a peculiar kind of influence which God in sovereignty pleases to vouchsafe only to a few.â No such special grace is needed, since God has graciously endowed every man with ample ability to believe his gospel: âNothing can be clearer than that all men are able to avail themselves of the propitiation, when it is presented to them.â
This is pure Pelagianism, though not every Arminian has spoken as unguardedly as Morison. Arminianism has had its own version of the âCalvin versus the Calvinistsâ debate (âArminius against the Arminiansâ) and some, like Philip Limborch and Charles Finney, have been accused of radical departure from the masterâs teaching. It is clear that Arminius himself (followed by Episcopius, Wesley, Watson, and Pope) insisted strenuously on the necessity of grace: âI ascribe to grace,â he wrote, âthe commencement, the continuance and the consummation of all good,âand to such an extent do I carry its influence, that a man, though already regenerate, can neither conceive, will nor do any good at all, nor resist any evil temptation, without this preventing and exciting, this following and cooperating grace.â
This means that wherever there is faith, grace has gone before it (prevenient grace) as its indispensable condition; and this grace is sufficient to enable us to come to faith. But it is not in itself effectual, because every one of us is free to resist it. Arminius himself is plain on this: âI believe, according to the scriptures, that many persons resist the Holy Spirit and reject the grace that is offered.â More recently, Howard Marshall has put it thus: âThe effect of the call of God is to place man in a position where he can say âYesâ or âNoâ (which he could not do before God called him; till then he was in a continuous attitude of âNo.â)â
This highlights once again the difficulties inherent in the Arminian doctrine of the divine decree and its associated rejection of the doctrine of definite atonement. God predestines believers to salvation; he does not predestine individuals to become believers. And Christ secures universal redemption, but he does not secure such a ministry of grace as will ensure that the resistance of the human heart is overcome. Grace must be âimproved uponâ or âcooperated with.â Otherwise it will not overcome our resistance. It is up to us, helped by grace, to say yes.
It is hard to reconcile this with the picture that the NT draws of the spiritual state of humanity. We are dead in sin (Eph. 2:1), utterly hostile to God (Rom. 8:7) and congenitally unable to see the gospel as anything but ridiculous (1 Cor. 2:14). If God does not regenerate us by a monergistic re-creative act in which we ourselves are âaltogether passiveâ (WCF, 10.2), we will remain dead; and if he does not give us the gift of faith, not one single human being will ever be able to free himself from the shackles of unbelief. What advantage is it that a gracious offer is made to us if we cannot but resist and reject the offer? And what advantage is it that the outward legal obstacles have been removed if the internal obstacles still prevent us from taking advantage of the proffered salvation? As B. B. Warfield points out, it is precisely the sort of intimate special influence denied by Morison that lies at the heart of Reformed particularism. It is God who touches us in the innermost core of our being and gives us faith. Every grace that might merit election is itself a result of this divine grace: a grace that we may indeed resist, but which in the case of the elect always proves invincible (the true meaning of the Latin irresistibilis). The love that provided a Savior also ensures that we come to him.
Arminian universalism suggests a complete lack of coordination within the divine decree. God decrees that his Son shall ...