Pilots and Management

Industrial Relations in the U.K. Airlines

A.N.J. Blain

• Éditeur: Routledge
• Année: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351810142
• Édition: 1
• Sujet: Business
• Sous-sujet: Business General

Airline pilots in various countries around the world have made determined use of industrial action. The use of strike action by the pilots challenges the view that militant trade unionism is confined to lower-paid workers and is associated with a left-wing political orientation. This phenomenon provides the author with an opportunity for singling out the basic factors underlying attitudes and behaviour in industrial relations. His starting point is a 'systems model' of industrial relations which is submitted to critical examination and refined, enhancing its usefulness as a research methodology. In particular he stresses the importance of personality elements in the parties to the disputes. The book, first published in 1972, also provides an analysis of the development of the airlines and their institutions.

PART I

Introduction

CHAPTER I

Industrial Relations Problems

The central purpose of this study is to provide an analysis of pilot–management industrial relations in United Kingdom airlines. In particular, it attempts to establish the nature and significance of the various factors determining the relationship of pilots with both publicly and privately owned airlines. Recently the industry has experienced an unprecedented period of strife. Throughout the first thirty years of its existence, BALPA never actually resorted to strike action, but within the short space of eighteen months the pilots suddenly became involved in five strikes. During this period of industrial warfare, retaliation by employers has taken such forms as the threat of lock-out action and the liquidation of an independent airline.

A principal objective of this study is to analyse the upsurge in militancy among the pilots. However, in addition to investigating the recent pattern of pilot and airline behaviour, it examines the factors influencing the longer-term trends. It is probably a widely held view that the resort to strike action by the pilots represents an ‘overnight conversion’ to militancy.¹ Although this use of the strike weapon indicates a radical change in pilot behaviour, it will be argued that the outbreak of militancy is the result of a gradual change in attitudes of pilots and managements over a considerable period of time. Thus, the change in pilot–management relations during the post-war years will be analysed.

Although the volume is primarily concerned with the United Kingdom airline industry, much of the analysis is applicable to pilot–management problems in foreign airlines generally. Civil aviation is probably the most international industry in the world; it is certainly unique in the extent to which prices, operational standards, and safety matters are regulated by international agencies. The experience of the United Kingdom, a leading aviation nation, is therefore relevant to pilot groups and employers within the world aviation community as a whole.

The aim of this chapter is to provide a background description of the industrial relations problems that are to be investigated later in the book. The methodology used in explaining the problems will be discussed in Chapter II.

1 THE BOAC PROBLEMS

Although both the public and private sectors of civil aviation have recently experienced problems of pilot–management relations, the difficulties in BOAC have been the subject of special attention by several official publications. In February 1968 the Pearson Report stated that, apart from the loss of goodwill to passengers and shippers, BOAC had lost an estimated £1·5 million as a result of industrial action by its pilots in 1967. The Court of Inquiry concluded that ‘something’ had gone wrong with pilot–management relations in the two air corporations and recommended that, in respect of the subjects on which they were dissatisfied, the pilots should be given a ‘new deal’ so that good relations between the parties would be restored.² However, fifteen months later a Committee of Inquiry headed by Professor Sir Ronald Edwards felt it necessary to refer to the continuing industrial strife in BOAC. The committee commented as follows:

‘The importance of good industrial relations is perhaps best illustrated not by mentioning the successes achieved by the airlines, but by showing the very high costs of failure. For example, BOAC has estimated that the restriction of pilot cooperation and the eventual strike between 16th June and 3 July 1968, together caused BOAC an estimated net loss of approximately £8 million. But for this, BOAC’S group profit of £8·2 million for the half-year in question would have been about £16 million.’³

The NBPI has also given attention to this problem. In October 1969, the Board concluded that relations between pilots and managements had long been in a bad state. It further commented that BALPA remained unconvinced that the corporation had taken effective steps to implement the ‘new deal’ proposed by the Pearson Inquiry. The Board noted the existence of distrust between the parties, and judged that the situation was still difficult and tense. Indeed, it went so far as to conclude that although both sides had made efforts to improve relations, BOAC and BALPA should seek external help and advice in resolving their difficulties. It took the view that a solution would not be possible without outside assistance and made the following recommendation:

‘… we believe that the task of laying the foundations for more harmonious future relations calls for a whole-time on the spot investigation over a longer term.… The terms of reference of this investigation would be wide ranging. They would cover any matters internal to either the Corporation or to BALPA (including their respective organizations) which are considered germane to the problem of putting future working relations on a permanently better footing. … we recommend that the Government consider urgently with the parties how to implement our suggestions for the provision of authoritative outside advice.’⁴

