The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism

Andrew Silke

• Éditeur: Routledge
• Année: 2010
• ISBN:
  9781136890369
• Édition: 1
• Sujet: Histoire
• Sous-sujet: Histoire de l'armée et de la marine

This edited book explores how psychology can be used to improve our understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism.

This work firstly aims to provide balanced and objective insight into the psychology of terrorists; what their motivations are, what keeps them involved in terrorist groups, and what eventually forces most to end their active involvement in terrorism. Secondly, the contributors focus on the challenging issue of how to respond to terrorism. These chapters provide information for those concerned with short-term tactical problems (e.g. interviewing), as well as those looking towards the more long-term strategic questions of bringing an entire terrorist campaign to an end. Ultimately, the individuals involved in terrorism require a more complex response from society than simply a quest for their apprehension. Believing inaccurate and misleading characterizations leads inevitably to damaging policies and deficient outcomes and campaigns of violence are needlessly prolonged. It is from this perspective that the concern arises with how researchers – and the policy makers guided by them – perceive the psychology of terrorists and of terrorism.

This innovative book will be of great interest to students of terrorism and counter-terrorism, security studies, psychology and politics, as well as security professionals and military colleges.

1
The psychology of counter-terrorism

Critical issues and challenges

Andrew Silke

Terrorism wins only if you respond to it in the way the terrorists want you to; which means that its fate is in your hands and not in theirs.

Fromkin (1975)

Wars are won when one side breaks the will of the other to fight on. When they capitulate, the defeated almost always still have armies in the field and still have some resources to draw upon. True, these may be greatly diminished compared to what existed at earlier stages of the conflict but it is extraordinarily rare for every soldier to have been slain or imprisoned and every town and city captured before the white flags of surrender are raised. What the vanquished have lost however is the belief that victory is possible or that the cost of the struggle can be borne any further. Victory or defeat then, ultimately boils down to a question of psychology, and terrorist conflicts are no different from other conflicts in this respect.

Indeed, most people understand – even if only instinctively – that there is a special psychological dimension to terrorism that is not always found in other types of violence. Terrorist violence is not simply about physical suffering, it is about making a psychological impact, partly about the creation of a wider sense of terror and partly about winning a psychological battle for hearts and minds. Inevitably, countering terrorism must also grapple with this psychological dimension if it is to be effective. Ignoring the psychology of counter-terrorism is to miss the crux of the problem.

At its core, there is a general acceptance that an act of terrorism is not aimed just at its direct victims but at wider audiences where the perpetrators are expecting and hoping for a diverse range of impacts. Beyond this, there is often fierce controversy over what is and is not an act of terrorism. The word itself was certainly first used to describe the violent repression carried out by a government against its own citizens: the ‘reign of terror’ waged by the government of revolutionary France saw up to 40,000 French citizens butchered in the space of barely a year. The chief architect of the Terror, Maximilien Robespierre, summed up its purpose succinctly:

We must smother the internal and external enemies of the Republic or perish with it; now in this situation, the first maxim of your policy ought to be to lead the people by reason and the people‘s enemies by terror.

In the decades that followed, however, the term drifted away from the state violence of its origins and was increasingly applied to violence carried out by smaller movements and organisations. As early as 1868, for example, many American newspapers routinely described the violence carried out by the newly emerged Ku Klux Klan as ‘terrorism’ (Hurst, 1993). This shift in seeing terrorism as something non-state groups did gathered pace, and by the end of the twentieth century among the wider public the word was used almost exclusively within the context of non-state groups.

The question as to what constitutes terrorism, and who is a terrorist, however is still deeply problematic. There is no widely agreed definition of terrorism, and some writers have concluded that ‘it is unlikely that any definition will ever be generally agreed upon’ (Shafritz et al., 1991). The failure to find a widely acceptable definition of terrorism is tied to the political use of the word. Fundamentally, ‘terrorism’ is a pejorative term with a range of negative meanings. For this reason, many media organisations such as the BBC and Reuters are extremely reluctant to describe any individual or group in their reports as ‘terrorists’, preferring instead to use terms such as ‘militants’, ‘insurgents’ or ‘guerrillas’. These concerns tie into the long-standing truism that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’. Individuals such as Nelson Mandela, for example, were labelled as terrorists for many years, and yet Mandela went on to become an internationally respected statesman. Indeed, on this point it is worth bearing in mind Audrey Kurth Cronin’s (2009) finding from a review of 450 terrorist groups that the terrorists actually win the conflict against the state in 6 per cent of cases.

Gearty (1991, p. 6) sums up well the major challenge with the definition problem when he notes:

The label itself is inevitably value-laden. Its meaning is moulded by government, the media and in popular usage, not by academic departments. The word resonates with moral opprobrium and as such is, as far as the authorities and others are concerned, far too useful an insult to be pinned down and controlled.

We will not continue further with the definition debate here – though a few of the subsequent chapters will touch on this point again – but in order to give some boundaries to the focus of this volume, we will follow the concise definition provided by Crenshaw (1992) who described terrorism as ‘a particular style of political violence, involving attacks on a small number of victims in order to influence a wider audience’. The claims as to what behaviours fit this definition still vary considerably but the focus here is very much on what could be termed ‘insurgent’ terrorism, which is essentially a strategy of the weak, adopted ‘by groups with little numerical, physical or direct political power in order to effect political or social change’ (Friedland, 1992).

