Comparative arts, interarts studies, and intermediality
The theory of intermediality I operate with in this volume is restricted to a research tradition continuing formalist analyses of the arts, which began at the end of the nineteenth â beginning of the twentieth-century mainly in the works of Heinrich Wölfflin1 in the fine arts, and of Eduard Hanslick2 in music. The theoretical apparatus of intermediality I use, shaped in the works of Werner Wolf3 and Irina Rajewsky,4 draws on the interarts theories of a previous generation of scholars active in the musico-literary field (Steven Paul Scher5) or the visual-literary one (Ulrich Weisstein6), whose arguments point back to the formalist theories of Hanslick and Wölfflin.
Currently, the theory of intermediality applied in this book consists of a delimited number of theoretical phenomena derived from concrete analyses of literary works in their relations with other media, mostly musical or visual media. Thus, my understanding of intermediality does not relate to media and film intermediality, as defined by scholars working in film and media studies departments.7
The concept of intermediality that I use and further develop has more in common with aesthetics as a branch of philosophy, and derives from certain aesthetical writings, which observed and discussed the concrete manifestation and behavior of arts/media.
The formalisms of Hanslick and Wölfflin dealt a deadly blow to the content-oriented and expressionist theories of music and the visual arts, respectively, putting an end to a tradition of emotional responses to the arts, at least in the thought tradition that I follow.
Hanslickâs influential and no less controversial On the Musically Beautiful (Vom Musikalisch-Schönen) indicated with clarity that instrumental music does not contain and does not raise emotions, or at least not real cause-related emotions, and that music consists of âtonally moving formsâ [âtönend bewegten Formenâ].8 Hanslick distinguished between emotions, which are rationally caused, and sensations, which are fleeting and pertain to the senses. Music does not trigger emotions, but it is defined by the perception of sound through the senses, argued Hanslick.9 Hanslickâs distinction between feeling and sensations echoes in Nick Zangwillâs formalist approach to the issue, who claimed that music may trigger in the listener moods, which lack âan intentional objectâ and are âcontentless emotions.â10 Hanslickâs insight regarding the a-causal nature of the sensations triggered by music is also confirmed by recent research on music and emotions. The editors of Music and Emotion: Theory, Research, Applications pointed out that âaffectâ would be a more appropriate term to describe the emotional response to music, which does not resemble at all the nature of everyday emotions, as Nico Frijda further emphasized in the âForewordâ to the volume.11 Furthermore, because instrumental music does not operate with concepts, music cannot tell a story, describe feelings, or anything outside itself. Instead, it develops melody and harmony in a rhythmic fashion, claimed Hanslick. The pleasure of the music listener, according to Hanslick, is to follow the rapid changes of the musical tones, which may be slow, strong, weak, rising, falling.12 The idea that music contains or raises emotions in the listener had been the stock interpretation of music aesthetics since the eighteenth century when the discussion on the nature of the arts was kindled by the philosophical developments of the time.
One cannot really think of the eighteenth-century debate regarding musical expression and mimesis in England without John Lockeâs An Essay Concerning Human Understanding of 1690, a first statement of empiricist philosophies, concerned with the way sensations, feelings, and ideas are formed in the human mind and conscience, shaping our knowledge of the external world, of ourselves, and of our senses.13
Almost half a century after the publication of Lockeâs volume, the polemic on the nature of artistic perception has taken the world of the London intelligentsia by storm. Hildebrand Jacobâs hugely influential but small treatise Of the Sister Arts (1734)14 opened up the discussion on modern aesthetic theories in England. The bold ideas expressed in this book kindled the debate on the mimetic theory of the arts, the only theory of the arts available at the time. Not only did Jacob notice that some arts can be forged while others not,15 an insight that lies at the basis of Nelson Goodmanâs distinction between autographic and allographic works of art,16 but Jacob also pointed out that music does not have concepts.17 Ideas such as these raised a conundrum for the thinkers of the time operating with the mimetic ideal of the arts. If all literature and music obviously imitate something that exists in real life, what does music imitate?