BOAC itself had acknowledged the significance of its industrial relations problem. In June 1969 its Annual Report made this comment:

‘Although 1968–9 was a good trading year, the pilots’ strike was a profound shock. At the present time the general basis of future terms and conditions have been set out in outline but the details still remain to be settled. When this task is complete it is to be trusted that it will mark the beginning of an improved relationship with the pilots, which regrettably deteriorated during the time leading up to the dispute.’⁵

The corporation expressed its great disappointment that relations with BALPA had proved so unsatisfactory, and indicated that the BOAC Board had given earnest consideration to the circumstances that had given rise to what had been disastrous stoppages.⁶ Although final data are not yet available, BOAC has calculated that, since 1967, industrial action by the pilots has probably caused it to lose at least £17 million in revenue, £12 million in profits, and £11 million in overseas earnings (including £3·5 million from the dollar area).⁷ Thus, several official inquiries and BOAC itself have recognized that the problem of pilot–management relations has had extremely serious consequences.

2 THE ATTITUDINAL CLIMATE

The Survey Findings

This study has endeavoured to look deeper into the nature of the problem of pilot–management relations by investigating the attitudes of the parties to industrial relations. Questionnaire surveys of both pilots and management were conducted during the course of research and these provide the main source of the attitude data (see Appendices A and B for information relating to the questionnaire project). The survey of pilots covered approximately three-quarters of the total number of pilots employed in United Kingdom airlines in 1968, and the total response was 83 per cent. The companies included in the survey were as follows: BEA, BOAC, British Eagle, BUA and other Air Holdings subsidiaries, Caledonian Airways, Cambrian Airways and Laker Airways. The management survey included management pilots in all of these firms except the Air Holdings companies, and the response rate was slightly lower at 74 per cent.

The survey sought to investigate two main aspects of the problem: the extent to which pilots were dissatisfied with relations with management in their company, and whether pilots were especially critical of management’s understanding of industrial relations matters. The objective was to obtain some approximate measure of the strength of pilots’ attitudes to industrial relations subjects. It should be emphasized, however, that the survey of pilots was conducted during the interval between the first and second strikes in BOAC, and immediately following a strike by BUA pilots. Although it provides a unique account of pilots’ attitudes at a crucial stage in the development of the conflict, the attitudinal climate was more extreme than at some occasions in the past few years.

It can be seen from Table 1 that the great majority of pilots in the survey regarded pilot–management relations in their company as being disappointing. As many as 51 per cent of all pilots felt that relations were extremely unsatisfactory, while a further 29 per cent thought them to be fairly unsatisfactory. Very significant variations were found between individual companies. Whereas pilots in BOAC, BEA and BUA were particularly dissatisfied, a very high proportion in Cambrian Airways, British Eagle and Caledonian Airways were satisfied. Indeed, in Laker Airways not a single pilot considered that industrial relations were unsatisfactory. This questionnaire result contrasts sharply with the finding that pilot–management relations were thought to be inadequate by such overwhelming majorities as 93 per cent in BOAC, 89 per cent in BEA and 80 per cent in BUA. It is also highly significant that as many as 70 per cent of BOAC pilots indicated that industrial relations were extremely unsatisfactory.

The following questionnaire comments are typical of those made by senior pilots in the two air corporations:

‘Industrial relations between pilots and management is a disease I and my contemporaries have suffered from for years. It is relative to the bickering the U.S.A. will have with Hanoi or have had with North Korea.’

‘Many pilots, like myself, have watched with dismay the progressive worsening of relations between management and pilots, and would like to see something done to restore an atmosphere of mutual respect … a prerequisite of this is an appreciation by the management that employees of the standard of intelligence they require as pilots cannot be bullied and regimented.’

‘A concise summary of the severe disappointment I feel… is that having given years of loyalty, enthusiasm and competence to my company, its management have not the initiative or gratitude to reward that effort, most especially in recent years when a large profit has resulted from our efforts.’⁸

Table 1. Pilots’ Attitudes to Industrial Relations in their Company

These remarks serve to illustrate the widespread disillusionment with management.

The research findings on attitudes to industrial relations are supported by the questionnaire data on the pilots’ assessment of the general level of pilot morale in their company (see Table 2). As many as 65 pe...