In practical terms, ‘insurgent’ terrorists are members of small covert groups engaged in an organised campaign of violence. This violence that they commit is often extreme and frequently indiscriminate. The terrorists themselves tend to live isolated and stressful lives and enjoy varying levels of wider support. Groups that fit within this framework have included movements such as the IRA, ETA, the Red Army Faction, the Italian Red Brigades and al-Qaeda.

What is counter-terrorism ?

By and large, terrorist conflicts are not won by terrorist groups. Sometimes, however, they are lost by the states opposing them. The policies, strategies and tactics that states use to combat terrorism and deal with its consequences are referred to as counter-terrorism. Counter-terrorism is not specific to any one agency or department. It can be carried out by government departments, the military, law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, emergency responders and many other groups in society.

States can respond to terrorism with a range of approaches. Traditionally, states will initially attempt to deal with the conflict using existing measures to exert order and control. In Western democratic states, for example, such measures will usually be found within the criminal justice system. Frequently these prove adequate to the situation and the problem is dealt with. The threat is eliminated or else reduced to a broadly acceptable level. When the threat is more prolonged or there has been an especially provocative attack, however, the state faces considerable challenges in determining how best to tackle terrorism.

Counter-terrorism can take a variety of forms. Some of the most common approaches are listed below and it is normal for a state to use a combination of different approaches rather than to rely on just one exclusively:

• Introduction of special counter-terrorism legislation.

• Creation of specialist counter-terrorism units in state services (including police and military).

• Use of repression.

• Use of military intervention and reprisals.

• Introduce Special Incarceration and Detention policies.

• Media management.

• Negotiated settlement.

While the above list outlines some broad ways of reacting to terrorism, one common problem is that the specific aims for these different interventions can vary considerably. For example, in reacting to a terrorist group, veteran terrorism analyst Paul Wilkinson (2001) highlights that the state might be trying to:

• Tackle underlying grievances and problems (the root causes of the violence).

• Deter terrorists by introducing severe penalties and punishments.

• Increase powers to the state (e.g. to allow search, seizure, detention, international co-operation, etc).

• Address symbolic needs (e.g. being seen to share public revulsion/outrage to an event).

• Enhance public security.

• Suppress terrorist organisations.

These aims are not always easily compatible with each other, and as a result some counter-terrorism policies which do a very good job with regard to one aim might be deeply counter-productive for another. This can give rise to counter-terrorism policy and practice overall being viewed as disjointed and flawed.

Which counter-terrorism policies are the most effective? This is not a straightforward question to answer. To begin with, as we have already touched upon the different policies do not all have the same aim and they are all trying to tackle different issues. In considering the overall impact, it is useful to start by first considering how terrorism itself is actually intended to work. Successful terrorist campaigns – from the perpetrators’ perspective – can be broken down into four general elements:

• Provocation – The terrorists carry out acts of violence, which are intended to provoke a strong reaction from the state and its forces. Normally one of the first reactions is to suspend or sideline the normal methods and operation of law and order. As the violence continues there is an increasing role for the military and special rules and regulations (often classed as ‘emergency powers’) are brought into the play. The terrorists are still referred to as criminals but they are no longer targeted or treated as criminals normally are.

• Escalation – having already convinced the state to abandon the old (and accepted) rule book, the terrorists attempt to increase the severity of attacks. This results in a demand for even greater security and protection. In response, the state takes increasingly severe and exceptional measures – sometimes including blatantly illegal tactics – in the search for victory.

• Blame – In the face of increased atrocities and rule-breaking on both sides, the conflict enters a blame phase where all parties attempt to place the responsibility for all atrocities at the feet of the other. This is the classic battle for hearts and minds.

• Endurance– The final phase. The terrorists aim to break the will and morale of the state to sustain the conflict. Amid the carnage of the escalation and the battle for hearts, the terrorists seek to convince the state and its supporters that the terrorists’ commitment to the conflict and ability to stay in the fight is greater than the state’s ability to continue to pay the mounting costs for the struggle. As belief in final victory fades, the search for ways out and alternative solutions increases.

In order for counter-terrorism to be effective then it somehow has to prevent the terrorists from realising this chain. As we consider different approaches both in this chapter and throughout the whole book is worth returning to this model and considering how does each counter-terrorism policy, strategy or tactic fit into the terrorist’s strategy. How does it hinder the process? Or is it actually facilitating the terrorists’ needs and requirements?

What works in counter-terrorism?

In confronting terrorism, the first question to ask is ‘what works?’ Because terrorist groups are so often relatively weak, the truth is that many things can work in defeating them, but they do not all work equally well. Indeed, it is crucial to recognise the fundamental weakness and frailty of most terrorist groups. They are vastly outmatched by the states that oppose them especially in the opening phases of any conflict. The Provisional IRA is a good example to use here. Widely regarded as one of the larger, more dangerous and more skilled terrorist groups of the 1980s and 1990s, it was still very weak when compared with the state it was fighting against. The average annual budget of the PIRA in the early 1990s had risen to around £11 million – a large sum compared to what most terrorist groups can raise (Horgan and Taylor, 1999). In contrast, the annual budget of the UK government in 1990 was roughly £200.9 billion. ¹ Thus in crude econo...