In order to accommodate Jacobâs inconvenient thoughts about music within the context of mimetic theory, in his book published ten years later, James Harris reorganized the theory of mimesis as Aristotle proposed it, to prove that music imitates through ânatural media or mere soundsâ (i.e., a-conceptual means), these being the sounds found in nature.18 In the first part of the second treatise of his book, the one dedicated to the mimetic theory of the arts, Harris first compared all the arts from the point of view of their ability to imitate sounds and natural media devoid of concepts, providing hierarchies among the arts from this point of view. In the second part of the same treatise, he dealt with imitations by âword significantâ or conceptual imitations. In addition to imitating sounds of nature, music can imitate sounds that have meaning, or âsounds significantâ as Harris named them, which are sounds expressive of emotions, such as grief, happiness, sorrow. However, these âsounds significantâ cannot express concepts.19
Jacobâs and Harrisâs volumes immediately echoed in the small society of the London thinkers about the arts and volumes supporting the expressive nature of music within the context of mimetic theory continued to gather, almost immediately in the work of Charles Avison, who built on the observations of both Jacob and Harris in his theory regarding the nature of musical expression published in 1752â1753.20 Writings endorsing the idea that music imitates and expresses emotions were published throughout the rest of the eighteenth-century England.21
The eighteenth-century discussion on music, mimesis, and emotion in England comes within the context of a vogue of the writings on emotions, which really peaked in England during the previous century, as Claude V. Palisca pointed out.22 Thus, it was convenient for the writers on mimesis in the arts to frame musical mimesis as expressive of feelings, since the topic of emotions was very popular in the London society at the time, rather than open up new ways of approaching musical meaning outside the Aristotelian model. It took another century and further developments in the sciences, especially physiology of sound perception through the works of Hermann von Helmholtz,23 to pave the way for Hanslickâs bold claims he made at the end of the nineteenth century.
Harrisâs book and the subsequent tradition of writing on the arts reek mimetic theory in an Aristotelian way. Harrisâs understanding of the expressive content of music, as being able to raise emotions in the listener, is not very remote from the current discourse of the Cultural Musicologists or New Musicology. According to the representatives of this recent trend in musicology, instrumental music does not only raise emotions but can tell stories, and provide descriptions. However, eighteenth-century thinkers were working within the strict confines of a rudimentary aesthetic theory, or Aristotelian mimesis, without having access to the subsequent developments of science and philosophy.
Aristotleâs mimetic theory of the arts, also named representational theory,24 which developed from Platoâs previous theorizations,25 has at its core the emotional impact representations have on the spectator. It is the essence of tragedy, the only type of mimesis fully discussed by Aristotle in his Poetics, to cause fear and pity when the actions on stage display recognition [áŒÎœÎ±ÎłÎœáœœÏÎčÏÎčÏ] and reversal of situations [ÏΔÏÎčÏáœłÏΔÎčα]. Aristotleâs text is very precise about the moment when mimesis is achieved: âBut the kind most integral to the plot and action is the one described: such a joint recognition and reversal will yield either pity of fear, just the type of actions of which tragedy is taken to be a mimesis [emphasis mine].â26 The most famous example of such a sudden change of events is the recognition of Oedipus that he killed his father and married his mother, followed by the reversal of status, from being the king of Thebes to the most despised of its citizens in Sophoclesâs play Oedipus King. The strong surprise the audience experienced within these key moments of the representation was for Aristotle the essence of mimesis. Although at the very beginning of his treatise, Aristotle indicated that all arts achieve mimesis by different means, such as color and shapes (painting), rhythm, language, and melody (music and poetry),27 the text of Poetics gave a detailed account only of literary mimesis, as manifest in tragedy.
Aristotle discussed the effects of music in Book Eight and last of his Politics from the point of view of its educational component, leading to amusement and relaxation, and emphasized its strong impact on the soul. He wrote: âSo it is clear from this that music has the power to produce a certain quality in the character of the soulsâ [áŒÎș ÎŒáœČÎœ ÎżáœÎœ ÏÎżÏÏÏÎœ ÏαΜΔÏ᜞Μ áœ
ÏÎč ÎŽÏΜαÏαÎč ÏÎżÎčÏÎœ ÏÎč Ï᜞ ÏáżÏ ÏÏ
ÏáżÏ áŒŠÎžÎżÏ áŒĄ ÎŒÎżÏ
ÏÎčÎșᜎ ÏαÏαÏÎșΔÏ
ΏζΔÎčÎœ].28 âÎŽÏΜαÏαÎč ÏÎżÎčÏÎœ,â translated as âa certain qualityâ is more accurately translated as âcreate a strong impact.â The rest of the passage goes on to emphasize the force of music, called âmotionâ [ÏáżÏ ÎșÎčÎœÎźÏΔÏÏ] in one instance.29 Music is described as having power, motion, strength, while emotions such as religious ecstasy, may appear in people who are more likely to feel the ecstasy, and not in everyone, claimed Aristotle in the same passage.30 Although only just sketched here, my argument is that Aristotle is not writing that music triggers emotions, but on the contrary, he describes the medium of music as having a forceful impact on the senses. This interpretation is also considered in view of the preference of medieval authors for âsensumâ versus âaffectioâ when describing the effects of music.31 However, in the last lines of the book, the word ÏαΞηÏÎčÎșÏÏ (subject to feeling, capable of feeling) is used, to describe two musical modes, the Dorian and the Phrygian, and not music in general: âfor both [modes] have to do with religious ecstasy and emotionsâ [áŒÎŒÏÏ Îłáœ°Ï áœÏÎłÎčαÏÏ...